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ABSTRACT
Together Without Consensus: Class, Emotions and the Politics of the Rule of Law in the
Lawyers’ Movement (2007-09) in Pakistan
By
Salman Hussain
Advisor: Avram Bornstein
This dissertation is an ethnographic examination of how political emotions, historical memory
and notion(s) of the rule of law are mobilized in postcolonial Pakistan. Specifically, it examines
how liberal legality (the rule of law, judiciary and courts) and discourses of rights have become
popular hegemonic languages for mobilizing political protests and legal claims. In particular, the
dissertation studies a protest movement, the Lawyers’ Movement for the Restoration of
Judiciary and Democracy (2007-09), that was led by the lawyers and their allied educated and
professional middle-classes, and investigates how the lawyers successfully galvanized Pakistanis
against the then prevalent military rule by formulating appeals to the rule of law and
constitutionalism and led their historic bloc to restore the higher judiciary.
Famously defined as the societies in which colonial law exercised only domination and never
hegemony, this dissertation further examines how liberal legality and rights discourses have, in
fact, become hegemonic and while managing populations and emotions, they have also enabled
new sites of popular mobilization, protest and agitation in postcolonial South Asia.
Furthermore, what this dissertation reveals is that beneath the shared language, there are
different ideas. Unlike more common understandings, whereby the hegemony of a historic bloc
emerges from shared beliefs, the Lawyers’ Movement and related cases reflect more of a
convergence than a consensus.
The dissertation is divided into three sections: the first part lays out the events of the Lawyers’
Movement and examines how their images and narratives mobilized emotions and protests; part
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two looks at how various classes both converged and diverged on the notion of the rule of law
within the historic bloc that the lawyers had successfully mobilized; and the last section lays out
the judicial terrain on which the courts became the site of a war of position against the state and
contested claims regarding what the rule of law ought to do about uneven legal development in
postcolonial Pakistan.
All three sections are based on eighteen months of fieldwork and archival research that I
conducted in Pakistan. Collectively, they illustrate the contradictions in the appeal and the
exercise of the rule of law, and the various ways in which the rule of law tends to be
simultaneously imagined as a form of popular empowerment and resistance as well as a mode of
discipline and governance.
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Introduction

On March 9, 2007, Pervaiz Musharraf, the President of Pakistan – a military
general who had seized power in the coup of 1999 – suspended the head of the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Musharraf feared that Chief Justice
Chaudhry would lead the court in opposing his desire to seek another term as president.
Soon after, protests organized by small groups of lawyers, alongside rights and political
activists, cropped up in order to restore the Chief Justice and the integrity of the higher
judiciary. Within months, the protestors had succeeded in galvanizing political emotions
across the country (Blom 2008). Initially, many commentators dismissed the protests as
a political nuisance created by a handful of ‘civil society’ activists and lawyers against a
powerful military ruler. Up till that point, General Musharraf had succeeded in
consolidating his rule by keeping the two majority opposition leaders in exile, and by coopting both the religious and ‘liberal’ political parties, and most of the civil society at
home. The protests were, as many pessimists rightly pointed out, organized and led by
the lawyers, not by the political parties or labor or student unions, who had historically
mobilized against military rule in the country. More curiously, the lawyers were leading
protests for the restoration of the judiciary in a society in which law, as some argue, is an
exercise only of domination and “alien justice” (Siddique 2013), or rule by “coercion”,
“collaboration” and “persuasion”, but never hegemony (Guha 1997, 20-23). The higher
judiciary was infamous for constitutionally legitimizing military takeovers in Pakistan
(Newberg 1995). And yet, within a short period of time, the lawyers and their bar
associations succeeded in mobilizing a “historical bloc” (Gramsci 2000, 192) of the
urban educated, professional and bazaar classes across Pakistan. The constitutional

crisis that unfolded, described in this dissertation, led to the November 2007
declaration of a state of emergency by General Musharraf. Yet Musharraf could not hold
back the tide of opposition against him. In the general elections held a few months later,
opposing parties enjoyed large victories and had by August, begun a process of
impeachment forcing Musharraf to announce his resignation. By November 2008,
Musharraf was in exile and by March 2009, Chief Justice Chaudhry was reinstated to
the Supreme Court. The lawyers, amazingly if only temporarily, had succeeded in
forging alliances across a varied political topography and leading their bloc against
Musharraf.
Based upon twenty-months of fieldwork in Pakistan (2014 – 2016), this
dissertation sets out to explore and understand the success of this seemingly unlikely
movement. It is a multi-sited ethnographic investigation, in which I collected case files
and petitions, and observed, interviewed and interacted with lawyers, (retired) judges,
petitioners, as well as youth and rights activists in order to investigate the emergence
and valence of the Lawyers’ Movement. At the same time, the work attempts to discern
what made the liberal discourses of rights and law socially appealing, and politically
convincing, in a culturally plural ‘non-Western’ society.
Since various interests, identities and emotions converged in the Movement, I
tracked, traced and followed discourses and ideologies, alongside agents, practices and
narratives. Rather than ‘studying up’ or ‘studying down’ (Marcus 1998; Gusterson 1997),
I engaged in “studying through”: tracing how “webs and relations between actors,
institutions and discourses are created” (Wright 1997, 14). Studying through further
entails a multi-sited ethnographic approach, tracing “connections” between different
institutional and ‘ordinary’ settings, as well as “everyday worlds” (1997, 14). Such an
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approach thus (re)conceptualizes the ‘field’ not as a “discrete local community or
bounded geographical area, but [rather] as a social and political space” articulated
through the practices of differentially-located social and legal actors and the
proliferation of discourses across the social, political and legal body (1997, 13).
Eventually, it became evident from this multi-sited approach, that the lawyers’
short-lived leadership had emerged from the deeper contours of postcolonial Pakistani
society. The ‘hegemony’ that the lawyers had exercised upon the site of the civil society,
was indicative of how the idea of the ‘rule of law’ has become a source of legitimacy for
governance, as well as, an inspiration of resistance and protest against bad governance.
The rule of law as an idea has produced forms of popular protest and political
movements, claim-making and resistance against the state in South Asia. The rule of law
and rights discourses have provided “the language of contention”, protest, and claimmaking against the state as well as of governance and rule (Roseberry 1994, 355;
Gilmartin 2017). They have provided the means, sites and language, to use “law against
the state” and mobilize, across classes, in the politics of/against the state (Eckert et al.
2012, 1).
Through this multi-sited approach, however, it became evident that different
groups conferred different meanings upon the concept of ‘rule of law’ (or qanun ki
hukmarani). Nevertheless, the ‘apoliticalness’ of liberal discourse has the potential to
bring opposing political groups and antagonistic social classes together towards for legal
mobilization and protest action.
The extension of liberal governmentality in South Asia can perhaps be cited as
one of the grounds for both this convergence, and the Movement’s successful appeal to
the country’s educated middle-classes, that had remained distant from protest politics
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in Pakistan for decades (Foucault 2004[1978]; Brockling et. al 2011). The lawyers’
liberal slogans, therefore, even appealed to their traditional middle-class allies, the
bazaaris, who had their own grievances against the state. For these middle-classes, the
rule of law, as metonymically represented by neoliberal notions such as accountability,
transparency and anti-corruption, legitimized the populist judicial actions of the
Chaudhry Court set out to discipline the ‘corrupt’ ruling elite of the country (Li 2007;
West and Sanders 2002). The educated middle-class youth, students too, identified with
political actions, based on constitutional and human rights, as outside and critical of the
mainstream electoral politics of patronage (Piliavsky 2014). The spaces of resistance
carved within/by the everyday protests of the movement allowed them to publicly
articulate a strong critique of the security state.
The Lawyers’ Movement became a successful bloc of the various shades of
Pakistan’s intermediate classes, while it continued to carry the tensions between the
aspirations of the educated middle-class aspirations and the ‘irrational emotions’ of the
others: the ‘subordinated’, but also of those, who even from within the middle-class, face
the ‘humiliations of the everyday’ by the state. Their sense of injury did not only
emanate from the violations of procedure or the transgression of law, rather, for them
Chaudhry’s humiliating suspension reflected a historical memory of military rule, its
humiliations and their own humiliations of the everyday. In the military state’s
insulting treatment of Chaudhary, the historical memory and the injuries of the
everyday – how ordinary Pakistanis (aam admi) experience ‘the state’ – all converged
together. Even though the sense of humiliation (or zillat) was articulated differently by
diverse groups of people, the manner of Chaudhry’s disgraceful suspension recalled for
each the memory of humiliations experienced by Pakistanis for decades. The emotional
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sense of humiliation and the historical memory informed protestors’ agency and their
protests.
The dissertation, therefore, suggests that the everyday “quiet encroachments” of
the “ordinary” populations (Bayat 2010; Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 15) should not be
viewed as politically innocuous or even ‘apolitical’. The Movement’s success depended
upon channeling popular emotion and moral outrage (at the ‘event’ of Chaudhry’s
humiliation and accumulated against the military state historically), alongside the
humiliations that Pakistanis had faced under military rule for decades. The Lawyers’
Movement became the site where the tensions between the desires of the educated
middle-classes, ‘the emotions’ of the subordinated and the governance aspirations of the
law and judiciary became apparent.
These tensions and synergies, between popular emotions, political aspirations
and governmental practices and projects, define what I call the politics of ‘convergence
without consensus’. These tensions were led by differing visions, desires and aspirations
surrounding what law and the rule of law ought to do in postcolonial Pakistan. Despite
these different visions and aspirations, the lawyers, the educated and the traditional
Islamist middle-classes mobilized and led a successful historic bloc, which resulted in
the restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry and the gradual departure of General
Musharraf.

Colonial Rule and the Rule of Law
As a discourse, the rule of law has been used to strengthen or undermine the
legitimacy of leaders across many civilizations, at least as far back as Hammurabi. In
South Asia, centuries of Mughal rule were punctuated with stories of just and unjust
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rulers as a call for political support. The colonial claim to rule and sovereignty also
rested upon a similarly assumed benevolence, of the rule of law as a universal tool of
governance to fix political, economic and social issues in South Asia. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the “rule of law had become … a byword for the justification” of
colonialism in India, as “its establishment … was deemed to be the supreme gift
imparted by imperial rule” (Mantena 2014, 91). Law was viewed not only as an
institution for adjudicating conflicts, but rather as a representation of the higher
principles of self-control, civilization, modernity and rationality.
The early colonials considered the princely and tribal local authority holders to be
despotic and ‘corrupt’, since the local legal systems, they assumed, lacked due process,
procedure and, thus, couldn’t impart ‘justice’. They aimed to replace the local rulers’
“arbitrary exercise of authority and justice” with the “rationality and uniformity” of their
own legal rule (Singha 1998, 2). The “de-personaliz[ing], de-privatiz[ing], [and] defeudaliz[ing]” of legal authority played a central role in establishing the modern colonial
state in India (Bourdieu 2014, 292). The “legalization” and “bureaucratization” of the
state took place simultaneously (ibid., 296). The rule of law, constitutional rule and the
higher courts figured centrally in how state authority was de-personalized.
Therefore, liberal legality (the rule of law and the rule of the judiciary and the
courts) served to cement the British claim of exercising sovereignty against what they
alleged was the arbitrary and personalized exercise of power by local rulers. It served to
expand colonial rule across the Indian princely states, and eventually defined the
borders of the Empire through its opposites: the idioms of lawlessness and excess
(Klosky 2010).
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The rule of law, then, does not necessarily possess an emancipatory genealogy,
nor has it historically been regarded as a radical slogan in the Subcontinent. In his
famous work Whigs and Hunters (1975), E. P. Thompson had suggested that the law
and courts, while used to enforce and organize domination, were also a vehicle by which
the ruling classes and the state could be held accountable. On the other hand, Ranajit
Guha argued in Dominance Without Hegemony (1998), that law in the colonies was
only a tool of colonial power and exercised only dominance, and never hegemony.
However, during the colonial rule, the rule of law did indeed offer “real and
rhetorical spaces to make claims upon the state” (Kolsky 2010, 148). Mitra Sharafi, who
has examined Parsi legal culture and professionals in early British India, argues that the
Parsi community and legal professionals employed the rhetoric of the rule of law at
multiple legal sites, so as to negotiate in matters of the personal law with the colonial
state (2014). Even prominent nationalists like Gandhi held a favorable view of the
liberal notions of equity and the rule of law (DiSalvo 2013).
In the context of nationalist politics and self-identification of Indian middleclasses, the impersonal and disinterested notion of justice, and the centrality of
procedure within it, became a critical element of their self-identification and
participation in politics. The educated middle classes played a major role in nationalist
movements against British rule in India and joined the nationalist struggles led by
British-educated barristers, like Jinnah and Gandhi. These classes partook in nationalist
politics and moreover, called upon the colonial state for its violations of the principle of
the rule of law, on which it claimed to exercise its sovereignty (Guha 1997, 57). David
Gilmartin has argued that the middle-class nationalists mobilized Indians by “drawing
fundamentally on British sovereign principles as a foundation for challenging the
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colonial regime’s power … [T]hese movements drew also on a newer concept of
sovereignty … closely linked to the sovereignty of law” (2017, 87-88).
But as postcolonial and Subaltern Studies’ critics argue, the nationalist politics of
parliamentary constitutionalism were exclusively bourgeois, and took place at a cultural
and ideological distance from the subaltern classes, who throughout, had maintained
their own domain of politics (Guha 1997, ix-xii). The “Indian bourgeoisie”, they further
argue, never spoke for the entire nation (1997, xii), and the nationalists were never able
to exercise their hegemony over the subaltern. Under late colonial rule, this aspect of
liberal law, that is, its claim to impartiality and as an arena of claim-making and conflict,
remained limited to professional and educated middle-classes. After independence, even
though the postcolonial state held on to the colonial state’s security apparatus (by
invoking the necessity of maintaining ‘law and order’), liberal legality and governance
eventually took over, while the liberal language of human and constitutional rights
became the language of claim-making and demanding justice from the state.

The Postcolonial State and the Historic Bloc of the Intermediate MiddleClasses
While law and order meant sustaining British control under the colonial state,
after Independence the state and law became terrains of class struggle within Pakistan.
Hamza Alavi famously argued that bestowed by the British, Pakistan’s was an
“overdeveloped” state (1982, 302). Pakistan had inherited the colonial legacy of a strong
centralized state, which tasked the judiciary with maintaining public order and security
(Newberg 1995). Owing to weak democratic popular politics, and ironically in the name
of securing the rule of law, the military-bureaucratic bloc quickly secured political power
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in the early years of Pakistan (Hussain 2000). The higher judiciary defended the
securitization of the state by repeatedly invoking the state of exception, or the necessity
of the state (Kelsen 1945; Schmitt 1922[1985]). The courts failed to constitutionally
define or judicially protect popular sovereignty.
Following Independence, the higher courts became the arena of elite,
constitutional politics, as powerful politicians, generals and state institutions struggled
for power, while the masses watched from the margins. The courts became the arbiters
of political power as they set about to establish constitutional limits amongst different
contenders. A resort to the doctrine of necessity in the Dosso Case (1958), and then later
in the Nusrat Bhutto Case (1977), was made by a judiciary obsessed with not only saving
its own institution and preserving some of its influence under military rule, but which
was equally fearful of the messiness of popular politics. In doing so, the judiciary
legitimized curtailing of democracy and the setup of a framework for the militarybureaucratic bloc by which to negotiate political power. In the movement against
Musharraf’s military rule, the popular politics of protest (Chakrabarty 2007) and the
constitutional politics of ‘the state’ finally converged.
Hamza Alavi was cognizant of how the postcolonial state was “as an arena of class
struggle” and not simply a tool of certain classes (1982, 291). More importantly, he was
mindful of how the state influenced civil society, and the role of professional, educated
middle class in the composition of postcolonial states (1982, 292). According to Alavi,
the “salariat” class played a key political role in the postcolonies, and in Gramscian
terms, their civil society-state relations. For Alavi, the salariat included lawyers, doctors,
teachers and other professionals, as well as low-ranking members of the state military
and bureaucracy, because they all shared the “life experiences and aspirations of the
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salariat” (1989, 1527). Amongst the Indian Muslims, the salariat were the ashraf class of
Northern India (Alavi 2002, 5120). In the postcolony, Alavi argued, “the educated
salaried middle classes” could be distinguished culturally from other classes, including
“indigenous groups”, through their “appropriation of an alien [Anglicized, and not
‘traditional’] language and culture” (1982, 299-300). In short, the salariat were
politically influential, but culturally distinct, from the many local formations of the
traditional middle-class and the dominant class of landowners and industrialists. After
partition, this class would lose its control of the nascent nation-state to the Punjabidominated military-bureaucratic elite. Some of these men and women, and their
offspring, would stand along the educated middle-class and rights’ activists in the
Lawyers’ Movement.
Aasim Sajjad Akhter modified Alavi’s theory of the state, and argued that from
1977 onwards, new intermediate classes emerged to join the historical bloc of the
Pakistani state, and that this change has been produced by (and continues to
perpetuate) the “politics of common sense” (2008, 15). Akhter argued, that “by
instrumentalising the deeply rooted cultural logic of personalized reciprocity, the state
and dominant social classes have created a patronage-based political order in which the
vast majority of working Pakistanis have been coopted” (2008, 6-7). Calling upon
Gramsci, Akhter claimed that a new “hegemonic political order has been crafted in the
period since the Zia military regime” and “consent” is now “generated ‘from below’”
(ibid.) In the post Z.A. Bhutto period, and especially during General Zia-ul-Haq’s
military rule, (1977-1988), “subordinate classes” entered politics via patronage-based
relations with the state and those who dominated its resources and coercive apparatus
(2008, 15-18).
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Akhter rightly emphasizes how the intermediate classes have emerged as the new
political and economic agents, and that through them, “the historical bloc ‘touches’ and
effectively maintains its control over the subordinate classes … [The] intermediate
classes derive their political influence from their access to the state” (2008, 170-71). The
consent of the subordinate classes, therefore, is constantly produced through the politics
of common sense and patronage, and in doing so, the intermediate classes have coopted
the subordinated ones (2008, 6-7). Even though Akhter maintains a clear separation
between the Pakistani subordinated and intermediate classes, the divide between these
classes (and furthermore, the defining of the ‘the middle-class’) cannot be so easily be
made and maintained. As Alavi (1972) and Ahmed (1996) also argue, perhaps their
relationship with the postcolonial state could be identified as one of the ways by which
class positions could be located, and I suggest, imagined, experienced and re-worked
upon, by people themselves.
Akhter fails to notice how deeply the politics of common sense as well as the
politics of resistance are influenced by governmental practices and the language of
rights and claims, as adjudicated by the law and the courts. And it’s not only the
educated middle-classes, but more importantly, the socially and politically
‘marginalized’ subordinate classes, that have increasingly and directly – without the
mediation of the intermediate classes –been able to appeal to the courts to intervene on
their behalf.
Therefore, the historic bloc’s success lies in the hegemony of liberal legality,
because it effectively provides a discursive “common language” for “contestation and
struggle” (Roseberry 1994, 362). The “languages of protest or resistance” often “adopt
the forms and languages of domination in order to be registered or heard” (1994, 364).
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Indeed, forms of protest and procedure that are recognized as “legitimate” are
established by a “dominant order”, however acquiescing to them does not establish the
uncontested hegemony of that order (ibid.) Hegemonic language provides a language of
domination and of resistance. When instituted by the state, “legitimate forms of
procedure” establish not only consent, but also forms of expressing “both acceptance
and discontent” (ibid.). Law, after all, is a contested practice and “judicial process” not
only coerces, but also encourages and enables multiple forms of resistance and shapes
oppositional practices (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994, 16-20). The Lawyers’ Movement
was thus indicative of the broader hegemonic appeal of liberal rights and the rule of law,
as a language of consent and contention in postcolonial Pakistan.
Moreover, rather than being subservient to the interests of the ruling bloc and
situated within clearly defined boundaries, there exists “a broad spectrum of
intermediate classes” each with their own ideologies, interests and identities (Ahmad
1996, 50). Their “war of position”, therefore, is neither based upon, nor necessarily gives
rise to, a single “coherent ideology”; and more significantly, it might even be vulnerable
to cooptation by those whom it is supposed to keep outside of the terrain of liberal
legality and rights (Gramsci 1971, 243; Hall 1986, 20). The courts, as I argue in later
chapters, became a site of challenging the state for not only the lawyers and the
educated rights activists, but also for the politically and culturally marginalized who had
entered judicial terrain on the basis of their own claims and grievances against the
excesses of the state’s bureaucracy and security apparatus. As law and the courts
increasingly became the site of governance and intervention, men and women from the
margins themselves began to appeal to the courts to grant them their rights and
protection from the state. The law and the rule of law became the mode of expansion for
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liberal governmentality across the uneven legal development of the state (Brockling et
al. 2011).1

Uneven Legal Development
The unevenness of the state, and of the reach of its legal apparatus, expressed
itself in the Court’s addressal of the long-term unevenness of law across Pakistan
(Gramsci 1971, 90, 106). The higher courts engaged with this unevenness when they
intervened and/or were appealed to do so by the educated middle-class rights activists,
as in the cases of ‘honor killing’. The unevenness of the state also became apparent in
the Lawyers’ Movement, when class differences were “compounded by the cross-cutting
relations of regional, cultural and national differences” (Hall 1986, 9). The lawyers’ long
marches were intended to overcome this regional and cultural unevenness across the
state, by rallying the fragmented nation-state in the name of the rule of law.
As the higher courts continued to address the legal unevenness of the state, as
mediators and adjudicators, and as ‘impartial’ sites of arbitrating claims, between both
state and non-state contenders, their own power greatly increased. The Lawyers’
Movement added to this transformational role of the higher judiciary in Pakistani
politics and society. The movement, and the judicial activism that ensued, displaced
1

By invoking notion of governance, I refer to Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality,
which he defined as a form of power that manages the “conduct of the conduct” (1998, xx). It
stood for a “range of forms of actions and fields of practice aimed in a complex way at steering
individuals and collectives” [Brockling et al. 2011, 1). Governmentality intended to address “both
processes of subjectification and state formation” (Brockling et al. 2011, 2). For Foucault,
“liberal governmentality” was a “specific art of government oriented toward the population as a
new political figure” (Brockling et. al 2011, 5). Liberalism, for him, had “introduced a rationality
of government … the idea of a nature of society forming both the basis and limits of
governmental action” (ibid.) Most importantly, Foucault saw “the distinctive feature of liberal
forms of government as their replacement of external regulation by inner production” (ibid.)
The subject’s freedom, with subject as the end of government, is then an “effect of governmental
praxis” (ibid.) Freedom and the welfare of populations is the object of governmentality.
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popular politics onto the courts and greatly increased the “judicialization of politics”
(Comaroffs 2006, 26). The Supreme Court, under Iftikhar Chaudhry, firmly extended its
reach within the state as well as to its social and cultural margins, in the name of
enforcing the rule of law and providing access to justice. Suo moto2 notices cemented
the judiciary’s governmental and political power, as the writ of habeas corpus centuries
ago had done for the English judiciary against the Crown (Halliday 2010). Law and the
rule of law became the site of governance and management of the nation-state.
This dissertation, then, suggests that the contradictions in both the appeal and
the exercise of the rule of law, point toward the various ways in which the rule of law
tends to be simultaneously imagined, as a form of popular empowerment, that is, a
structure of authority by which those in power can be called to account by those outside
it, and as a form of discipline and governance (a mode of coercion and consent over the
‘common people’, the aam admi), that is, a structure of legal control and procedures
exercised by the courts, and appealed to by the rights activists and the educated middleclass.

Writing History and the Plan of the Chapters
Contestation over historical narratives, especially of independence in 1947, marks
the historiography of South Asia. Partition, as David Gilmartin argues, remains a highly
contested event in Pakistan and has an “uncertain” place in the country’s history (1998,
1068). The “master narrative” of nationalist history – history from the perspective of the
state – dominates all other marginal, regional and ethnic nationalist narratives (1998,

2

Courts taking notice on their own accord, rather than appealed to do so, mostly, in matters to
do with fundamental constitutional rights.
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1071). However, I argue that the problems in construing “narrative sense” (1998, 1071)
of nationalist politics and the movement for independence in postcolonial Pakistan,
often spill over a collective interpretation of political movements, military take overs
and the movements against them – and the same is the case with the Lawyers’
Movement.
One of the most influential challenges to nationalist historiography, its methods
and its domination of nationalist narratives has come from the Subaltern school of
historians (Guha 1982 and 1998; Pandey 1992; Amin 1995; and Chakrabarty 2000). The
“high politics” of the nationalists, and the domination of their narratives in the
postcolonial period, is questioned by historians that privilege the subaltern voices, often
silenced, in nationalist history (Gilmartin 1998, 1069). The historiography of Indian
nationalism, Subaltern historians argue, is dominated by “colonial” and “bourgeois
nationalist elitism” (Guha 1982, 1). The subaltern contribution, their ideas and
consciousness towards advancing nationalism, is disregarded within nationalist
historiography. Often left out of the nationalist narrative – as an “autonomous domain”
of politics – are the politics of the people (Guha 1982, 4). However, as later Subaltern
critics have argued (Prakash 1994), the fine distinction between the high politics – of
liberal democracy and nationalism – and the low politics of the subaltern, as a form of
their ‘resistance’, is difficult to draw. An understanding of the narratives employed by
the ‘petty’3 as well as the leading lawyers, the ‘non-aligned’ citizens and the political
activists, in order to recall and re-construct the history of the Lawyers’ Movement, thus

3

I designate those young, struggling lawyers as ‘petty’ lawyers, who are often briefless and
socially belong to lower-middle class and lack cultural capital in the form of anglicized education
and networks. (See also Morrison 1969 on stratification amongst Indian lawyers).
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becomes a useful exercise; because the story of the movement that then emerges, carries
its own contradictions and gaps within it as well as reveals the convergences of different
class and political positions.
The Subaltern school had also questioned the traditional historical methods,
particularly the uncritical privileging, of the official archives. But, as Gyan Prakash
points out, the subaltern predicament is that “Indian peasants had left no sources, no
documents from which their own ‘voice’ could be retrieved” (1994, 1480). There was no
such “general subalternity”, and, as Michel Foucault suggests, no “autonomous subject”
(ibid.) “Subaltern Studies”, therefore, “could not just be the Indian version of the
‘history from below’ approach; it had to conceive the subaltern differently and write
different histories” (ibid.) That’s why “subaltern memory” became an important site
from where to examine and engage with, rather than retrieve, a subaltern vision (Pandey
1994, 1488).
The engagement with subaltern memory, I would add, becomes more crucial in
the work of interpretation of history and historical events. An example of such
engagement is Shahid Amin’s seminal work, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri
Chaura, 1922-1992, which, rather than presenting a “more ‘complete’ account or to
recover the subaltern”, treats “gaps, contradictions, and ambivalences as constitutive,
necessary components of the nationalist narrative”; his innovative historical method
“inserts memory as a device that both dislocates and reinscribes the historical record”
(Prakash 1994, 1488). The resort to memory, which often lives in fragmented and
contradictory forms, then, not only helps in countering dominant histories, but can also
be looked upon as a fertile and dynamic site of narrative-making.
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In this regard, oral history has been invoked as a useful device to counter the
“institutionalization of history” (Deshpande 2017, 40). Methodologically, oral history
can indeed be utilized “as a tool of antiestablishment history” (2017, 39-40). Oral
history challenges dominant narratives, and “the narratives of the oppressed survive the
onslaught of hegemony by moving into the oral domain” (2017, 39). These counternarratives must not be assumed to be totally autonomous, but they do serve as sites for
questioning historical narratives of the state or the dominant established histories. 4
This dissertation pursues a postcolonial critique of ‘history’, by privileging the
memory and narratives of political activists and protestors (including the lawyers), and
the terms in which they remember certain events, like the mishandling of Chaudhry by
the policemen, and how these events propelled the movement to the imagination of
common Pakistanis. But as Sidney Mintz reminds us, our interlocutors (as well as we
ourselves) have “perceptual limitations” and “trying to record what really happened, or
happens, is perilous” (1974, 1). However, the question of ‘truth’, of what really
happened, should not be dismissed, because at stake is how people respond to particular
events, how those events moves them, and how they perceive what affectively drives

4

Adding to Pakistan’s recent historiography, Kamran Asdar Ali (2015), builds upon postcolonial
methods of historical retrieval by bridging fragmented histories and memories of communist
and class politics in Pakistan. He attempts to mend the “selective amnesia” in Pakistani political
history (2015, 7); Ali makes use of interviews, archival material and literary works, to introduce
to us the agents, alongside their motivations and ideals, of an early progressive politics in the
country; and facilitates an understanding of the nature of state power in Pakistan’s formative
years. In line with Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s (1997) efforts to reveal how history can be efficiently
silenced, Ali addresses the many deliberate silences in Pakistan’s history, such as the unfaltering
display of reticence that has followed since the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. But, and perhaps
because, he reconstructs his story from fragments of a forgotten history, the voices of the agents
within this history are only feebly heard and, at times, are felt to be lost in the impressive
narrative of the Left in Pakistan. Ali struggles to show us what Communism really meant to the
marginalized laborers and political workers themselves. In Surkh Salam, the agent in/of history
is sacrificed, at the expense of formulating an alternative (to the nationalist, state’s) narrative of
Communist politics.

17

them. My intervention as a ‘chronicler’ of the movement was seen by my interlocutors as
an opportunity to (re)construct and (re)present their narrative by displacing/reflecting
them on me (Crapanzano 1980). My presence was a chance for the lawyers and the
activists to tell the ‘truth’ of the movement. Often, during interviews, the lawyers would
interrupt each other; sometimes they would interject and correct each other’s stories,
which were told for me; while some would even slyly attempt to take control of others’
narratives. These interruptions, corrections and re-framings, rather than filling in the
gaps, created further contradictions in the narrative, yet were constitutive of the story of
the movement (Amin 1995). These ambivalences reaffirmed that the historical narrative
of the Movement, if there ever was one, is still contested, despite the desire of some
powerful voices to close off and cover its cracks.
The eight chapters that follow are divided into three sections: an overview of the
Movement in chapters 1 and 2, a closer focus on separate groups that converged in the
Movement in chapters 3 through 6, and a post-Movement reflection on the hegemony of
the rule of law and courts’ governmental interventions in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 1
outlines the main events of (and leading up to) the Lawyers’ Movement. I closely
examine the terms in which lawyers and activists recall the protests against Chaudhry’s
suspension; how his humiliating treatment by the state’s security apparatus was
witnessed, remembered and experienced by them; and how the image of that encounter
became a symbol of the emotional outrage for not only the lawyers, but for Pakistanis
across classes. The chapter is partly framed by an autobiographical account of the
movement by one of its main lawyers, Munir A. Malik, and his account of how the
lawyers mobilized the political topography through their protest rallies and marches.
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Chapter 2 sets up the discursive landscape of the Movement. It shows how
various intermediate middle-classes joined the protests; what they aspired to achieve
through the rule of law; and, how they differed in these imaginations and aspirations.
The chapter follows young and senior lawyers, and educated middle-class rights
activists. From the site of Lal Masjid, it also examines the ideological cleavages between
the Islamists and the educated middle-class activists in the movement, and how these
cultural and political differences revealed the limits of consensus amongst those who the
movement had brought together.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus exclusively on the lawyers. These chapters examine the
lawyers and the role of their bar associations in the context of colonial and postcolonial
politics; how they mobilized their historic bloc for the movement and how allied
intermediate classes joined in; the kinds of strategies used for assembling various
groups in the lawyers’ bloc; the long marches to galvanize political emotions across the
spatial artery of Pakistani politics: the G.T. Road; the lawyers’ own emotional politics
and memories; their confrontations with the state and their humiliations of the
everyday; and how professional hierarchies and class cleavages came together amongst
them. A reading of the archives of the Rawalpindi Bar Association places the Movement,
the petty lawyers and their emotional outrage together in their historical context.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I continue to traverse the ideological landscape of the
Movement and focus on Islamists and the middle-class students and youth. The
Movement provided, for some of the educated middle-class students, their very first
experience of the ‘politics of/against the state’. Many of them carried a ‘neoliberal’
aversion to politics, and the appeal of the movement built on their desire that the law
and the courts could work as apolitical bodies of the state. Chapter 5 examines their
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experiences of state violence in protests as well as those of the subaltern students’, and
the latter’s recognition of the humiliations of the everyday. Chapter 6 follows an Islamist
lawyer and his litigation career, and places his activism in an Islamist, modernist, theory
of the state. The chapter discusses how the Islamists see the modern state as a tool for
disciplining and governing the ‘wild’ passions of the aam admi (common Pakistanis) by
placing hudood (limits) through Islamic law and the state.
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the litigation and claim-making practices in the courts
by appeals to the rule of law against the state in the courts. They look at two
(contradictory) sites of judicial interventions: enforced disappearances and honor
killings. In these chapters, I examine how those at the state’s cultural and political
margins find themselves subjected to, and how they respond to and resist, governmental
discourses and practices of the rights activists and look to the courts to save them. The
human and women rights activists, the lawyers and even the ‘subaltern’ themselves,
invite the courts to secure their life and welfare. These chapters focus on how the
marginalized themselves experience their encounter with the law; how they use law
against the state; and the subjectivities that are re-fashioned in the process.
The dissertation is based on ethnographic fieldwork and archival research
conducted in Pakistan between January 2014 and June 2015, with shorter field trips
taken in January and August 2016. Two hundred interviews later, and after collecting
debris of archives – petitions, pamphlets, poems and literature, courts cases and
resolutions, newspapers and magazines – I am well aware of the partial and provincial
nature of knowledge assembled and (re)presented here. As I discuss in the next chapter,
“memory work and historical re-visioning” is always an unfinished political project
(Kligman and Verdery 2011, 9) and is deeply influenced by the present. At stake is not
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only the interpretation of the past, and the violence, losses and the triumphs it encloses
(Trouillot 1997), but also who claims the authority, or power, to narrate and establish
their ‘truths’. As my dissertation shows, memory can, or at least has the potential to,
collectively mobilize for political projects and protest actions. During the interviews,
many protestors invoked the historical memory of military coups and violence in
Pakistan, so as to contextualize and legitimize their actions. This was, of course, a
retrospective move and gave the narrative of the Movement a historical continuity and
political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER 1
History, Myth, and Memory: The Chief Justice’s Humiliation, the Long
Marches and the Violence Against the Lawyers’ Movement
Events trigger movements. Aam admi doesn’t create events – he is helpless. We are not able to
analyze and predict social and political change and crisis. And so when we experience
unexpected events, we reduce them to the workings of RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), to all kind of conspiracies … Of course, Chief Justice was part
of the power structure of the Pakistani state, but he challenged it from within. Musa firoan ke
ghar hi peda hota hai [Moses challenged the same King who had raised him]. A contradiction
emerged within that structure, and we exploited it to challenge the whole structure, especially
the Military… Initially, I didn’t join the Movement because, in Pakistan, people usually end up
settling their disputes by muk muka – bargaining and negotiating with the state. But when I saw
that Chaudhry refused to compromise, I came out to support him.
~ Sohail Mahdi (Political Activist, Rawalpindi)
The manner in which the Chief Justice had been treated on 9th March and subsequently
manhandled on 13th March had generated a considerable ire and fire in the bellies of persons
who watched television or read newspapers.
~ Munir A. Malik (Ex-President Supreme
Court Bar Association)
On February 16th, 2007, Pakistani newspapers published an open letter by a prominent Barrister
and a well-known celebrity, Naeem Bokhari. The letter was addressed to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, and was severely critical of his disparaging and
arrogant attitude towards the lawyers that appeared in his court. More significantly, Bokhari’s
letter chastised Chaudhry for using his powerful office to promote his son through the ranks of
Pakistan’s coveted civil service (Bhushan 2007). The letter took the lawyer community by
surprise. Munir A. Malik had been recently elected as the president of SCBA (Supreme Court
Bar Association); he had captured the office in a closely fought election against Malik Abdul
Qayyum, leader of the government-backed group of lawyers. Qayyum’s group was openly
supported by General Musharraf’s government, Malik claimed, because Musharraf hoped for a
compliant leadership of the powerful lawyer community and a non-confrontational Chief Justice
in the Supreme Court. Bokhari’s letter, Malik argued, was devised to disrepute a Chief Justice
who “had become too big for his boots”.

General Musharraf’s presidential election by the Parliament was set to take place a few
months later, and after eight years in power – both as the Chief of Army Staff and as President –
it seemed that this time his candidacy was at risk, as it was about to be challenged in the
Supreme Court.1 On the other hand, Chief Justice Chaudhry had started to slip under
Musharraf’s shadow by challenging the government in cases to do with the privatization of state
assets (especially the Pakistan Steels Mill), police excesses, bureaucratic incompetence, lethargy
and ‘corruption’, and crucially, had taken up the ‘missing persons’ cases against the military and
intelligence apparatus (Chapter 7). Speculations over why Chaudhry turned against – or at least
appeared to undermine – Musharraf’s rule would take many forms in the conspiratorial mills of
journalists and analysts, because Chaudhry had earlier taken oath under General Musharraf’s
PCO (Provisional Constitution Order 2000)2 and was part of the bench which ratified
Musharraf’s takeover against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Bokhari’s letter, Malik
claimed, was cleverly written to conceal the identity of “the establishment lawyers” behind this
intended move to undermine the Chief Justice’s legitimacy, and perhaps to cow him, if he
intended to exceed the limits set for him by the military government.
About three weeks later, the allegations raised against Chaudhry became the grounds for
his suspension and appeared in the judicial reference sent by Musharraf to the Supreme Judicial
Council. With the strong backing of bar associations across Pakistan, Chaudhry challenged the
reference and was restored by fellow judges on July 20th, 2007, only to be sent home again on
November 3rd, when Musharraf imposed the Emergency (or martial law). The movement of the

Musharraf had de-seated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup in December 1999
and had been in power since then. As an Army Chief, Musharraf could not constitutionally hold
both the offices of the President and the Army Chief. However, the Supreme Court had given
Musharraf this leeway in the Zafar Ali Shah Case (SC PLD 2000).
2
Military take-overs in Pakistan are usually followed by a purge in the higher judiciary, and
judges are asked to take a fresh oath under the new military government. PCO constitutionally
legitimizes the Army take-over. Many judges have refused to take an oath under PCO and
chosen to resign in the past.
1
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lawyers, joined by the intellectual, educated urban middle-class, political parties, human rights
activists, youth and university students, would be reborn in the protests against the Emergency.
This chapter follows the narratives of lawyers, political and rights activists and
journalists to recount how the Lawyers’ Movement unfolded, and how years later, these men
and women recall particular events to remember the movement as well as to formulate its
historical narrative. Apart from the lawyers and activists’ narratives, I also draw upon
newspapers, court cases and an (autobiographical) account of the Movement by one of its
leading lawyers, Munir A. Malik, the then leader of the SCBA.
However, my focus on certain events, especially the one of Chaudhry’s humiliation at the
hands of policemen, is not only to illustrate how they were witnessed, remembered and
narrated, but also how ‘the event’, and the emotions it invoked, moved people to protest against
military rule. Anthropology has traditionally approached event as a puzzle to be solved (Geertz’s
famous Balinese cockfight is an example of such an approach [1972]) or “event-as-case”
(Gluckman 1955, quoted in Meinerret and Kapferer 2015, 2) to be unpacked. In both
approaches, events have been assumed to be expressions or reflections of larger relationships
and social structures. However, Bruce Kapferer had recently argued for “the exploration of the
event as a singularity of forces in which critical dimensions of socio-cultural existence reveal
new potentials of the ongoing formation of socio-cultural realities” (2015, 2, emphasis added).
This re-visioning of event not only interprets it as an exception or a singularity to be explored on
its own, but also approaches it as “a continual becoming”, rather than a closed and concluded
occurrence (ibid.). The emphasis, as I understand, is on the event’s potential for making possible
further action as well as launching agentive traces into the future. What follows, then, is a focus
on the event as an “accidental, the fortuitous” phenomenon and how it has the potential to
“unintentionally unchain” political emotions (2015, 11). Chaudhry’s suspension at the Army
House, his disparaging treatment a couple of days after as he was on his way to the Supreme
Court, and the images of those events, unleashed political passions few had anticipated. These
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events gave the movement its mythical character and emotional impulse – at the same time
molding the movement to the larger structures of national memory and political history.

Prior to the Letter: Bar Politics, Judicial Activism and Governmental Interventions
of the Courts
Munir A. Malik has a long history of bar activism, and has served as the President of the
KHCB (Karachi High Court Bar Association) and as a member of the Pakistan Bar Council. He
recalled that even in October 2003, the lawyers had organized against Musharraf’s LFO (Legal
Framework Order) and taken out a Long March from Lahore to Islamabad in protest. But they
had to hold their protest rally at the Rawalpindi District Bar, rather than at the Supreme Court,
as they were refrained from doing so by the then Chief Justice (Malik 2008, 12). That Long
March was a disappointment for Malik as “the ordinary citizen didn’t respond” to the lawyers’
call. He thought that because “we had not been able to effectively translate our message to the
masses about the rule of law and the significance of an independent judiciary”, Pakistanis had
refused to mobilize on the lawyers’ appeal (2008, 13-14). Four years later, hundreds of
thousands would join the long marches, demanding a restoration of the judiciary. After his
(re)election as the President SCBA (Supreme Court Bar Association), the Bar adopted two
resolutions under Munir A. Malik’s leadership: to organize public opinion against General
Musharraf and to support the Supreme Court in its efforts to provide justice (2008, 33).
However, Munir A. Malik was wary of Chief Justice Chaudhry since he was one of the
judges who had agreed to take oath under Musharraf’s PCO (Provisional Constitutional Order)
in 2000, and had refrained from delivering anti-government judgements in the Lawyers Forum
and Qazi H. Ahmed Cases, in both of which Musharraf’s military rule was challenged (2008,
40). The Pakistani higher judiciary rarely challenged military take-overs and had, in fact,
willingly delivered constitutional legitimacy to the martial laws of 1958, 1977 and 1999 (Jalal
1995). The Kelsenian doctrine of “state necessity” (1945) and military coup as a revolutionary
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exercise in “law creating” provided jurisprudential basis to their infamous decisions (Dosso PLD
1958 SC). Chaudhry’s refusal to resign on General Musharraf’s demand, and the subsequent
rebellion of fellow judges against the military government, was a ‘radical’ departure from the
judicial history of the past.
Even though Malik was apprehensive of Chaudhry’s independence vis-à-vis Musharraf’s
government, a quick look at the higher judiciary’s interventions in the month (February 2007)
prior to the suspension reveals increasingly robust judicial activism, partaken by both the High
and Supreme Court judges against state bureaucracy. Senior bureaucrats were publically
admonished in the higher courts and openly humiliated by Chaudhry, and other Supreme Court
judges, in light of their incompetence and indifference. The media widely reported on these
proceedings.
In a number of cases in the SHC (Sindh High Court) and the SC (Supreme Court), the
bureaucrats were either admonished, or fined and charged with contempt of court (Dawn
2007i). The bureaucracy indeed felt the ire of the Supreme Court and was relieved by
Chaudhry’s removal, who had openly displayed his contempt for them.3 The higher judiciary
intervened against state bureaucracy, both civilian and police, took up cases of Baluch and
Sindhi nationalists, real estate and property encroachments, missing persons cases and
fundamental human rights issues (such as of women and juveniles). And it was not only the
Supreme Court, under Chaudhry, but also all four High Courts (Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and
Quetta), that seemed to be proactively paying attention to matters of public interest.4 The higher
courts increasingly intervened to correct and add to governance practices. Through these public
In a recent interview, Pervaiz Musharraf openly admitted that senior bureaucrats had
repeatedly requested him to remove Chief Justice Chaudhry. See https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=v1lhdmrHVcE
4
Pakistani higher courts became more receptive to PIL (public interest litigation) from 1980s
onwards. The Indian Supreme Court’s favorable turn towards PIL is considered to be one of the
main influences in this respect (Menski 2000). Benazir Bhutto vs Federation of Pakistan, PLD
1988 SC 416 and Darshan Masih vs The State, PLD 1990 SC 513 are considered amongst the
pioneering cases of PIL history in Pakistan (Menski et al. 2000:5-11). The latter concerned the
registration of a political party, while the former had to do with bonded labor.
3
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interest cases, the courts established their own interventions. The increasing violations of city
codes and encroachments on public property were noticed by the SHC and by Chief Justice
Chaudhry, as in Lahore, where he ruled on the illegal building of a plaza near the city’s historic
wall (Dawn 2007g and 2007h).
The higher judiciary was often perplexed at the extreme incompetence of senior
bureaucrats. For example, in reference to a case in the SHC involving encroachments, the
headline of the daily Dawn on February 1st, year, read: “SHC finds KCBA deputy chief inefficient
over violations of building codes in the city” (Dawn 2007c). On February 8th, the same court
“admonishes KBCA for misplacing files and being incompetent” (Dawn 2007d). In his reference
against Chaudhry and again in his proclamation of Emergency months later, General Musharraf
would hold the Chief Justice responsible for the Supreme Court’s scorn for bureaucracy, and its
demoralizing effect on senior bureaucrats.
Emboldened by the higher judiciary’s challenge to state bureaucracy, an increasing
number of public employees and their unions approached the courts against the state. On
February 13th, the women’s crew of PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) appealed to the SC and
challenged their forced retirement; the Court issued notices to the PIA administration to
respond (Dawn 2007e). Even milk sellers moved the SHC on February 15th on the issue of price
fixing (Dawn 2007f). As I discuss in detail in later chapters, many elite, senior lawyers, legal
experts and members of the educated middle-class, expressed their displeasure over the
populism that was gradually encroaching upon the higher judiciary. They ridiculed the populist
postures of the Supreme Court under Chaudhry. However, the aam admi took pleasure in the
higher courts’ humbling of the country’s powerful bureaucracy. Many had regularly experienced
the “structural violence” of the state’s “red tape”, tightly held by these powerful men (Gupta
2012, xiii, 19). At the same time, the higher courts were extending their reach into areas and
domains that had, until then, remained hidden from judicial intervention and state regulation.
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The missing persons cases (Chapter 7) proved to be the most irritating for General
Musharraf’s military and intelligence apparatus. These cases concerned the disappearances of
both Baluch and Sindhi nationalists, as well as of Islamists and their sympathizers, by security
agencies in the so-called war against ‘terrorism’ and separatism. I give a detailed genealogy of
these cases in the chapter on enforced disappearances (Chapter 7). Here, it suffices to point out,
that in the month prior to the dismissal, on February 1st and 8th, the SHC (Karachi Branch) took
up the Baluch nationalists’ case, while missing persons’ cases were heard by the Supreme Court
all through February until March 8th – the day before Chaudhry’s suspension. In the SHC
session on February 13th, the AG (Attorney General) disclosed that one of the missing persons,
Majid Khan, was under detention in Guantanamo Bay; the Pakistani government, he claimed,
was not involved in his detention there. The presiding judges directed the state to ensure the
well-being of Khan and to bring him back to Pakistan.
These overtures of the judges were seen as encroachment upon the state’s bureaucratic
authority and as a direct challenge to the powerful military. On March 1st, a bench of the SHC
issued notice to the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) on a habeas corpus plea, filed in a Sindhi
nationalist (Jeay Sindh Theirik) activist missing case. The day after Chaudhry advised the
government to set up a commission in order to investigate missing persons’ cases (in the hearing
in Amina Janjua’s case),5 he was called over to Musharraf’s Presidential Camp (residence of the
Chief of Army Staff), detained and suspended.

Suspension, Affidavits and the General in Uniform
The evening of March 9th, 2007, Munir A. Malik turned on his television; after a long day
of meetings in the capital, Islamabad, he was resting in his hotel room. Malik had flown from
Karachi to attend to the SCBA’s affairs. Malik was shocked at what he saw in the news: the CJ
(Chief Justice) was in a meeting with General Musharraf (in uniform), flanked by another Army
5

See Chapter 7.
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officer (see fig. 1). Musharraf had suspended Chief Justice Chaudhry, made him ‘nonfunctional’, and sent a reference, under Article 209, to the Supreme Judicial Council. Justice
Javed Iqbal, the senior-most judge in the absence of Justice Rana Bhagwan Das, was made
intern Chief Justice. Chaudhry, after his meeting with Musharraf, was detained for almost five
hours, restrained from going to the Supreme Court, and escorted by senior police officers to his
official residence. Malik learned of these details as he eventually succeeded in speaking with
Chaudhry on his son’s cell phone. All communication lines, telephone and internet, had been cut
off at the Chief Justice’s residence. Iftikhar Chaudhry was under a virtual house arrest.
What took place on March 9th would remain a contested, refracted truth – with multiple
versions of the event. For now, I leave aside various conspiracy stories about the meeting, in
which two other Generals reportedly accompanied Musharraf: Chief of the MI (Military
Intelligence) and the ISI’s (Inter-Services Intelligence) Chief. Director General of the IB
(Intelligence Bureau), a civilian spy agency, was also present. Even though these Generals were
absent in the image that Malik saw on the news – of the CJ seated with Musharraf in his full
Army uniform – and millions more Pakistanis witnessed the day after, this uncanny depiction of
military might was to reignite the memory of multiple coups and excesses of military rule in
Pakistan.
In his reference, General Musharraf alleged that Chaudhry had exerted influence to
secure his son’s admission at Bolan Medical College, Quetta and recruitment by the Health
Department, followed by his induction in the FIA (Federal Investigations Agency), and later, a
transfer to the Civil Services of Pakistan (Police Services division). Through these transfers
between public services, Chaudhry was alleged to have established back door access into the
highly competitive civil services for his son. It was also claimed that Chaudhry coveted protocol
and luxury cars; in fact, a “fleet of cars” was alleged to be under his and his family’s use; in
addition, he had apparently asked for, and flown in, a helicopter for personal purposes.
Chaudhry was further charged with inconsistency between the verbal and written judgements
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that were issued in his court. Barrister Bokhari too, had raised most of these claims in his open
letter. The President thus asked the Supreme Judicial Council to conduct an inquiry and “after
such inquiry as it may deem fit, report to the President its opinion whether the learned judge has
committed misconduct and whether he should be removed from the office of a judge of the
Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of Pakistan” (Dawn 2007a, Text of Reference IV).
As the reference against Chaudhry progressed in the Supreme Court and was
subsequently challenged by his legal team, comprising of Atizaz Ahsan, Munir A. Malik, Ali
Ahmad Kurd, Qazi Anwar, and Hamid Khan, affidavits were soon filed by Chaudhry and those
present at the meeting. To establish what had truly transpired on March 9th would prove crucial
in deciding whether or not Chaudhry would return to the highest seat of judicial authority in the
country.
In his affidavit, Chaudhry submitted that he saw the President in his Camp Office at
10.30 a.m. on March 9th. It is important to note that he doesn’t specify if he had asked for this
meeting or had been ‘summoned’, as the Court would later probe this question in its
proceedings. In his affidavit, General Musharraf’s COS (Chief of Staff), also present in the
meeting, claimed that Chaudhry had asked to meet Musharraf and therefore, he had to reshuffle the President’s program for that day. Chaudhry then claimed that after some formal
exchanges with Musharraf, who was in uniform, photographers and cameramen entered and
after they had left, the Prime Minister, DG ISI, DG IB, DG MI, and Musharraf’s COS joined
them. Musharraf then went over the complaint he had received against the Chief Justice and
asked him to resign. Musharraf, Chaudhry stated, was reading from small pieces of paper in his
hand. Chaudhry described what happened next:
The Respondent [Musharraf] insisted that the deponent [Chaudhry] should resign. The
Respondent also said that in case of deponent's resignation, he (the Respondent) would
‘accommodate’ him (the deponent). He also said in case of refusal to resign, the
deponent will have to face the reference which could be a bigger embarrassment for the
deponent. The deponent finally and more resolutely said 'I wouldn't resign and would
face any reference since I am innocent; I have not violated any code of conduct or any
law, rule or regulation; I believe that I am myself the guardian of law. I strongly believe
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in God who will help me'. This ignited the fury of the Respondent; he stood up angrily
and left the room along with his MS, COS and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, saying that
others would show evidence to the deponent …The meeting continued for not more than
30 minutes. (Chaudhry Affidavit 2007)
According to Chaudhry, after Musharraf angrily stormed out of the room, DG ISI, DG IB and DG
MI stayed behind. They continued to sit, but did not show him any evidence to support the
allegations; however they did insist on his resignation. Chaudhry continued to refuse.
“During subsequent hours”, as Chaudhry further alleged in his affidavit, he was kept
there “absolutely against his will”. After 5.00 pm, Chaudhry stated:
DG MI came in again and told the deponent [Chaudhry] that his car was outside to
drive him ‘home’. DG MI came out of the room and once outside told the deponent, ‘this
is a bad day, now you are taking a separate way and you are informed that you have been
restrained to work as a judge of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice of Pakistan’.
When the deponent saw the car of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, he discovered that his
car had been stripped of both the flag of Pakistan and the emblem flag. The staff officer
of the deponent informed him that Mr Justice Javed Iqbal had taken oath as Acting Chief
Justice and it had been shown on TV. The driver also informed the deponent that he had
been instructed not to take the deponent to the Supreme Court while on way to the
residence of the deponent.
While on the way, the deponent directed the driver to go to Supreme Court but an
Army official prevented the deponent's car near the Sports Complex from proceeding
further. In the meanwhile, Mr Tariq Masood Yasin, SP, also appeared; He ordered the
driver to come out of car so that he could drive the deponent and also asked the
deponent's gunman to come out of the car as well. The deponent said 'okay, I will not go
to the Supreme Court but my driver will drive my car and my gunman will escort me
home'. Only then, did Mr Tariq Masood Yasin, SP agree to let the car be driven by
deponent's driver.
The deponent got home at about 5.45 p.m. and was shocked to see police officials and
agencies personnel without uniform all over his residence. The deponent also
discovered that landline phones had already been disconnected; Cell Phones, TV, Cables
and DSL had been jammed or disconnected. The deponent and his family were
completely cut off for several days from the outside world. (ibid.)
While Chaudhry was detained at the Presidential Camp office, the news of his suspension and
Justice Javed Iqbal’s oath-taking ceremony as the acting Chief Justice had already been aired.
Two Chief Justices of the high courts had also been flown in to Islamabad to sit in the Supreme
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Judicial Council. Musharraf’s government had moved swiftly with its plan to prosecute the Chief
Justice.
DG ISI, Lt. General Kiyani, who would take over the Army’s command from
Musharraf a few months later, did not submit his affidavit in the Supreme Court. The other four
officers, including Musharraf’s COS, did present theirs. Chaudhry was apparently on friendly
terms with the intelligence chiefs, and according to DG MI, had even asked him, after his
elevation as the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to arrange a meeting with the DG ISI. The DG MI also
claimed that Chaudhry was in contact with the officers in-charge of the MI in Islamabad and
Lahore, as he wished to collect information on judges for his own “database”. The DG IB claimed
to have been on “cordial relations” with Chaudhry and that both used to visit each other.
Chaudhry, the DG further stated, even asked him to investigate and suppress media reports
against him. About March 9th, he stated:
That between 1300 hours and 1400 hours the details of the Reference and some of
the findings of the intelligence agencies as a result of the exercise initiated at the behest
of the CJP were discussed. That during the discussion the CJP clearly stated that he
would face the Reference. In his affidavit the CJP has sought to create an impression that
on his refusal to resign the President became furious stood up angrily and left the room.
The President did not become furious. Throughout the meeting he was calm, composed
and respectful. He was neither angry nor did he leave in anger. He is also not accurate, as
stated in his affidavit by the CJP, that he said to the President, “I believe, that I am
myself the guardian of law. I strongly believe in God who will help me”. Neither these
words nor any words to such effect were used by CJP. (Text of Affidavit of IB DG 2007)
DG IB refuted Chaudhry’s allegation that he was ill-treated and kept against his will. He added
that no “threats” were made that day and their exchanges were, on the contrary, “courteous”.
According to Musharraf’s COS, it was the Prime Minister who had advised Musharraf to
file a reference against the Chief Justice and the details of the reference were brought to the
President’s attention on March 7th, two days before the aforementioned meeting. Refuting
Chaudhry’s version, the COS claimed that it was the CJ who had insisted on this meeting. He
explained in his affidavit:
On 8 March 2007 the CJP rang the Military Secretary to the President (“MS”),
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requesting an urgent meeting with the President. The President was due to leave for
Karachi on 9 March, to participate in the Pakistan Navy exercise “Aman 2007”. The MS
explained this position to CJP but as the CJP insisted on the meeting, the MS stated that
he would do his best to re-adjust the schedule. Later, after having re-adjusted the
schedule the MS told the Deputy Military Secretary (DMS) to inform the staff of the CJP
accordingly. The DMS later confirmed to the MS that this had been done. The
appointment was accordingly set for 11:30 a.m. on 9 March 2007. (Text of affidavit of
Chief of Staff to President 2007)
The COS then went on to list the findings of the intelligence agencies against the Chief Justice,
which, in addition to the ones listed above, included allotment of land, use of public resources
for personal purposes and interference in the appointment of and even intimidation of fellow
judges. Finally, Musharraf’s COS presented some instances of Chaudhry’s intervention against
senior police and civilian bureaucrats. For example:
The CJP summoned Additional Chief Secretary Mr. Khushnood Lashari and later Chief
Secretary Mr. Kamran Rasool and made them wait for hours on being provided a
Mercedes Benz car of an older model. He wanted Mercedes car of latest model. The two
officers were pressurized to immediately suspend from service, Mr. Mushtaq Hamdani,
DG (Protocol), Punjab, for this alleged lapse. Mr. Hamdani saved his skin only after
tendering an unconditional apology. [See: Unqualified apology tendered by Lt Col (R)
Mushtaq Hussain Hamdani, DG (Protocol) Punjab and Affidavit by Mr. Khushnood
Akhtar Lashari, former Additional Chief Secretary Punjab]. (ibid.)
Iftikhar Chaudhry’s proximity to the intelligence chiefs of the country reflected the
insecurity and ambition of someone who had risen from a humble and less prestigious class
background. Chaudhry, albeit Punjabi, belonged to Quetta, Baluchistan, and was said to have
had a close relationship with the influential Baluch tribal chief and politician, Nawab Akbar
Bugti, who had apparently helped lift his professional career there. Chaudhry lacked social and
cultural capital; former judges and legal professionals often ridiculed his shaky command of the
English language and the lack of legal knowledge reflected in his judgements. Chaudhry lacked a
loyal following amongst lawyers too; he had risen from a marginal province, rather than the
influential Punjab and its powerful bar associations. His arrogance also didn’t earn him any
sympathizers among fellow judges and senior lawyers. But, for his fellow judges, who would
hear his petition against the reference filed at the Council, what took place on March 9 th would
matter in deciding the fate of the higher judiciary and the Chief Justice, in particular. As the
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reference against Chaudhry progressed, on the advice of his legal team, he had challenged the
reference by filing a petition under Article 184(3), which empowers the Supreme Court to
intervene in matters concerning the enforcement of fundamental rights.6 A full bench of the
Supreme Court accepted his petition and delivered its judgement on July 20 th, 2007.

March 13th: The Image that Would Spark a Movement
Soon after oath-taking of the acting Chief Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council directed
Chaudhry to appear before the Council on March 13th. The bar associations had already
announced the boycott of courts and protests for Monday, March 12 th. Chaudhry’s suspension
had taken the country by surprise. With leaders of the two main political parties – the PML-N
(Pakistan Muslim League) and the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) – in exile, political opposition
against Musharraf lacked any leadership, agenda or mass support. Judicial confrontations –
there had been a few – of the past had usually ended in either compromise, fragmentation
within the higher judiciary or the departure of judges, and so, with hardly any organized
political resistance to General Musharraf on the streets, few foresaw the popular rage
Chaudhry’s dismissal was about to unleash.
On his phone call, Munir A. Malik had reassured Chaudhry of the lawyers’ support
against Musharraf. However, Malik knew that the lawyers, and Pakistanis at large, had to be
mobilized to turn judicial opinion in Chaudhry’s favor, and therefore his first appearance at the
SC (Supreme Court), before the SJC (Supreme Judicial Council), had to be made spectacular
and loud. He contacted the leadership of the local Islamabad and Rawalpindi Bars and asked

Article 184(3) deals defines “Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” and reads thus:
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a
question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental
Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the
nature mentioned in the said Article (The Constitution of Pakistan 2012[1973])
6
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them to ensure the presence of their lawyers outside the Supreme Court at the first hearing
(Malik 2008, 49).7
Malik writes in his account of the Lawyers’ Movement that “the manner in which the
Chief Justice had been treated on 9th March, and subsequently manhandled on 13th March, had
generated a considerable ire and fire in the bellies of persons who watched television or read
newspapers” (Malik 2008,74). Malik was referring to Chief Justice Chaudhry’s manhandling by
the police, an event witnessed and reported by hundreds on March 13th, and seen by millions the
next day in the newspapers; this image enraged Pakistanis across class, ethnic, political and
religious lines. A number of lawyers and activists had converged on the Supreme Court to
accompany and welcome Chaudhry that day. I turn to their narratives, from multiple
perspectives (Gluckman 1958), to recreate the event of March 13th and the image of the CJ’s
humiliation and the lawyers’ ensuing rage that would charge the lawyers and the movement.

The Event
On the morning of March 13th, Chaudhry started from his house on foot. His official cars
had been removed from his residence and the flag taken off. Chaudhry’s wife accompanied him.
The Supreme Court lay about two and half kilometers away.
By 10.00 am, Munir A. Malik had somehow reached the Supreme Court Building. The
police and paramilitary forces had blocked most of the roads leading to the Supreme Court.
Some human and women rights’ activists, “scores of lawyers” brought by the Rawalpindi Bar
President Asmatullah and Islamabad Bar’s Haroon Rasheed, lawyers from the bars of
surrounding cities, Taxila and Attock, alongside the families of missing persons and political
workers and their leaders were also present outside the SC (Malik 2008, 51).

Local bars of Islamabad and Rawalpindi would play a pivotal role in mobilizing protests
outside the SC and then later on in the country.
7
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Malik Sadeeq was one of the lawyers protesting there. He practiced in Rawalpindi and
had yet to obtain his Supreme Court license. Raja Inam Minhas of the Islamabad Bar had also
reached the SC. Abdul Qayyum Siddiqi, a journalist on the Supreme Court beat from GEO News,
had also been standing there, waiting for the CJ to arrive.
Sadeeq had protested against Chaudhry’s dismissal the day before at the Rawalpindi
District Bar, he had publicly argued for his restoration at his village’s Tehsil bar on March 10th,
and had arranged for three cars to bring fellow lawyers to protest outside the SC on March 13th. I
met Sadeeq at his office in Rawalpindi. In his early 50s, Sadeeq carried provincial mannerism
and had an uneasy command of English; he quite openly and eagerly exaggerated his role in the
Rawalpindi Bar’s mobilization and organization in the movement. He was adamant that his
story of the Lawyers’ Movement had to be recorded, and that, in fact, it was him and Sardar
Asamatuallah (President Rawalpindi High Court Bar Association)8 who had together led the
Rawalpindi Bar in the movement. As Sadeeq left the Rawalpindi District Courts on March 13th,
he found all roads leading to the SC blocked by the Police. He explained:
We drove towards Islamabad, but all the roads had been blockaded by then and the
policemen wouldn’t let us pass. At one checkpoint, they even tried to arrest us, but we
sped away. I know Islamabad well because I studied there as a young boy. And so I led all
the cars to Serena Hotel and through the residence of government employees, opposite
to the cricket park. We parked our cars in the Park and walked from there. As we were
crossing a ditch ravine to get to the SC, the policemen saw us and charged towards us.
We ran.
The spatial politics of protest, the overcoming of blockades and the confrontations with police
forces marked the activists’ and lawyers’ memory of the movement.9 When Sadeeq finally
reached the SC, only a handful of the lawyers had made it there. A few political and civil society
activists and journalists were also present.
Raja Inam Minhas of the Islamabad Bar had also reached the SC early in the morning.
Minhas had learned of Chaudhry’s suspension at a wedding on March 9th. He felt “disheartened”
Introduced in Chapters 3 & 4 on lawyers and politics of the bars.
In Chapter 5, on youth and student protests, I specifically deal with public protests and spatial
politics.
8
9
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when this “horrible” news was conveyed to him by a “group of jubilant retired and serving
bureaucrats”. I saw Minhas at the Islamabad District Courts years later. Minhas was a successful
criminal lawyer and had been involved in Bar politics for decades. He remembered that upon
reaching Islamabad Bar on March 13th, the lawyers already present were unsure of what to do,
and that there was “extreme uncertainty”. He remembered:
There were about 30-40 of us present at the Bar. Soon speeches started and then we
decided to go to the SC, but weren’t sure if we should walk or take cars. Someone
shouted that all roads are blocked and the police is patrolling the city. So we decided to
march to the SC. It was very hot and sunny and we were wearing black coats, our black
uniforms. People along the roads were watching us. We were chanting slogans against
Musharraf. There were about 150 lawyers with me. When we reached China Chowk, the
district administration and the police stopped us and told us that we couldn’t proceed
further. But, that day, there was no stopping us. We decided to break that wall of
policemen. There were only us, the lawyers, and like madmen, we marched, fought with
the police and finally reached the SC.
As the police began to baton-charge lawyers, Minhas and the others fought back. The media had
been broadcasting these events on live television and soon, more lawyers started arriving at the
SC. Minhas and fellow lawyers “broke the wall of policemen” and charged towards the SC. Inside
the SC, the Pakistan Bar Council was holding its emergency meeting. “Half of us”, Minhas
recalled, “sat by the main gate, while the rest were at the judges’ entrance. Officials from the IB
and ISI came and stood by as well”. Their presence indicated that the lawyers were already
under the surveillance of the state’s intelligence agencies. Around 11.00 am Minhas learned that
the CJ had started towards the SC on foot, so he gathered other lawyers and informed them.
They decided to wait for the CJ and give him a thunderous welcome.
Munir A. Malik wanted the SCBA to act as the intervener in Chaudhry’s case before the
SJC and so he quickly went inside and handed over a petition to Justice Javed Iqbal (the acting
Chief Justice). As soon as he returned to the SC gate, IG Islamabad called to tell him that the CJ
wanted to see him and was refusing to be escorted to the SC, unless accompanied by Malik
(2008, 54).
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Malik Sadeeq, too, was standing with the crowd of activists and lawyers at the judges’
entrance. Suddenly, a woman activist, Sadeeq recalled, raised her cellphone and shouted Munir
A. Malik’s name. Sadeeq asked the woman to give the phone to Chaudhry Ikram, a senior
activist and lawyer who was also present, as he didn’t know who Malik was at the time. It was
Chief Justice Chaudhry’s wife on the line. After Ikram had spoken with her, Sadeeq
remembered, the phone eventually went to Malik, and that’s how he finally learned of Munir A.
Malik. Sadeeq heard Malik assuring the CJ’s wife, who was at the Baluchistan House at the time:
“Don’t worry, a number of lawyers are here for Chief Sahib and Chief is welcome here. Tell him
not to worry and be steady, because there are a lot of people who have come out to support him”.
On his way to the SC, Chaudhry had been stopped near the Baluchistan House. Police
officers, apparently under orders to ensure that he didn’t reach the SC, had been following him.
After the CJ refused to be persuaded to sit in a police car, the zealous officers stepped forward
and tried to force Chaudhry in. Sajjad Ali Qureshi, a press photographer also present there,
captured the moment when the Chief Justice of the country, surrounded by uniformed men
(again!), was held by his hair and shoved into a police car (fig.2). Years later, Qureshi recalled
Chaudhry’s wife shouting at the policemen who had swarmed the Chief Justice: “He is the chief
justice! He is the top judge of the country! Why you are manhandling him! Don’t humiliate
him!” (The Express Tribune 2013). Qureshi had eluded policemen at the blockades by
pretending to be a laborer to reach the Judges Colony, and when the officers learnt of this
photograph, they tried to arrest him but he escaped. Chaudhry didn’t relent and was finally
taken to the Baluchistan House, where former Prime Minister Jamali convinced him to proceed
to the SC by himself. Jamali offered his car to take the CJ to the SC and promised the safe return
of his wife.
The story of Iftikhar Chaudhry’s abuse at the hands of the Islamabad Police quickly
reached the lawyers gathered outside the SC. Some went running to Malik, who was on the
phone with IG Islamabad Police.

38

Raja Inam Minhas was standing outside the SC with lawyers, he recalled, when “a
reporter came running and showed us a photograph in his camera: the CJ was held by his hair
and was being hit by the policemen. After seeing that image, we just went mad; we started
swearing and raising slogans against Musharraf. We became so jazbati [emotional]”. “Staging
crowd action as an expression of authentic public emotion and outrage is one of the oldest and
most sophisticated political technologies among political activists” in South Asia (Hansen 2008,
6). Many other protestors, especially from the educated middle-class, as I discuss in the next
chapter, would show disdain at such displays of collective emotion. However, this image of the
CJ would work as a powerful emotional metonym for their personal humiliations, and would
outrage millions.
The IG offered a police escort to take Malik to the CJ, but Malik refused. He didn’t want
to be seen in a police car. Any indication of collusion with the state would have damaged the
legitimacy of the Bar to lead the lawyers. He asked instead for an unmarked car. While at the
SCBA office, more lawyers informed Malik that they had seen on television that the Chief Justice
had been roughed up, dragged by the hair and his black coat torn in the ordeal (Malik 2008, 58).
The unmarked car was soon made available and Malik departed to see the CJ.
Abdul Qayyum Siddiqi, a news reporter, had been patiently waiting outside the SC for
the CJ’s arrival. Siddiqi had somehow managed to enter the SC, and close to the judges’
chambers, he claimed, he had seen men from the intelligence agencies. He was quickly pushed
out of the chambers’ area. The SC was a slow, insignificant beat for reporters. Chaudhry’s
ascendance and his activist postures against the state had made the SC coverage exciting for
journalists like Siddiqi. The Lawyers’ Movement, Chaudhry’s obsession with media coverage,
and the judicial interventions that succeeded the Movement, would decorate the careers of many
journalists. Siddiqi picked a high point and suggested to his cameraman to also take position,
because he sensed that the CJ would be arriving from the opposite direction.
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At the Baluchistan House, Munir A. Malik was escorted to Jamali’s suite. Chaudhry had
been forcibly brought there. The Chief Justice “appeared self-assured and confident yet
extremely agitated” (Malik 2008, 55). Malik informed the CJ that the atmosphere outside the SC
was “highly charged” and “hundreds of lawyers, activists from civil society and political workers
had gathered” (2008, 56). The police officials insisted that Chaudhry be escorted in a police van
to the SC, but Malik flatly refused; Chaudhry was not in custody so why convey the impression
that he was being “transported as an accused” (2008, 56)? After intense negotiations, officials
agreed that the CJ would ride in Jamali’s car. Malik sat at the back with Chaudhry, while a
magistrate sat in front.
As Chaudhry arrived at the SC, the lawyers stormed Jamali’s white Toyota Corolla. The
roof caved in, the windshield broke, the hood dipped to the engine and the door on the side of
the CJ almost came off. “People were highly emotional”, Malik recalled (2008, 57). Hundreds
attempted to shake or kiss the CJ’s hands. Malik and Chaudhry firmly locked hands but the “sea
of people” snatched the Chief Justice away (ibid.) Chaudhry’s humiliation had charged the
lawyers and their outrage was televised live on the news channels.
Minhas had learnt from fellow lawyers that the CJ was arriving from the Baluchistan
House in the “IG Police’s car”. He “saw Munir A. Malik in the front and the CJ sitting at the
back”. Minhas remembered, “as soon as the CJ’s car arrived, we stood on its hood, on its top, to
the sides and we demanded that the CJ be brought out. The CJ thought that the lawyers were
protesting against him. He was not sure what was happening. An advocate ran to the car, put his
head inside and told the CJ that ‘the lawyers are with you, don’t resign, we are with you’. The CJ
was finally relieved to hear this”. These political emotions had yet to find a collective expression,
and direction, beyond the anger expressed against Chaudhry’s abuse by the policemen. Malik
and Atizaz Ahsan were closely observing the young lawyers’ passionate protest that day.
The Chief Justice’s public humiliation by the police, and by district bureaucrats – the
Bars’ old nemesis – had enraged the young lawyers (see Chapter 4). Malik Sadeeq recalled, “as
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soon as Chaudhry’s white car arrived, we charged it, and I put my head inside and said, ‘Chief
sahib, don’t worry, we have all come here for you; we will take badla [revenge] for your zillat
[humiliation]; and we will sacrifice our lives for you!’” Chaudhry looked perplexed, he added.
The lawyers passionately raised slogans against Musharraf: “Go Musharraf Go and We Will
Fight to the End for an Independent Chief and Judiciary”. The lawyers were furious, Sadeeq
claimed, and that (soon to become iconic) image of “Chaudhry’s mistreatment had made
everyone so jazbati [emotional]. I have never been so emotional in my life; we felt junoon
[madness] to secure and reinstate the CJ”. Sadeeq continued, “Musharraf was a zalim [ruthless]
ruler and all this jazba [emotion] was against him. He was tightly controlling the whole country
and there were no venues left for us to resist him; the resentment and opposition against
military rule had been brewing deep under, and it suddenly exploded”. Musharraf, as I stated
above, had muted all opposition to his rule. Chaudhry’s suspension and humiliation was about
to spark a movement, which would eventually mobilize most of the urban educated middleclasses.
It took the CJ one hour to reach the judges’ entrance, 50 meters away from where his car
was stalled by the lawyers (Malik 2008, 57). Minhas saw that as “the CJ came out of the car one
of his shoes came off and he tried to run inside. But before he went in, he proclaimed, ‘I am not
going to resign’. We all responded, raising slogans: Chief Tere Janesaar, Beshumaar
Beshumaar [Chief, Countless are your defenders]”. Sadeeq remembered that “it took one hour
for us and the CJ to move from his car to the gate. First time in my life, I was entering the SC
from the judges’ entrance, with the asli [real] CJ of the Supreme Court. This was a historic day
for the lawyers; but we didn’t know yet, that the Movement, our movement, would be born on
the morning of March 13th, 2007”.
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Image, Emotion and Event
The iconic images of March 9th and 13th helped mythologize the movement, formulate its
narrative and cover the many contradictions – in terms of multiple and often opposing
meanings attributed to its main slogan of the rule of law – within it, while at the same time
creating clarity and providing direction to political emotions against General Musharraf and his
military’s rule. The mythic character in the movement’s narrative was the Chief Justice, who had
dared to stand against an Army General and uttered the famous ‘No’. His humiliation by the
(Army) men in uniform – first in the presence of Musharraf and then three days later in public
(by the policemen) – was affectively experienced and witnessed by Pakistanis across class,
profession, ethnic and religious divides, as an excess of state power that had a long history in
Pakistan. The myth and its iconic images derived their affective power from the historical
meanings attributed to them by ordinary Pakistanis.
The memory of coups and violence played a crucial role in the reading of these images
and the emotions invoked by them – those of disgust, anger and helplessness. The images were
de-contextualized from the present, or more recent past – it was the same Chief Justice who,
after all, had endorsed Musharraf not long ago – and then re-contextualized historically. The
“reader’s gaze”, as Catherine Lutz argues, “has a history and a future, and it is structured by the
mental work of inference and imagination” (1991, 138). The photographs had opened up
questions of excess, military power, and the humiliation caused by being subjected to that
power, again and again, in the course of Pakistan’s troubled history.
Ronald Barthes famously argued that the “photograph is a message” (1977, 15). “It is not
only perceived, received”, it is also “read, connected more or less consciously by the public that
consumes it to a traditional [or historical] stock of signs” (1977, 19). A powerful image builds
upon both concrete and abstract meanings of signs – referring to absences, memories, losses
and promises (1977, 73). In the image, we might do without language – without explanation – as
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the signs themselves invite readers to engage in interpretation, making use of both the present,
pragmatic, as well as the past, historical meanings.
The images of the Chief Justice ‘moved’ people, even enraging many. Their emotional
power lay in their appeal to the collective memory of the abuse of power and excess during
military rule(s) in the country. Recalling recent history, many remembered Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was toppled by General Zia in 1977, and after a sham murder trial, the
military had hanged him. Political workers and lawyers sympathetic to Bhutto’s PPP,
provocatively placed the image of Chaudhry, seated respectfully facing uniformed General
Musharraf, in the context of the coup against Bhutto and his ‘judicial murder’ – considered to be
military punishment for an arrogant populist leader. The “political mythology” of military coups,
and the resistance and sacrifice against them, gave life to these die-hard activists’ actions against
yet another military ruler (Bourdieu 1990, 69-70, Quoted in Hansen 1999).10
Rage and disgust unleashed by the images of March 9th and 13th and how effectively they
mobilized the emotions and sympathy of the lawyers, activists and of Pakistanis, across classes,
against General Musharraf, were interpreted by some journalists and analysts as the handiwork
of ‘the establishment’ – the powerful shadowy complex of Pakistan’s omnipotent bureaucratic,
military and intelligence complex – which, they argued, perhaps wished to remove Musharraf
from power. Brokered by the U.S., General Musharraf’s NRO (National Reconciliation
Ordinance) agreement with Benazir Bhutto, who was in exile, was also taking shape at that
point. Musharraf needed fresh political legitimacy and Bhutto seemed, albeit reluctantly, set to
bargain for and share political power with the General. In return for accepting Musharraf as the
President, the ‘corruption’ cases against her were to be dissolved. The ISI’s chief, Lt. General
Kiyani, had apparently played a key role in negotiating the NRO deal and some analysts

Pierre Bourdieu explains the corporeal nature of political mythology: “Bodily hexis is political
mythology embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking,
walking, and thereby feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu 1990, 69-70), Quoted in Hansen 1999.
Bourdieuian provocation, I think, can be extended to the work of memory as well.
10
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believed, it was perhaps he who had orchestrated a soft coup against Musharraf through
Chaudhry. The images, and their placement in the newspapers, these analysts claimed, were
intended to turn the popular opinion against Musharraf.
Imputing such conspiratorial agency to these images, I think, disregards their
contingency and the ‘agency’ of those activists and common Pakistanis who daringly challenged
Musharraf’s military rule. This intellectually privileged interpretation disregards the historical
and “social meanings” attributed to these images of humiliations and the emotional outrage they
gave rise to (Jaoul 2008, 2). A state’s management of memory and emotion is part of state craft
in the governance of populations in South Asia (Blom 2008, 17). The religious outrage against
blasphemous images, cartoons, acts and persons is carefully allowed and even sometime
choreographed (ibid.) The forms in which “the state emotionalizes, and consequently
depoliticizes, the public sphere is, indeed, hard to ignore in South Asian countries, where riots
often take the shape of ‘moral crusades’ precisely, and where the postcolonial state inherited a
politics of social control precisely based on the assumption of the ‘emotional subject’” (ibid.).
The outrage over the CJ’s humiliation, captured in these images, was directed against the state
and its repressive apparatus, both at the level of ‘high politics’ – where military reigned – as well
as the everyday, where the police and the state’s security and secret agencies brutalize and
humiliate ordinary Pakistanis. The Chief Justice’s humiliation trigged emotions which
encapsulated the zillat of the everyday and were directed at the structure of military power in
place for decades.
Many lawyers and political activists were indeed aware of, or had at least recognized,
Chaudhry’s penchant for, and proximity to, the same military-bureaucratic bloc of the state,
which was being challenged by their outrage. As Sohail Mahdi, a veteran political activist from
Rawalpindi, stated “of course, we knew that the Chief Justice was part of the power structure of
the Pakistani state, but he challenged it from within. A contradiction emerged within that
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structure, and we exploited it to challenge the whole structure, especially the military’s hold on
the state”.
However, Pakistani private media played a crucial role in the politics of humiliation in
the new age of electronic and social media. The images, which the media transmitted to the
entire nation, helped cover the movement’s internal and ideological contradictions (such as
Chaudhry’s closeness to the military) and simplify its narrative of the rule of law.11 They molded
the narrative of the movement by mystifying the struggle between the Chief Justice and General
Musharraf – as amongst two state institutions: Army and Judiciary – as a reincarnation of good
and evil, dictatorship versus democracy, arbitrary rule versus the rule of law, and state violence
versus peaceful resistance. The images instigated action because “they condense[d] many
[historical and cultural] referents, uniting them in a single cognitive and affective field” (Turner
1974, 55). The media mythologized the character of the Chief Justice in this moral, emotional,
mythical saga. Let me return to the Geo News reporter, Qayyum Siddiqi, to explain this point.
Siddiqi was one of the main characters in dramatizing the myth of the movement. He
eventually became so close to the CJ that he was alleged to carry some secret documents for him
a few years later, when after his restoration, the CJ clashed with the elected government of the
PPP.12 The electronic media not only developed the CJ’s mythical character and inserted his ‘No’
in the narrative of the movement, it also sketched Chaudhry’s heroic figure. Returning to the
days of the movement, Siddiqi gave to the history of the movement its mythical meaning. It was
on March 13th, Siddiqi disclosed to me, that he realized the grander significance of the
movement and the bigger purpose he had been chosen to serve:
On March 13th, I ran to the SC and stood under a certain point by the entrance, telling
everyone that the lawyers would be coming from that direction. So I was standing
there, live on the channel, and on the line with Hamid Mir [Geo News anchor], who was
arguing that the CJ is not going to come to the SC. I kept on refuting him. And then
In the next chapter, I discuss in detail, the various meanings attributed and aspiration raised
of the notion of the rule of law by various professional and educated middle class lawyers and
activists.
12
Interview with Siddiqui, Islamabad 2014.
11
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suddenly, the CJ arrives in a white car. So how did I know that he was in that white car? I
was in a wajdaani [mystical] state then. Words were spilling out of my mouth. We were
so emotionally charged – lawyers, journalists and activists. And so I see: Chaudhry
Iftikhar comes out of his car and waves at us. Nobody could see him, but even today, I
swear that I saw him, before he actually arrived! I was in a wajdaani state. Whatever I
was saying live, it was foreseen, and the whole event unfolded as such. I was in a state of
junoon [madness]. On the one side, lawyers were fighting with the policemen, while on
the other, activists were trying to climb over into the SC. Everyone was so charged! It was
my continuous coverage and commentary that electrified the people. I was so involved
with the Lawyers’ Movement that I hardly slept, maybe no more than a couple of hours
every night.
The “collective effervescence” of protest (Durkheim 2008[1912]; Verkaaik 2004), that Siddiqi
claimed to have experienced, cemented is close association with the CJ and seemingly proved to
Siddiqi that he was selected to carry out the role of serving him and the movement.
Journalists, like Siddiqi, so passionately molded and dissipated the narrative of the
Lawyers’ Movement, that Musharraf soon imposed restrictions on the electronic media and after
declaring Emergency, an outright ban on channels such as Geo. It is important to note that these
channels were live-telecasting Chaudhry’s marches around the country and appearances at
Court. Pakistani media would continue to shape the politics of humiliation after Chaudhry’s
restoration, when the senior civilian and police bureaucrats, and politicians, would be at the
receiving end in Chaudhry’s court. Their public chastising, read and witnessed by millions,
would be widely applauded by ordinary Pakistanis taking pleasure in these spectacles of
humiliation.
The journalists transmitted images of March 13th on the media with intense emotional
commentary. They were powerful enough to not only stir popular emotions then, but years later,
these same images are still recalled by lawyers and journalists to give mythical color to the
movement and its narrative.
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Post-March 13th: The Movement Marches On
Once Chaudhry had recovered at the SC Dispensary, Munir A. Malik proposed himself,
Hamid Khan, Atizaz Ahsan, Ahmed Ali Kurd and Justice (rtd.) Tariq Mehmood, to represent the
CJ at the Supreme Judicial Council. Chaudhry agreed, and his lead counsel, Atizaz Ahsan,
submitted before the Council objections that Chaudhry had himself formulated; the Council
adjourned the hearing until March 16th. The next day, courts across Pakistan were boycotted on
the Pakistan Bar Council’s call to protest Chaudhry’s manhandling by the police. His
maltreatment had “evoked intense passion amongst the legal fraternity” and lawyers came out to
protest all over the country (Malik 2008, 63). On March 14th and 15th, members of Chaudhry’s
defense team attempted to meet him, but were not allowed inside his residence by the
intelligence and security officials posted outside. Chaudhry was still under detention (ibid.)
On his next hearing (March 16th), Chief Justice Chaudhry was driven in a procession
from his residence to the SC. Crowds of lawyers and activists had started to gather both outside
his residence and at his hearings at the SC. Ahsan requested the Council to adjourn once again,
as he had not been allowed to meet the CJ. Upon questioning by Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed
(member of the Council), the Attorney General replied with “there was no restraint on the
movements of the Chief Justice” (Malik 2008, 65).
Once the government admitted that Chaudhry was not restrained under any detention
orders, Malik and Ahsan decided to mobilize ‘public sentiment’ and the bar associations for the
CJ. The presence of protesting activists and political workers were read as a sign of popular
anger and frustration against Musharraf’s government and its firm control over dissent in the
country. For both Malik and Ahsan, mobilizing the bars and lawyers across the country was
essential in pulling the legal fraternity’s weight behind Chaudhry, which, they thought, would
closely be watched by the judges deciding his fate.
In the next few months, the CJ and his caravan drove thousands of miles across
Pakistan. Bar associations from all over the country were extending invitations, on various
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pretexts, to Iftikhar Chaudhry. Political activists belonging to opposition political parties – PPP
(Pakistan People’s Party), PML-N (Pakistani Muslim League), JI (Jamaat-e-Islami) – also
joined the lawyers in these protests and marches. Most significant for the CJ’s case, was the
presence of the local serving judges in the events organized by these bars. Their attendance at
these events and the consequent extension of judicial protocol to Iftikhar Chaudhry – the
‘suspended’ Chief Justice – sent a clear message of solidarity to fellow judges presiding over his
case at the SC.
On March 27th, Chaudhry was taken to the Rawalpindi Bar in a procession; Malik and the
lawyers were “still uncertain about the response from the general public and simply wanted … to
test waters”; when Chaudhry’s convoy reached Kacheri Chowk [intersection] near Rawalpindi
District Courts, about a “thousand lawyers and five hundred members of the civil society”
surrounded his car (Malik 2008, 80). The Rawalpindi Bar and its lawyers, as I discuss in later
chapters, would play a central role in mobilizing and organizing protests for the CJ’s restoration.
On April 14th, Chaudhry visited Sukkur Bar, and on April 15th, Hyderabad Bar (2008, 82). Two
SHC (Sind High Court) judges received him at the airport. The distance of 4 kilometers, from
the airport to the judges’ lodges, Malik witnessed, was covered in 3 hours. Activists from the PPP
and Awami Tehreek, as well as lawyers from interior Sindh, had come out to welcome the CJ
(2008, 83). Bar associations had set up their camps along the National Highway for Chaudhry’s
convoy (2008, 84). Fifteen SHC judges were in attendance at Hyderabad Bar as well (2008, 85).
Atizaz Ahsan (as I explain in the next chapter) had suggested first, and then insisted, that
the lawyers mobilize the people by “going to them; by touching them”, as he put it. Pakistanis
were curious to know more about the man who had stood up to a General and said ‘No’ to him.
Ahsan, Kurd and Malik had taken part in political movements in the past and they knew that in
order to mobilize the “aam admi [common man], you had to go to them”. They also knew that
there was a rich, extant tradition of long marches in South Asia, such as Gandhi’s famous Salt
March (Weber 2009). In postcolonial times, Hindu nationalists have attempted to do the same,
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that is, to create a politically “sacred space”, by traversing thousands of kilometers across India
(Hansen 1999, 165-65).
The lawyers understood that if the movement against Musharraf was to be made a
spectacular success, the G.T Road (Grand Trunk Road) – an ancient route across Pakistan that
was fortified by Sher Shah Suri in the 16th century – had to be mobilized, especially the towns,
cities and villages along its length in the Punjab. The G.T. Road was the spatial artery for
popular mobilizations in the country. Successfully rallying the G.T. Road has historically been
understood as indicative of strong popular support behind any public protest or political
movement in Pakistan. Rather than flying over or driving on the country’s proud, relatively
newer highway – the Motorway – Ahsan and Malik insisted that the journeys be taken on the
politically influential and densely populated G.T. Road. Once again, these drives were telecast
live on news channels and the images of the crowds, waiting for and receiving the CJ along the
G.T. Road, reassured the skeptics that ordinary Pakistanis had indeed come out to embrace the
CJ, against General Musharraf, and so, that the lawyers’ agitation was not just a political
nuisance stirred up by some rights activists and bar associations.
Next, the lawyers turned their attention toward the northwest of the country. On an
invitation from the Peshawar High Court Bar, the CJ was driven to the provincial capital on
April 21st. At the PHC (Peshawar High Court), its Chief Justice and fellow judges welcomed
Chaudhry. The drive, partly completed on the G.T. Road, had taken the whole day (normally
done in 2 hours); arriving 5 hours later than the scheduled time, the electronic media covered
the journey live from the CJ’s residence to the Peshawar Bar (Malik 2008, 89-91).
Chaudhry had yet to visit Lahore, and Malik and the lawyers close to the CJ realized the
significance of winning Lahore and its Bar, which was the biggest in the country. They were also
worried because the Chief Justice of the LHC (Lahore High Court) was considered ‘hostile’
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towards Chief Justice Chaudhry, as Malik claimed.13 If Punjab was the heart of political power
and leverage in Pakistan – as history had repeatedly proved – Lahore was its pulse. In order to
mount a powerful challenge to General Musharraf, Lahore’s political temper had to be tested,
and had to be done so from the G.T. Road.
The march to Lahore was an impressive success for the lawyers (which I discuss in detail
in later chapters). Atizaz Ahsan and Hamid Khan charted the route, along Punjab’s smaller bars
and their towns that lay along the G.T. Road (Malik 2008, 94). Thousands came out to welcome
the lawyers and the CJ on the G.T. Road; having started early in the morning from Islamabad,
the CJ’s caravan reached Lahore the next day at 4.00 am; they had covered a distance of 400
kilometers in about 20 hours, again, telecast live (2008, 97). Malik was delighted with the
overwhelmingly popular response.
In early May, the CJ was invited to Sind once again, to Karachi where General
Musharraf’s political ally, the MQM (Mutahida Qaumi Movement) – an ethnic political party of
self-declared mohajirs (refugees of the Partition) [Verkaaik 2004] – held the seat of government
and ruled the streets. On May 12th, the day Malik, the CJ and other lawyers had planned to land
in Karachi, the city exploded; its political and ethnic rivals clashed on the streets; the Lawyers’
Movement became the site to settle old accounts and (re)claim political ground. I turn to the
accounts of that day and the narratives of lawyers and political activists who witnessed the first
major bloody milestone of the movement.

May 12th: Karachi Bleeds
Munir A. Malik and Atizaz Ahsan were accompanying the CJ when he flew to Karachi
Airport the morning of May 12th. A rally had been announced by the lawyers and the opposition
political parties, mainly the PPP, ANP, and JI, to escort the CJ from the airport to Jinnah’s
Mausoleum, and from there to the Karachi High Court Bar. After waiting at the airport the
13

According to Munir A. Malik, they were not even on speaking terms.
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whole day, while the convoys of lawyers and political parties desperately tried to congregate and
make their way to the airport, Malik, Chaudhry and the lawyers accompanying them, decided to
fly back to Islamabad. Clashes on the streets and at the blockades guarded by armed men had
turned the city into an urban war zone. At the end of the day, 34 lives had been lost and about
140 were injured (Dawn 2007). In a predominantly Punjab-centered movement, the biggest
massacre had taken place in a mohajir-dominated city.14
Karachi lawyers and those from interior Sind, where the PPP had strong popular
support, had openly welcomed and joined the CJ on his prior visits to the province. However,
MQM, Musharraf’s ally, which had kept Karachi under its violent sway for decades, didn’t want
to allow a movement against the General to take root in the city. The lawyers, a handful of leftist
and rights activists, alongside the city’s intellectual class, had been regularly protesting since
Chaudhry’s suspension, but no major mobilization had taken place in Pakistan’s biggest city yet.
The CJ’s Karachi visit was intended to complete the overarching loop of national support.
Karachi’s Urdu-speaking, urban, educated middle-class sympathized with Musharraf –
because of both his ethnicity and the ‘moderate’ national, ‘secular’ vision he often (and openly)
declared and displayed.15 Previously, military dictators had either belonged to Punjab or hailed
from the North-West Province – an Urdu-speaking ‘mohajir’ was the first in the country’s
history. Aware of ethnic and political proximity, General Musharraf had supported the MQM’s
drive to develop city infrastructure. MQM’s access to the local state bureaucracy and its political
apparatus defines the city’s politics and the strong hold that the party has been able to keep over
the mohajir electorate, which, prior to the MQM’s violent rise had sympathized with the Islamist
political parties (Verkaaik 2004). The party successfully mediated between the city, its people
and the state. Unlike other regions of Pakistan, especially the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtun

Mohajir is a (self)designation often used by those who migrated from India during Partition
(1947).
15
Musharraf was born in Delhi, India, and like millions of Indian Muslims, his family had
migrated to Pakistan too.
14
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Khwa (KPK), the Urdu-speaking Karachiite is not considered close, nor desires proximity, to the
state: the MQM has filled those spaces with its own network – even at the level of the local
neighborhoods – and so the locals have to engage with the party, rather than the state, for their
needs. According to local activists, the party mediated all personal, neighborhood, family,
bureaucratic and employment issues. The MQM had also localized violence in the city, often in
turf wars with other political and ethnic groups (Gayer 2014). The city’s pricey real estate and
other resources were often brutally contended (Hasan 2015). Drive-by and targeted shootings,
abduction and the torture of rivals and dissidents were common practice in the battle to keep
the city under the party’s control. Malik , however, was relying upon the organizational strength
of the Islamist JI, the mass support of the Pashtun-dominated ANP and the Sindhi-supported
PPP – MQM’s ethnic and political contenders – to rally Karachi around the CJ.

May 12th: The Lawyers’ Mobilization, Resistance and Retreat
Owing to its proximity to the airport, the lawyers had decided to assemble at the Malir
District Courts, located in the eastern part of Karachi, on May 12th. As lawyers all across the city
learned early in the morning, all roads, especially one of the main arteries leading to the airport
– Shahrah-e-Faisal – had been blocked with cargo containers at some places and trucks with
flattened tires at others. Those political activists and lawyers who dared to push through these
barricades or even attempted to take alternate routes were pelted, fired upon, beaten and
harassed.
Abida Channar, an advocate of the high court and a former judge, was a member of her
bar association’s organizing committee. I met Channar at the Karachi High Court. On the
morning of May 12th, Channar told me she came across a number of blocked roads on her way to
the Bar. As most of the lawyers had failed to reach the location, Channar and a handful started
from there to the SHC (Sindh High Court). As soon as they reached the main road, they
suddenly came under heavy gun fire,. The lawyers ran and hid in nearby alleys, Channar
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recalled. Most then took off their black coats. Men on bikes and cars, patrolling the roads and
bridges leading to the airport, and those posted by the blockades, were detaining, harassing and
beating men and women dressed in black . Karachiites had opened their homes to those fleeing
the violence in search of refuge, and so, Channar along with some women lawyers hid in the
houses nearby. Channar, all the same, didn’t want to give up so soon.
When the men who were shooting at Channar’s convoy finally drove away, she came
back to the main street. Her fellow lawyers had all dispersed. Channar realized that she was very
close to her neighborhood. As she contemplated returning home until the violence subsided,
Channar spotted her neighbor’s son on a motorcycle. He was flying MQM’s flag on his bike. A
number of lawyers and activists claim to have used MQM’s flags on their motorcycles and cars to
save their lives that day (Malik 2008, 143). Channar signaled the boy to stop. He told her that
they had been instructed to disrupt the lawyers’ rally at all costs. She implored him to take her to
the High Court on his motorcycle. Channar had taken her coat off by then. The boy hesitated at
first, but then agreed and dropped her behind the High Court building.
Malik accompanied Iftikhar Chaudhry on his 10:00 am flight from Islamabad to Karachi.
Asma Jahangir (a prominent lawyer and human rights activist), Atizaz Ahsan, Hamid Khan and
some others were also with the CJ (Malik 2008, 151). At 11:55 am, Malik recalled, they landed in
Karachi. He noticed a helicopter on the tarmac, apparently, waiting to fly Chaudhry to the SHC.
The lawyers surrounded Chaudhry so he wouldn’t be forcefully removed (as the local
administration had planned) to the helicopter (2008, 152). Malik had already started to receive
troubling updates from the lawyers under siege inside the city. The Registrar of the SHC had
also flown to the airport; he informed Malik that all roads leading to the airports had been
blocked with water tankers and containers. As they waited in the lounge, the number of distress
calls to Malik increased:
The Vice-President of the Malir bar Association phoned to say that Zahoor
Hussain, President of the Malir Bar had been kidnapped but had been released with a
warning to desist and was released after being badly beaten … A former President of the
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Karachi Bar Association recounted on the phone how a group of lawyers, including a
former President, Muhammad Ali Abbassi, walking on foot from the City Court to the
High Court, were intercepted a few hundred meters from the City Courts by an armed
group and detained for almost 4 hours in terrifying circumstances. (Malik 2008, 153)
Nazia Khan,16 a local lawyer and rights activist, was wounded as she attempted to reach
the High Court. The night before, Khan, along with fellow lawyers, had taken a tour around the
Court and found most of the streets already blocked. On May 12 th, Khan recalled, she was part of
the procession of those 200-250 lawyers who set out for Malir; as soon as they reached
Shahrah-e-Faisal, they were pelted by groups of armed young men. When the lawyers
retaliated, Khan claimed, they were shot at. “Everyone started to run and hide, and even I was
hit by stones”. Khan, however, pressed on. “Near Pakistan Chowk, some boys stopped me. One
ordered: take off your coat. I said, do whatever, I am injured and I can’t run anyways”, Khan
chuckled, recalling how exhausted she had been by then. Eventually, only Khan and a handful of
her comrades had been able to reach the SHC.
An “armed mob” kept the Sindh High Court building under siege the whole day (Malik
2008, 154). Even judges had to scale the walls to get inside, and the car of the Chief Justice SHC
escaped serious damage as he attempted to enter the Court (2008, 154). However, the lawyers
were not the only ones targeted that day; political workers from opposition parties were fired
upon and stones were thrown at their convoys as they attempted to drive to the airport.
Latif Mughal, a member of the PPP Media Cell, claimed that his party lost a number of
activists on May 12th. Mughal and other activists had tried to join the PPP’s main rally, led by
one of its local leaders Sherry Rahman, but came under intense gunfire on Shahrah-e-Faisal. All
roads leading to the airport (next to Malir in the east) had been blocked; there was hardly any
traffic on the streets, Mughal recalled. He witnessed armed men stationed at strategic places,
“especially on the bridges and overheads, for example, by Gorra Kabristan and Baluch Colony,
and these men were shooting directly at us and at the rallies passing under. Near Malir, the
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lawyers and ANP workers were targeted too”. There didn’t seem to be any single target that day
– was anyone out on the street was assumed to be complicit with the other side and detained,
harassed or shot at.
ANP Karachi’s chief, Shahi Syed, agreed that the city was put under a deliberately
planned lockdown. Syed resides and runs the party from a heavily fortified bungalow in the
Defense Housing Society of Karachi. Syed, a Pashtun from Mardan, claimed that the police were
ordered not to bring weapons to duty that day. They stood unarmed, by the side, and let MQM
run the city. “Closing off of the airport and not letting the CJ out was brute display of force”, he
added, “with the complicity of the state”.
After waiting the whole day and evening at the airport, Malik and the lawyers with him
decided to take the CJ back to Islamabad. They had rejected the government’s offer to fly to the
SHC. Around 8:30 pm, as Malik and those with the CJ were deciding to leave for Islamabad,
local administration officials appeared with externment orders from Sindh for all those
accompanying the CJ. Now, there was no choice but to return; all boarded the flight back to
Islamabad. Channar and her comrades remained confined at the SHC until midnight. After
12:00 am, once the CJ had left the Karachi airport, the city calmed down and the lawyers and
judges were finally allowed to leave the building by those laying siege to it.
That same night, General Musharraf held his own rally in the capital, Islamabad, and
from behind bullet proof glass, waved his fists on national television. These were the symbols of
raw power, displayed by his allies in Karachi earlier that day. At his public rally, General
Musharraf held the CJ and the lawyers responsible for the violence in Karachi. He threatened
the lawyers: “if they think they are powerful then they should know that the people’s power is
with us” (Malik 2008, 157-58). Musharraf asked the protesting bars to stop their agitation and
wait for the verdict of the Supreme Judicial Council.
Since the 1980s, when Karachi had started experiencing a mass influx of Pashtuns,
Punjabis, and other non-mohajirs, the MQM, claiming to represent Mohajir interests in the city,
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had been locked in a violent conflict with the ‘settlers’. ‘Ethnic tensions’ would often flare up in
various parts of the city, but the violence on May 12th, Latif and other political activists claimed,
didn’t erupt due to a sudden flare up in ethnic tension, rather it was a very well-organized ploy
to achieve certain political goals. Musharraf’s allies had wanted to demonstrate to the whole
country, and especially to their political contenders in the city, that Karachi didn’t stand with the
lawyers and the CJ.
Decades of inter-ethnic violence had turned most Karachiites impervious to displays of
power and violence, such as the one they experienced and witnessed on May 12 th. Often they had
witnessed rival political groups clash in the shadow of the state. May 12 th further obscured the
line between state and non-state violence. The state, owing to its passivity towards the MQMbacked armed men, further fragmented the city’s social and political landscape.
The memories of violence, detention and confinement, colored the lawyers’ and activists’
narratives of the movement. In the context of the movement, these fragmented memories
provided a milestone for many lawyers and activists as they were pieced together by them years
later. Spaces of violence were created and re-created in their imagination. The next bloody
milestone in the lawyers’ narrative of their movement would be the July 17th bomb blast in
Islamabad.

Blast in Islamabad, while the CJ’s Tour Continues
The state-backed display of violence on May 12th resulted in attracting more sympathy
for the CJ and support for the movement, whose impetus that same violence had intended to
break. The May 12th attacks had truly shocked the country. Journalists had telecast live gunfights
and filmed men freely roaming the streets with shotguns, rifles, pistols and even automatic
weapons in their hands. Aaj TV, a Karachi-based news channel, whose office was attacked and
shot at, live-telecasted the assault. These attacks were protested against all over the country and
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even in the diaspora by Pakistani activists and academics.17 Back in Islamabad, Chaudhry’s
defense team had been regularly appearing before the Council. On April 18th, Atizaz Ahsan and
Gohar Ali Khan filed a Constitutional Petition on Chaudhry’s behalf, in the Supreme Court,. The
petition:
raised 132 questions on the competence of the SJC to try the Chief Justice. These
include[d]: constitution of the Supreme Judicial Council without the CJP, the
personal bias and prospects of advancement of some members of the council, alleged
mala fide of the referring authority and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, the haste with
which the referring authority (the president) acted against the CJP, illegal suspension
and forced leave, illegal assumption of office by the Acting Chief Justice, the executive
assault on the independence of judiciary and in-camera proceedings of the SJC. (Iqbal
2007)
Chaudhry had challenged the judicial reference by filing the petition under Article 184(3), which
empowers the Supreme Court to intervene in matters to do with the enforcement of
fundamental rights. It is important to note that the Supreme Court was often appealed to
intercede on the basis of the same article, and its governmental practices were invited in the
name of securing life, freedom and security of the citizens.
On the political front, even after the troubling events of Karachi, the lawyers refused to
be cowed down and continued with their mobilizations across the country. On June 2nd, the CJ
was driven to Abbottabad, on invitation from its High Court Bar Association. Malik claimed it
took fifteen hours for a 120-km long journey (2008, 113). Thousands of lawyers and activists
joined at Taxila and Haripur (2008, 111-112). The region of Hazara was considered a traditional
stronghold of Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N (in exile then). On the other hand, along with the local
bars, civil society NGO (Non-Governmental Organizations) activists and political parties in the
Hazara region provided additional resources and sites for organizing protests. The Umar Asghar
Khan Foundation set up a two day camp in Abbottabad and announced rallies on the day of the
CJ’s visit.
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On June 16th, the famous journey to Faisalabad took place.18 Atizaz Ahsan electrified the
crowds there, when he spoke of “a new contract between state and its citizens based on social
justice” (Malik 2008, 117). He would later give his re-imagination of the Pakistani state a poetic
form in his oft-recited Aaj aur Kal (discussed in later chapters). The CJ’s caravan took 22 hours
to reach Faisalabad through Central Punjab – making stops at Chakwal, Talagang, Bheera,
Chiniot and Sargodha. These cities were in festive mood to receive the CJ. The Chiniot Bar
Association had even arranged for the traditional horse dance in honor of their guests. The
network of bars (from district to smaller tehsils) across Pakistan, as I mentioned earlier, played
a crucial role in organizing and mobilizing their local, and not only legal, professional networks.
Ahsan, Malik and Kurd addressed the people wherever the lawyers’ procession stopped. Except
for at the bars, the CJ never addressed or spoke to the public. Conscious of allegations of
politicizing his suspension case, the CJ always discussed jurisprudential and public interest
topics in his speeches at the bars.
The lawyers now turned towards Southern Punjab. The next stop scheduled for the CJ
was Multan on June 23rd. Malik accompanied the CJ to Lahore, where they stayed the night and
left for Multan early in the morning, once again taking the G.T. Road. Malik recalled, as their
convoy reached the New Campus Bridge in Lahore, hundreds of “university students and their
professors in black robes” had lined up on both sides of the road; “activists of various political
parties showered rose petals while the university students offered drinking water and lunch
boxes” (Malik 2008, 118). Urban middle-class youth and university students (mostly of the
private, prestigious schools, such as LUMS in Lahore) were amongst the first to join the protests
in Islamabad and Lahore (as I discuss in Chapter 5). Led by their teachers, these students
idealized resistance against General Musharraf’s military rule and often spoke in the ‘apolitical’
language of human rights and the rule of law. After a drive of 36 hours, the CJ finally reached

Young activists and university students joined the protest march in Faisalabad, and I discuss
their narratives in Chapter 5.
18

58

Multan – passing through Cheechawatni, Mian Channu and Khanewal, “where people had
camped all night on the roads to receive him” (Malik 2008, 119).
On July 14th, it would take the lawyers and the CJ over 12 hours from the airport to the
LHC (Lahore High Court). A distance covered normally in about 45 mins. Students, activists and
lawyers had lined up on the streets once again. Thousands joined Chaudhry’s convoy as he made
his way, through the jammed streets of Lahore, to the LHC.
After Lahore, the lawyers decided to complete their mobilization loop and end their
campaign at Islamabad. The Supreme Court decision was due on July 20th and so, a rally and
address by the CJ was announced for July 17th at the Islamabad District Bar.

July 17th: Islamabad Blast, Political Revival and Betrayal
Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry was scheduled to arrive at precisely 8:30
pm at the Islamabad District Courts on July 17th. However, as the Islamabad Bar’s President
Haroon Rasheed, who had been asked to accompany the CJ, was delayed, the lawyers’ caravan
left his residence late in the evening. Around 8:30 pm, Munir A. Malik received a call from the
District Courts that a bomb had gone off near the stage, from where the CJ was to address the
lawyers. Although the local administration claimed a suicide bomber had struck, when Malik
reached the Courts, he witnessed “some persons using shovels to fill up a crater” at the site of
the blast (2008, 124). The bomb, Malik alleged, was timed to go off (which it did at 8:30) at the
CJ’s arrival because he was the intended target (ibid.). A number of suicide blasts and attacks on
security forces had followed the military operation against Lal Masjid on July 3rd, 2007
(discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Benazir Bhutto, it is important to mention, had taken a very
critical stand against ‘terrorism’ in the country, and her stance was seen as suspiciously close to
the ‘Western’ discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’. The bomb went off about 30 meters away from
her party, the PPP’s, welcome camp, set up for the CJ’s arrival; 15 persons, mostly PPP workers,
died and around 45 were injured.
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Among the seriously wounded was Dr. Israr Shah. Shah was a veteran PPP activist, who
had been associated with the party since the 1970s. He was a veterinarian and ran a small
business in the Industrial Area of Islamabad. Shah was at the PPP Camp at the time of the blast.
He lost both his legs.
Even in the absence of its chairperson, Benazir Bhutto (who was in exile), the PPP had
been able to proactively contribute to the protests and provide leadership to the movement –
mostly through its Lawyers’ Wing.19 Atizaz Ahsan, after all, had been a diehard PPP man for
decades. However, the PPP had also activated its organization, while its activists and leaders
were always present at the protests. Since Shah was in Islamabad, he was responsible for
coordinating and organizing party workers and protests. “I would manage flags, placards and
attend the CJ’s hearings, on the direction of Bhutto”, he explained. On July 17 th, Shah was
standing at the PPP camp. “There was a loud bang, that’s all I remember”, he recalled, “and then
I lost consciousness”. Shah also alleged that “the bomb was remotely controlled and placed close
to our Camp. The blast was pre-planned”. Shah had lost a lot of blood by the time he arrived at
the closest hospital. “My life is a miracle in medical history”, he exclaimed, “my right arm was
damaged and my ear drums were ruptured. I had plastic surgeries all over. My whole body was
punctured by the ball bearings in the bomb. My face was saved. I battled death for 3-4 days on
the respirator, but Allah saved my life”.
State violence has shadowed Shah for most of his political life. Many activists like him
spoke of their protests by invoking the historical memory of military violence and coups of the
past. Shah was arrested and tortured during General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law (1977-1988),
especially when he joined the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) in the early
1980s. “I always had a romance with politics. I spent my youth in jail. I have seen CID’s (Central
Investigation Department) torture cells in the [infamous] Shahi Fort in Lahore. I was tortured in

Bigger political parties, such as PPP, PML-N, and JI, run their own ‘Lawyers’ Wing’, which
often play important roles in bar elections and politics.
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those cells. I witnessed the brutality of the Army during Zia’s regime. But I feel honored, and I
am proud, that I was a part of the fight against martial law.”
PPP activists had daringly challenged General Zia’s brutal martial rule (1977-1988).
Along with activists of the left political and nationalist parties, PPP workers were severely beaten
and tortured and imprisoned by Zia’s military. These activists would often speak of and
contextualize their protest actions in terms of the pain, suffering and resistance endured against
the martial law and military rulers of the past. For these activists, that political history and its
violence always formed the imaginary background for the protest actions against General
Musharraf, and was often explicitly referenced as such in their narratives. Even though the
majority of PPP activists candidly acknowledged that they joined the protests on the direction of
their party’s leadership – rather than an ideological affinity with the CJ or the lawyers – they
would often equate the state’s abuse of Chaudhry to the suffering of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at the
hands of the military. Pakistan’s political history was marred by violence, torture, betrayal and
the excesses of state power for these activists – the majority of whom were politically orphaned
after Benazir Bhutto’s death; Bhutto died in a suicide blast on December 27th, 2007 – five
months after the Islamabad blast.
After two months of surgeries and rest, Shah decided to go home. It had taken him ten
days to learn that he had sacrificed both his legs for PPP and the Bhuttos, in a movement for the
‘rule of law’. Doctors had placed pillows where his legs ought to be; he picked up the sheet,
despite his wife’s plea, and saw that “a six feet tall man had been turned into half”. “It was a new
life for me”, he stated; “most people live with their legs, but there are a few who do it on
wheelchairs”.
A big rally was organized to take Shah home. “We made stops all over the city and I
addressed the crowds”, he explained with glowing pride. “I entered my home with the party flag
in my hand”, he added. Shah reaffirmed his “support for the Lawyers’ Movement and the
commitment to democracy”. While he was in the hospital, Bhutto had returned to Pakistan.
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When she visited him in the hospital, he was offered an election ticket to contest from
Islamabad. Shah lost to a “corrupt real-estate tycoon” in the parliamentary elections next year.
He was bitter about his defeat by a “crooked, corrupt politician”; Islamabadis had chosen a realestate developer over a die-hard, committed, middle-class political worker.
“The history of the Lawyers’ Movement is written on my body”, Shah passionately
asserted. I “gave parts of my body to the Movement”, he added. Shah is a witness to history of
the Lawyers’ Movement, whose violence is inscribed on his body. Post-restoration, lawyers and
activists often expressed their disappointment and resentment by invoking their sacrifices and
suffering for the rule of law and democracy – two central ideological slogans of the Lawyers’
Movement. The lawyers had indeed suffered financially – as courts were regularly boycotted –
and faced state violence in their protests, but it was Shah’s body which bore the ultimate
political sacrifice – recognized at least by the lawyers. When the CJ was finally restored, it was
Shah who was asked to re-hoist the national flag at his residence. “The CJ had announced that
the flag at my home will only be hoisted by Dr. Israr Shah. And I was the one who raised the
flag”, he proudly stated.
May 12th and July 17th are remembered as bloody milestones in the lawyers’ and
activists’ memory of the movement. These men and women often spoke of their sacrifices in the
movement with reference to these two days. Moreover, these dates were frequently invoked to
shape the narrative of a peaceful movement. Munir A. Malik, Atizaz Ahsan and many others
repeatedly emphasized that their movement was essentially a peaceful mobilization. The
Pakistani lawyers had risen against Musharraf in the backdrop of a violent insurgency in the
country’s north-west. The Pakistani security forces had been locked in a violent stalemate with
Taliban groups in the tribal and some of the settled areas, such as Swat, in that region. However,
political activists also spoke of their peaceful resistance to military rule in the context of the
coups and the collective memory of protests against military take overs in the past. General Zia’s
martial law regime was one of the most brutal in their collective memory; political activists and
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dissenters were publicly flogged, disappeared and tortured by Zia’s military and intelligence
apparatus. The blast at the Islamabad District Courts marked the end of the lawyers’ blazing
campaign across Pakistan, and three days later, the Supreme Court delivered its verdict on the
CJ’s petition.

The July 20th Verdict and the Coup
In its July 20th Short Order, the Supreme Court restored Chaudhry (with 3 judges
dissenting) and declared General Musharraf’s reference to be “mala fide”, based on “personal
interest and bias” (C.P. 21/2007, 271).20 In its postcolonial history, Pakistan’s higher judiciary
had never so openly challenged a military ruler and overruled his directions. The judges had
engaged in tacit resistance against military rule before; however, they were popularly known for
extending legitimacy to Army takeovers (Newberg 1995). Their decision to reinstate Chaudhry
was applauded and it lent popular support and moral legitimacy to the higher courts. The
lawyers and activists were jubilant at their victory, but many also knew that Musharraf’s
presidential elections were about to take place and the challenges to his candidacy would soon
be raised in the same Supreme Court, once again under Chaudhry. Malik and Atizaz wanted to
pose a constitutional challenge to Musharraf’s candidacy, but in order to do so, they needed to
file a presidential candidate of their own.21
After his restoration, Chaudhry once again turned towards public interest issues. He had
returned to the office through a display of people’s power, and so he started to lead the SC as a
populist judge. “Judicial activism” and its governmental interventions returned to the Supreme
Court (Siddiqi 2014), and soon the CJ took notice of the missing persons of the Lal Masjid
operation (Chapters 2 & 7); questioned the government on prices of everyday commodities; took
up the issue of false voter lists; the human organs’ smuggling and transplantation; the CDA’s
The bench issued short order first and, as is the practice, gave its detailed judgement later on.
In order to challenge Musharraf’s eligibility as a presidential candidate, they needed to
become an interested party and could thus file under Article 184(3).
20
21
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(Capital Development Authority) illegal awarding of land leases; and the women rights, ‘honor
killings’ (Chapter 8) and ‘Jirga justice’ (Malik 2008, 200-03). These interventions were
launched against the state’s bureaucracy and security apparatus, and extended judicial reach
into the social and cultural spheres of everyday Pakistani life. Rather than to rule or discipline,
the Court intervened to ensure the safety, security and welfare of the aam admi.
While the Chaudhry Court was indulging itself in reprimanding the incompetent and
‘corrupt’ civilian and police bureaucracy, the lawyers were preparing for a legal showdown with
Musharraf. They convinced a well-respected retired Justice of the SC from Karachi, Wajihuddin
Ahmed, to become their presidential candidate. Soon after, the lawyers submitted a
constitutional petition against Musharraf’s candidacy, whose nomination papers had been
accepted by the Election Commission Pakistan. This petition was filed under Article 184(3) as
well; Hamid Khan had prepared it, with the help from Wajihuddin (Malik 2008, 223). Malik,
Kurd and Tariq Mehmood decided to act as the counsels in the case. A ten member bench
granted the lawyers stay; that is, Musharraf was allowed to take part in the presidential elections
but the official notification of results was to be held until the SC decided on the petition. As
expected, Musharraf was re-elected as President by the provincial and national assemblies on
October 6th, 2007.
As proceedings in the SC lingered on, many feared the Musharraf government’s reaction
to the protracted litigation against his elections. Soon, rumors of an imposition of Emergency
(martial law) started to circulate. It was also rumored that Chaudhry was re-entrenching his
position and waiting for General Musharraf to hand over Pakistan’s powerful Army command to
his successor (ISI Chief Kiyani), as per his agreement with Bhutto – that was apparently
brokered by the Americans. Once he had done so, Musharraf would forfeit the power to impose
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martial law. As a civilian President, then, could also be tried for his unconstitutional actions:
Army take over against an elected government (in 1999) and coup against the higher judiciary.22
The afternoon of November 3rd, 2007, as Munir A. Malik landed at the Islamabad Airport
from Karachi, he learned that Musharraf had gone ahead and imposed Emergency in the
country. The sections of the constitution to do with the Fundamental Rights had been
suspended. The SC judges had been escorted home and put under house arrest. Atizaz Ahsan
had already been arrested from his office. Soon, Malik heard the familiar knock on the door of
his hotel room. With the imposition of Emergency, the Lawyers’ Movement entered its next
stage. The lawyers and activists, who had returned home, were back on the streets in protest.

Post Emergency to Restoration
The next phase of the Lawyers’ Movement would be marked by Musharraf’s resignation
as the Chief of Army Staff (he would keep the office of the President), Benazir Bhutto’s death
(December 2007), the PPP’s re-taking of the government after parliamentary elections in
February 2008, the First Long March against the reluctant PPP government to restore the CJ (in
June 2008), the Second Long March and the restoration of the CJ (on March 16th, 2009) as a
result of that March, led by PML-N’s Nawaz Sharif from Lahore, Punjab.
After weeks of imprisonment in various jails and demotion from Class A to Class B
prison, Munir A. Malik fell seriously ill. Musharraf, by then, had appointed Justice Dogar as the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The judges, who refused to take oath under the Musharraf
government’s second PCO (Provisional Constitution Order), were removed. The SC, under
Dogar, dismissed petitions filed against Musharraf’s presidential election; he had now
constitutionally secured the office of the President. Malik, after release from prison and due
treatment, joined the protesting lawyers once again.
If these were truly Chaudhry’s views, history proved him wrong. The Army openly protected
Musharraf after he resigned as the president in 2008. Cases against him are still pending in the
courts.
22
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Benazir Bhutto’s death on December 27th, 2007 in a suicide blast in Rawalpindi, the
PPP’s victory in subsequent elections and the government-backed PML-Q’s humiliating defeat
further weakened Musharraf’s grip on power and the legitimacy to rule. PPP’s Prime Minister
Gillani (who would be disqualified by the Chaudhry Court three years later), soon after taking
oath, freed all judges from detention. As the movement to restore Chaudhry, and now the other
judges, who had refused to take oath under Musharraf’s second PCO, would once again pick up
momentum (the PPP was reluctant to restore the CJ but would eventually restore other judges),
the lawyers and activists continued to organize protests and marches. The First Long March,
organized by the lawyers in June 2008, brought out hundreds of thousands from their bloc on to
the streets of Rawalpindi and Islamabad (discussed in later chapters). Musharraf’s resignation,
following the Long March, in August 2008, was considered a long-awaited triumph of the
Lawyers’ Movement. Even though the politics of the post-Emergency movement would disturb
the sensibilities of many ‘liberal’ human rights and political activists, seeing as Islamists and
even militant groups and their sympathizers would attempt to dominate the historical bloc
supporting the Movement (especially after the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007), the lawyers
and their bar associations would sustain the Movement to restore the judiciary.

Conclusion
The lawyers and political activists interpreted the event of the CJ’s humiliation and the
violence, pain and suffering, which they themselves and their comrades had experienced – in
both instances by a military state – in the context of a historical, collective memory of previous
martial laws and excesses of state power. This historical memory rendered continuity to a
fragmented and troubled history. Latif Mughal, the PPP worker we met above, made this astute
observation: “We had seen military dictatorships in the past and fought against them; rebellion
against military rule is inside us; it moved us to come out against this dictatorship too”. And yet,
the party itself had betrayed these activists, after Benazir Bhutto’s death, when most of the
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veteran PPP activists were ignored or sidelined in decision-making or just made irrelevant in the
party. PPP, under Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, lost most of its ideological prowess and
commitment. Dr. Israr Shah, who lost the most for the Movement and for the party, was bitter
about how political workers are treated today. “Worker badqismati se iss nizaam ki Bhatti ka
eindhan hai [Our political system runs on the blood of the workers, but they are so easily
discarded and thrown away]”, he lamented. The memory of the Movement was thus painfully
entangled with the disappointments and betrayals of the present.
The emotions invoked by the images of the CJ’s humiliation, according to lawyers and
activists, enraged many – moving them to protest. The events and their images informed their
political agency. The lawyers, like Malik, who would soon lead the movement against Musharraf,
closely noted these emotions. The marches and drives across Pakistan were planned to mobilize
and diffuse these political emotions across the country, along its political artery, the G.T. Road.
Violent confrontations, blockades and blasts were carried out to stymie the movement and the
inspiring force in its ideological appeal, as represented in the liberal language of rights, justice,
democracy and the rule of law.
In this chapter, I have made use of the lawyers’ and political activists’ memories and
stories to map a historical, multi-perspectival narrative of the movement. In later chapters, I
continue to follow this method. The next chapter focuses on the ashrafia middle-class, the
lawyers, the human and women rights activists (the Pakistani ‘civil society’, which was once the
beneficiary of Musharraf’s moderate, ‘secular’, de-centralized, local governance) and how they
all converged upon the notion of the ‘rule of law’, albeit imparting various contradictory
meanings.
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Fig. 1. Chief Justice Chaudhry meets General Musharraf. Courtesy of Dawn News. Published
March 10th, 2007.

Fig. 2. Chaudhry manhandled by the police. Courtesy of The Express Tribune. Published
December 11, 2013.
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CHAPTER 2
Convergence Without Consensus: Ashrafia Middle-Class, The Unruly
Lawyers and the Politics of the Rule of Law
Adal ke awano me sunlo asli munsif phir aaen ge

The true Justice will return to the
courts
Roti kapra aur ghar apna janta ko hum dilwaen ge
And we will all then prosper
Aata bijli paani eindhan sab ko saste daam mile ga
All that we need, will be
provided
Berozgaron ko harmumkin rozgar aur kaam mile ga
All the unemployed will find
work
Riyasat ho gi maa ke jaisi
The State will take care of us as a
mother does
Haar shaerri se pyar kare gi
And will take care of all of its
citizens
Fauj lage gi saab ko achi jab sarhad ke pass rahe gi
The Army will be admired too,
when it will protect the borders
Aur Moh. Ali Jinnah ne logon dekha tha jo sapna sab ka Jinnah had a dream
Sari dunya par ab ho ga saya eik hi rab ka
Of one God for all
Woh rab sanjha woh rab sacha
One true God for all
Har mazhab har dharam ka wo rab hai
For all religions, all faiths
Muslim, hundu sikh esayi, har insaan pe karam ka rab hai For Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and
Christians
Sanjha malik sanjha khaliq us ke dar pe sab hasil hai
There is One creator of us all
Adam-tashadat us ka rasta aaman hamara mustaqbil hai Who teaches us peace, which is our
future
Jaao jaao sab se keh do qadam hamare rukh nahi sakte Join and march with us
Jaao jaao sub se keh do sar hum sab se jhuk nahi sakte
Tell the powerful that we will not
bow our heads
Zalim qur ghasib ki dushman janta hum se ahid kare gi To injustice and in front of the
unjust
Mazlum ki akhir wohi jarri jadhojahid rahe gi
The oppressed will keep on
resisting
Rasta thora hi bajki hai
We are close to victory
Dekho dekho wo manzil hai
Look!
Zalim daar ke bagh raha hai
Look, the oppressor is retreating
Jeet hamara mustaqbil hai
It is We who will win!
~ Barrister Atizaz Ahsan, Aaj Aur Kal
On the morning of March 10th, 2007, Mrs. Ahmad1 picked up her newspaper and sat
down to have breakfast with her husband, a retired Major General, in their drawing room. The
front page of the English daily that day featured the infamous photograph of the recentlydeposed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, being
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Pseudonym

forced into a police car. The police officers encircling Chaudhry looked on as one of them pulled
Chaudhry by his hair and pushed him into the car.2 The day following the manhandling of the
Chief Justice by the police, and its spectacular coverage in the national dailies, Mrs. Ahmad, who
had never been to a political rally or protest before, was standing enraged on the steps of the
Supreme Court in Islamabad.
Accompanying her outside the Court were a handful of Islamabad’s human rights and
political activists and local ‘non-partisan’ concerned citizens (like herself), carrying placards in
their hands, demanding Chaudhry’s reinstatement. “You can’t do this to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; it was like the sikha shahi [rule of the jungle] of a military ruler”, Mrs. Ahmad
would later tell me. “One just felt so strongly that if this sort of thing can happen to the Chief
Justice of Pakistan, who is then spared?”, she continued. The lawyers, students and political
activists, both of the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’, would soon join her in these protests. However, the
majority of these middle-class protesters would claim to be ‘non-political’, or as some would
explain, ‘apolitical concerned citizens’. They would argue that their protests were purely for the
sake of a principle (to restore the Chief Justice and higher judiciary) and to speak out against the
Chief Justice’s humiliation. They didn’t intend, many claimed, to participate in the ‘dirty and
corrupt’ sphere of the traditional politics. As many would ruefully explain to me, they came out
to protect and defend the rule of law – to save the institution of the higher judiciary – and not to
secure the position of a single person, the Chief Justice Chaudhry.
In this chapter, I examine how the urban, educated, professional middle-class men and
women – “the Salariat” (Alavi 2002, 5121 and 1982, 299) – and senior and young junior lawyers
converged upon the notion of the rule of law in the Lawyers’ Movement. The discourses of the
rule of law, human and constitutional rights and (social) justice played a major role in this

These overzealous police officers were apparently attempting to stop the Chief Justice from
attending his office as General Musharraf, the Army Chief and Chief Executive of the state at the
time, had ordered him under house arrest. I have discussed in detail this image and the
emotions invoked amongst the lawyers and activists in the last chapter. See figure 2.
2
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mobilization as the movement was able to articulate a new “political imaginary” through them,
one which claimed to counter the excessive exercise of state power and political and moral
‘corruption’ in an ‘apolitical’ neoliberal language (Iqtidar 2014; Taylor 2003). The lawyers
succeeded in creating a “historical bloc” against the military rule of General Musharraf by
synthesizing the liberal legality of the professional and educated urban middle-class with the
popular politics of discontent of the other “intermediate” traditional classes (Gramsci 2000, 192;
Aijaz Ahmed 1996, 44), such as the traders and shopkeepers, petty businessmen and Islamists
and trade and labor unionists, whom identified with the figure of the deposed Chief Justice
Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. Chaudhry was widely perceived to have stood up against the
arbitrary exercise of military power in the country (Gramsci 1971, 365, 377, 418).
The convergence of various professional and political groups was made possible in the
Lawyers’ Movement by an identification with the deposed Chief Justice. The event of his
manhandling and dismissal were recognized by the lawyers and middle-class protestors as yet
another exercise of excessive state power against an emerging challenge to a military ruler in the
country. For others, it revived the historical memory of betrayal, humiliations, violence and
military coups in Pakistan and moved them to protest action. However, these diverse protestors
imputed multiple non-normative meanings and political aspirations to the rule of law.
The educated middle class desired for the postcolonial state to reach political modernity
– to finally mature as a modern, democratic nation-state – through the enforcement of the rule
of law and liberal rights. An aversion toward the disorder inherent to the “political society”
(Chatterjee 2004, 53) and the ubiquity of violent, unruly politics, indicative of a “crisis of liberal
democracy” (Schmitt 1985 [1923]), and the demand for a radical judicial intervention in the
social and political spheres, shaped their imaginary.3 On the other hand, some of the senior
lawyers recuperated the colonial mapping of the extant legal topography of power and excess at
the geographical as well as social margins of the state (Das and Poole 2004), and identified the
3

In Chapter 8, I take up this point in detail in the discussion on ‘honor killings’.
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rule of law as an instrument to rectify uneven legal development – the absence of the rule of law
and prevalence of tribal, traditional forms of justice – in the nation-state. Both intended, invited
and partook in interventions to reach and to save the men and women suffering between the
uneven legal margins of the state.
However, there also existed ideological differences amongst the senior lawyers leading
the movement, as some of them construed the rule of law and the restoration of judiciary to be
‘progressive’ steps towards achieving substantive justice in Pakistan. Amongst the lawyers, the
young, ‘unruly’ junior ones diverged both from the educated middle class and from their legal
ideologues (the senior lawyers), as they identified the senior lawyers’ elite with the corrupt
ruling class of the country.
The Lawyers’ Movement therefore emerged as a conjunctural site (Callinicos 2005) for
an organic expression of the middle-class “conception of the state” (Gramsci 2000, 194). Not
only “political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has its subject top political
leaders and personalities with direct government responsibilities” (2000, 177) took shape in the
movement, but also historical and structural inequalities, injustices and state excesses were
spoken of and critiqued. A new conception of the postcolonial state, based on the rule of law,
was forwarded by the lawyers and the professional educated middle-classes. There were of
course tensions between different aspirations and meanings of the rule of law and where they
were referenced socially, culturally and politically. The movement had become a site upon which
diverse groups converged from different trajectories and brought forth their skeptical or
aspirational meanings and interpretations of a state based on the rule of law.
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The Salariat Middle-Class and its Aversion to ‘Irrational Politics’ and Populist Rule
Ghazala Minallah, Mrs. Ahmad, and her close friend Aslam Khan,4 whose father was a
retired diplomat, were amongst the first Islamabadis to initiate the protest at the Supreme Court
against the Chief Justice’s dismissal. All three belonged to Pakistan’s ashrafia class (the
salaried, educated middle-class). Hamza Alavi has argued that the “salary-dependent class of
Muslim government servants, called the ‘salariat’”, led the movement for Independence in
British India and alongside the “military-bureaucracy oligarchy” continued to play a major role
in the political economy of the postcolonial state after Independence (Alavi 1972, 59-81). I
extend Alavi’s classification “ashrafia class” to include not only those salaried classes who
played a major role in the movement for Independence, but also their educated and professional
offspring. I also include in this class the mid and high-level bureaucrats (most of whom were
retired) alongside those educated and professional salaried middle-class men and women, who
shared their political sensibilities: politics as a non-violent, ‘civilized’ and non-disruptive
practice.5 On the other hand, ‘the salariat’ class, as I discussed in the introduction, helps define
differences within intermediate middle-classes between petty businessmen, traders and
bazaaris and those who depend upon the state or private, corporate sector for employment but
share the same aspirations and precarities.
Mrs. Ahmad’s father, she told me, “was the private secretary to Field Marshall Sir Claude
Auchinleck (Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army) in 1946-47”, and “so he saw the
making of Pakistan from very close quarters”. It was the “emotional feeling for Pakistan,” rooted
in the memory of the struggle for Independence, that led Mrs. Ahmad to protest in March 2007,
because she experienced the Chief Justice’s dismissal as the “last straw” in the tragic political
Pseudonym.
See Barbara Metcalf (1984) on “adab” as the repository of ashrafia moral behavior and
dispositions. I am aware that ashraf (well-educated and belonging to elite families) was used to
designate north Indian Muslims, distinguished from ajlaf (the ‘other’ Muslims). My use of the
term ashraf extends the classification and the distinction built upon it to suggest that this
distinction can be useful to investigate how the aam admi appears to have replaced ajlaf in
political imaginary of the educated middle-classes in postcolonial Pakistan.
4
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history of post-Partition Pakistan. Many protestors from the ashrafia salariat class experienced
the Chief Justice’s dismissal and his subsequent humiliation as the reflection of an already
decaying political culture, which had now, finally, taken its fatal fall.

The Salariat Ashrafia Class
In his seminal work on Pakistani state and society, Hamza Alavi has placed the ashrafia
salariat class at the center of the Pakistan Movement and at the political forefront in the early
postcolonial state. Alavi argued that the salariat class provided a major thrust to Muslim
nationalist politics in British India. Rooted in Northern India, specifically, the Muslim minority
provinces of United Provinces and Bihar and its Persianite culture (Metcalf 1984), the Muslim
ashrafia were those urban, educated professionals who had historically been trained in Persian
and employed by the state; they felt threatened when the British switched the state vernacular
from the Persian to English. The “Hindu service castes”, Alavi argued, were quick to adapt to
this change, while the ashrafia struggled to regain their place. It was in the context of this
precarity of the Muslim ashrafia class that Muslim nationalist politics took shape in India:
It was in northern India, that modern Indian Muslim politics were triggered off by the
new Anglo-vernacular language policy that was introduced by the British in the 19th
century. It abolished the use of Persian as the official language. Persian was the language
of the northern Indian, Muslim Ashraf, the pre-colonial ruling elite. Abolition of Persian
as the official language hit them hard. To qualify for government jobs, they had to take to
English education. Hindu service castes, like kayasthas, khatris and Kashmiri Brahmins
in northern India (or the baidyas, kayasthas and Brahmins in Bengal) took to English
education more rapidly and competed more successfully for jobs than the Muslim Ashraf
had previously monopolized. Muslims began to lose their primacy. (Alavi 2002, 5120)
Amongst the ashrafia, Alavi further argued, two of the three main groups painfully felt this
social and economic regression: the ulema6 and the educated ashraf. The landed ashrafia had
already aligned themselves with the British. Historically, the ulema had led the Muslim juridical
and legal life and the shift in formal state legality severely affected them. However,

6

Traditional religious scholars. See Zaman 2002, on their social roles and history in Islam.
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The most important Ashraf group … behind modern Indian Muslim politics, were the
educated Ashraf who depended mainly on careers in government employment. I have
designated them as the ‘salariat’, i.e., those who aspire to and depend on careers in
salaried employment, overwhelmingly in the government in the absence of a large
enough private sector. Associated with the salariat were professionals such as lawyers
and doctors. For them the new language policy meant that they too had to have English
education. Competing with the Muslim salariat and professionals were Hindus who
aspired to similar employment in government or as professionals. Unfortunately, given
the communal (caste!) structure of Indian society, Muslim and Hindu members of the
salariat and professionals were pitted against each other because their lives and careers
were embedded within rival institutionalized communities. The mutual competition
between the Muslim and Hindu salariat was of no direct concern for the vast majority
of Muslims or Hindus. (2002, 5120)
Post Khilafat Movement (1919-1922), the core of Muslim nationalist politics shifted from
Northern India (the Muslim minority provinces) to the Muslim majority provinces, where the
Muslim landed elite gradually took over the nationalist movement:
By the time secularists like Jinnah, who had left the Muslim League at the time of
the Khilafat movement, rejoined it, it was a changed Muslim League in a radically
changed political (and constitutional) context. As a result, the center of gravity had
shifted from Muslim minority provinces like UP and its salariat base, to Muslim majority
provinces and their dominating feudal landed magnates. That happened because of the
implementation of the Montague-Chelmsford reforms under the government of India act
of 1919. Under that act, limited power was transferred to Indian ministers, at the
provincial level, over certain departments of the government. That injected a new logic in
Indian politics. From then on distribution of state patronage by Indian ministers began
to play a part in building up political support. (2002, 5123)
However, by then, the Muslim middle-classes had taken their place in the broader Indian
nationalist politics, which drew its ideological strength to resist colonial rule from the new
principles of colonial rule and modernity: the sovereignty of the people based on the rule of law
(Gilmartin 2017).7
In the early years of the postcolonial state, the northern ashrafia continued to maintain
their leading place in the Pakistani state, mainly in the bureaucratic and, to a limited extent, in
the military apparatus, which had historically been dominated by the Punjabis and Pashtuns
from the north-west. However, the ashrafia class lost its privileged position within the political

I have discussed the historical relationship between modern notions of sovereignty, the
educated middle-classes and nationalist politics in detail in the introduction. See also Gilmartin
2017 and 2010.
7
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economy of the state as post-Independence Pakistan drifted through several military coups and
the state became increasingly dominated by the landed, military and bureaucracy from the
Punjab. With the rise of populist leaders (like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) and politics (carried out
around economic and political emancipation) in the 1960s and 1970s, this educated,
professional class further retreated from the sphere of popular, electoral politics, expressing
disdain for the emerging popular politics that was replacing the elite, ashrafia nationalist
politics of the pre-Partition era.
Within this class and its offspring of the educated middle-class, an aversion to
emotional, ‘violent and disruptive’ popular politics continues even today. For example, Aslam
Khan told me that after the first few days of protesting against Chaudhry’s dismissal at the
Supreme Court, “the young junior lawyers joined in, and of course, when the lawyers joined in,
things got out of hand. We lost that purity, adab and tameez [cultured behavior], of standing
quietly to protest. In our protests, I don’t think we even stepped on a blade of grass”. The
lawyers’ outrage and emotional protests violated ashrafia moral comportment. Once the young,
rowdy lawyers joined in, the purity of the civilized protest and its underlying politics, were lost.
Many of these ‘petty’ lawyers, as I noticed during my fieldwork, albeit part of the new salariat
class (and not from the traditional ashrafia), belonged to either working or lower-middle class
families and had migrated to cities from rural areas and small towns. Most of these young men
saw legal profession as a path for upward social and economic mobility. Only a handful had
attended the English-medium private schools that Islamabad’s protesting elite patronized. Most
lacked the cultural capital to socially connect to this class. What in fact did bind the young
lawyers in political action with the ashrafia was the liberal, constitutional language of rights and
the rule of law.
“When the lawyers joined us, it became noisy, it went out of control, and turned violent”,
Aslam Khan continued. The young lawyers seemingly expressed their fury and turned their
civilized protest into a raging crowd. Crowds were indeed a matter of fascination and concern
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for the bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Europe, and researchers, including Gustave Le Bon,
and later Sigmund Freud, studied them as peculiar scientific objects of politics. For Le Bon, a
crowd possessed a collective mind, was prone to irrational outbursts, and was mostly composed
of the unruly elements of a society (1896). Historians of popular politics, such as George Rude,
criticized these approaches to popular unrest in their work on mass protests and their
underlying ideologies in the nineteenth century Europe (1981). Rather than romanticizing
popular protest, Rude focused on the “underlying body of ideas” and the relationship between
the “inherent” and the “derived” ideology (1980, 1, 22). In South Asia, politics of discontent and
moral outrage have often fashioned crowd protests as well and the state manages these
emotions carefully (Blom 2008). The lawyers however were furious not only because of the
Chief Justice’s humiliation and the violation of the rule of law, but they had their own structural,
professional grievances, towards the senior lawyers as well as the state. I briefly look at this
relationship in the context of the afore-mentioned young lawyers below and then in detail in
Chapter 4.
In liberal political theory, the aversion to ‘the irrational’ in politics, as well as the lament
for reason, persuasion and debate have also been expressed by the critics of parliamentary
democracy (Schmitt 1985 [1923]). However, in the case of Pakistan, the distance that the urban
educated middle-class has maintained from popular politics needs historical contextualization
of its own.
Following a surge in popular politics, brought about by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s populist
mobilizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Pakistani middle-class found itself caught in
a state of nationalist-socialist euphoria, which subsided once Bhutto’s centralized rule took full
swing against any form of dissent. This disenchantment with popular politics was further
exacerbated with the return of the military rule in 1977. During General Zia’s reign (1977-1988),
this class was further disillusioned by the blurring of boundaries between local-level-patronage,
ethnicity, religion and politics, as Zia manipulated both national and local-level politics to
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weaken the hold of political parties on the electorate. His political manipulations gave a
ubiquitous rise to a “politics of common-sense” and brought serious transformation in the class
structure of Pakistan (Akhter 2008, 15). New intermediate classes rose during the Zia era and
captured the space of civil society, again, not in opposition but in alliance and collusion with the
military and bureaucracy complex of the Pakistani state. The result was an enactment of a new
hegemonic bloc overshadowing the state and the governing society (Zaidi, Akhtar, and Akhter
2014).8
In 1985, General Zia held parliamentary elections on a strictly non-party basis – thus
encouraging the emergence of local strongmen from intermediate classes, representing diverse
ethnic, regional, sectarian and religious interests and groups. This fragmentation of popularpolitical power helped General Zia remain at the apex of a tightly controlled political system,
based on patronage and fueled by ‘corruption’. Pakistan’s use as a site of armed intervention –
in the name of global jihad – sponsored by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, in Soviet-occupied
Afghanistan, channeled new forms of political and class mobility. Drugs, weapons and other
commodities of violence gave rise to an illicit economy, within which the state, the military and
petty businessmen all shared the spoils of war (Hussain 2012).9
Meanwhile, the urban educated middle-class gradually distanced itself from this
dominant form of ‘uncivil’ and ‘unruly’ politics, assumed to be based on locally-rooted interests
and squabbles on primordial ethnic divisions. After the death of General Zia (in a yet unsolved
airplane crash in August 1988), Pakistanis went through a cycle of democratic governments.
Zia’s death had only made the Military take a seat behind the curtains; the Generals and their

In the introduction, I have discussed the relationship between the politics of the rule of law, the
intermediate classes and their fragmented hegemony in Pakistan.
9
On shadow war economies, see Nordstrom 2004 and 2007.
8
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spy agencies kept on exploiting political divisions and even secretly funded opposition political
parties.10
It was thus after decades of political dormancy that the urban, educated middle-class
joined protest action in the Lawyers’ Movement. The rule of law and the language of
constitutional rights provided a de-politicized frame, within which the lawyers, the ‘civil society’
and middle-class activists could take the lead in a protest movement directed at the
reconfiguration of the state and make claims upon it, while simultaneously keeping a distance
from the so-called corrupt politics of the ‘traditional’ ruling elites and some of their intermediate
class allies and financiers.
The tensions between political aspirations, popular emotions and governmental
practices and projects define what I call the politics of ‘convergence without consensus’. These
tensions were led by differing visions, desires and aspirations of what law and the rule of law
ought to do in postcolonial Pakistan.
The demand for a return to constitutional democracy and the rule of law allowed for the
making of a larger alliance between the lawyers, political parties and the urban professional
middle-class, although the meanings that each imputed to the rule of law and what they aspired
to achieve through it greatly differed.

The Unruly Jazbati [Emotional] Lawyers
It was at one of the protests, which were taking place almost every week outside the Chief
Justice’s official residence in Islamabad, that advocate Saira Khatoon became a daring ‘hero’ of
the protesting lawyers. Khatoon and many other women lawyers were quite active in the

See the famous Asghar Khan Case (H.R Case No. 19/2012), decided by Chief Justice
Chaudhry, in which the retired COAS Aslam Baig admitted providing funds to anti-PPP political
parties in the 1990 parliamentary elections.
10
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movement and even travelled with the Chief Justice on his long marches to mobilize and
address various bar associations across the country.11
Saira Khatoon claimed that she never withdrew from the frontlines of protests, even
when these protests were violently suppressed by the military government. Khatoon proudly
recalled in our interview that she would always be at the front of these protests, and never felt
the need for cover or protection, generously offered by her overly concerned male colleagues.
She explained, “we would all get tear-gassed during these protests, and so one day, the
policemen wanted to remove us from outside the CJ’s house, but we wouldn’t move. So, they
started to fire tear gas at us. A couple of shells landed near my feet. I picked them up, one by
one, and threw them back at the police. The next day, all the lawyers were praising my actions in
their speeches and one of them even wrote a poem about me”. It was not uncommon to see
angry young men and women in black coats pelting the riot police with whatever they could find
on the streets during these protests. Realizing their collective power and organizational potential
to disturb and unsettle the government, the young lawyers would often clash with police and
judges, even after their movement ended.12
These were the jazbati (emotional) ‘crowds’ that irritated the bourgeois sensibilities of
the civilized ashrafia protestors. In these protests, Khatoon felt as if she was completely
engulfed by anger and despair because of how the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had been
mistreated and humiliated publicly by the military. Khatoon, like many other lawyers, had
witnessed and was shocked by how the Chief Justice had been abused by the police publicly.
“Moral shock”, theorists of social movements argue, often emotionally seduces people to join
protest movements (Jasper 1997, 106). Khatoon explained, “Lawyers’ Movement ke waqat toh
hum peh jaisay eik bohut swaar tha. Hum neh khud ko eisa kar liya tha. Bas eik jazba tha
In Chapters 3 & 4, I discuss professional, class and cultural fragmentation amongst lawyers
and their mobilization of other middle-classes and bars in detail. In this and the following
section, I present a sketch of how the young, petty lawyers diverged professionally from their
seniors as well as culturally from the protesting ashrafia.
12
See Altaf 2017 and Dawn 2017.
11
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[During the time of the Movement it felt as if I was in a trance, or taken over by some mystical
force. That is how all of us lawyers had become. We were taken over by a single emotion]”.
Emotion of outrage quickly diffused among the lawyers, especially the young, petty ones. It was
their jazba which would drive and carry the movement for the next two years.
The day following the manhandling and dismissal of the Chief Justice,13 when Advocate
Mohammad Azhar arrived at the Islamabad District Court, he found that the lawyers there were
enraged because of the way in which the Chief Justice was dismissed. Everyone was so furious,
he explained, because a Chief Justice “can’t be removed in such an insulting manner; he can
only be dismissed through a due process of law. They pulled him by his ear and threw him out.
There was this footage that I saw in the news, in which five Army Generals were shown sitting
with the CJ and trying to force him into resigning”. For the educated middle-class as well as the
lawyers, the CJ’s dismissal was an open and deliberate violation of procedure.14 For Azhar and
the lawyers assembled there, many of whom would soon become the vanguard of the movement,
“this movement’s spirit reached out from the core of [their] hearts”. The lawyers would not have
been so indignant, Azhar explained, if Chaudhry had been dismissed according to the rule of law
– by following due process. Not only did the lawyers identify Chaudhry’s dismissal as a
“malafide exercise of state power”, as Azhar argued, they also abhorred the insulting way in
which he was treated by the state – as it treats the aam admi [common Pakistanis] everyday.
Many in the educated ashrafia middle class recognized the lawyers’ fury over the
dismissal of Chaudhry as an expression of the irrational emotions of the crowd – a distinctive
feature of popular politics. Crowds were objects of scientific fascination and civic concern for the
bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Europe, and as I mentioned earlier, researchers like Gustave
Le Bon and Sigmund Freud closely studied them. Le Bon postulated that the crowd possessed a

See the last chapter on the emotional outrage expressed by the lawyers the day Chaudhry
appeared before the Supreme Judicial Council.
14
The two images, both of uniformed men intimidating the Chief Justice of the country, shocked
the country. I discuss both in Chapter 1.
13
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collective mind; was composed of the unruly elements of a society; and was prone to irrational
outbursts (1896). The early twentieth century rise of fascist regimes rendered scientific
investigation of crowds further urgency. Scholars of the Frankfurt School turned their attention
to this phenomenon as well. Even though he was skeptical of the Freudian explanation of
crowds’ behavior, Theodor W. Adorno attempted to understand how the leaders instigated the
“psychology of the masses” (1982, 119). Freud had added to Le Bon’s argument – that, in a
group, the individual is able to set himself free of repressive instinct – and suggested that it were
in fact “id energies which throw off the pressure of the existing social order” (1982, 123). Adorno
instead argued that there must be other “psychological agencies which are pressed into the
service of the unconscious” (ibid). For example, demagogues’ oral prowess does its magic, he
suggested, and incites those “archaic regressions which reduce individuals to members of a
crowd” (1982, 133). Adorno thought that it was impossible for “Fascism to win the masses
through rational arguments” and therefore, such ideologies must mobilize “irrational,
unconscious, regressive unconscious processes” to make their appeal successful (1982, 134).
“Suggestion” of the leader awakened a primordial “archaic inheritance” – lying deep inside of us
all (1982, 123).
Crowds unsettle liberal political ideals because they challenge the composition of the
liberal subject – as a conscious political being who possesses reason, intent and individuality.
Recall violent protests against the publication of ‘Danish Cartoons’ and then the ‘Charlie Hebdo’
affair. Western political leaders and cultural critics ferociously responded to what they saw as a
threat and swiftly rallied to rescue their citizens’ fundamental human freedoms. More to the
point, the violent protests were claimed to be instigated by Muslim demagogues as if their
protest over blasphemy had aroused an irrational emotional attachment to an icon; the passions
attached to Him and the pain expressed were incomprehensible to the ‘secular’ West (Asad,
Mahmood and Butler 2009). Not only do these views refused to acknowledge popular pain as an
expression of a deeply personal and individual injury, the passionate protests and the
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attachment to a supposedly archaic icon (in the case of Danish Cartoons) were considered
summoning primordial attachments and emotions aroused by an innocuous insult. Similarly,
emotional outrage over the CJ’s humiliation too was disdained by the educated classes as it
didn’t fit neatly in the ‘non-violent’ liberal politics of the rule of law and constitutional rights.
The liberals activists failed to recognize how the CJ’s image of humiliation was empathetically
witnessed and experienced by ordinary Pakistanis. The injury felt was incomprehensible to
many of the educated middle-class protestors.
Moreover, the young lawyers’ passionate protests were also rooted in their everyday
encounter with the state (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) as well as their prolonged struggle
against professional hierarchies and injustices within the profession.
The ashrafia critics therefore failed to recognize that for the lawyers, the notion of the
rule of law which had brought them together in political action with the middle-classes was not
an abstract, distant slogan or even a claim. These lawyers considered the movement’s cause
intrinsic to their profession, but most significantly, saw it rooted in their living as well as
working material conditions. The rule of law allowed the lawyers to identify themselves, their
aspirations and emotions with those outside of their profession (whose rights were regularly
violated and humiliated), who, in their imagination, shared this personal class experience.
However, how the rule of law would be able to bring about a ‘radical’ change was not clear to the
lawyers nor those whom they identified with.

Junior Petty Lawyers: The Rule of Law and Rage Against the Status Quo
Upon entering the Rawalpindi District and Sessions Courts, after crossing police check
posts and stalls of chai, pakora, and chat, one is welcomed by rows upon rows of office-shacks
of the lawyers, many overshadowed by the adjacent narrow, multi-level court buildings. Here, in
these offices, sit over 4,000 lawyers who practice in the Sessions, District and High Court, the
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latter being located across the road from the Sessions Court. These courts and offices were the
main sites of protest and the lawyers’ mobilization in 2007-2009.
In the interviews, conversations, and observations conducted here, even though most
lawyers claimed that they receive briefs regularly, it became apparent later in my fieldwork that
only five to ten percent of the top-level, senior most lawyers (their names well-recognized in
different branches of the Criminal, Family, and Civil Law) receive most cases and what’s left
over then trickles down to the others. The family or other types of personal networks bring in
the bulk of work for most of the lawyers. But the lawyers also consult, provide aid and appear in
each other’s cases at the courts and divide the fees accordingly. Upon joining the profession as a
junior lawyer, one is expected to intern for a senior lawyer and live on a minimal stipend for
years. For those who don’t belong to the upper middle-class families, it is often difficult to
survive only on the stipend (or early in the career even on one’s own practice) and many engage
in non-legal work on the side. It was the bulk of these junior petty lawyers who formed the core
of and drove the movement to restore Chaudhry. Their protest and strike actions were dismissed
as ‘unprofessional’ and their outrage as indecorous by many of the senior, ‘professional’
lawyers.15
Khurram Masood Kiyani, the General Secretary of the Rawalpindi High Court Bar
Association, accompanied Chaudhry in his protests, rallies and marches all over the country.
Kiyani claimed that the lawyers had become “jazbati [emotional]” about the indignant dismissal
of the Chief Justice Chaudhry. “At the start of the protests, we were so jazbati because our chief
of the judiciary had been dismissed in such an insulting manner; the lawyers felt his humiliation
as their own. Every lawyer felt as if it had happened to him. He [the CJ] was our head, which is
why people felt so strongly about this violation of the rule of law”. The lawyers experienced a
personal sense of injury by how the Chief Justice was ridiculed by those in power. But as the

In the next two chapters, I discuss this criticism, and the divide between the ‘professional’ and
‘political’ lawyers, in detail.
15

84

movement progressed, Kiyani argued, many of these lawyers started remembering their own
structural grievances, everyday injuries and insults and began to associate these with the
restoration of the Chief Justice. “The lawyers started to think differently about the inequalities
in the legal profession”, he explained. If the aam admi was influenced by the liberal notions of
constitutional rule, justice and the rule of law, so fervently annunciated by the lawyers, the
“inherent” (taken for granted) ideas of these young lawyers (Rude 1981, 22), in turn, began to
transform as well: they identified the rule of law as the key not only to the restoration of
judiciary and democracy, but restoration based on it as an intervention into their professional
lives and conduct.
Munir A. Malik (introduced in the last chapter), claimed that the possibility of a ‘new’
Pakistan based on the rule of law and insaaf (justice), appealed not only to the aam admi, but
also to the young lawyers. He further claimed that this political imaginary about the nation-state
struck a chord with them. The young lawyers thought, Malik argued, that “if there is more access
to justice, the profession will thrive. Their economic interests will be protected. But if the
judiciary is not independent, money and big faces will prevail”. The young lawyers associated
the unequal distribution of briefs in the profession with the corruption in the judicial system and
expected the restored judiciary to introduce renewed transparency, merit, and accountability to
the system. They abhorred the structure of patronage within the system, not too dissimilar to the
one prevalent in the politics of the state, and which fueled the politics of common sense in the
country.
Ahmed Satti was the Vice President of the District Bar Rawalpindi in 2009, when Chief
Justice Chaudhry was finally restored. “Even though senior lawyers didn’t agree with our protest
politics”, he claimed, “we still have no disappointment over what it took [protests and marches]
to get the CJ restored”. Framed photographs of Satti with Chaudhry, from the days of the
movement, adorned the walls of his crummy office, otherwise covered with many layers of dust.
These artifacts of memory represented, for some lawyers, affirmation of their proximity to the
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highest seat of judicial power in the country; if observed by the clients, these mementos could
help their practice. For others, these photographs collected dust and had become objects of
resentment; for most young, petty lawyers, the profession remained the same, the professional
hierarchies changed very little, and the judicial system was still as lethargic and ‘corrupt’ as it
had been before the movement.
Nevertheless, Chaudhry’s defiance against Musharraf was deeply admired by Satti. He
stated, “Iftikhar Chaudhry’s ‘No’ gave us the chance to do something. We wanted to bring
change but we couldn’t find the opportunity to act. People were already upset and ready for the
call to action. In those days, we used to discuss how we needed someone to lead us, that we will
become their bazu [arms] and then we got that person, in the shape of the Chief Justice”.
Chaudhry’s stand against an Army General broke the pessimism that was prevalent in the
country’s political culture, and moved activists like Satti, and many other lawyers, who claimed
no political affiliation, to protest action.
Satti claimed that while the Bar was seemingly united in its support of the movement to
restore the judiciary, some of its senior members disdained the “unprofessionalism” of activist
lawyers like himself. These senior, ‘professional’ lawyers, he explained, just sat in the Bar and
chatted on, while “we protested in the streets”. “It is these people, it’s that class, which has never
figured out the right path for this nation and only cares for and protects its own professional
self-interest”, he exclaimed. Satti argued that the senior lawyers were protective of the “status
quo” because of their privileged, established and dominant position in the profession. “People of
status quo say things like this, whenever there is a revolution”, he retorted, and “there will
always be people who will resist and oppose change and revolutionary thinking”. Satti, like the
aam admi, was anticipating the movement to achieve more than just the restoration of the Chief
Justice: he expected and desired the movement to overturn a system which many like him
despised as corrupt and unjust, because it protected only the interests of the few, those of the
dominant ruling and professional elites.
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Senior Lawyer-Activists: The Rule of Law, Memory, Adal (Justice) and Unevenness
of the State
A number of senior lawyers did indeed lead the young petty lawyers in the movement.
But, how they approached the rule of law, and what they aimed to achieve by it, was much closer
to the aspirations of the ashrafia middle-class, as these lawyers emerged from, were part of, and
represented the urban educated middle-class. Amna Ali,16 Atizaz Ahsan and Mohammad Ikram
Chaudhary were the first amongst the senior lawyers to join the protests against General
Musharraf. Ali, a corporate lawyer, was a diehard supporter of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the
famous photograph that she saw of the Chief Justice sitting with the five Generals, reminded her
of the time when Bhutto, “our first civilian elected prime minster, was sitting in the company of
General Zia-ul-Haq and other Generals, who had also come to intimidate and humiliate him.
That was good enough for me to get out on the road”.17
“Through reference to past experiences”, people do not “merely clarify the meaning of
contemporary political processes”; rather they also make sense of the “opaque and capricious”
nature of political power (West 2002, 115). As I discussed in the last chapter, Chief Justice
Chaudhry’s confrontation with General Musharraf was given a conspiratorial spin by some
analysts, who suggested that perhaps certain sections of the military (especially those who were
disturbed by the General’s close association with the U.S.) desired the departure of Musharraf.
When I raised this conspiracy theory, Ali admitted that she did recognize Chaudhry’s proximity
to state power. However, she placed her protest for Chaudhry’s restoration in the history of
resistance against the military rule in the country (a point which I have discussed in detail in the
last chapter). Ali thus referred back to and contextualized the arbitrary actions of a military ruler
against a judge within the historical memory of coups and betrayals, but also challenged the
violent and chaotic nature of political power in Pakistan.
Pseudonym.
After General Zia overthrew Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, he tried the former Prime Minister on a
dubious charge of murder and hanged him in 1979.
16
17
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Soon, Ali joined Mrs. Ahmad and other local activists outside the Supreme Court. She
emphasized that she joined the protest “against the military dictatorship and
unconstitutionality, and still opposes any action that is contrary to the constitution”. “We stood
up”, she continued, “for a principle, that the Army or a military dictator or President doesn’t
have the right to sack a sitting CJ. There is a procedure to do so and which can be initiated
according to the rule of law”. As was the case with Aslam Khan and Mrs. Ahmad, Ali “went to the
Supreme Court, not knowing whether someone was starting a movement or not”. She came out
to protest, she explained, not “in support of the CJ as a person, but in support of the supremacy
of law”. For Ali, and many of the lawyers and rights activists, the constitution is a “moral
document” (Bhargava 2008, 4), is “sacred” (Crapanzano 2000), and must not be interfered
with, for when this principle is violated, democratically-elected prime ministers are hanged by
the military dictators.18
The convergence of the lawyers with the political activists was not necessarily totally
‘spontaneous’ then; rather there did exist a historical context of resistance and protests against
military rule in Pakistan. Liberal constitutional democracy and the rule of law provided a
language of articulation for these protestors to assemble together against Musharraf and to
create a “chain of equivalence” between different political demands and claims, on the site of the
Lawyers’ Movement (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, 4, 8).
Although historical memory of coups and betrayals passionately moved Ali, she was at
pains to justify her political action as an intervention to save an “institution” for the “principle of
the rule of law”. And therefore, she concluded, that even though she herself felt betrayed by how
Chief Justice Chaudhry dealt with the Pakistan People’s Party government, the one that had
In the context of American Constitution, Vincent Crapanzano has argued that there exists a
sacred aura around the Constitution. Judges, and even many lawyers, he argues, are protective
of the ‘original meaning’ approaches and the original intention of the founders (2000). The
‘intent’ and ‘meaning’ of the constitution remain contentious in Pakistan, with the major fault
line not between “original” or “plain” meaning, but rather between an Islamist and ‘secular’
reading of the constitution.
18
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restored him, she would unequivocally protest again to protect the constitution. The protest
movement for the restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry had to be supported, Ali argued, to
thwart an exercise of excessive state power by yet another military ruler in Pakistan. For many
like Ali, the stand that the Chief Justice and the higher judiciary had taken against General
Musharraf was to prevent the occurrence of the inevitable in Pakistani history: the triumph of
military rule over all state institutions. Barrister Atizaz Ahsan,19 one of the key figures of the
Lawyers’ Movement, also placed his role in the movement to restore judiciary within the larger
political history of the nation-state. I now turn to his narrative.
Atizaz Ahsan’s Islamabad office reflected the success of a well-known barrister’s
chamber, where one usually finds junior lawyers engaged in hushed conversations with clients,
secretaries running around with cups of tea in hand and bundles of case files under their arms,
and a few anxious visitors, like me, sitting on uncomfortable couches, sipping their tea and
waiting for the vakil sahib20 to arrive.
During the Lawyers’ Movement, Ahsan became popularly known as “the Chief Justice’s
driver”. He was ever-present at Chaudhry’s side, driving him to the protest marches and
meetings. However, Ahsan’s role in the movement was much more than as Chaudhry’s
chauffeur. In fact, he was one of the leading lawyers, who, along with Munir A. Malik and
Ahmad Ali Kurd, gave the movement its ideological color. His poem Aaj Aur Kal (cited at the
start of the chapter) was recited by the lawyers and activists as the anthem of the movement.
Ahsan was also a seasoned political activist (affiliated with Bhutto’s PPP), and therefore had,
from the very start, placed his finger on the political pulse of the movement. I was not surprised
when he claimed that it was he who had molded the lawyers’ protest into an “uncontested
secular, political mobilization”.

19
20

Introduced in Chapter 1as one of the leading senior lawyer-activist.
Vakil is a traditionally used term for lawyers in South Asia.
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“To keep me away from the Lawyers’ Movement, General Musharraf’s closest advisor
had offered me the Prime Ministership of Pakistan, in this very room” Ahsan boasted to me.
Now in his late 60s, Ahsan has an impressive record of agitation against almost all the military
coups that Pakistan has experienced.21 He was politically active (and in fact jailed) during
General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-1988). Ahsan claimed that since those early days of protesting
against military regimes, he has been “committed … to the idea of converting Pakistan from a
hard-militarized security state to a soft civilized social welfare state”, and so, he professed, he
had carried this vision of a “soft welfare state in Pakistan for a very long time”. The Lawyers’
Movement provided him with a rare opportunity, he explained, “not just to lead a movement,
but to craft it accordingly. To give the idea its soul and the Movement its dream”. And this is
what Ahsan aspired to achieve by mobilizing the lawyers, activists and their allied intermediate
classes.
However, to do so, Ahsan had to carve a popular language for the movement that would
resonate with their allied educated middle-class as well as the aam admi. As the judicial system
remains lethargic and ‘corrupt’, in the experience as well as the imagination of many Pakistanis,
a movement based on simply reinstating those who run this inept system would not have been
effective in mobilizing Pakistanis, other than the lawyers who, indeed, had a stake in the judicial
system. Neither would an idea of justice, based on correcting certain procedural flaws, seemed
appealing. Ahsan explained that he had “never thought that courtroom justice was a complete
panacea for the people, because courtroom justice can be a very distorted justice. It could take a
very warped shape of justice”. That form of justice is contingent upon, he further explained, the
“social norms of the individual judge; or even the mind of an individual judge, who is deciding
the case. For example, if he is a patriarchal sort of judge, he won’t give a woman a chance at
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Pakistan has experienced military take-overs in 1958, 1977, and then in 1999.
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justice.” Ahsan was the counsel for Mukhtar Mai and appealed in the Supreme Court against the
acquittal of the accused in her rape case.22
So, the courtroom justice was not what Ahsan was contemplating, when he raised the
slogan of “adal [justice]” and identified the movement with it. He explained that “the popular
cause that was presented at the start of the Lawyers’ Movement was limited to restoring
courtroom justice: A Chief Justice has been thrown out, have him restored so that the dignity,
authority and independence of the courtroom is reinstated. That was probably the aspiration of
most of the lawyers. But for me, that was not a complete idea of victory. I wanted to expand the
canvas of the cause”. Ahsan therefore transformed the notion of justice (adal) that people tend
to associate with the rule of law and courts, into a rights-based social-economic justice. He
explained:
In Pakistan, millions go hungry; children die of malnutrition and disease in their
mothers’ arms … So, I had to expand the canvas from a courtroom cause of
restoring dignity to the courtroom and giving dignity to and rights to the marginalized.
Adal had to be the basic focal point, but adal not just in the courtroom. I wanted to
educate the people in my speeches, in my poetry, in my writings, in my talks to the
media, in my addresses to the Bar Associations, that we were not struggling for one man,
Iftikhar Chaudhry; I had said this many times. It’s not him, it’s the principle. It’s the
broader principle that we want justice, we want social justice.
Ahsan further claimed that he was “largely able to shift the focus of the movement from the
singularity of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry” towards “broader social and political issues” by
reframing the “question of deprivation, not just of one man from his job, but of a nation from its
rights”. For lawyers, like Ahsan, the rule of law was about socio-economic justice and welfare
state rather than procedural or legal transgressions (which, for the educated middle-class and
rights activists, defined what the rule of law was meant to rectify in the state). This was the
tension between different visions at the heart of the idea of the rule of law.

In Chapter 8, I place the Movement and Chaudhry’s Court in the broader context of how a key
issue of “injustice” in Pakistani society, honor killings, was defined and contested over by the
lawyers and human and women rights activists. I discuss in detail Mukhtar Mai’s rape case in
that chapter.
22
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Ahsan perceives his political and professional life profoundly marked by the political and
social challenges facing Pakistan, many of which persist. His poem (Aaj aur Kal) and other
intellectual reflections express his engagement with these challenges. A shallow and naïve liberal
notion of justice wouldn’t have been useful to encounter the deep crises faced by the country and
its citizens, particularly the marginalized aam admi. Recognizing the limitations of such a
project, Ahsan presented (in his poem) his reflections on how the social contract between the
(security) state and its citizens could be, nay, ought to be, re-written; and in which the state was
affectively identified as the matriarch and its citizens as her children. Note that further down in
his poem, Ahsan hinted at who the children would be: they would not exclusively be Muslims
(the majority), but would also include Christians, Sikhs and Hindus. The demand for the
reformulation of the state as a secular, humanist state, based on the notion of adal, Ahsan
claimed, shaped the ideological appeal of the Lawyers’ Movement. The nature of the Pakistani
state and its relationship with the society remained a contentious divide between the Islamists
and those who desired a ‘secular’ state until General Zia’s takeover in 1977. Soon after, Zia
proceeded to ‘Islamicize’ the state, thereby introducing hudood laws as well as a number of other
amendments in the Constitution.23 Ahsan’s secular challenge was therefore directed at all
Pakistanis, especially those who demand an Islamic state in the country.
Mohammad Ikram Chaudhry, also one of the leading lawyers of the movement,
formulated these notions as well – especially that of justice, which however for him was closely
associated with constitutional rights, the rule of law and uneven exercise of the rule of law in the
nation-state. Ikram Chaudhry, a long-time lawyer-activist, was one of the few senior Supreme
Court advocates who were jailed earlier on during the protests. I met Chaudhry at his chamber
in Rawalpindi. He had generously agreed to see me without any prior appointment. Chaudhry

The Second Amendment in the Constitution by Bhutto’s government had intended to define
the definition of a Muslim and by default, placed Qadiyanis outside of Islam. I discuss these
amendments and laws in detail in the chapter on Islamists (Chapter 6).
23

92

has a distinguished history of bar activism,24 and has represented lawyers in national politics as
well.
Ikram Chaudhry, in fact, has filed several Constitutional Petitions in the Supreme Court
on issues to do with political corruption, nepotism, excessive exercise of state power, enforced
disappearances, and constitutional transgression by the state. He has petitioned the courts
against the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (contempt of court case); ex-President
Leghari’s imposition of Emergency rule; against the contamination at the site of Pakistan’s first
nuclear test; and against the National Reconciliation Ordinance (passed by General Musharraf
to withdraw ‘corruption’ cases filed against the political elite in return for their support). He has
also been the leading counsel in the cases of the ‘missing persons’ – men in the extra-judicial
custody of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who are suspected of maintaining links to militant
groups – in the Supreme Court.25 Chaudhry explained that he filed these petitions because of the
violation of fundamental human rights of these persons, laid down in Chapter 2 of the
Constitution. His other petitions pertain to political corruption and the abuse of state power. “As
a person of the law”, Chaudhry continued, “I must participate and contribute towards an
independent judiciary and the rule of law, because there can be no democracy without an
independent and impartial judiciary”.
Returning to March 9th, 2007, when the Chief Justice was first dismissed by General
Musharraf, Chaudhry recalled: “My perception was that the corrupt political and military
leaders had already destroyed most of the institutions in Pakistan over the years, and now
General Musharraf was putting the last nail in the coffin by going after the higher judiciary”.
“And I realized”, he continued, “that with a weaker judiciary, or no judiciary at all, Pakistan may
break up”, as had happened in 1971, when East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh.

In the next two chapters on lawyers, I discuss in detail bar politics and how lawyers intervene
in national politics from the bar.
25
See Chapter 7 on ‘missing persons’.
24

93

For advocate Ikram Chaudhry, the rule of law and its absences existed because of uneven
legal development across the nation-state, and this unevenness provided more than a
prescriptive lens to identify social and political problems. It also make possible for him certain
political imaginaries regarding the nation-state and its relationship with its citizens and
territory. Chaudhry doesn’t ideologically prune down the rule of law to be a hegemonic tool of
the ruling elites or a means of state formation. He explained, “our national problems have
emerged because of the non-adherence to constitutional supremacy. Even after 65 years, we are
splitting rather than unifying: in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Territories], Swat,
Karachi, and Hazara. These are the voices of dissent, independence, rebellion, and autonomy,
because there is no justice there [in those areas] nor a functioning legal system”. The rule of law
has the potential to unify the Pakistani nation, Chaudhry argued, because “it’s not an abstract
idea … it’s about the fundamental rights of the people of Pakistan. We lost East Pakistan because
we denied them their fundamental rights”. The excessive use of military power against
nationalists in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) is considered the catalyst for the break-up of the
country. Chaudhry referred to the injustices, both economic and cultural, that preceded the
military operation in East Pakistan in 1971. Bengalis were not only denied equal share in the
country’s economic development, they were also refused their cultural rights, such as the official
recognition of Bengali as the official language. In the historical memory of break-ups and
military coups, the rule of law is invoked as the basis of the unity of the nation; more
significantly, this claim is placed against that of the military state: the necessity of the state and
the use of military power to ensure the security of the state. Recall that, Atizaz Ahsan, in his
poem, argues the same against the Army, when he asks it to protect the nation and remain at the
borders.
However, ironically, the terms in which Ikram Chaudhry identifies the rule of law as a
unifying force for the Pakistani nation – under a strong centralized state which would draws its
sovereignty from the rule of law – resonates with what the British aspired to achieve in colonial
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India through the rule of law. Historian Radhika Singha (1998) explains the British expanded
their sovereignty over the locals by bending and outlawing certain ideas, practices and forms of
authority, which claimed legitimacy on local religious and/or cultural grounds and challenged
theirs. Chaudhry and the ashrafia middle-class, as I discuss below, see the same potential in law
for the Pakistani nation-state: that the rule of law and the constitution can bring ‘everyone’, even
those whom Chaudhry places at the margins of the nation-state in areas such as the FATA
territories, under the state’s sovereignty.
For Ikram Chaudhry, the rule of law, in the form of rule by constitution, forms the spirit
of the democratic rule in Pakistan and is imperative for maintaining social and political order
within its boundaries. He identifies the rule of law as the binding force of the nation-state, one
that ensures equality and rights to all. Recall that, for Munir A. Malik, Atizaz Ahsan and many
young lawyers, it was insaaf or adal (justice) that defined the rule of law and provided the bases
for a ‘new’ social and political order in Pakistan. The political and moral meanings that senior
lawyers, like Chaudhry, attribute to the rule of law, and the relationships that they delineate
between this notion and that of excess, power, and violence, are not too dissimilar from what the
urban, educated middle-class expected from and desired of the higher judiciary to perform in its
name (the rule of law) on the road to political modernity.
Both the ashrafia middle-class and the lawyers, felt moral indignation over how an Army
General had dismissed the highest judge of the country. Both joined in protest, concurring that
the rule of law and constitutionalism must be upheld and associated these notions with the
restoration of the Chief Justice. However, the ideological fault lines ran deep in the ‘civil society’
between various protesting groups and activists joining the lawyers.
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Violence of The Rule of Law: The Lal Masjid Operation and Ideological Fault lines
in the Lawyers’ Movement
The Pakistani educated, middle-class ‘civil society’ had candidly cheered General
Musharraf’s unseating of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. A number of these men
and women had come under scrutiny of the Sharif government and had been mobilizing against
his plans to Islamize the Pakistani legal system. Many of the leading civil society activists
became the General’s advisors and Ministers and served in his cabinet. However, by 2007, the
majority of these activists had turned against Musharraf and took the lead in the protests of the
Lawyers’ Movement. They became the loudest supporters of the rule of law against Musharraf’s
military rule.
The notion of ‘civil society’ became popularized in Pakistan, following the end of the Cold
War era; the foreign-funded NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) became Pakistan’s new
‘civil society’; the emergence of the NGO-civil society had followed the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the withdrawal of its military forces from neighboring Afghanistan. Post-1989, a
number of Pakistani leftist activists, many disheartened by the breakdown of the Communist
bloc and the retreat of Marxist ideas globally, joined the NGO-populated development and
humanitarian industry. Even though the women activists and intellectuals had been running
human and women’s rights organizations, such as Shirkat Gah, since the 1980s, the decade of
the 1990s saw a rapid growth of NGOs, funded by the global development organizations and
monetary funds, such as the World Bank (WB), United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Department for International
Development (DFID), and so on, across the country. A few organizations and development
banks, like the ADB and the USAID, funded the rule of law programs and assessments of the
country and its judicial system as well (ADB 2009; USAID 2008).26
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See Asian Development Bank’s “Pakistan: Access to Justice” Project 2011.
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/35805/files/pvr-1897-99.pdf
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The emergence of the rights and advocacy-based civil society and its activists were soon
identified with the West and its ever-threatening ideologies, mainly liberalism and ‘secularism’.
Both, however, are thought of as incompatible and even antagonistic to the traditional Islamic
social and cultural life in Pakistan.27 The civil society activists, are popularly labeled as the
‘liberals’ and ‘secularists’. In the cultural politics of the nation, they often clash with the
Islamists and traditional intermediate classes. The resistance to their practices and ideologies is
justified on the grounds of ‘foreignness’ of their cultural life styles and social ideas; but, small in
numbers, the liberal civil society does carry moral weight – it is loud and is composed of
educated, privileged middle-class protestors, who are aware of their right to public space and to
protest. When faced with state violence during the movement, many were shocked to experience
‘the state’ that the ordinary Pakistanis face on a regular basis. 28 In contestations over Islam,
secularism and modernity, the ‘secular’ civil society often clashes with the traditional, religious
class, the ulema, modernist Islamists (such as the Jamaat) and even Islamist-nationalists;29
both share the same public space of protest and mobilization once claimed by the leftist and
Marxist students and labor unions in the country. However, the secular civil society has often
been a violent target of the ‘Islamist’ groups in cases to do with the national identity and
‘religious honor’, such as that of blasphemy. Even lawyer-activists, who have dared to defend
those suspected of blasphemy, have been murdered.30
Pakistani civil society is a donor-led assemblage (Li 2007). The western notion of civil
society, as a domain of civic life against the state, fails in the case of Pakistani civil society,
because it has historically advised, or collaborated with, the state and even with the antidemocratic ones, such as that of General Musharraf’s (Zaidi 2008). It derives its legitimacy and
See the chapter on Islamists in the Movement (Chapter 6) and their critique of ‘the West’ and
its historical, colonial context.
28
I discuss this point in Chapter 5, on youth and students’ politics of protest.
29
I discuss Islamists politics and history in Chapter 6.
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In May 2014, Rashid Rehman, a lawyer and a human rights activist, was gunned down in his
office in Multan. Rehman was representing Junaid Hafeez, a local academic, suspected of
blasphemy. See BBC 2014.
27
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mandate to intervene not from its local ethnic, religious or class rootedness, but rather from the
power of international development capital and humanitarian emancipatory ideologies and
expertise (Fassin and Recthman 2009; Rist 2002; Mitchell 2002; and Ferguson 1994). The
‘universal’ liberal ideas of human and women’s rights, democracy, constitutionalism, and the
rule of law inform the civil society’s interventions into Pakistani social and cultural life
(Chakrabarty 2000). Musharraf’s slogan of ‘enlightened moderation’ – raised for and directed
towards his reluctant Western allies – was eagerly embraced by Pakistani civil society. Afiya
Sherbano Zia, a “feminist activist”, claimed, that under Musharraf’s “leadership, women gained
unprecedented rights in terms of political representation in Parliament; appointments in the
federal cabinet; appointments in the armed forces and in public services, as well as patronage in
the arts and cultural expression. Most importantly, we saw the reform of the discriminatory Zina
Ordinance against which the women’s movement had pitted a long-term struggle” (Zia 2009,
225). A well-known and respected academic and activist, Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, in an article for the
Economic and Political Weekly published seven years after General Musharraf’s take-over, also
lauded his rule:
There is a perceptible shift in institutional practices and inclinations. Heads of
government organizations are no longer required to lead noon prayers as in the 1980’s;
female announcers with undraped heads freely appear on Pakistan Television; to the
relief of many passengers thickly bearded stewards are disappearing from PIA flights;
the first women fighter pilots have been inducted into the Pakistan Air Force. More
importantly, in early July 2006, Musharraf directed the Council of Islamic Ideology to
draft an amendment to the controversial Hudood Ordinance, put in place by General
Zia-ul-Haq and not repealed by any of the civilian governments that ruled from 1988 to
1999. This law gives women a lower legal status and punishes the victims of rape. Repeal
of these anti-women laws has been a long standing demand of Pakistani women’s
groups. A vastly overdue – but nevertheless welcome – action was taken by the
government when it released in July hundreds of women prisoners arrested under the
Hudood Ordinance, many of whom had spent years awaiting their trial. (2006)
Even though Hoodbhoy expressed skepticism about Musharraf’s complete untethering from the
Islamist political parties (which the General needed for popular as well as parliamentary

98

legitimacy) he seemed to be content because of the apparent de-Islamization of the Pakistani
state under Musharraf.
That the majority of the civil society activists belong to the urban, educated anglicized
middle-class,31 sets them apart, from both the aam admi and the ruling political landed and
industrial elites. The ‘corruption’ of the latter and their proximity to the state disturbs these
activists; they carry deep suspicion of the state and its abuse of power by the ruling classes –
often pointed out by the international development and monetary organizations as the main
causes for political and economic instability and underdevelopment and indicative of the lack of
the rule of law.32 However, ‘culture’, rather than politics or economics, has increasingly served as
the terrain on which Pakistani civil society and its activists place themselves against, and have
repeatedly clashed with, the Islamists, who claim and influence the ‘traditional’ civil society of
the intermediate class – traders, shopkeepers, labor unions, mosques and various religions
brotherhoods and neighborhoods and other local organizations. It is important to recall that this
section of the intermediate classes played a key mobilizing role in the movement against
Musharraf.33 Even though the traditional middle-class of petty bourgeoisie did converge with
the lawyers and the anglicized Pakistani civil society, activists, and students, and although the
liberal civil society stood with various Islamist groups during the Lawyers’ Movement, the
ideological fault line between them cracked during the Lal Masjid Operation in July 2007.

‘Operation Silence’ and the Violence of the Rule of Law
The Lawyers’ Movement brought together various political parties, activists and ordinary
Pakistanis across political, cultural and ideological fissures. However, many of the liberal rights

I use the term anglicized in Bourdieuian sense of carrying a particular taste, “distinction”
(Bourdieu 2010), and occupying a habitus, fashioned by their English-language schooling and
cultural orientation toward western cultural ideas (Bourdieu 1977).
32
Transparency International’s periodic announcement of corruption index exemplifies such
perspectives of ‘corrupt’ statecraft.
33
See Chapter 3 on how lawyers successfully mobilized the traditional civil society.
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(civil society) activists distanced themselves from the movement as they saw the movement
come under the influence of traditional Islamists groups, particularly after the military
operation against Lal Masjid (Mosque) and the subsequent violent response of the militants to
the destruction of the Masjid and the killings of students and militants inside its premises. The
number of missing persons drastically increased after the Lal Mosque operation as many critics,
like Advocate Tariq Asad (introduced below), claimed that the Military had either hidden the
bodies or moved the injured and arrested to the internment centers and secret detention sites.34
Rukhsana Babar,35 a self-proclaimed feminist and human rights activist, claimed to be
present in the protests, which started soon after Chaudhry’s suspension by General Musharraf.
However, by June 2008, when the first Long March was taking place in Islamabad, she
withdrew and never returned to the protests. I met Babar at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad.
Highly secured and surveilled, Serena hosts most offices of the international and even some
local non-governmental organizations. In her late forties, Babar introduced herself as a
parliamentary development expert, working with the UNDP for the last 10 years. Before joining
UNDP, Babar worked with different rights-based organizations. Babar has been part of the
movements for women’s and minority rights and freedom of expression for many years now.
Babar, in fact, is often invited to appear on the media and to speak on women’s and human
rights issues. Recently, she clashed with an Islamist politician on live TV. The vulgar
theatricality of this confrontation exposed a deep spilt between self-proclaimed Islamists and
liberals in the Pakistani public sphere, which both attempted to capture through the Lawyers’
Movement.
It was at the first long march (June 14th, 2008) that Babar noticed how the Islamist
groups and their allies were dominating the protests against Musharraf’s unholy rule. She felt
betrayed by these post-Lal Masjid political alignments. She explained:
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As soon as we joined the Long March, I felt like screaming, because, first, we passed
by the Jamaat-e-Islami’s contingent, and, then, we saw Jamia-e-Hafza’s [Lal
Masjid] big contingent with their flags, and after that, I even saw some flags of AlQaeeda. I was like, this is surely not something I belong to, and within 10 minutes, both
of us (Husband and I) left that protest. And we never went back to the movement. The
presence of the extremists was the final nail in the coffin for me. We were beginning to
understand what was happening with the Lawyers’ Movement. All the right-wingers,
military establishment guys, especially the right-wingers in the establishment … they
were positioning themselves against Musharraf and it was basically because he had
conducted a couple of military operations, like the Lal Masjid one and in Waziristan,
against these people and their sympathizers inside the state.
Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) had indeed challenged the liberal sensibilities of many civil society
activists. Established in 1965, during the 1980s, Lal Masjid had enjoyed state patronage under
General Zia, and, many claim, had held close ties with the ‘jihadi’ (Islamic militant) network in
the region, especially in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Advocate Tariq Asad, the counsel for the
Masjid, claimed to me that the Masjid’s imam, Maulana Abdul Rashid, was so popular that he
was even appealed to to resolve property, personal, and business disputes by the locals, and
Asad himself had once appeared in such a dispute, settled in the Masjid. However, in the
summer of 2007, the Masjid made the international headlines, when its madrassa students,
both men and women, stormed local neighborhoods to enforce hudood (limits) – against
immoral exchanges and ‘westernization’ in the country. Its leading imam demanded that the
state enforce Shariah law in the whole country – the same call which was then being raised by
the Pakistani Taliban and other Islamist, militant groups. 36
For many liberal civil society activists, the ‘Islamic unruliness’ nurturing at the Masjid
signified growing ‘talibanization’ of Pakistan, which now had breached the liberal Capital of the
country. They demanded the state to strike and enforce its writ, in the name of the rule of law
(Hussain 2003).

I discuss Islamists’ approach to hudood and arguments for its necessity via Maududi’s
political and constitutional theory in Chapter 6.
36
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The Lal Masjid crisis started when the CDA (Capital Development Authority) began
demolishing mosques built illegally on public land in the Capital. 37 In protest, the women
students occupied a children’s public library, adjacent to the Masjid, and demanded that CDA
halt its campaign. As the security agencies moved against them, the students took two
policemen hostage. After fellow students were released, the policemen were let go. Soon the
students began their raids on the local CD shops, ‘brothels’, and massage parlors in the areas to
enforce their writ against obscenity and moral laxity at public display and in private spaces.
They intended, as Faisal Devji suggests, to “clean up” the society around them (2008, 20).
Emboldened by their sensational actions and the silence of the state’s security apparatus, the
students made a tactical error and stormed a Chinese massage parlor. The unpleasant
diplomatic reaction from the Chinese government shook Musharraf’s regime. Even though the
captives were quickly released, this confrontation set the stage for a bloody faceoff with the
state. Hundreds were killed and tens went ‘missing’, when the Army Special Services Group
stormed the Complex on July 10th, 2007.
For the civil society activists, the ‘Lal Masjid Brigade’, of burqa-clad young women and
stick-yielding bearded men, represented the failure of law and order and the collapse of the rule
of law in the country. Aimal Khattak, one of the leading civil society activists of the Lawyers’
Movement, was also amongst the first to organize protests against the excesses of the Lal Masjid
students. Khattak is one of the main figures leading a renowned NGO, SUNGI, and is the son of
the late Pashtun nationalist poet, Ajmal Khattak. Khattak explained that “when the Lal Masjid
people’s activities increased and they started to come out on the roads – to stop women from
driving – to stop people from selling certain things and closing certain businesses (such as CD
shops), we decided to organize a protest rally here in Abpara chowk”. “Residents and businesses
in the vicinity” he continued, “felt terrorized because of the activities of the students, so our aim
was to turn the state’s attention towards this, because the state was silent”. He claimed, “we
37
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wanted to show people, how to stand up against the excesses of the Lal Masjid people, and how
to openly protest against the Masjid. We wanted to show people that they could come out as we
done so in the Lawyers’ Movement”.
The state was “silent” because, first, the Musharraf government desired to flare up the
madrassa unruliness so that the Western states could once again be made to realize the threat of
the ‘Islamic fundamentalism and extremism’, now felt so close to, in fact, inside, the Capital, and
second, the security and military intelligence apparatus did in fact have sympathy for Lal Masjid
and its overzealous, naïve reformers. Khattak acknowledged the shadowy association between
the Masjid and the state. He said, “yes, the State was collaborating with the Lal Masjid people,
fighting together in Afghanistan and Kashmir. These men were trained by the state. The state is
still not disengaged from them; there are still good taliban and bad taliban, and that’s why, the
state didn’t take any decisive action”. Lal Masjid, he concluded, “was the symptom of the cancer
of talibanization in our society”. Lal Masjid painfully symbolized, for the civil society and the
educated, urban middle-class, that the period (or even the claim of) enlightened moderation –
(no matter how cynically proposed and nurtured by Musharraf) – was finally over.
Affia Pervaiz,38 who runs a women’s development organization and who regularly joined
the protests of the Lawyers’ Movement added “we wanted Musharraf to act against the Lal
Masjid’ militants, because: the militants had imprisoned the children inside; established a state
within a state in Islamabad; stood guard on top of the masjid, armed with guns; and were
stopping the girls and telling them that they should wear full-sleeved clothes. They broke a
friend’s car’s windows, telling her that women mustn’t drive”. Like Rukhsana Babar, Pervaiz
noticed that, “after the Lal Masjid operation, religious groups joined the Lawyers’ Movement in
increasing numbers”. The fear of creeping talibanization was interpreted by many as the absence
of the rule of law and a deep crisis within the Pakistani state. Therefore, the civil society
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demanded the state to enforce the rule of law to discipline the Islamic unruly and to forcefully
display the ‘writ of the state’.
The liberal civil society and the educated urban middle-class, which had once supported
General Musharraf’s take over and his vision of the enlightened moderation for Pakistan, but
which was soon disenchanted by his Machiavellian dealing with them as well as the Islamists,
once again looked towards the General and his Military to crush this new, violent surge that had
risen in the country. Aimal Khattak felt indignant because:
In the Capital, which is our country’s heart, in a city area that houses the diplomatic
community as well as international community’s offices, we had some people who
wanted to impose and enforce their narrow and extremist version of Islam, and then they
started to interfere in people’s personal and private lives. So, in such a scenario, what’s
left [sort of freedoms?] for the citizens? Being myself a concerned citizen, and possessing
some political sense, I thought that if no one else is protesting this, that if political
parties because of political compromises, are not speaking up, or if others are not
speaking up because of fear, then, why should we not step forward? We, the civil society,
who were always talking about people’s rights, political freedoms and the rule of law,
how could we stay quiet? We issued press statements, but no action was taken on that or
even on our press conferences. So public protest was the only tool left for us to raise our
voice against Lal Masjid.
In one of the protests, organized by the “Islamabad Citizens Committee”,39 the daily Dawn
reported that “the protestors condemned the government’s reluctance to take action against Lal
Masjid’s” students and the clerics leading them. A human and women rights activist (active in
‘honor killings’ cases as well),40 expressed her outrage and questioned: “How dare the mullahs
threaten to throw acid on women who don’t cover their faces? How does the government allow
anyone to set up a parallel court? Why our rulers feel helpless in acting against these people who
kidnap a woman and label her as a prostitute?” (Dawn 2007j). Many of the civil society
protestors were disturbed by the challenge to state sovereignty, posed in the name of justice by
these clerics. As I discuss in the chapter on honor killings (Chapter 8), parallel courts were

Recall that a concerned citizens committee was also formed soon after Chief Justice
Chaudhry’s suspension. Majority of it protestors described themselves as ‘non-partisan’ and
‘apolitical’.
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See Chapter 8.
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considered devoid of due process, procedural justice, fundamental rights and assumed to be
arbitrary and violent towards women by the women and human rights activists. This ‘moderate
majority’, which had once embraced a ‘secular’, liberal General, therefore, once again, urged him
to rally the state against the extremist nuisance rising up in Islamabad.
The intermediate middle-class sympathizers of the Islamists were shocked at the ferocity
of the military operation against the Masjid and held Musharraf directly responsible for the
blood spilled in the operation. The chairman of the small-traders Union of a major market in
Islamabad, Chaudhry Mahmood,41 closely saw the operation against the Masjid unfold. His inlaws lived in the area of the mosque, and once the siege began, he was responsible for bringing
provisions to their house. Aslam told me that when he first spotted the military armored vehicles
surrounding the Lal Masjid, he was deeply disturbed at the violation of that sacred space.
Mahmood angrily claimed that “the whole Pakistan, even the larger Islamic world, shook up
because of the operation and how children inside were slaughtered by the Army”. He called it a
“dark period in Islamabad’s history that let loose a wave of violence and hatred in the whole
country”. Mahmood held General Musharraf, “the dictator”, responsible as “nobody could go
against what he was doing and because all the state power was in his hands”. It is important to
recall here that the lawyers’ movement against Musharraf received overwhelming support from
the bazaar class, the tajaran (small traders and shopkeepers’) organizations across the country.
All the major trader unions in Islamabad openly supported the protest movement, took part in
strikes and provided free provisions to protesters. The traditional middle-class was already
alienated by a ‘secular’ General and his overtures towards the anglicized class of the country.
The Lal Masjid operation, and the violence supposedly exercised to discipline the ‘terrorists’,
was deeply resented by this class and their professional public allies, the tajirs and the petty
lawyers.

41
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Tariq Asad, an Islamist public-interest lawyer, filed a petition in the Supreme Court to
halt the impeding operation against Lal Masjid. However, the Court turned down his appeal.
According to Asad, “I plead in the Court that the Constitution gives you [the Court] the power to
stay the Operation”, but the judges rejected the petition on the basis of the Articles 199 and 245
– both of which concerned limiting jurisdiction of the higher courts when the Armed Forces are
called “in aid of civil power” (The Constitution of Pakistan 2012[1973], 330). Asad, who after the
operation emerged as the spokesperson and counsel for Lal Masjid, considered the liberal, civil
society activists as the “anti-Lal Masjid Mafia”; he termed the human rights activists “antiIslamic NGO agents of foreign powers, and who, in the name of civil Society, act for the interests
of Qadianis”.42 “These liberals”, he continued, “have no faith”. Asad claimed that the number of
the missing persons, and their cases in the Supreme Court, surged after the Lal Masjid operation
because many students were either killed by the Army or arrested and transferred for
interrogation to the internment centers and secret prisons.43
Activists, like Aimal Khattak, continued their association with and activism in the
Lawyers’ Movement, even after the Lal Masjid Operation and the surge in Islamist sentiment
and mobilization against Musharraf within the movement. However, for some, such as
Rukhsana Babar, the domination that the Islamists were attempting to exercise over the
movement was indicative of the deep split within the Pakistani state’s military-bureaucratic
complex. She explained that even though:
In 2007, I was one of those protestors who were always at the forefront of the
Movement, within months, we (my husband and I) figured out that something
strange was happening. Because it was not the first movement of our lives … And we
knew how the military and the intelligence agencies used to harass us, what were the
tools available to the establishment, to the ISI … If they wanted to stop us, it was a
matter of a month or two. So in some sense, we were not being harassed and maybe
supported by them. It seemed there was someone within his government trying to
patronize this movement against him. After the Emergency was imposed, I met Benazir
Bhutto, and she was the one who made me think along these lines, when she said: ‘look
who’s standing around you? When you are being part of a movement, look around and
42
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see who’s standing with you?’ And that evening when I went for a protest rally, I found
myself amongst Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Hameed Gul, and Imran Khan. I was like, “Oh my
God, what am I doing here’. It’s not where I belong.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed was then the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Hameed Gul, his close ally, a
retired Lt. General, who had once commanded Pakistan’s powerful spy agency, the ISI (InterService Intelligence) and its ‘jihadi’ adventures inside Afghanistan, and Imran Khan, an
emerging cricketer-turned-politician, then was being touted as the military’s next pawn.
However, what they all shared was a sympathy for the Islamists’ triumph at Musharraf’s
expense. Gul and Ahmed in fact had also been involved in negotiations with the Lal Masjid
people before the operation. Both had also played an intriguing role in the ideological, political
and logistical assemblage of the so-called Afghan Jihad during the 1980s. Rukhsana Babar’s
departure was thus marked by both the ascendancy of the Islamist sentiment as well as its
mobilization for the movement and a split in the military-intelligence apparatus of the state,
which, it seemed, even if not fully sympathetic towards the Islamists, desired Musharraf’s
eventual departure.
The liberal civil society and its activists diverged from the traditional middle-class and its
Islamists allies on other sites as well. Both sought to re-configure the Pakistani state and model
interventions through it in the society, and both saw the Lawyers’ Movement as the site to
capture the imagination of the aam admi for these projects. Both were the children of
modernity, desiring to discipline a nation which they considered emotionally unruly, politically
puerile and lagging behind.44

The Rule of Law and Political Modernity
On December 2nd, 2007, Ghazala Minallah, a law teacher, published an open letter
addressed to Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan and the chairperson of the

44

I discuss Islamists’ place in political modernity in Chapter 6.

107

PPP (Pakistan People’s Party). As a result of a compromise (in the form of NRO – National
Reconciliation Ordinance) with General Musharraf, Bhutto had returned to Pakistan (in October
2007) after a self-imposed nine-year long exile. Minallah chastised Bhutto for not openly
declaring her support for Chief Justice Chaudhry. Addressing Bhutto, Minallah wrote:
I was shocked and amazed at your latest statement regarding the judiciary. How could
you, of all people, say that you believed in an independent judiciary BUT that
personalities did not matter? Why were some judges locked up whereas others were not?
How can you separate the personalities from the institution? What you have on
Constitution Avenue right now is a besieged and helpless building. The unfortunate but
harsh truth is that right now we are a besieged nation as well. I have vowed that I will
continue to fight for the independence of the judiciary come what may! Ms. Bhutto, is it
not obvious to you WHY Musharraf wants Justice Iftikhar out of the way? Ask the
families of the ‘missing persons’, who for the first time were being heard and for the
first time they could see a light at the end of the tunnel. Everyone knows who is
responsible but no one before this CJ had the courage to take up the matter. Ask the
countless downtrodden people who had discovered that they could have direct access to
the CJ through Suo Moto notices. Ask 2 and 3 yr old Aneela and Tasleem from Naudero
Feroze in Sindh, ask 4 yr old Shaneela or 6yr old Munni or 8 yr old Marina from
Mardan what this Chief Justice has done for them. These innocent little girls were the
victims of jirga decisions according to which they were to be handed over to the enemy
as a symbol of truce. It was Justice Iftikhar who took serious notice of this barbaric
custom and passed strict orders to the local authorities to prevent this atrocity from
carrying on. Who prevented Shah Sharabeel from converting a public park in sector F-7
Islamabad into a multi-million commercial project? Ask the poor people living in the
adjacent Christian colony what that decision meant to them. I can go on and on about
the cases in which the SILENT CRIES OF THE DOWNTRODDEN of our society were
being heard by a sympathetic judge for the first time. (Minallah 2007, italics added)
Ghazala Minallah’s father had also served as a Supreme Court judge, and he too had refused to
follow the orders of the military rulers during his tenure and thus was twice sent into early
retirement. According to Minallah, her father died as an “unhappy man”. She passionately
admonished Benazir Bhutto, because it was Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Benazir’s
father) who had sent Minallah’s father home the first time. General Zia-ul-Haq had tried to use
Minallah’s father in a murder case against the senior Bhutto, but the judge refused, and was sent
home once again. Minallah thus reminded Benazir Bhutto, that it has been the judiciary, or at
least some exceptional members of it, who have sacrificed for democracy in this country. This
time around, the judiciary needed the support of the civil society as well as of the political
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parties. Benazir Bhutto, therefore, pleaded Minallah, must take a stand for the institution of the
judiciary and for Chief Justice Chaudhry.
Minallah described herself as “a very apolitical person”, and told me that she had “never
actually been involved in anything political. But there was something about this movement,
about what happened on the 9th of March that triggered something, not just in me, but in a lot of
people in this country”. She went on, “it was just that image of the policemen abusing the Chief
Justice; I mean it was just too much to digest. It was just enough being enough; this is
intolerable and something had to be done about it”.
“Moral shock” derives its meaning from historical memory, and, as I discussed before, is
“often the first step toward recruitment” into protest movements (Goodwin et al. 2001, 16;
Jasper 1997); it takes place, “when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a
sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not
she has acquaintances in the movement” (Luker 1984; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997,
Quoted in Godwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001,16). The shock of Chaudhry’s humiliation was
collectively shared and emotionally moved even many educated middle-class men and women,
who claimed that their protests were ‘apolitical’; that they were non-partisan; and that they
supported the ‘universal’ good of the rule of law.
Minallah joined the protest for the “restoration of the judiciary”, she stated, but then
soon discerned the significance of democracy, because “without the supremacy of the
Constitution”, she argued, “the other becomes, irrelevant”. Without the rule of law, she argued,
“there is just chaos and anarchy, and for me, the constitution is everything. It is because we, as a
nation, don’t care about the constitution, which the Army keeps on violating by taking over,
every few years, and which pushes us back twenty years each time”. Presuming an inherent
relationship between liberal democracy and the rule of law, Minallah rhetorically asked: “Why
has the constitution never been violated in India? Why has the military not interfered, even
though there is more ‘corruption’ there?” The only difference between “us and them is the
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continuation of democracy,” she responded, and it is the same case with the “Western world”,
where “there have been no interferences by the Army. Democracy is not just a part of the
constitution; it is the crux of constitutional rule itself”.
I pushed Minallah on this point and asked how did the supremacy of the constitution
translate into the well-being of the people, to which she irritably replied: “In a proper, civilized,
democratic country, the constitution protects your fundamental rights; an independent judiciary
ensures non-violation of rights. Under military rule, there are no rights to freedom of speech or
other fundamentals”. Judges, after all, had saved young women from jirgas and ‘tribal justice’,
and the judiciary had intervened to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens, even at the
supposedly ungovernable peripheries of the state.
Minallah argued that we reach the “ideal” state of democracy and rights by evolution.
“We have to allow democracy and an independent judiciary to evolve and help govern the state”,
she explained. “Look at the history of western democracies”, she stated, “you will always find a
stage in which there is turmoil and turbulence; every country goes through it, and I think that is
what we are going through. We have been going through it for the last 50, 60 years”.
“Democracy”, she concluded, “is like a flowing river. If you let it flow, it cleanses itself, but if you
dam it, it gets dirty. The dam being military dictatorships”.
I have quoted Minallah at length because there are two interesting elements in her
narrative – which I found common among the lawyers and the civil society activists as well –
which need to be closely looked at. Both concern why the rule of law and the supremacy of the
judiciary and the constitution are imperative for bringing social and political change. The first
has to do with the lack of political education of the aam admi and the second is that of the
evolutionary nature of the democracy-modernity couplet – a belief that the evolution of liberal
institutions will take the nation-state on the road to progress and modernity. Both of these are
based on the assumptions – prevalent amongst the urban educated and professional middle-
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class – about liberal democracy and legality, according to which ‘We’ (the developing world) and
‘the West’ are on the same evolutionary trajectory of modernity, via democracy.
After Independence, South Asian nationalist ruling elites imagined (and indeed used) the
state as a tool of intervention and social change in an effort to reorganize their respective
societies. The aam admi became the subject of state intervention, political education, discipline,
and, eventually, governance. In other words, a new (meaning ‘modern’) political subject was
sought and imagined by the postcolonial state. The state was considered a means to “radically
transform society” (Kaviraj 2012, 13-14). Sudipta Kaviraj construes such desires as entirely
modern in the South Asian postcolonial context. “Modern state power,” he argues, was sought
by the political elite to “command the reflexive organization of society”, such as in India, which
soon after Independence, experienced the rise of the Nehruvian developmental state (2012, 14).
This developmental political project reached its climax with the imposition of Emergency in
1975, by Nehru’s daughter Prime Minister Indra Gandhi, when the state even went to the extent
of sterilizing certain social groups to discipline the growing population.
In postcolonial Pakistan, the ruling ashrafia held a disparaging view of the aam admi,
which for them mainly included the Bengalis (East Pakistanis), the Punjabis and the rugged
Pathans of the North-West Frontier Province. This elite had migrated to Pakistan (after
Partition) from the central Indian province of U.P. (United Provinces) and considered itself to
be the carrier of a finer political and cultural gemeinschaft (of the glorious Mughal era). They
therefore placed themselves and their cultural suavity against what Mrs. Ahmad called “the
Punjabi mentality”. She argued that, “this part of the Subcontinent [the present-day provinces of
Punjab and the NWFP in Pakistan] was never developed because the British wanted to reserve it
for recruiting soldiers from here. So, it’s in the psyche of people from there to be culturally
backward. Just look at the Punjabis; there is so much occha pan [a cheap sort of show-off-ness]
in their culture. It sickens me when I look at Lahore and the emphasis on clothes, fashion and
food. What are their priorities? And these corrupt people from Punjab lead our politics?”
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The aam admi for this elite was a politically bereft being, susceptible to emotional
irrational political appeals and desires, led by primordial divisions, hatreds and the politics of
ethnicity, region and patronage. In Partha Chatterjjee’s terms, he belonged to the sphere of the
“political society”, never quite ready to be admitted into the civil one (2004, 53). From the
ashrafia perspective, democracy has then failed in Pakistan, precisely due to its
instrumentalization to win political power by appealing to the unruly, irrational crowds,
stimulated by the hordes of the aam admi.45
Sudipta Kaviraj suggests that the South Asian “modernist elite, which assumed power
through somewhat fortuitous circumstances” sharply distinguished “between the state and
society that it governed, precisely to view the state as an instrumentality, rather than an organic
growth that should reflect society’s cultural habits” (Kaviraj 2010, 69). “Through the adoption of
a new constitution, enforced by the state, modern people could achieve something like a ‘refoundation of society’, a fundamental overhauling of the basic principles of social cooperation”
(ibid.). Social change was thus envisaged and desired by the nationalist elites to facilitate
progress towards modernity. And yet, the feeling was, still is, of always lagging behind.
Post-Independence, the judiciary in Pakistan carried on with its politically and
juridicially-conservative approach to state-society relations that it had inherited from the British
Suspicion of mass democracy and its contaminating marks on liberal democratic institutions
has long been a part of the liberal critique. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy
(1988[1923]), Carl Schmitt criticized the appeal to masses that modern political parties had to
make to win political power. Schmitt lamented the fading role of parliament in liberal
democracy, which was to debate and reason (within the parliament) and thus to educate, as
Schmitt’s critic Richard Thoma argued, the public outside. Parliament was considered a site
of/for political education so that the public could be brought closer to the “truth” (1988, xiv).
Even Max Weber worried that demagoguery could become “the greatest danger in democratic
states” (1988, xxiii). Schmitt argued that because of universal suffrage, the appeal to voters
outside the parliament had increased and political parties had become representative of
“particular classes and corporative interests”, rather than engaging in the political education of
the public (1988, xxvii). Open discussion was, according to Schmitt, the core principle of
parliamentary democracy, meant to facilitate the emergence of “truth and reason” (1988, xxxix).
As with the middle-class ashrafia protestors, in Schmitt’s reflections on liberal democracy, one
finds the Jacobian belief in the power of the liberal institutions and constitution to bring social
change.
45
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colonial state. As I discussed above, the higher judiciary legitimized martial law on the principle
of ‘necessity of the state’ multiple times. However, under Chief Justice Chaudhry, the Supreme
Court shifted this juridical approach and carefully took a step towards “judicial activism”
(Siddiqi 2014). It began to imagine and represent itself as an agent of social change and
governance and acted on reported violations of women’s rights, for example, by challenging
prevalent “barbaric” and “uncivilized” customs, such as those of Wanni, Swara and Sung Chatti,
when it was appealed to do so by the human and women rights and civil society activists.46
Minallah refers to some of these cases in her letter to Bhutto. Similar to senior lawyers, such as
advocate Ikram Chaudhry, she invites and celebrates the intervention of the higher judiciary in
the ‘tribal’ life of those living at the margins of the nation-state. Indeed, many middle-class civil
society activists have asked for the courts’ intervention in matters of gender and human rights.
The Supreme Court, under Chaudhry, did take suo moto notices on several cases concerning
‘honor killings’ and violence against women.47
The Pakistani educated, professional ashrafia middle-class then imagines the rule of law
and democracy as the means through which the nation-state can finally catch up with Western
modernity, but they have come to see this as a slow, evolutionary process. The higher judiciary,
in this project of modernity, is construed to be and invited to act as the key agent that has the
power to act both in the political (where democracy is placed) as well as the social sphere (where
intervention into backward traditions and cultural life is needed). The ills of corruption and
popular politics are identified by the educated middle-class and its civil society to have
contaminated liberal democracy, and the judiciary is appealed to to punish the corrupt

Customary practices, based on wanni, swara and sung chatti, are often invoked in matters of
settling disputes in the rural areas of KPK, Punjab and Baluchistan in Pakistan. The mainstream
media and ‘progressive’ activists often label these practices as ‘tribal’, ‘backward’ and extra-legal.
On the other hand, their supporters invoke the historical continuity of these practices as a selfevident fact of their effectiveness in dealing with local-level issues on a self-help basis.
47
In Chapter 8, I examine the cases of honor killings and how the lawyers, civil society and
human women rights activists engage with the rule of law on the site of women rights and honor
killings.
46
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politicians and ruling elites considered to be responsible for both. On the other hand, the liberal
law is invited to fill in any gaps found to exist in the social order. Law is imagined to act as a
“mode of governance” – rather than a penal intervention to discipline or punish – to slowly
eliminate spaces of exception, hidden for far too long (Esmeir 2014, 27; Foucault 1978 and
1977).

Conclusion
In postcolonial Pakistan, if the educated professional middle-class continues to cite the
(colonial) notions of excess, arbitrariness, and corruption of the local elites as the raison d’etre
for the exercise of the rule of law and to govern the unruly masses, for the young lawyers, the
rule of law makes possible the recognition of professional and political hierarchies and
formulating challenges to them. The kind of protest politics that this notion allows shows not
only that the subordinated classes absorb the ideas (of the ruling elite), but also how they act
upon these as well. The meanings of hegemonic ideas are then re-formulated, and new sites of
political action, resistance and challenges can be opened up by acting on their basis.
Even though the populist stance of the lawyers and other protestors disturbed the liberal
sensibilities of the ashrafia middle-class, their political convergence with this class in the
Lawyers’ Movement demonstrates the potential in aspirational language of the rule of law for
bringing together disparate social classes, as they raise their own interpretations and
imaginations to challenge the state. At the same time, the ‘irrational’ and ‘unruly’ politics of the
young lawyers and the aam admi disrupted the dreams and desires of the educated middle-class
to refashion the society by reinforcing a liberal constitution by the state and by closing off any
exceptional gaps in social order which were seen as a residue from the past. This is the limitation
of the (anti)politics based on the rule of law (Ferguson 1994). As the collective mobilization of
lawyers, middle-class students and the political and civil society activists shows, the rule of law
can serve as a site of posing challenges and making claims upon the state (Thompson 1972). At
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the same time, it may also become a modality of action filled with contradictory political and
social desires and stymie other possibilities for political actions.
The following chapters examine the aspirations, histories and socio-political ideologies
of various group of Pakistanis who assembled in the name of the rule of law and democracy on
the site of the Lawyers’ Movement. These included Islamists and their traditional middleclasses, such as tajirs and bazaaris and their political representatives. The Islamists had an
influential following amongst the lawyers too, and, in Chapter 6, I ethnographically follow the
legal career of one such lawyer, Wahab-ul-Khairi. University students and youth from
prestigious education institutions also joined and organized protests; how they diverged from
young Marxists and other self-identified leftists, is discussed in the chapter on the spatial
politics of protest in Chapter 5. The next two chapters focus on the lawyers, their bar
organization and politics, the history of their nationalist politics and engagement with the
colonial and the postcolonial state. I will also be ethnographically examining the class and
ideological fault lines between young, petty and senior, professional lawyers in the next two
chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
Mobilization and Ideology: Routes, Bazaar, and the Rule of Law
We had raised the level of expectations of the people that “there would be a new Pakistan based
on justice”. I think Atizaz Ahsan’s poem, riasat ho gi Ma ke jaise (the welfare state),1 went along
with the concept of the rule of law. The ideas of the welfare state, substantive justice, not just the
application of the law, had struck a chord with the aam admi [common Pakistanis].
~ Munir A. Malik, Ex-President Supreme
Court Bar Association
Every day the Movement was spreading. Maybe the reasons were socio-economic or injustice,
but the Military was caught by surprise by the scale of people’s reaction. Pakistanis had their
own grievances against the state, but they thought that the Chief Justice was their Messiah. “In
his shape we have got a man who can get rid of all of these evils”, they thought.
~ Qazi M. Anwar, Ex-Chairman Executive Committee
Pakistan Bar Council
We were not out there to change the system, we just wanted to defend it … Only educated
people, ones who understand the Constitution, understood what the Lawyers’ Movement was
about and condemned Chief Justice’s dismissal. Aam admi didn’t know what was wrong about
the whole episode.
~ Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Ex-President
Islamabad Bar Association
We went around Rawalpindi to mobilize the whole city. We had put loudspeakers on our cars
and hired taxis, and we went to all the big bazaars. We went to the masjids to announce our
marches and to mobilize the locals and the bazaaris.
~ Sardar Asmatullah, Ex-President High Court Bar
Association Rawalpindi
The crowds waited in the burning blazing sun for hours and hours and hours. Obviously, they
believed in us and our cause. Nothing else would have mobilized them. The idea was not just to
mobilize the Bar Associations, the idea was to mobilize the people, the aam admi.
~ Atizaz Ahsan, Ex-President Supreme Court
Bar Association
Both Atizaz Ahsan and Munir A. Malik emerged alongside the Chief Justice as his
counselors and advisors early on (in the movement?) and soon became the leading figures for
the rest of the lawyers. Both expanded the ideological appeal of the Movement by fusing the rule

A. Ahsan’s poem was written while under detention and he wanted to share what he thought
was Jinnah’s ideology of the Pakistani state.
1

of law to (with?) the notions of insaaf (justice) and adal (state justice), thereby building a new
“political imaginary” (Taylor 2004) or, a “state imaginary” – how ordinary people think about
the state (Kaviraj 2012, 41) – for the aam admi. They attributed legal as well as political and
moral meanings to the idea of the rule of law and justice, and colored the political imaginaries
about state, ‘corruption’, and political power through them. Ahsan’s conflation of justice with
secularism and social welfare (sketched in his poem Aaj Aur Kal, which he wrote while in
detention)2 gave a broader political thrust to the project of the rule of law, expanding its appeal
to the aam admi. Both Malik and Ahsan identified “substantive justice” to be the basis for the
re-writing of the social contract between the state of Pakistan and its citizens.

Lawyers as Colonial Liberal Agents
One is surprised by the number of lawyers who joined and led the independence
movement against British rule in India. Notable amongst these were Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Lal Nehru, all of whom were well-known
Congress leaders – until Jinnah joined the All Indian Muslim League in 1913 – as well as
prominent, England-educated, successful barristers. Gandhi started his legal career in South
Africa; having struggled professionally at the start of his practice, , he eventually became a
successful lawyer and represented the South African Indian community (DiSalvo 2013). Jinnah
practiced in Bombay and Karachi, and is remembered among his peers as a master orator, par
excellence in the court (Pirzada 1978; Pannu 1976). Lawyers continue to be active at all levels of
politics in postcolonial South Asia.
Historians of the legal profession in colonial India have presented a number of
arguments for the (presence and prominence of lawyers in nationalist politics. They contend
that the lawyers were well-positioned and well-suited (legally and socially) to serve as
intermediaries between their own communities and the state that they served. They acted as
2

See Chapter 2.
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“cultural intermediaries, who traded in cultural forms of knowledge” and produced “judicial
ethnography” for the colonial state (Sharafi 2014, 11, 33). “Imperial justice” as a colonial
discourse of governance further enhanced their role as social and political mediators between
the colonial state and the colonized. As the legal profession became autonomous from the state
monopolization and discipline, the lawyers finally became openly involved in nationalist politics.
During colonial times, lawyering became an arena of social and professional prestige for
the Indians. For the native ashrafia, lawyering was indicative of ideological, social and political
capital to carry in or necessary for a changing social and cultural milieu. Social mobility, wealth,
individual success, status, close contact with the colonial state power, and the intermediation of
that power with the local communities, enhanced one’s esteem amongst his people (Sharafi
2014, 98-100). Access to social capital and the recognition of the fact that the lawyers spoke the
mystifying, powerful language of the state and its institutions (Kafka 1925; Galanter 1969; and
Bourdieu 1987), facilitated their emergence as not only cultural, but also as the political
negotiators and representatives of their respective communities. Lawyering also provided
proximity to, as well as independence from, the state. One could seek employment in the
colonial state as a legal professional (as Law Officers), but could also remain independent and
still function as an intermediary between the state and the local society. A lawyer could gain
from the patronage of the state, but could also stay free of its influence and project that
independence as a personal attribute. The lawyers, even today, proudly flaunt this aspect of their
profession, which distinguishes them from other professionals.3
The lawyers and other legal professionals became an influential part of the colonial
governance within local society. On the other hand, the litigation that the native lawyers
pursued on the behalf of their respective communities expanded the legal space for their
communities, while they continued to act as the facilitators and conveyors of the ideology of the
rule of law, and as I explain below, of ‘justice’ (“imperial justice”, to be precise); the lawyers
3

For Indian lawyers as independent mediators, see Schmitthener 1969.
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imported this imperial ideology to their communities. In the process of acting as intermediaries
with the colonial state and owing to their legal education: training and practice in colonial
courts, the lawyers internalized liberal legal values, such as the rule of law, justice and due
process. The native lawyers naturalized the “rule of law values”, such as that law could check the
power of the colonial state (Sharafi 2014, 40). They served – and still do – as the carriers of the
“legal culture” across their society (Galanter 1969, 202).
The figure of the native lawyer was well-placed within the representational form of
“juridical epistemological” nationalist politics, as conducted with the colonial state (Mukherjee
2010, 113). “Representation” was grounded in the everyday discourse through the practice of
law, and in the courts, which is why representational politics also took on discursive persona life
there on (2010, 117). Congress leaders,
taking on the enunciative persona of the lawyer, scrupulously adhered to the rules and
systems of constraint that framed the discourse of the lawyer in the courtroom, so that
the internal economy of their political discourse bore a remarkably close resemblance to
that of judicial discourse within the courtroom. So, for instance, the arguments against
the British administration in India were given their strength not from a set of universal
principles of freedom or liberty, or absolute political ideologies of popular sovereignty,
but always proceeded by way of simile, metaphor, analogy … remarkably akin to the
methods of argumentation that lawyers use in the court, deploying what in legal parlance
are called ‘judicial precedents’ and illustrations. The Empire was imagined based on the
principle of justice, and this imagination was normalized by the local, native lawyers;
many of these were prominent Congress leaders whose political discourse was
profoundly shaped by the legal language and argumentation of lawyerly conduct in the
courts (2010, 117-8).
Before he turned towards the mass politics of the street, Gandhi the barrister held
steadfast conviction in the ‘justness’ of the British legal system. Although without success,
Gandhi challenged the oppressive and unjust laws of the Orange State in the courts, up until the
very end of his legal practice in South Africa. While later on, in his political career Gandhi would
take up civil disobedience as the signature political tactic against the colonial state, even this
tactic was informed by peaceful resistance in a legal manner and was not aimed at directly
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challenging the law or confronting the colonial state.4 Gandhi’s actions, in fact, expressed the
deepest respect for the law (DiSalvo 2013, xiii). Civil disobedience, then, was not a turn away
from the law in its fullest, rather it was a form of defiance of law in accordance with the law, with
the acceptance, rather than resistance, of the punishment for that defiance (DiSalvo 2014, 231).
Jinnah is similarly remembered as a constitutional politician and one who was against
any form of political agitation that entailed violence or posed a challenge to the law (Pirzada
1978). These nationalist leaders believed in the idea of “British fair play and equal justice” and
therefore engaged in petitioning the courts against those laws of the colonial state which they
considered unjust (DiSalvo 2014, xxi).5 In other words, rather than outright disobeying colonial
laws by defying them publicly, these nationalists chose to challenge them, respectfully and
legally, in the courts. Petitioning was a form of challenge that was considered “polite, respectful,
relatively restrained” (ibid.), and these forms of polite, legal and respectful challenges expressed
not only a belief amongst the nationalist lawyer-leaders that the British had a “clear sense of
fairness and justice”, but they also held deep respect and conviction in legal emancipation in
general, and in the rule of law in particular (ibid.)6
Mithi Mukherjee argues that “imperial justice as equity and liberty” provided a
“discursive framework” for the British Empire in India, and that the idea of justice itself became
the ground for the “anti-colonial representational” nationalist politics practiced by Congress
(2010, xiv). The British empire, she claims, worked through a “complex dialectic” of two
discourses: the Colonial, which was molded upon the use of power, violence and conquest, and
Even those who were inspired by the Gandhian form of politics emulated his nonconfrontational and passive political tactics of civil disobedience. Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai
Khidmatgar (Red Shirts) movement is one such example (See Banerjee 2000). However, I
think, it’s mistaken to argue civil disobedience was “opposed to the law” (Asad 2012, 294). Civil
disobedience is very much a part of the repertoire of liberal contentious politics, and to consider
it threatening to the state is to understate its legality and passivity.
5
See the Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial critique of nationalist politics in Introduction
and Chapter 1.
6
This natural conviction in the emancipatory potential of the rule of law, as I argue throughout
the dissertation, is carried by the educated, urban middle-class and humanitarian ‘civil society’
and rights activists as well.
4
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that of the Imperial, which was a de-territorialized discourse of justice under Natural Law
(2010, xvi). Justice, equity and liberty were signified and represented by the figure of the
benevolent monarch, who was considered to be above the violence of (the) conquest and could
be appealed to by its subjects to deliver justice (2010, xxiii). It was within this “epistemologicaljuridical paradigm”, led by a native lawyer elite, that the AINC (All India National Congress)
formulated its early political appeal to Indian middle classes and political pleadings towards the
colonial state (2010, xxv).
As I mentioned above, the most prominent Indian politicians of the time, were lawyers,
and as Mukherjee argues, it was in fact one of them, Gandhi, who by unleashing a mass politics
of protest, broke away from the lawyerly form of politics. Early nationalist politics were modeled
on the petitioning mode of pleading with the colonial state, and the law courts served as the site
of that civilized, polite form of politics (Mukherjee 2010, xxvii).7 In other words, Gandhi stepped
away from elite Indian nationalist politics and turned it into a popular politics of the street
(Habib 1997); this was a major shift away from the pleading form of politics, as inherited and
influenced by the legal values and etiquettes practiced by lawyer-politicians in the colonial
courts.
It was the figure of the lawyer who demanded justice for the Indian masses from the
colonial state in its courts . The English-educated barrister epitomized and openly called for
justice, while questioning government authority. The lawyer thus became that unique colonial
subject who challenged – albeit politely – and questioned the colonial state in the Indian public
sphere (Mukherjee 2010, 46). The colonial Supreme Court helped the Indian barrister’s postures
in this regard, as it (the Court) became the “theater of justice” where he could vent out against

Pakistani lawyers continue to use petitioning to challenge the state, its constitutional, social
and cultural policies and actions. In Chapter 6, I follow the petitioning career of one such
Islamist lawyer, Wahab-ul-Khairi.
7
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the state, in the name of justice (2010, 47).8 The Supreme Court even ruled against the East
India Company and its revenue collection cases in the early colonial period (2010, 51-3). The
Court had its own interests in sight, though, and aggressively attempted to enforce its writ and
jurisdiction; the Court even charged some of the Company officials with contempt (2010, 54-55).
One can, of course, ask for which classes did the figure of the barrister embody this beacon of
justice? Was it for the educated and professional and business classes, which needed
intermediaries to deal with the colonial state or sought its benefits and employment, such as the
Muslim ashrafia (Alavi 2002)?9
Imperial and de-territorialized, justice became the raison d’état for British colonial rule
and empire in post-1857 (War of Independence) India. Mukherjee argues, “justice as a discourse
of governance” was borne out of the imperial desire to reconcile colonial power and its exercise
with justice (2010, 73, emphasis added). Justice was equity: the British were to be an “impartial
mediator” between the warring Indians (2010, 74). Through the figure of the Queen, Mukherjee
explains, Indians as her subjects became entitled to liberty, equity and justice (2010, 84). For
example, the question of caste – divisions, hierarchies and politics based on it – was posed in
terms of justice, while the castes thought of themselves as minorities and spoke to the colonial
state in the language of justice as well (2010, 100-03). As I discussed above, justice as equity (as
‘fairness’ and due process) became a crucial element of the self-identification of the educated
Indian middle-class. The lawyers were rooted in and emerged from this class.
Both Sharafi and Mukherjee’s accounts provide useful insights into the emergence of
lawyers as the cultural, legal, as well as political brokers between the colonial state and the

See Grunwald 2012, on how lawyers turn the court into sites of public performances, while
seeking justice.
9
See Otter 2012 on how the colonial regime claimed to uphold ‘legal pluralism’ based on local
customs, laws and knowledge, and how the British relied on local religious and legal
intermediary authorities to achieve this.
8
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society which it desired to govern through law (Cohn 1996).10 However, the lawyers’
independence from the colonial state was a result of a contentious, bitter and prolonged
confrontation with the colonial courts. When the colonial judicial system opened its doors to
native lawyers, local vakils11 and advocates found themselves at the bottom of the professional
hierarchy (under the barristers). Their independence from the colonial state and path to (the
then) leading of nationalist politics took place simultaneously. The struggle for autonomy from
the colonial courts, as well as from the regulatory authority of the judges, and the rise of
associational politics, deeply affected both colonial and postcolonial politics.
In the early colonial period, barristers were the only legal professionals permitted to
appear in the courts, while the vakils served the briefs and tended to other petty matters outside
(Paul 1991). The profession also lacked autonomy in its adolescent years; the British colonial
state, judges in particular, set the rules of practice for the lawyers; only after the passing of the
Bar Councils Act of 1926 did the profession gain the autonomy that the vakils so coveted (Paul
1991, 2). Therefore, until the 1920s and even up to 1930s, the lawyers did not dare boycott the
courts to protest against the colonial state or join the Gandhian calls to agitate (1991, 3).
Rather than being an inherent feature of the legal profession – as Sharafi and Mukherjee
assume – or considered granted by the colonial state, the autonomy of the bar was hard-fought
and historically achieved by the native lawyers. The judges, from early on, were suspicious of the
vakils’ intentions and remained, for a long time, unconvinced of their legal skills and
professionalism; they wanted to regulate the vakils’ practice and professional habits. The vakils
were not even allowed to dress as barristers did, when they first started to appear before the
judges. In fact, a social and prestige-afforded hierarchy between the barristers, attorneys and
vakils – based, for example, on caste and professional esteem – had always existed in the

See also Esmeir 2012, on the role of law and “juridical humanity” on colonial populations
under British colonial rule.
11
Vakils practiced at the lowest level, in the hierarchy of legal professionals (Paul 1991).
10

123

profession (Paul 1991, 90-92),12 but the judges considered vakils to be those indigenous agents
or middle-men who cleverly manipulated the judicial system and slyly dealt with the legal
matters of their clients.13 The Bench disdained the ‘lowest’ cadre of lawyers and swiftly moved to
regulate them in the name of the rule of law and professionalism:14
On 13 March 1899 the judges circulated an order throughout all subordinate courts: ‘No
vakil shall carry on any trade or business without the previous sanction of the High
Court. Any vakil carrying on a trade or business without such previous sanction shall be
liable to suspension or removal from practice’. This rule also applied to pleaders in all
sub-courts under Section 6 of the Legal Practitioners’ Act of 1879 and remained in force
until 1916, when the communications between the government, High Court and the
Vakils’ Association led to subsequent modifications. (Paul 1991, 109)
In response, the vakils quickly formed associations and demanded equality within the
profession. They asked for the right to wear black gowns, which only barristers were permitted
to wear in the courts. The Vakil Association re-emerged in 1889 and it allowed vakils to express
their grievances, build solidarity and provide a platform for protest (Paul 1991, 132). The
discrimination, as exercised by the courts, between vakils and barristers was deeply resented by
the former, as it was based on the supposed differences between the standards of British and
local education (of the legal professionals); this remained one of the major points of contention
for the vakils’ association. The vakils considered uneven granting of prestige and treatment by
the state as one of the main causes of the unequal distribution of both briefs and professional
respect.
It is important to note here that the colonial state had introduced collective
representation and negotiation with the state through the “logic of associationism” (Kaviraj
2012, 28). The colonial state took demands made by the collectives seriously, as they claimed to

As I explain in Chapter 1 and 4 (next chapter), the resentment between lawyers still exists
across the profession, but now it has to do with uneven distribution of briefs rather than a strict
professional hierarchy. Class and professional divisions do exist, however. (See also Siddique
2014 and 2013 on legal profession in Pakistan).
13
This suspicion of the manipulating vakil still exists, but after the Movement, lawyers have
confronted judges more aggressively. (See Leiby 2012).
14
Lawyers remain dubious cultural characters. See Jolly LLB (2013) on their comical and dark
representations in popular culture.
12
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represent the interests of their respective communities (ibid.) “Associationism” profoundly
impacted politics with the colonial state and continued to do so in the postcolonial period, as the
history of the lawyers’, their bar associations’ (next chapter) and their protest movement shows.
The associations simultaneously worked to regulate the (unprofessional) conduct of the
lawyers and collectively represent their interests (Paul 1991, 138-39). In regard to the latter, the
associations pushed the colonial state to appoint vakils, and not only barristers, to powerful
positions at the Advocate General and High Court Judgeship (1991:143). Eventually, the
government elevated the vakils from their Association and appointed them as Advocate General,
Assistant Professor at law colleges and as District and High Court Judges (1991:132). The vakil
members were also thus coopted into the administrative structure of the colonial state:
By supervising the conduct of members and by making periodic representations to
authorities, the Vakils’ Association only endeavored to protect its reputation and further
the advancement of its members. Other professional or occupational bodies would have
done much the same. What marked the legal profession as the most unique among
modern professions – medicine, clergy and army – was that only lawyers assumed the
mediating role: between government and people, court and people, government and
court, and finally, between litigants. Versed as they were in the language of the legislative
process, in the obtuse enactments, and in the intricate technicalities, procedures and
traditions of courts, the roles that lawyers filled became indispensable. Involved in the
source and art of conflict resolution, their primary task was to apply the law through
the machinery of courts in order to satisfy the interests of clients. (Paul 1991, 143, italics
added)
The associational politics and professional leverage, exercised by the lawyers as a
collective, propelled the profession in unprecedented and unexpected directions. That is, the
judges and the state intended to control and regulate the legal profession – based on certain
norms of legal professionalism as well as the conduct and ideals of the rule of law and due
process – but it unintentionally escaped away from these intended objectives. As Mathew Hull
has argued in his ethnographic analysis of the Pakistani bureaucracy, the projects of state
administration, intended to develop on certain normative ideas, often spill over into other
domains and create unintended networks (2012).
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The unruly associational politics, the disorderly conduct of lawyers, and their
‘manipulations’ inside and outside the courts, even in postcolonial Pakistan, disturb the
sensibilities of the educated middle-class and senior elite lawyers, as well as invite disdain from
the judges.15 In the lower courts, whose bar associations were quite active in the Lawyers’
Movement and regularly engage in the associational form of politics, often based on negotiations
with the state, that is considered by many legal experts as indicative of a declining legal
profession in Pakistan (Siddique 2014). I discuss these points about the legal profession in the
next chapter on young, petty lawyers.

The Lawyers’ Mobilizations Against Military Rule in Postcolonial Pakistan
Lawyers continued to play a prominent role in the political and legal life of postcolonial
South Asia. As Pakistan experienced a succession of martial laws in the first few decades
following Partition (1958, 1962 and 1977), the higher judiciary took center stage in these
challenges to the country’s civil and political society by the ruling military-bureaucratic bloc.
However, the Supreme Court followed the colonial legacy of providing judicial cover to the
state’s extra-legal actions.16
During this early period of Pakistani state formation (Corrigan and Sayer 1985), the bar
associations became professionally organized and increasingly politicized, and emerged as the
sites of challenging and resisting military coups. However, instead of the emergence of
individual lawyer-leaders – who were prominent in the Independence movement, having led the
Indian masses – the collective action of lawyers and their bars became more profound and
defined in their engagement with the state (Braibanti 1966).

Post-Lawyers’ Movement, the confrontations between the young, ‘unruly’ lawyers and judges
increased dramatically, starting from District and reaching the High Courts. (See ‘Violent
Lawyers’, Editorial Dawn).
16
The Supreme Court, as I mentioned earlier, relied upon the “necessity of the state” doctrine
(Kelsen 1945). On the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ in Pakistan, see also Mahmud 1994 and Stavsky
1983.
15
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In the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy), launched against the military rule of
General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), the lawyers and their bar associations defied the General by
launching public protests, even when all political activities were banned and violently
suppressed.17 They became a vocal part of the protests from early 1981 and remained so for the
next two years. They boycotted the courts, passed resolutions, and took out processions in the
streets against the General (Ahmad 1983). His effigy was burned, and so were the newspapers as
a means or in order to protest the censorship imposed by the military government (Barnetson
1986). The biggest bars in the country, Karachi and Lahore, led the dissenting lawyers in their
movement against General Zia. Many were arrested and baton-charged by the police in their
protests (Barnetson 1986a). The lawyers and their bars defied the military regime’s ban on
political activities by engaging in demonstrations and, in further defiance, by inviting political
figures to their bars to address the lawyers. General Zia had made free use of the state’s military
and security apparatus to obviate any political challenge to his rule. The bars’ response was to
open up their offices providing spaces for political speech and to challenge the military regime
from the site of the bar associations.
For instance, on October 25th, 1982, the Karachi Bar Association announced that it would
continue to invite political leaders to its offices to address the lawyers and deliver speeches
(Ahmad 1982). In response, in November 1982, a military court sentenced two lawyers to oneyear prison terms for violating the military ban on political activities (UPI News 1982). They
were punished for inviting a political figure from the banned People’s Democratic Party to speak
at the bar (ibid.) The lawyers’ protests, which had started in 1981, continued well into 1983,
when the MRD movement turned violent in the southern part of the country – the home ground
of the Bhuttos: the province of Sind. In fact, the lawyers and their bar associations dispelled the
view – spread by the military government to weaken the protest movement – that the resistance

On the history of the MRD and other political movements in Pakistan, see Khan 2005 and
Mushtaq 2014.
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to General Zia (a Punjabi migrant from the Indian Eastern Punjab) was being rustled up only in
the Bhutto’s home province, Sind. The lawyers challenged this deliberate misconstruction by
organizing and leading the protests in Lahore, capital of the province of Punjab (Caliborne
1983). On September 3rd, 1983, the Washington Post reported that 500 lawyers took to the
streets to “revive protests” against Zia and to challenge the perception that the resistance to the
General is only concentrated, in a nationalist guise, to Sind (ibid.) In his commentary on the
MRD movement, Abdul Qadir Mushtaq also recalls the lawyers’ protests:
On 19th Oct. 1983, the lawyers again organized “a protest day against the martial law
regime”. In Lahore, they tried to take out a procession but police created hurdles through
throwing stones and bricks. A clash took place in the premises of Lahore High Court. The
role of Talat Yaqub (Lawyer) was very remarkable in Lahore Bar Association. She used to
shout at the male dominated Lahore Bar Association, throwing off her glass bangles and
waving the Pakistani flag. She raised the slogans of democracy and challenged the
clutches of the police. In Karachi, the same case came to surface. Few lawyers were
injured and a few were arrested by police. (2015, 127)
The lawyers’ involvement in politics today therefore must be placed in this larger
trajectory of their political and legal engagement with first, the colonial and then, the
postcolonial state. However, it was the first time in the country’s postcolonial history that they
had the opportunity to lead a movement – a point repeatedly emphasized by Atizaz Ahsan.
Prominent activist-lawyers, such as Atizaz Ahsan, Ikram Chaudhry and Munir A. Malik,18 had
from early on engaged in the movements against military dictatorships, and their activism
added to the lawyers and the bars’ social capital, political acumen and prestige. Ahsan belonged
to the PPP and was jailed a number of times during the protests against General Zia. Munir A.
Malik, too, was imprisoned during Zia’s martial law.
It was the first time, since Independence, that the lawyers were once again positioned to
lead a political movement.19 Ahsan claimed that “the Lawyers’ Movement gave me a greater
chance to craft the movement. To not just to lead it, but to craft it. To give it its soul, its dream,
Introduced in the last chapter.
Recall that Jinnah was a barrister as well, and had led the Pakistan Movement. (See Jalal
1985).
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and its purpose. And the purpose in my mind, was a broader purpose than getting the judges
restored.” But how did Ahsan and other lawyers lead and mold a political movement? What
were their slogans and discourses? And how did these senior activist-lawyers, mobilize their
fellow lawyers and bars across ethnic and class divides alongside other social classes in the
country?

Crafting the Ideology of the Lawyers’ Movement: Welfare State and Substantial
Justice
On the evening of May 24th, 2008, advocate Sajjad Gul,20 a Trotskyist labor lawyer,
wearily took his seat at the lawyers’ convention at the Faisalabad Bar Association. Gul was
exhausted because he had accompanied the deposed Chief Justice in an hours-long journey from
his residence in the capital, Islamabad, through the towns and cities of Central Punjab, to
Faisalabad .21 The hall was packed with lawyers, Gul recalled. It was a very hot day, and the heat
was adding to the dreary, dull speeches of the lawyers on the podium. The people outside had
gathered to welcome and see Chaudhry – the man who had said ‘No’ to a ruling General. “So
inside we had lawyers”, Hussain continued, and “outside the public, yet none of the speakers
were able to inspire the aam admi waiting outside”. “Then Atizaz Ahsan came on the stage”, Gul
said, and “started (directly) addressing the crowd outside. ‘Right now’, Ahsan declared, ‘we are
separated by this wall [of the Bar] and you have been left out [of our political system]; and by
getting this man, the Chief Justice, restored, together we won’t be able to achieve real justice; we
won’t be able to break the walls of this system, which keep you out; we will win true justice,
when all of you, when every Pakistani, will have roti, kapra aur makan [food, clothes and
shelter] in his reach. This is our fight, and today we are entering the first phase [of restoring
Chaudhry], but tomorrow, we move to the next’”. Ahsan knew that bars across Pakistan and the
Pseudonym.
I have discussed the lawyers and the Chief Justice’s marches (on the G.T.Road and through
Punjab) in the last chapter.
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majority of the lawyers were with the Chief Justice, but a narrative needed to be crafted that
would appeal and speak to the aam admi, and would reach out beyond the lawyers and their
professional confines, to mobilize and motivate Pakistanis across class, ethnic, regional and
religious divides.
Soon after Chaudhry was dismissed by General Musharraf on March 9 th, 2007, Atizaz
Ahsan, Munir A. Malik, Ali Ahmad Kurd and Hamid Khan emerged as the leading coterie of the
movement. Many of these men found themselves on Chaudhry’s side by default. Malik was the
President of the SCBA (Supreme Court Bar Association) at the time, while Qazi Anwar was the
Chairman of Executive Committee Pakistan Bar Council. Athar Minallah,22 who would soon be
identified as Chaudhry’s ‘spokesperson’, claimed that “the biggest achievement was that in the
first week after Chaudhry’s dismissal, he managed to put together a dream, wonderful team, to
lead the movement. And these were brilliant people”. Ahsan, Kurd and Malik had been active
(both inside as well as) outside of bar politics for decades, and had been part of the protest
movements of the past. Minallah claimed that theirs “was a brilliant team; it managed to lead
the idealism of the youth, young lawyers as well as the Pakistani youth. Young lawyers, across
the country, were enthusiastic about it … I saw Pakistani students [like Samad Khurram, who
appears in the chapter on the youth] taking a year off from Harvard and coming to Pakistan and
working for the movement. That kind of spirit was amazing”. 23
Malik and Ahsan played a central role in molding the narrative, slogans, aspirations, and
language of the Lawyers’ Movement; they also strategized closely with lawyers such as Sardar
Asmatullah (ex-President Rawalpindi High Court Bar) and Malik Sadeeq (ex-General Secretary
Rawalpindi High Court Bar),24 both of whom worked at the (lower) level of the District,

Minallah’s wife, Ghazala (introduced in the last chapter), who had written the open letter to
Benazir Bhutto, and sister, were regular protestors in the Movement.
23
In the last chapter, I have discussed Malik and Ahsan’s successful organization of marches
and protests.
24
Sadeeq, introduced in Chapter 1, claimed to be amongst the first protestors who witnessed
Chaudhry’s initial appearance at the Supreme Court.
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Sessions, and High Courts, in order to mobilize the lawyers , and more significantly, for the
broader success of the movement, for the intermediate, traditional middle-classes to join the
protest and the long marches. As I discuss later, the success in organizing the traditional
intermediate class, for example the bazaaris (small traders, shopkeepers, retail sellers and
merchants) from the City, would be the key in popularizing the appeal of the movement
(Moadell 1993).
In a number of ways, Atizaz rose amongst the lawyers to drive the movement against the
military government of General Musharraf. Malik and Ahsan painted the narrative of the
movement with slogans against socio-economic inequality and injustices, experienced on a daily
basis by the aam admi. They spoke to the alienation felt by Pakistani youth – both young
lawyers as well as the urban, educated middle-class students – and stoked their idealism.
Because of their past activism against the military rule, both also bridged the movement,
protesting lawyers and their bars, to the Pakistani ‘liberal’ civil society and its activists. The state
and its excesses –structurally faced by common Pakistanis in the form of police violence and
bureaucratic lethargy – featured boldly in their narrative of the rule of law and substantial
justice. Civil society and political activists rose to join the political storm that the lawyers were
brewing against the General as they passionately received this critique of military rule in
Pakistan – expressed as it was in the excess against the higher judiciary. That the Movement had
been launched against the rule of a General spoke to the historical memory of resistance against
martial laws in the country, and many responded to the call to rise up (Shah 2104).25 However,
as Ahsan and Malik repeatedly argued, the deposed Chief Justice had to be brought closer to
Pakistanis while their protest movement had to be presented in a language concrete enough to
resonate with them; the slogans were of “hope” and “change”, Malik claimed, and they broke the
“pessimism” existing in Pakistani society.
I have discussed invocation of the memory of coups (by political activists) in the last chapter
and Chapter 1 on the history and memories of the Movement. See also Shah 2014 on military
coups in Pakistan.
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I met Munir A. Malik in Karachi in June 2015. His office was not difficult to trace, but
Karachi’s testing heat had made it an arduous task. Like many other well-to-do lawyers , his
chamber was located in a bungalow in an upper-middle class neighborhood. This I came to
discover early on in my fieldwork. Malik was the very first lawyer to give a first-person account
of the Movement.26 He was the president of the SCBA (Supreme Court Bar Association), when
Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry was dismissed in March 2007. He became one of
the leading figures in Chaudhry’s defense team. Malik even fell seriously ill while imprisoned
during the protests against Musharraf’s imposition of Emergency.27
“From day one, we understood that we were not revolutionaries … we were liberal
activists”, Malik opened with a smile. A heavy-smoker in his early fifties, Malik leaned forward
and explained, “precedent and stability are central to law, legal practice, and justice”. The
lawyers, indeed, are the gatekeepers of a system that a majority of, if not all Pakistanis find
‘corrupt’, frustrating and perplexing. 28 For Malik and his contemporaries, as they were shaping
the ideological content of the movement, the ideas of a “welfare state” and “substantive justice”
were pivotal slogans to rally the politically-distant aam admi.
As an overarching re-definition of the nation-state, the invocation of ‘justice’ was an
attempt to transcend the ethnic, sectarian and regional differences, which have pestered
Pakistan since independence. Liberal thinkers have attempted to resolve the tensions created by
the contradictory, plural values that exist in liberal polities, by building up and assuming
universal, common safeguards, such as the notion of “basic liberties” (John Rawls 1971) or
“fundamental rights or side restraints” (Robert Nozick 1974) [Gray 2000, 70]. The (unresolved)
tension between plural values and the need for a unified, strong state has haunted liberal
political thought historically.29
I have made use of Malik’s book to sketch the keys events, in the Chapter 1.
See Chapter 1.
28
See Siddique 2013.
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See Schmitt 1996[1938] and 1985[1922].
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The idea of substantial justice, delivered by an empowered judiciary in a welfare state,
colored the lawyers’ political imagination of a just state – in which the higher judiciary was
(awarded and) presumed to command a central position; Ahsan and Malik both agreed upon
such a non-procedural idea of justice.30 This re-positioning of the judiciary within the state
resonated with the educated middle-class as well. Atizaz Ahsan explained:
I have never really thought of courtroom justice as a complete panacea for people,
because courtroom justice can be very distorted justice. It can, and does, take a very
warped shape of justice, because of the social norms of the individual judge. The values
of the individual judge, who is deciding the case, become important in the courtroom
justice. If he is a patriarchal sort of a judge, he won’t give a woman a chance at justice.
Take the case of Mukhtar Mai [see Chapter 8, on honor killings]: A judge of the Supreme
Court says that she would have been a credible witness, had she been a virgin. But since
she was a divorcee, she can’t be given the credit of trustworthiness as a witness. This is
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the year of our lord, I think, 2011, that this judgment
has come, and we filed a review of that judgment. So courtroom justice to me is not, in
fact, has never been, the justice I wanted to pursue although I have been associated with
the legal profession for almost half a century now.31
Agreeing with Ahsan, Malik defined “substantive justice” as “the empowerment of the
people, [to provide] clean water and [end] corruption”. Before General Pervez Musharraf
imposed a state of Emergency on November 3rd, 2007, the lawyers drew support for Chief
Justice Chaudhry from the civil society, youth and political activists, and a few anti-Musharraf
political parties. And so, after November 3rd – as people faced yet another martial law by the
same General – Malik claimed, “we raised the expectations of the people on the premise that
there will be a new Pakistan based on insaaf (justice)”.
The possibility of a just state appealed to the masses at large, but especially to the
middle-classes. Recall that Chaudhry’s Supreme Court distinguished itself by taking up cases
against ‘corruption’, excesses of the state’s security agencies, and the abuse of state resources

Procedure and precedent are central tents of Common Law practice. (See Munir 2014)
Atizaz Ahsan was Mai’s counsel in the Supreme Court and had challenged the acquittal of
suspects in her rape case. See Chapter 8.
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and powers.32 His populist postures often targeted senior bureaucrats and politicians, to the
extent that General Musharraf’s proclamation of Emergency on November 2nd, 2007, explicitly
mentioned the Court’s interventions against the state. Chaudhry’s actions in court, directed
towards the public outside, were dismissed by professional lawyers and the educated middleclass as second-rate populism. More importantly, justice in Chaudhry’s court was often seen as
arbitrary, spectacular (Thompson and Hay et. al 1975) and empty of precedent and/or
procedure. However, common Pakistanis [the aam admi!] took pleasure in witnessing popular
justice lashed out at the powerful bureaucrats and political class of the country.
Malik and Ahsan wanted to steer the Movement beyond the restoration of the deposed
Chief Justice of Pakistan and the reformation of courtroom justice; they intended to re-ground
the Pakistani state as ‘secular’ and welfare, rather than based on Islamic-nationalist security.
Pakistan’s history is scarred by a bloody tension between the desire for a strong executive to
maintain public order – a colonial desire for law and order and to maintain the ‘writ’ of the state
– and the security of democratic rule or support of mass politics. The judiciary has been the
mediator of this tension and has always legitimized military executive powers in order to secure
the state. The Pakistani state inherited the colonial legacy of a strong centralized state, which
tasked the judiciary with maintaining public order and the security of the state. As democratic
popular politics, where they did exist, were suppressed, and wary ethnic minorities were
marginalized within the state, the powerful military-bureaucratic complex quickly secured
political power in Pakistan’s early years, in the name of the rule of law. Ahsan’s famous
proclamation in his poem, Aaj Aur Kal, that the state will take care of its citizens as a mother

In Chapter 1, I briefly list the higher courts’ interventions (their judicial activism) in the
month prior to Chaudhry’s suspension.
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does of her children, was a provocative challenge to the security-centric state in Pakistan and
those who argued its necessity.33
The new “state imaginary” (Kaviraj 2012, 41) also impressed the young lawyers. Malik
explained, “In my speeches and writings, I argued that if there is more access to justice, the
profession will strive. The young lawyers’ economic interests will be protected. But if the
judiciary is not independent, money and big faces will prevail.” The idea of Insaaf (justice) also
appealed to the tajaran, the bazaaris (Moadell 1993), the small traders and shopkeepers, as
they too are often victims of, what Malik called, the “thana (police station)/bhatta (extortion)
culture”. The idea of finally being able to have recourse to justice attracted their instrumental
support for the Movement. In solidarity with the lawyers, the traders from the traditional
“intermediate classes” (Aijaz Ahmad 1996, 44) would later play a key role in shutting down
major cities of Pakistan to de-legitimize the military government.34
Malik explained that the idea of a new Pakistan, based on the rule of law and justice,
would have to be pitched to the urban middle-classes as well to seek their support against the
‘corrupt’ political and the military ruling elite. These classes are a frequent consumer of media
and the lawyers’ ideological slogans were directed at them through the electronic media.
Politically-abstract slogans, such as the rule of law, Malik further argued, had to be explicated:
“We had to explain to people what the rule of law meant: qanun ke samne har admi barabar
hai [every person is equal before the law]; the fundamental principle, which we enunciated, was
one of equality; everyone is equal before the state, I proclaimed; the understanding we were
trying to convey to everyone was that in Pakistan there are indeed rulers and the ruled, and that
the law is made for the interest of the ruling classes”. Malik and Ahsan spoke of socioeconomic

Christian Fair’s recent work on Pakistan Army describes how the Army has dominated the
state since Independence and how its “strategic culture” defines its relationship with
neighboring India (2014).
34
‘Shutter-down hartal (strike)’ is one of the many nonviolent modes of political protest against
the state in South Asia and not successful without the crucial support of the bazaar class. (See
Venkiteswaran 2014 and Irschick 1986).
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inequalities in the language of the rule of law to create a new political imagination that would
carry appeal beyond the educated middle-class. Malik was speaking about the experiences of
inequality before the state and the law that the majority of working and middle-class Pakistanis
faced everyday: police excesses, ‘corrupt’ practices in the state bureaucracy, nepotism,
favoritism in job hiring, and so on.
Atizaz Ahsan claimed that he was also reaching out to speak to the aam admi in his
speeches, poetry, writings, talks with the media and addresses to the Bar Associations. He
explained:
I said that we were not struggling for one man, Iftikhar Chaudhry; I said this many
times. It’s not him, it’s the principle, I said. It’s the broader principle that we want
justice, we want social justice and we want religious harmony [Ahsan reads from his
poem: Hindu Muslim Sikh and Christians are all one, together…] So we wanted that and
I think justice, equity and unity were the ethos of the Lawyers’ Movement: justice,
equality and unity. I was, if I may arrogate to myself, largely able to shift the focus of
the Movement, from just Iftikhar Chaudhry, whose reinstatement was cathartic to the
Movement itself, … to broader social and political issues. So it was not a question of
deprivation of one man from his job but a nation from its rights. (emphasis added)
Ahsan’s poem, Aaj aur Kal (today and tomorrow),35 written while under detention,
became the anthem of the Lawyers’ Movement. For educated, middle-class Pakistanis, his poem
articulated the historical vision, as well as demand, of what the postcolonial Pakistani state
ought to be. The most popular verse of the poem was about reconfiguring the hard military,
security state of Pakistan as a “soft, welfare state: riyasat ho gi ma ke jaise [the state will be our
mother]”. By asking the Military to serve its constitutional role – to protect the borders of the
nation-state – Ahsan severed the nationalist chord that many of its political allies used to bind it
(the Army) to the socioeconomic and ideological security of the nation-state. He stated: “Fauj
lage gi sub ko achi jab sarhad ke pass rahe gi [the Army will be admired by all, when it will
remain at and protect the borders]”. Recall that the movement provided the public space for
protest, political satire and critique – as I discuss in the chapter on youth and street theatre

35

See Chapter 2.
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(Chapter 5) – to openly criticize the political ambitions and economic enterprises of the Pakistan
Army.36
So, on the one hand, Ahsan spoke to the urban, educated ‘civil society’ of Pakistan, which
defines itself through the support and activism for democracy and liberal, human and
constitutional rights, and on the other hand, he and Malik painted the narrative of the
movement with populist slogans and ideas, which would articulate the aspirations and
precarities of the majority of Pakistanis, especially of the urban, intermediate middle-classes,
which have historically formed the core of popular movements in the country.37 In his poem,
Ahsan went on to resuscitate the socialist slogans of the 1960s and 1970s, popularized by Z.A.
Bhutto and his populist PPP (Pakistan People’s Party):38
Roti kapra aur ghar apna janta ko hum dilwaen ge
Aata bijli paani eindhan sab ko saste daam mile ga
Berozgaron ko harmumkin rozgar aur kaam mile ga
Riyasat ho gi maa ke jaisi
Haar shehri se pyar kare gi

We will find food and
shelter for all
All that we need to survive,
will be cheaply provided to us
All the unemployed will find
work
The State will be like a
a mother
And will take care of each of
its citizens

Ahsan’s imaginary of the state attempted to transcend the sectarian, ethnic, regional and
ideological divides that many Pakistanis have felt entrapped in since Partition. Transcending
these divisions and formulating a powerful and imaginative narrative of unity and consensus,
has been lacking in Pakistan’s history and therefore Ahsan’s reimagining of the state, although
building on populist slogans from the past, was nevertheless an attempt to bridge differences
For an excellent analysis of the Pakistani military forces’ business ventures and investments in
the country, see Siddiqa 2007.
37
Including Pakistan Movement, landed political elite has historically led political movements
in Pakistan. The urban middle-classes have formed the core of these movements and have
mainly followed these men. The Lawyers’ Movement was the first time in the country’s history
that the middle-classes not only formed the core supporters and protestors, but also in the form
of a professional class, lawyers, led the movement.
38
PPP’s support of the Movement brought out its activists, who, as I discussed in the last two
chapters, often invoked the historical memory of the resistance against General Zia’s military
rule and PPP’s founder Z.A. Bhutto’s toppling and death by the same military.
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through a narrative that speaks in the universal ‘secular’ language of humanity, rather than in
the language of procedure or court justice.
Modernity and secularism, the couplet of ‘universal humanity’, have hegemonized
political and social thought in South Asia. In the last chapter, I discussed how the nationalist
elites, soon after independence, set to work on developing their respective nation-states,
assumed to be lagging behind the ‘West’. Modernity, as Dipesh Chakrabarty argues, can’t be
invoked without first invoking the West, and liberalism (and the liberal state) has emerged as
the site of these debates. He explains:
The phenomenon of “political modernity”— namely, the rule by modern institutions
of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise—is impossible to think of
anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the
genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of
Europe. Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human
rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private,
the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific
rationality, and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history. One simply
cannot think of political modernity without these and other related concepts that found a
climactic form in the course of the European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century.
(Chakrabarty 2000, 4, emphasis added)
In the projects of political modernity, the state prominently features as the tool of intervention,
reform and progress (Scott 1999). The liberal state’s relationship with its populations defines
itself in debates over secularism as it (the liberal state) mediates the differences between them
(Mahmood 2016; Gray 2000; and Asad 1993). Religion then becomes the site of articulation for
the definition and contestation of secularism as well as the kind of role the state ought to play in
this process (Asad, Mahmood and Butler 2009). Through the “rationalization of religion”
(publicly approaching and defining religion as a “cohesive whole”), the Islamists have also
contributed to the debates and contestations within Pakistan (Iqtidar 2011, 22).39 Everyday
affects, “aspirations and skepticism” over the meaning of a Muslim identity defines these
debates as well (Khan 2012). As he puts it, Atizaz Ahsan’s ‘secular’ humanity recalled “Jinnah’s
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I discuss Islamists (JI’s Maududi) theory of the state in Chapter 6. (See Maududi 1960)
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Pakistan”, but rather than placing religion outside of the state, he placed it at the center of
Jinnah’s imagined (still unaccomplished) project of a secular Pakistan:
Aur Mohammad Ali Jinnah ne logon dekha tha jo sapna sab ka
Sari dunya par ab ho ga saya eik hi rab ka
Woh rab sanjha woh rab sacha
Har mazhab har dharam ka wo rab hai
Muslim, Hindu Sikh esayi, har insaan pe karam ka rab hai

Jinnah had a dream
Of one God for all
One true God for all
For all religions, all faiths
For Muslims, Hindus,
Sikhs, and Christians

As I discuss in Chapter 6 (on Islamists in the Movement), the interpretation of the constitution
has become a central site of defining the space for religion in Pakistan.40 Sharing the liberal
language of modernity (of constitution, rights and the rule of law), even the Islamists dream of a
state that would transform Pakistani society through the establishment of hudood [limits] on the
passions and actions of the aam admi.
By speaking about high unemployment, the lack of basic services, the excesses of state
agencies, and ‘corruption’, Ahsan and Malik were broadening the narrative of the movement to
include the educated middle-class that feels increasingly alienated from politics and
marginalized in the political economy of the nation-state. Javeed Alam has made an intriguing
argument about parliamentary democracy and the Indian middle-classes: the participation of
the poor, working class in elections, and voting, he argues, has increased over the years as
compared to other classes (2004). The middle-class, especially the urban, educated circles, feel
left out of the popular discourse of ‘unruly’ politics, and from a patronage system that doesn’t
allow access to the state through education and on ‘merit’. Ahsan and Malik were thus stoking
the “precarity” (Standing 2016) experienced by this class, and the Lawyers’ Movement provided
a mode of expressing middle-class discontent with the state and its legal and political apparatus.
The Supreme Court, under Chaudhry, became famous for its sensational interventions in
the cases of ‘corruption’ and illicit profiteering, misuse and abuse of state resources (Cheema

Hudood and blasphemy laws are prime examples of how Islam and its legal iterations and
mechanisms have become a site of contestation between various ideological groups, as well as
for state control of the public sphere.
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and Gilani 2014). The middle-classes, the traditional as well as the urban educated, took
pleasure in and lauded these populist postures of the Chaudhry Court. For them, the populist
posturing of the Supreme Court under Chaudhry demonstrated that his restoration might check
the corruption in the state apparatus and of the ‘traditional’ ruling political elite (of landowners,
industrialists and bureaucrats).41 Thereon, owing to the re-disciplining of the state and the
political elite, their class might be able to achieve what they truly deserve, that is, their share in
and welfare from the state.42 This class has been losing to others what they believe they truly
deserve. Although state law and regulations make it clear that appointments should be made
according to merit, according to this class, it is because of the ‘corruption’, nepotism and a
diseased political system, that those who deserve to don’t achieve what they truly earn. And so if
a Chief Justice like Chaudhry took over the Supreme Court, the illegal and illicit use of state
power and resources might come to an end, or at least be kept in check.
The Chaudhry Court had become popular for taking suo moto notices (under Article
184(3) of the Constitution) on matters of public interest, and Chaudhry’s notices addressed
populist concerns. After his restoration, the Supreme Court’s Human Rights Cell received
thousands of applications (Siddiqi 2014); most of these had to do with police violence, judicial,
property, and human and women rights; most were aimed at, or involved, the state. The
excessive violations of fundamental rights by the state and its apparatus had been taken notice
of before too, but the ferocity and the spectacle brought upon them now had no parallel in
Pakistan’s political and judicial history.43 Violations of fundamental rights by state security

As I discussed in the introduction, the ‘ traditional ruling elite’, an old Marxist conception,
doesn’t do justice to the changed political economy of power in Pakistan, in which the traditional
intermediate classes have become more influential since the 1980s. However, the perception of
the traditional ruling elite, comprised of landlords and industrialists, as the most ‘corrupt’,
persists. (See Niaz 2011).
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As I mentioned, the educated civil society and rights activists criticized the Chaudhry Court’s
arbitrary actions in ‘corruption’ cases and his incessant suo moto notices, even on petty
complaints.
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The ‘Missing Persons’ cases, discussed in Chapter 7, is an example of the Supreme Court’s
activism for fundamental rights.
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apparatus, ranging from local police to the country’s most powerful and ruthless shadowy
intelligence agencies, were never so openly discussed in the public sphere as they were after
Chaudhry’s restoration. The missing persons cases (see the chapter on Enforced
Disappearances) were first taken up by the Chaudhry Court and became one of the most
irritating and daring challenges thrown to General Musharraf and the military and intelligence
apparatus at large.
Munir A. Malik claimed that it was because of the Lawyers’ Movement that a new
political imaginary had taken root among Pakistanis in general, and the urban, educated
middle-classes in particular. “The fatalism has finally been broken”, he declared, because “aaj
har admi yeh kehta hai ke iss maashray mein insaaf nahin hai, insaaf hona chahiyay [Today,
everyone demands justice; Pakistanis say that there is no justice in our society and there should
be justice for all]”.
Malik and Ahsan provided the popular language, a new common sense, for the narrative
of the movement, within which an alternative imagination of the fragmented nation-state could
take root (Crehan 2016); the lawyers as well as the urban, educated middle-class and its
intellectual and civil society allies raised the slogans of a ‘new’ Pakistan together. However, one
would be naïve to assume that Pakistanis had been mobilized solely on the basis of these slogans
and the crafting of a critical language that spoke of their precarities and deprivations. The
educated youth, university and college students, and civil society and political activists were
quick to join the protesting lawyers, but Ahsan and the lawyers knew that other social classes
had to be mobilized to turn the protest for Chaudhry’s restoration into a mass protest movement
against the Musharraf government.

Crowds and Routes: Mobilizing the Bazaar and the Aam Admi
Advocate Qazi Anwar recalled that it was in a lawyers’ meeting on April 20th, 2007, when
Atizaz Ahsan had suggested that “the time has come for us to get out of the Court and go to the
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people”, and the first place they decided for the Chief Justice’s visit was the Rawalpindi Bar
Association.44 Ahsan also proposed that the lawyers should take Chaudhry, in a procession, and
drive through the bazaars to the Rawalpindi Bar. However, the majority of the Committee chose
the sparsely populated route between Islamabad to Rawalpindi. Ahsan was voted down, even
though he claimed to have arranged a welcome for Chaudhry with the Rawalpindi’s old bazaar
communities.
Atizaz Ahsan was well aware of the “political dividends” to be had from calling upon the
“aam admi” to come out. At that meeting, Qazi Anwar remembered Ahsan sagely persuading his
fellow lawyers: “if you go through the bazaars, you will see that people will receive you.” Ahsan
was a seasoned and acute political activist, and had sensed that Musharraf had already
antagonized many classes, including the bazaaris. Secondly, he knew that to mobilize the
people, one had to go to them. As Ahsan put it, “you have to touch the people”, especially when
most of the country wanted to see the man who had refused to kneel down before a military
ruler – a rare, rare exception in Pakistan’s history. The public’s reception of the deposed Chief
Justice and the local judiciary’s presence at the bar gatherings were duly noted by the Supreme
Court judges hearing Chaudhry’s case. Qazi Anwar claimed:
if we hadn’t started the public campaign, … the July 20th judgment, which restored the
Chief Justice, would not have been possible. The public support played a huge part …
Everybody welcomed Chaudhry, even the retired judges of the Supreme Court and of the
Lahore High Court were there [at the Lahore Bar]. Justice Jawad S. Khawaja (LHC)
resigned against Chaudhry’s dismissal and this sent a strong message to the judges.
Some of the Sessions Judges had resigned in protest too. These messages were surely
noted by the judges at the Supreme Court.45
After Rawalpindi, various bars across Pakistan invited the Chief Justice to address them.
As spectacular displays of popular power, as well as of political mobilization, these road journeys
impressed upon the military government and its political allies the intensity of the popular

I discuss the lawyers’ mobilization of bars and on road journeys along the G.T. Road in
Chapter 1.
45
Discussed in Chapter 1.
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discontent brewing across the country; the popular support that the Chief Justice drew
symbolized the growing resentment against Musharraf’s rule. The most spectacular of these was
the road trip from Islamabad to Lahore (a city 380 km from the Capital) – the heart of political
power and mobilization in Pakistan.46 Ahsan had wanted to mobilize Pakistanis along the G.T.
Road and especially across the Punjab. The political topography drawn by the Chief Justice’s
caravan shocked the military government. Punjab, dormant along this vital political route, came
out in numbers that surprised even Ahsan and his fellow lawyers. Popular and electoral support
from Punjab is considered the key to political power in Pakistan. Winning Punjab means
winning Pakistan.
For the trip to Lahore, Atizaz Ahsan drove the Chief Justice for 26 hours, where it usually
takes about 4-5 hours. Ahsan remembered:
It took 26 hours to drive from Islamabad to Lahore, which is 150 miles. It took me
26 hours of driving. The Chief Justice was sitting with me. Why would it take 26 hours?
Because everybody and everybody’s grandmother and their great, great grandmother was
on the street to welcome us as we drove. And you can’t drive through a consistent body of
a crowd, from here to Lahore. Obviously, people were not massed there permanently.
People dispersed after we had moved on. But we moved from one crowd into another
one, into a third one, into a fourth one, and so on. At the most, there were distances of
may be a mile or two between them. It would take us two hours, or sometimes even
more, to negotiate out of one crowd. When we would negotiate ourselves out, there
would be a free run and then we would again run into another crowd. When it takes 24
hours to drive from Islamabad to Faisalabad, which is 120 miles. When it takes 16 hours
to drive from Islamabad to Abbottabad, which is 75-80 miles only, then, it means that
Pakistanis from all backgrounds and classes were in our movement and had been
mobilized by the lawyers.
After Rawalpindi and Lahore, Ahsan and his fellow lawyers strategized to take the Chief Justice
across the country to address the bars, to motivate more lawyers to join, and in the process, to
mobilize people in the bazaars, towns, and villages along the way. The strategy succeeded
impressively; also because the media had thrown its support behind the lawyers and livetelevised the Chief Justice’s caravan across the country. Antagonism against General Musharraf

46

Discussed in Chapter 1.

143

had indeed found its spark in the charisma of Chaudhry’s ‘No’ and in the shape of the movement
launched by the lawyers to restore him.

The Bazaar
The “bazaaris” have played a central role in political movements and protest
mobilizations in postcolonial Pakistan, as well as in other Muslim states such as Iran (Moadell
1993). In the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) movement (which later became the movement to
demand enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan) against Z.A. Bhutto in 1977, on the call of the
alliance of religious and nationalist political parties, the small traders and shopkeepers managed
to shut the country down. As I discussed in the introduction, merchants, craftsmen, petty
businessmen, small retailers, alongside wholesale traders, comprise the intermediate traditional
middle-class in Pakistan (Akhter 2008, 33, 87-88; Ahmad 2000, 44). Historically, they have
also provided the social base for the Islamists (such as the JI)47 and the ulema, as well as, and
most importantly, for a majority of the petty lawyers. Along with the lawyers,48 they continue to
play an influential role in the politics of religion, such as in the blasphemy cases in Pakistan
(Abbas 2014). General Musharraf’s proclamation of an ‘enlightened moderation’ for Pakistani
society and closeness to the ‘West’ had antagonized the traditional bazaaris, who predominantly
considered Islam and Islamic identity to be their most powerful cultural revenge against the
‘West’ and its ‘agents’.49 During General Zia’s military rule, the bazaar class had expanded and
become more influential in that their proximity to the state had increased – because of both the
emergence of a politics of common sense, as well as, the state’s cultural and logistical hosting of
the Afghan jihad. In short, there existed a hegemonic, historic alliance between the bazaaris and
In contrast to conventional deoband political parties (like Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam), JI has
traditionally drawn its support from urban, middle-class traditional class of professionals and
petty traders and businessmen. See Nasr 1996 and 2001.
48
How, through passing bar resolutions, the lawyers insert their voice in national politics is
discussed in the next chapter.
49
In Chapter 6, I show how Islamists theorize state as the site from where to counter Western
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the lawyers, which needed to be revived in order to reclaim state power, resented as it was in
secular hands. The bazaaris were an effective part of, and crucial allies to, the lawyers’ bloc.
General Musharraf had alienated the religious political parties as well as their allies and
sympathizers.50 Pakistan’s support of the U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan, the hunt for
Islamic militants within Pakistan,51 and the military operation launched in FATA (Federally
Administered Tribal Area), had drawn strong hostility from the religious, traditional,
intermediate middle-class. A majority of Pakistanis felt indignant over the deferential
relationship with the U.S. as witnessed in the Lal Masjid operation of July 2007, its bloody
conclusion and the saga of the missing students of the Masjid; resultantly, these classes were
deeply antagonized against the Musharraf government (see the Chapter on Enforced
Disappearances).52 Not surprisingly then, the bazaar openly provided support to the movement
against Musharraf.
Historically, the bazaaris have remained close, or at least sympathetic, to the local
established religious political parties and ulema. Orthodox, tablegi and Wahhabi variants of
Islam and local traditional cultural identities have fueled their nationalism. The bazaaris, after
the fall of Bhutto, openly encouraged General Zia’s push to Islamize Pakistani society and state.
There continues to exist a close ideological proximity between the Sunni sectarian groups and
the bazaaris, especially in Punjab (Zaman 1998). Apart from the ideological differences with
General Musharraf, the bazaaris had their own professional interests to secure against his
military government as well.
After he unseated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999, General Musharraf set
out to reform the Pakistani state, its political and economic systems. He moved forward, as
many past military rulers had claimed before him, to punish the ‘corrupt’ in the political and
bureaucratic elite of the country. He also moved ahead to regulate the bazaar and reform the
Even though their political alliance (MMA) supported the General in the Parliament.
See the chapter on the ‘Missing Persons’.
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taxation system – a much-needed project, which past civilian governments had avoided because
of the potential confrontation with the powerful bazaar. However, the bazaaris vehemently
resisted this move. Ajmal Baloch led the bazaaris in their campaign against the Musharraf
government in Islamabad.
As one turns towards Abpara Market in Islamabad, a faded sign from the local Traders
Welfare Association stares out: “All civil society, political and religious parties are requested to
refrain from all kinds of political protests and gatherings in Abpara Chowk” (see Figure 3). And
yet Abpara Market remains one of the favorite sites for civil society and political protesters in
Islamabad. It is also one of the oldest and busiest commercial centers in the city. Abpara, along
with most of the markets of Islamabad, supported the Lawyers’ Movement. Its long-serving
president, Ajmal Baloch, runs a stationary shop there. In May-June 2000, Baloch’s and other
markets in Islamabad went on strike against Musharraf’s drive to collect business data and
document their transactions. Baloch recalled: “Musharraf sent PEMRA, Army soldiers, Tax
Bureau people to conduct a survey in our market. They wanted to document all business
transactions and calculate taxes for us. For 17 days, it was a battle between us and the state as we
shut down the whole city”. The government backed off, Baloch claimed, because it didn’t want to
document the big financial and industrial institutions, which Baloch and other bazaaris
demanded, be included in the reformed system too. Musharraf’s government then settled on
introducing a self-assessment scheme for the traders and shopkeepers. States view the
“decentralization” of the bazaar and its continuing informality with deep suspicion (Smith
1985). Internal patronage networks of the bazaaris, through which they not only mediate their
own disputes but also negotiate with the state, unsettle the state’s regulatory relationship with
individual bazaaris. The bazaar’s associational politics also poses serious challenges to how the
state intends to govern these financially opaque and semi-independent spaces.
In 2007, Baloch led the bazaaris in the movement against Musharraf. He was arrested
and imprisoned once the Emergency was imposed. Baloch argued that the Lawyers’ Movement
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was not a part of “siyasat” [politics] for him or for other bazaaris, it was above personal,
political and ideological affiliations. However, similar to the lawyers, bazaaris also sympathize
with, and are even active members of, various political parties. Baloch claimed affiliation with
Sharif’s PML-N – Musharraf’s political opposition at the time. Also, as in the case of the lawyers,
political affiliations matter when association elections are held. As I have repeatedly argued, the
Lawyers’ Movement became a site of resistance and a space of public protest, against Musharraf
and his military’s rule, remonstrated in the language of the rule of law and constitutionalism,
which were claimed to be above siyasat [politics], and upon which alliances and blocs could be
forged between various, even antagonistic, political groups and social classes.
After his arrest and subsequent release the same night, Baloch met the Chief Justice at
his residence and openly declared the bazaaris’ support in his favor. Baloch admired Chaudhry’s
actions against ‘corruption’ and his bold stand against General Musharraf. He claimed that
when he met Chaudhry, he told the journalists there: “ ‘I am not here to meet the CJ, I am
meeting present day’s Tipu Sultan, because we used to read about Tipu that he stood up against
the tyrant and died, but never bowed down. Tipu uttered Qalma-e-Haq in his jihad and the
Chief Justice said his by saying ‘No’. Musharraf was at the height of his political and military
power and was quite over-confident in his position, but Chaudhry still stood up against him”.
Baloch had invoked another ‘hero’ from the cultural and political memory of the anti-colonial
struggle (and from nationalist historiography), who had challenged the ‘unjust power’ of his
time.53 Like Tipu, who was known to be a brave, kind ruler, Baloch admired Chaudhry for taking
suo moto notices on “many helpless cases, when he was serving in the Court; and so the aam
admi, such as myself, felt secure that they could get justice in his court, as they would in Tipu
Sultan’s. Even the corrupt and powerful men were apprehended and punished by the Chief

Tipu Sultan (1750-99), known as the ‘Tiger of Mysore’, was the Muslim ruler of Mysore, a
Hindu-majority state. He died in battle, defending the city against British assault. (See Habib
1997).
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Justice.” After the Chief Justice was reinstated, Baloch took 80 tajir representatives with him to
congratulate Chaudhry and publicly distributed hundreds of kilograms of sweets.
Baloch and other bazaaris regularly joined the protests outside the Supreme Court, took
part in strikes to declare solidarity against Musharraf’s rule and logistically supported the
protests and long marches organized in the Capital. The lawyers relied upon these alliances to
turn their rallies and mobilizations into successful long marches such that would pressurize the
government to restore the Chief Justice.

Mobilizing for the First Long March
Sardar Asmatullah was the President of the Rawalpindi High Court Bar and Malik
Sadeeq54 the General Secretary, when Chaudhry was removed from office. Both led Rawalpindi
lawyers, organized protest rallies and, more importantly, mobilized the City and its bazaars to
that made the long marches against the PPP government successful.
Sardar Asmatullah’s chamber was located in one of the old bazaars of Rawalpindi. His
practice kept him quite busy, Sardar’s clerk told me as he leaned over a hefty register. I waited in
the annex as clients poured in and engaged in hushed conversations with Sardar’s clerk. His
junior lawyer (an apprentice) was waiting for him as well; I quickly introduced myself and
turned on the voice recorder. As the junior started listing the grievances against the juniorsenior patronage arrangement in the legal profession, Asmatullah arrived.
After Chaudhry’s dismissal, Asmatullah, like other elected Bar officials, found himself
called upon to lead the Bar against Musharraf, whom he had welcomed a few years back (in
2002) in an inauguration ceremony, and because of which he was seriously censured by the local
lawyers. I discuss the lawyers’ antagonism against Musharraf’s government, that was brewing
prior to the Movement, in the next chapter. “I am not a political person”, Asmatullah told me
with a grin, but, “for two years, we were on war-footing”. The Rawalpindi and Islamabad Bar
54
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Associations, owing to their proximity to the Supreme Court and the politics of the Capital,
found themselves leading lawyers from across Pakistan. The local lawyers were amongst the first
protestors to have appeared outside the Supreme Court and Chaudhry’s residence, soon after his
dismissal.55 Their favorite slogans for the Chief Justice would later affirm their ceaseless loyalty
to him: Chief Tere Janisaar Beshumaar Beshumaar [Chief, you have countless followers] or
Chief Qadam Barhao Hum Tumhare Sath hain [Chief, step forward, we are with you]. The
young lawyers, the majority of whom were indifferent towards the Chief Justice or the high
politics of the Supreme Court prior to the Movement, would soon become Chaudhry’s staunch
loyalists.56
One of the most noted and celebrated, but also often criticized, element of the Lawyers’
Movement was its political and ideological mélange. Chief Justice Chaudhry’s ‘spokesperson’,
Athar Minallah, described this aspect well:
In the protests and the Long March, there were women in hijab; women in jeans; young
people; old people; people from the urban areas; people from the most elitist classes of
the urban areas … and you had mullahs and liberals standing there. And each time, we
would gather on Constitutional Avenue, we would see flag of almost every political party,
whether nationalists, communists or religious. Except for the MQM and Q-League
[Musharraf’s allies], no political party stood with General Musharraf because of the
popular pressure … Even the Islamists followed the most liberal faces [like of Ahsan and
Malik]. And so the Lawyers’ Movement united them all, and everyone came on our
platform of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy. It was the face of Atizaz Ahsan,
leadership of Ali A Kurd and of Munir Malik that people followed; they were very, very
known liberal people, probably most liberal and yet everyone followed them.
The ideological uncertainty of the Lawyers’ Movement and the use of slogans of the rule of law
and constitutionalism, which Ahsan and Malik labored hard to pin to concrete meanings, helped
the lawyers in collecting support for their bloc from the various ideological and political groups
and activists who would have never appeared, protested or taken a political stand together.
Representing different sections of the intermediate, middle-classes – professional, educated,

Discussed in Chapter 1.
In the next ethnographic chapter on the Rawalpindi lawyers, I examine in detail the young
lawyers’ passionate devotion and support for the Chief Justice, and the role of the Rawalpindi
and Islamabad Bars in the Movement.
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traditional, and Islamist – these political and social formations congregated together across
sectarian, class and local divisions on the site of the movement. As the celebrated nationalist
poet Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) put it:
Ek hi saf mein khade ho gaye Mahmood-o-Ayaz

Sultan and slave stood in a single
file, side by side

Na koi banda raha aur na koi banda-nawaz

There was not a servant nor a master,
nothing divided them

Through their first Long March, the lawyers demonstrated and affirmed popular support for the
Chief Justice against the military rule of General Musharraf. The Long March collected a
hegemonic, historical bloc under the protesting lawyers: the bazaaris, religious parties and
militant groups, the ‘liberal’ civil society and rights activists, students, opposition political
parties and supporters from the intermediate, middle-classes, both the urban traditional as well
as the urban educated professionals.
After the PPP government came to power through parliamentary elections in early 2008,
the lawyers and activists expected a swift restoration of Chaudhry and the other judges who had
remained defiant against Musharraf.57 Even though Prime Minister Gillani quickly put an end to
Chaudhry and the other judges’ house arrests, his government remained wary of the former’s
political ambitions and closeness to their political rival, Nawaz Sharif. Out of the 100 judges who
had refused to take oath under Musharraf’s Emergency orders (PCO, Provisional Constitutional
Order), many were offered a fresh oath by the PPP government. The majority took the oath and
returned to office. Most of the PPP lawyers, except Atizaz Ahsan, had already split from the
movement. Chaudhry and his loyalist lawyers, along with some of the judges, still refused. The
lawyers’ leadership finally announced a long march58 to protest against the PPP-government, to

The PPP’s electoral win had followed Benazir Bhutto’s death in a bomb blast in December
2007.
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There exists a long tradition in South Asian nationalist politics of long marches, which I
discuss below. (See also, Habib 1997).
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force it to restore the judiciary. On May 17th, 2008, the Pakistan Bar Council publicized the
launch of a long march on June 14th from Lahore to Islamabad.
The Rawalpindi and Islamabad Bars considered themselves the host Bars for the lawyers
from across Pakistan. The announcement of the march had raised the stakes for local lawyers.
This was to be a show of popular power against a government, which was just recently elected in
by popular vote. Sardar Asmatullah had been re-elected as the President of the Rawalpindi High
Court Bar by then. The local lawyers, Asmatullah frankly admitted, recognized his activism in
the movement, and he was chosen once again, to organize and lead the local lawyers. Both
Asmatullah and his General Secretary, Malik Sadeeq, realized that Rawalpindi and Islamabad
were to play a crucial role in the success (or the failure) of the long march, and a disappointing
result would have ended the Lawyers’ Movement and any hope of restoring Chaudhry.
Asmatullah began with collecting funds for the long march and claimed to have collected
over Rs. 600,000 in just a few days. Since he was a local of the city, but more importantly as he
admitted, had been regularly appearing on the media, this coverage had helped in soliciting
funds from local businessmen and other sympathizers. He explained, “I went into every galli
[street] and muhallah [neighborhood] and bazaar of Rawalpindi, and the people there knew me
because I was in the media regularly. The media played a big role in publicizing our protests”.
Sadeeq added that he and the fellow lawyers also went around the city, in cars, with
loudspeakers fitted atop, and claimed that the locals “welcomed us, wherever we went, because
they wanted Musharraf to leave”. Asmatullah knew that they had to mobilize the big bazaars,
and the locals of the cultural and political labyrinths, of the Old City. Informal and non-partisan
contacts were the key to successfully mobilizing for the March. So they visited traditional retail
markets such as the Saraffa Bazaar,59 once famous for certain commodities and trade, and still
held under the firm sway of the local bazaaris. These bazaars are located in the densely
populated, ancient neighborhoods of the city. Asmatullah recognized the cultural and political
59
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sway that the local mosques, ulemas and mullahs held over, and their cordial relationship with,
the bazaaris. And that’s why, he and the fellow lawyers visited local mosques, met with the
imams, and spoke at the mosques to mobilize the locals to join the March. They even went to
mosques held by Islamist organizations, such as Jamaat-ul-Dawa and invited them to join.60
Sadeeq explained that the bazaaris also contributed logistically. They gave the lawyers
bottles of water, food, cartons of juice, and so on. Bazaaris across Pakistan had expressed their
support for the Chief Justice and protesting lawyers, and Sadeeq had experienced this a number
of times in Rawalpindi and on his drives with Chaudhry across the country. Even some from the
professional middle-class (the ‘salariat’, employed by the state), such as the high school teachers
and nurses, called upon Sadeeq and donated food and drink for the March. Ajmal Baloch (the
President of Abpara Market) further confirmed that the bazaaris in Islamabad had provided
refreshments for the March once it reached the Capital. Baloch and other tajirs had set up
welcome booths outside their markets, and along the route of the March, and distributed food
and water to the marchers.
The Rawalpindi Bar had decided that the March would arrive at the High Court, would
be taken to the District Courts, and from there to Punjab House, and then on to Islamabad via
Murree Road – a major artery that connects the old garrison city of Rawalpindi to the Capital.
However, the Pakistani Army’s assets and its top Officer Corps, including the Chief of Army
Staff, resided in Rawalpindi. The Army’s General Headquarters also lay close to the route that
had been decided by the lawyers. Since hundreds of thousands were anticipated to arrive in the
twin cities, the lawyers were asked to change the route of their Long March, which had already
been announced, and people invited to join. Sadeeq and Asmatullah found themselves under
intense pressure from the political leadership supporting the March (such as Nawaz Sharif’s
PML-N) to change their plans. Sadeeq described the crisis he and Asmatullah had unwittingly

Recall that some civil society activists left the March and the Movement, when they observed
the presence of Islamic militant groups’ at the protests. See Chapter 2.
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entered, and how the confrontation with Musharraf’s military was about to turn into a national
crisis:
Once we had prepared our float and assembled the most powerful audio system on top,
the state pressure started to reign on us: Nasir Durrani was the DIG Police in Rawalpindi
then, and he threatened us that your March would be entering RED ZONE [around GHQ
and COAS Residence and Army House] and that you might bring militants with you, and
what if there are suicide bombers wanting to target Army? Even the Chief Minister of
Punjab called and asked us to re-route the March.
For the long march, all the surrounding Tehsil and District-level Bars had been invited:
Chakwal, Jhelum, Attock, Islamabad, Murree, Kahutta, Tala Gang, Pind Dadan Khan, Jhang,
Taxila, Hasan Abdal, and so on, and, as Sadeeq explained, their Presidents and Secretaries were
called upon by the leadership and deliberations were held with them. After heated discussions,
the lawyers decided not to change the route and to continue on Murree Road towards
Islamabad. The lawyers had decided to press on and throw a defiant, public challenge to
Musharraf and his Army.
According to Sardar Asmatullah, the lawyers decided upon the route of their Long March
mainly to mobilize people from Rawalpindi, as locals were expected to join the lawyers en route.
The Long March was planned to cut through the most dense areas of the city. In Atizaz Ahsan’s
terms, the March was to “touch the aam admi”, to bring him out, and to merge with others.
Numbers mattered. But since “the Vice Chief of Army Staff and Army House was on the route of
our March”, Asmatullah explained, “the government was scared of militants joining the
procession and attacking Army targets. However, we explained to them that we had already
given a public call and so we had to follow this route. Even our higher leadership asked me to
change the route. I replied, if you want to, take the Islamabad route but we have made the call
for the people of Rawalpindi to come and join us, and we will fail if we can’t mobilize the locals,
the bazaars and our other allies”. A torchlight procession was taken out the evening before in
Rawalpindi to mobilize for the main procession the next day.
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The march was a spectacular success. According to various sources, between 250,000 to
350,000 people joined the Long March and reached the dharna (sit-in) site outside the
Parliament in Islamabad (Syed 2008; MacDonald 2008). Men, women, families, political and
civil society activists and, of course, lawyers from across Pakistan joined in. Retired bureaucrats
and military personnel, non-partisan citizens and students from various colleges and
universities had also joined the sit-in. However after only two days, the sit-in was called off
because of the scorching heat and the threat of military take-over. The military had been closely
watching and patiently waiting for any militant activity that might have originated from the site
of the march, triggering a military response.
The lawyers and political commentators still do not agree on why the march was called
off, however Atizaz Ahsan claimed that he made the decision because the lawyers couldn’t
sustain a sit-in of hundreds of thousands of protestors in the heat of June. The sit-in was
ultimately called off on June 12th. The young lawyers were shocked at the announcement. “In
their minds”, Sadeeq explained, “they had come to take over the Capital, and to stand their
ground until the Chief Justice was restored”. They viewed terminating of the sit-in as a bitter
defeat and a betrayal by their own leadership. Fiery slogans were raised against Atizaz Ahsan
and the others who had announced the end of the sit-in.61
Chief Justice Chaudhry congratulated Sardar Asmatullah the next day. Chaudhry had
remained fearful about the outcome of the march, and lawyers close to him claimed that he was
terrified of the possible Military reaction.62 Announcing the march had raised the stakes, and its
failure, Asmatullah said, would have meant not only the end of their protest movement but also
the end of their careers, lawyers like himself. “We were out to follow history, but we made
history”, he proudly concluded.

I discuss the young lawyers, their activism and politics in the next chapter.
These lawyers described him as a “spineless opportunist”, who had by sheer accident,
captured popular? Pakistani imagination by his refusal to resign.
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As an expression of civil disobedience, a long march mobilizes the moral and political
landscape and in the process collects diehard as well as reluctant followers and spectators. In
the South Asian history of long marches, Gandhi’s famous Salt March (March 12 th-April 6th,
1930) had launched the civil disobedience movement in colonial India (Suchitra 1995). The 250mile journey, from his ashram in Ahmedabad to the coastal village of Dandi, was taken to defy
the British ban on indigenous salt-making. The March unleashed a “wave of civil disobedience”
across India, even in its north-west, “where the British troops fired and killed about 200-250 of
Khudai Khidmatgars in Qissan Khawani, Peshawar” (Habib 1997, 55-57).63 Postcolonial
politicians have attempted to emulate the Salt March as well, and so it was restaged by Rajiv
Gandhi in 1988, and later by his widow Sonia Gandhi, in 2005 (Suhrud 2005, 1491, Das 2005,
2372; and Suchitra 1995, 743). Even the Hindu nationalists carried out their march before the
assault on the Babri Mosque (ibid.) The Salt March and its memory lives on because “it is almost
as if any time an individual or group needs to establish their bona fides as being pro-nation, propeople and especially pro- poor, reference to the Salt March enhances the credibility of their
own particular cause” (Ibid.)
In postcolonial Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto launched his political career when he resigned from
General Ayub Khan’s cabinet in late 1967, on a train march across the country. Bhutto’s train
stopped at a number of stations, where he addressed the crowds assembled to see him – the
man who had defied an Army General.64 Bhutto built upon the nationalist tactic of collecting
popular support through moving public spectacles of defiance and protest. Atizaz Ahsan had
been close to Z.A. Bhutto, but especially his daughter Benazir, and had closely observed how
protest marches could arouse popular emotions and collect crowds by witnessing rituals,
populist slogans and displays of defiance.

Khudai Khidmatgar, a non-violent political movement against the British, was led by Ghaffar
Khan. (See Banarjee 2000).
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But like Gandhi, Bhutto was also a shrewd tactician. Both carefully planned and
choreographed their marches. Gandhi, ever conscious of press coverage, ensured that the Salt
March was fully covered, and it was. The Salt March was a “carefully constructed event” and
Gandhi had “visualized the event”; his choice of salt, “why he decided to march and why he
selected Dandi as destination” were all carefully strategized tactics (Suchitra 1995,743).
Similarly, Bhutto was aware of the anti-Ayub sentiment brewing in the country; he had come
close to the leftist students, the labor unions and the intellectual class, and had touched the
working classes with his socialist slogans, roti, kapra aur makan [food, clothes and shelter].
The same populist language used by Atizaz Ahsan in his famous poem. The quickest way to test
these emotions and to collect them was, as Ahsan put it, “to touch the people and let them see
you”.
The lawyers were therefore building upon the long march as a symbol of peaceful civil
disobedience and a tactic of mobilizing emotions and popular support in South Asia. Chaudhry’s
journeys across the country, via the G.T. Road,65 were intended to create moving spectacles of
popular power. The Long March was to collect and draw together such support to the Capital.
The march attracted crowds from across social, political and professional classes, regardless of
their ethnic and religious differences. Ahsan’s poem and other anthems blared on loud speakers
on a shipping container (mounted on a truck) and on other buses and trucks in the March.
People continued to join the procession as it made its way from Lahore to the Capital. In
Rawalpindi, the launching ground of the movement, the lawyers had already reached out to
their allies, the intermediate classes that included the bazaaris, and led them to the Capital.
Hundreds of thousands entered Islamabad, where once again, the local bazaaris were prepared
to welcome them. Even though abruptly ending the march in two days would de-moralize the
lawyers and their allies, their next long march carried out nine months later, would compel the

65

See the last two chapters.

156

PPP government to finally restore the Chief Justice. Although that march also mobilize from
Punjab (Lahore) to Islamabad, it would be led by an opposition politician, Nawaz Sharif.

Conclusion
Soon after Chaudhry’s restoration in March 2009, his relationship with Ahsan began to
deteriorate. “We were very, very close friends, family friends”, Ahsan said, bitterly; it was
because of this personal closeness that Ahsan had decided to not appear before Chaudhry
following his return to office, so to obviate any charges of favoritism. Ahsan was a professional, a
highly successful lawyer and many influential clients with cases pending in Chaudhry’s Court
had wanted to hire him, whereby Ahsan had declined. Even though Chaudhry re-branded
himself as a populist judge after returning to office, Ahsan had expected him (in fact he met and
advised him) to seriously reform the lower judicial system, where the majority of Pakistanis
painfully interface with ‘the law’ (Chaudhry 1999). Ahsan was disappointed as Chaudhry
completely disregarded his suggestions and engineered his own interventions.
Iftikhar Chaudhry’s restoration ended the Movement, the lawyers’ alliances with the civil
society and political activists and parties, the internal consensus of the lawyers, together with
the consent and support they had achieved across classes. The lawyers split into two factions:
the pro and anti-Chief Justice. Chaudhry patronized particular cliques of young lawyers – who
considered themselves his janissars (die-hard followers) and soldiers. Before the Movement,
most of these young, junior lawyers, practicing at the District and Sessions level courts, had
been indifferent about the Supreme Court, its crises, intrigues and conspiracies. They had
remained at a professional as well as political distance from the Supreme Court and its high
politics within the state. Their bars occasionally intervened in national crises and raised a
collective voice for the lawyers, but as I show in the next chapter, the lawyers’ associational
concerns at the District/Sessions level were, in a way, petty – negotiating with the state and its
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bureaucracy on land and other professional issues. The movement gave birth to novel
professional alliances and loyalties as well as new splits and divisions amongst the lawyers.
Soon after his return to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Chaudhry proceeded to purge
the higher courts of the “PCO Judges” – those judges of the Supreme and High Courts who had
taken oath under Musharraf’s second martial law and later under PPP’s government. Through
the judgement in the (in)famous Judge Case (PLD C.P 09/2009), over 100 judges, many of
whom were reputed to be highly competent and experienced, were removed from office. As
these judges went back to their bars and re-started their practice, the resentment against
Chaudhry and his coterie of judges and lawyers increased. The ‘Pro-CJ’ groups started to lose
bar elections. The bars were split once again, as Chaudhry’s support shrank to a small group of
lawyers.
By the time Chief Justice Chaudhry retired, Munir A. Malik had become the Attorney
General of Pakistan (appointed by Nawaz Sharif’s government in June 2013). Honoring
Chaudhry, his farewell address at the full court reference reveals, unlike Atizaz Ahsan his
continuing admiration for Chaudhry the person, as well as his historical mark on Pakistan’s
governance, as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Addressing the Chief Justice on his
retirement on December 13th, 2013, Malik said:
Today I feel especially privileged to be called upon to honor and to acclaim a Chief
Justice to whom history will doubtless offer a front seat in the pantheon of the truly great
Chief Justices … A great Chief Justice is one who is possessed of an unyielding spirit,
demonstrates exemplary courage, has nerves of steel, has been forged by adversity and
who with the gravitational force of his personality unites his court and shepherds his
flock. He unseals the law from its jurisprudential tomes and transforms it in to a living
letter, finding in its provisions the potential solutions to contemporary legal and social
problems. He takes the lead in changing mindsets … In the process he re-calibrates the
“province of the judiciary” and the constitutional limits of legislative and executive
action. He understands that the efficacy and authority of his office rest not on the
shifting sands of pomp or glory but on the far surer foundations of the moral authority
that his court enjoys with the people. He is one who unshakably believes that the
judiciary’s true function is to stand guard over the inalienable rights of the people and to
protect the weak from over-reach, exploitation and oppression by the mighty.
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Malik remained, to the end of Chaudhry’s tenure, his admirer and saw in his populist postures
the drive to humanize and popularize law by severing it from its formality and retreating into
tradition and precedent. He appreciated Chaudhry’s non-conventional and flamboyant actions
against the inefficient civilian government and the ‘corrupt’ political and the bureaucratic elite
of the country. Chaudhry had initiated these interventions through his suo moto notices, and
Malik saw these as an attempt to re-establish the meaning of law for the aam admi in Pakistan.
On the activism of the Chaudhry Court, referencing the Lawyers’ Movement and the populism
that it had unleashed in the Courts, Malik thus stated:
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience.” … It is the experience that is imbibed when one courageously and defiantly
says “No” - not even knowing what fate has in store for him, experience that comes from
instilling the same courage and defiance in scores of judges throughout the land,
experience that impels one to transform oneself; experience that is tested by adversity,
experience that gives a person a common touch and a sense of compassion; an
understanding of how the world works and how ordinary people live, a sense of bonding
with the weak against the mighty and the powerful. It is experience humbled by the
march of multitudes of people on the road from Haripur to Abbottabad, the highways
from Peshawar to Chakwal; humbled by witnessing hundreds of thousands of people
stand all day in Lahore’s scorching heat and brave Faisalabad’s all night’s thunderstorms
simply to catch a glimpse of him or hear him speak. It is this empirical experience that
liberates and transforms a jurist. Such are the hallmarks of a great Chief Justice. After all
history has been more receptive to activist judges than it is to strict constructionists.
The senior professional lawyers, retired judges, political commentators and rights
activists, including a majority of those who had vehemently supported Chaudhry against
Musharraf and his military, strongly disdained the Supreme Court’s disregard for procedure or
precedent in judicial decisions, or the flaunting of judgeship’s decorum within as well as outside
the Court. Chaudhry’s populist style and judicial activism, alongside his interventions in the
social and cultural life of Pakistanis, ridiculed the traditionalism of the higher judiciary and the
legal profession in the country, and this is why, I think, that the young, junior lawyers converged
with the Chief Justice; they too shared Chaudhry’ disregard for decorum, tradition and a
professional culture that had, until then, only helped to maintain the hegemony of a particular
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lawyerly class in the profession and of the political bureaucratic elite all over the country. I
return to this argument in the next chapter on young lawyers.66
Munir A. Malik concluded his address by recalling “the momentous moments of 7th
March 2007, 20th July 2007, 3rd November 2007, the long marches of 2008 and 2009, and the
dawn of 16th March 2009”, and thanked Chaudhry for “taking us along on this fascinating and
incredibly exhilarating ride on the avenues of the Constitution, on the highway of the rule of law
and the pathway to substantive justice”.
The leading lawyers had successfully felt the political pulse of Pakistanis across the
nation-state; the bazaaris and other classes and professions had responded to the lawyers’ call
as they were also eager to collectively show General Musharraf the door. Ideological reinterpretation of liberal notions such as justice and the rule of law, helped in creating a narrative
that spoke to the influential, locally-embedded classes such as the bazaaris. The young, petty
lawyers led the charge in this journey and the marches that followed. I turn to their narratives
and histories in the next chapter.

However, Chaudhry was obsessively conscious, and demanding, of protocol. His security
entourage included a big fleet of police vehicles; he seemed to enjoy travelling in expensive
bullet-proof cars (Asad 2014; Boone 2013).
66
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Figure 3. Abpara Chowk, Islamabad.
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CHAPTER 4
Humiliations, Emotions and Confrontations with the State: Young Lawyers
of the Rawalpindi Bar
Raqam qarti hai naya baab nayi fasal
Mande parwana-e kamil soye maqtal
Bekhauf chali jati hai zindagi
Nijaat jis ki ban jati hai bandagi
Hath me pakra bekhtar shell
Phenkti hai wapis soa-e qatil
Junun me moot se khelti hai
Khard to lab-e-baam dekhti hai
Ye hi tu us ki jawan mardi hai
Masum-e-chaman kiya raaz-e-hasti hai
Jaan nisari pe dam bharti hai
Dukhter-e-watan qaum pe marti hai
Ye bhai apna bcha leti hai
Bhagdar police me macha deti hai
Tera shauq-e-diwangi bharta hai
Jaise chand badal se ubharta hai
Falak pe sheron ne pukara hai
Shaheed-e-Arzu ghazi aur mujhida hai
Dast-e-Saira me maut ka piyala hai

New histories were inscribed today
By those who had no fear
And they will be set free
Who unite with the One
She picked up the shell courageously
And threw it back at the oppressors
She toys with death
And this is the secret of life
She is the daughter of the nation
And will never flinch
She rescues her brothers
And breaks police lines
Your iron resolve rises
As a light for all to follow
Even the angels in the heavens cry
This is a divine warrior
Every brother desires a sister
Of whom even the shackles are afraid of
Even death is frightened of Saira.

For Saira Khatoon Advocate High Court, who returned the state’s tear gas shells, fired by its
messengers, with her bare bloody hands outside the house of the Chief Justice Chaudhry.
~ Mohammad Yunus Nadir Ch., Advocate
High Court, Rawalpindi
Saira Khatoon1 was one of the few women lawyers who stood at the frontline of the protests held
by her male-dominated Rawalpindi Bar Association. She was a diehard follower of Chief Justice
Chaudhry and proudly told me that she carried the same “jazba” [passion or fury] that her male
colleagues did. Nadir Chaudhry wrote this poem after he witnessed how daringly Khatoon
challenged the policemen and threw tear gas shells back at them. His poem was a traditional,
Islamic interpretation of her display of passionate defiance, and it shows how languages other
than the liberal articulation of the rule of law or constitutional rule were being employed in the
protests; his poem represented the experiences and epistemology of classes other than the
educated middle-class and its ‘civil society’ in the Lawyers’ Movement.

1

Introduced in Chapter 2.

Munir A. Malik candidly admitted that the Lawyers’ Movement would not have been
successful without the crucial support, enthusiasm and emotions of the young junior lawyers
who were, prior to the movement, indifferent towards the politics of the Supreme Court and the
higher judiciary. As I discussed in the last chapter, soon after Chaudhry’s suspension, the
Rawalpindi lawyers, particularly those from the lower District and Sessions Courts, led the
protests and later, organized the long marches for his restoration.
The lawyers, however, had class grievances as well; professional hierarchy and class
differentiations became visible amongst the bar members in the course of the movement. The
young lawyers’ unrest divulged the discontent felt by Pakistani urban middle-class youth with
the country’s political culture, ruling elite and the state. Their alienation from the profession as
well as the state, found an expression in the movement against Musharraf’s military rule in the
country.
Moreover, the history of the Rawalpindi Bar, traced through its archive of resolutions
from 1988-2007,2 shows that the Bar’s confrontation with the state was drawn over the last two
decades and its associational politics were regularly tied up with petty professional concerns –
such as negotiating with the state via its local bureaucracy. The Bar frequently made ceremonial
proclamations in nationalist, Islamic and traditional matters as well. These resolutions show
how the lawyers represented (and spoke for) the concerns of their allies – the traditional
middle-class. Like the bazaaris, the lawyers also regularly deal with the state, at individual as
well as collective levels. Most of the lawyers, again, similar to bazaaris, come from the
traditional intermediate middle-class. Both, therefore, intervene in the cultural and political life
of the nation-state, and define the role of the state through their resolutions. These resolutions
also disclose how the bars collectively voice their concerns and intervene in the public sphere.

I collected the archival record of the Rawalpindi Bar Association’s resolutions during my
fieldwork at the Rawalpindi District Courts.
2
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In this chapter, I examine: What are the traditional, Islamic tropes and ideas, other than
the liberal ones, in which the lawyers remember the movement and their protests? How do the
bars articulate their politics of/against the state and represent the cultural and political interests
of the traditional intermediate middle classes? How does the ethnography of the Rawalpindi Bar
and its history help in understanding the lawyers and their professional and class hierarchies?

Ethnography of the Rawalpindi Bar and the Jazba of the Young Lawyers
In a news report filed in 2012, The Independent laments that the Pakistani lawyers, once
recognized as the “heroes” of the nation, are now merely thought of as aggressive “gangsters”
(Leiby 2012). The local media also reported the excesses of the young lawyers, such that
followed in the wake of Chaudhry’s restoration and at the end of the Lawyers’ Movement. Noted
Pakistani journalist Ayaz Mir stopped short of calling the lawyers fascists, in an article entitled
“Our New fascism” (2012). The lawyers’ ugly altercations with both judges and policemen made
it seem as though the lawyers had suddenly realized their collective power and were aching to
exercise it at the slightest provocation from the state’s security and judicial apparatus. After his
restoration, Chief Justice Chaudhry had continued his association with the bars and nurtured
groups of lawyers in certain bar associations. Many lawyers accused him of patronizing cliques
of his supporters, so as to continue influencing bar politics.3 However, as the Rawalpindi Bar
Association’s history shows, the lawyers’ relationship with the state is rather complex (and the
bar can’t simply be characterized as a ‘pressure group’), and the state bureaucracy in its unstable
and violent dealings with the bars, has been attempting to contain the lawyers’ encroachments
(literally, in terms of land) for decades.
For some legal scholars and senior lawyers, the lawyers’ return to associational
hooliganism and violence was not unexpected in a profession that the majority joins by default
A number lawyers, in their interviews, also accused Chaudhry of elevating his supporters to the
Bench. They would point out Athar Minallah, the CJ’s ‘spokesperson’, and Shaukat Siddiqi. Both
were made judges of the Islamabad High Court in 2014 and 2011 respectively.
3
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and is defined by its unruly political actions and exaggerated demands (Siddique 2014). Joining
the legal profession is not the first choice for the majority of Pakistanis, even though, since the
opening up of private law colleges, the number of graduates has increased. There are
approximately 90,000 registered lawyers in the country and out of these about half are licensed
to only practice at the District and Sessions Courts (Siddique 2014, 502). The lawyers enter an
already saturated profession, spend the first few years as lowly paid apprentices for a senior
lawyer and remain briefless for years.4 Many lawyers turn toward bar politics and other ‘nonprofessional’ ways to bypass professional hierarchy and the slow accumulation of prestige. The
lawyers graduate into the field with little professional training or research, and are eager to
enter bar politics as they see this as the quickest possible route to professional prestige and
political power (Siddique 2014, 500). Siddique disdains bar politics and is alarmed by its effects
on the profession and the ethical and professional development of young lawyers. He says:
Historically, the legal bars in Pakistan have been highly politicized, as well as
politically divided. Other than inadequate emphasis on professional regulation, this also
is due to the active role played by South Asian lawyers in the years leading up to
independence … It is also key to note that aspirants, while maintaining close alliances
with political parties, have pursued successful routes to prestigious appointments to the
appellate courts that include: election to offices in legal bars; appointments to
government positions in the Attorney General’s or the provincial Advocate Generals’
offices (which invariably are politically motivated). These rich career incentives as well
as the active street-mobilization potential of lawyers convert bar council elections into
mini-battles between various political-ideological factions. (2014, 503-4)
While Siddique rightly highlights stagnation in legal training and lethargy in legal pedagogy, he
nevertheless sees these as symptomatic of the absence of professional integrity, and so he shares
the uneasiness that was felt by the colonial judges and barristers over the vakils’ unprofessional

Precarity is inherent to the legal profession, and even Jinnah and Gandhi struggled early on in
their careers (DiSalvo 2013). While his practice was still unrecognized, Jinnah had even worked
as an ad hoc magistrate in Bombay. After the completion of his contract, he was offered a
permanent magistrate position, which he famously turned down because his ambitions were to
earn Rs.1600 a day, rather than a month (Pannu 1976).
4
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and unethical conduct in the profession.5 This ‘unruliness’ expressed itself in the form of
untamed emotions that had informed the lawyers’ protest actions in the movement.
Professional lawyers and scholars, such as Siddique, disparage the young lawyers’ nonprofessional activities inside the bars and the election campaigns led by them, which appeal to
ethnic, caste and political affiliations. Yet caste, region, and ethnicity play the key role in a
profession for which clientism and patronage are built upon these same networks (Piliavsky
2014; Schmitthener 1969; and Morrison 1969). The lawyers collect briefs through informal
identifiers and networks that reach back to their villages, neighborhoods and castes. Moreover,
most young lawyers belong to the traditional middle-class and enter law colleges and later the
profession from the less-prestigious, mostly public, education system. For the majority, the
access to social capital establishes their reach into the law-enforcement apparatus and an
influence over the lower bureaucracy of the state. The black uniform that lawyers wear (black
pants, coat and a tie on top of white shirt) provides many with a niche in the society from where
they can influence the state and its apparatus, and muscle and/or negotiate their way up the
social and political hierarchy. These young lawyers formed the core of the movement, and some
of them continued to provide support in the bars for the Chief Justice, even after his restoration
in March 2009.

History of the Bar: The Confrontations with the State and the Interventions in the
Cultural Politics of the Nation
In Lahore, one of the leading lawyers of the movement commented (to me) that the
lawyers were quite upset with Musharraf’s government, and the dismissal of Chief Justice
Chaudhry had triggered a fury that had already been brewing. The archive of the resolutions,
passed by Rawalpindi Bar, years prior to the Chief Justice’s dismissal, reveals that the bar
maintained a fractured relationship with the state, and had experienced bloody confrontations
5

I have discussed the disdain of colonial judges and barristers towards vakils in the last chapter.
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with its law enforcement agencies. The most recent encounter (before the movement began) had
been in 2005, in the Gujjar Khan Tehsil of District Rawalpindi. Recall that the Tehsil Bars
around Rawalpindi played a major role in mobilizing lawyers for protest in the twin cities. 6
These resolutions also recount the politics of the bar and the interventions it enunciated in the
national cultural politics and within the Pakistani public sphere.
Traditional middle-class lawyers dominated the Bar and its resolutions show how these
lawyers fought the cultural politics of the nation from there. The bar had been extremely critical
of the Musharraf regime because of his post-9/11 military support of the U.S., the assault on the
democratic and judicial institutions of the Pakistani state, and his celebrated “secularist” stance
– Musharraf’s program of “enlightened moderation” for Pakistani society. The Islamists, their
allied religious political parties, and the bazaaris, also disdained Musharraf’s secularist hold on
the state.7 And so the bar quickly and successfully mobilized lawyers as well as its allied
traditional middle-class in March 2007 to protest Chaudhry’s suspension.
The resolutions passed by the bars are regularly reported in the media, albeit usually
placed in the back pages; these are received as the collective voice of the lawyers. A quick look at
the resolutions passed by the Rawalpindi Bar discloses that, over the last two decades, the
lawyers have submitted resolutions on a number of pan-Islamic, national as well as professional
issues. These have included: resolutions supporting Palestinian claims to statehood against
Israel’s occupation (1988); against the publication of Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1989); for
Kashmir’s independence from India (1990); to condemn Serbian war crimes against Bosnian
Muslims (1992), and the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and
Iraq (2004); to protest the desecration of the Quran at Guantanamo Bay (2005), and the
publication of Danish cartoons ridiculing Prophet Muhammad (2006); and against the

Chief Justice Chaudhry’s residence and the Supreme Court became the main sites of lawyers’
protest in the capital, Islamabad.
7
In the chapter on Islamist politics and lawyers, I discuss in detail Islamists (JI’s founder,
Maududi’s) theory of the state.
6
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knighthood awarded to Salman Rushdie (2007). The lawyers and their bars’ staunch
‘conservative’ and ‘traditional’ stance on social and political issues is often criticized by the
‘liberal’ commentators and self-proclaimed progressive political and rights activists, who joined
these same lawyers in the protest against General Musharraf. And yet, within the cultural
politics of the movement, the lawyers were not only able to mobilize the anglicized, educated
middle-class but further succeeded in collecting widespread support.
The Bar is regularly moved, when an insult is felt against the imagined Muslim umma
(transnational Muslim nation) or against Islam at home.8 The Bar’s nationalism is deeply
steeped in an imagined religious solidarity with fellow Muslims, and the lawyers share this
traditional cultural affinity with the intermediate classes. These classes, the political parties that
claim to represent them – such as Jamaat-i-Islami – and their ideologues and sympathizers,
became close allies of the lawyers against Musharraf’s government and generously extended
their support for the movement.
Bars often comment and record their stance on national issues too. The Rawalpindi Bar
condemned the Sindhi nationalists for insulting the Pakistani flag (1989); favored the Sharia Bill
during Nawaz Sharif’s first government (1990) (this resolution was opposed by the Shia lawyers
and those close to Sharif’s opposition, the PPP);9 passed a resolution in support of the Supreme
Court’s decision against interest-based banking and contributed towards the fund as well (1991);
supported Sharif’s drive to reduce international debt and contributed toward it (1997); and
passed a resolution against corruption in the courts (2001) and pledged to forward it to the
Lahore High Court.

Recently, such reaction has been observed in the cases of blasphemy. In the high-profile
murder case of Governor Punjab, Salman Taseer, his bodyguard, who had fatally shot the
governor (accusing him of blasphemy), was commended and applauded by the lawyers (Dawn
2011).
9
Sharia, and the politics and debates around it, have regularly taken place in Pakistan. General
Zia’s (1977-88) moves to Islamize Pakistani law were the most ambitious attempt to date. I
discuss his introduction of Hudood Laws in Chapter 6. (See also Nelson 2011)
8
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The Rawalpindi Bar’s opposition to General Musharraf’s coup in 1999 and his
supposedly anti-Islamic and anti-nationalist actions in support of U.S. interests in the region
following 9/11, converged onto the lawyers’ continuing confrontation with the state and its
security and judicial apparatus. Enforced disappearances (Chapter 7) by the intelligence
agencies, and the lawyers and the higher judiciary’s helplessness in those cases, also represented
the growing impatience with Musharraf and his military regime. The conflict with the state and
its judicial and administrative apparatus was an inevitable result of the expansion of the
profession and the frustration experienced by the junior, petty lawyers within the profession.10

Confronting the State: Humiliations of the Everyday
The density on the premises of the Rawalpindi District and Sessions Courts reflects the
level of saturation within the legal profession itself. Their spatial proximity expresses the
closeness, as well as the tension, felt by the lawyers in their professional and judicial space.
Unlike North America or Europe, in South Asia, lawyers’ offices and the courts are situated on
the same premises, often adjacent to one another.11 Financially able lawyers may manage to keep
their chambers off the courts, but court properties remain densely populated by thousands of
lawyers. The bar officials work to mediate these spatial tensions. During my fieldwork at the
Islamabad and Rawalpindi Courts, I often entered the offices of bar officials that were busy
resolving office-sharing or allotment conflicts amongst fellow lawyers. In fact, the lawyers’
encroachments upon public land have been the major site of contention between them and the
district and police bureaucracy.
Upon entering the Rawalpindi Sessions Courts, one is welcomed by rows upon rows of
lawyers’ sheds. After passing through the lawyers’ tables, seated as they are under tin shelters
As I explained above, I designate the young, struggling lawyers who are often briefless and
socially belong to lower-middle class, lacking cultural capital in the form of anglicized education
and networks, as ‘petty’ lawyers. (See also Morrison 1969 on stratification amongst Indian
lawyers).
11
On spatiality of adjudication and (customary) courts, see Gluckman 1955.
10
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and surrounded by carts and vendors of chai (tea), fruit chat and other snacks, one enters a
complex of multi-storied buildings, designated as Blocks.12 Labyrinthine office rooms, corridors
and galleries make up these Blocks. Filled with rickety furniture and dusty files, these offices are
allotted to and shared by multiple lawyers, and often, conflict arises amongst them, as there are
always more new candidates and very few new offices. Occasionally, the lawyers attempt to push
the boundaries of their compound and build new sheds. Journalist Matiullah Jan, who has
reported on such encroachments in Islamabad, claims that the lawyers there have encroached
upon and are currently illegally occupying the public football ground next to the courts.13 The
lawyers have been regularly confronted by local judicial and administrative officials to end these
qabzas (encroachments). In retaliation, the lawyers have been passing resolutions against these
senior and powerful bureaucrats. These officers are often targeted and scrutinized for petty
matters as well. According to the Bar’s records, in 1989, Advocate Wahab-ul-Khairi was the first
to present a resolution against AC (Assistant Commissioner) Rawalpindi. 14 It was alleged that
the presence of alcohol and women had been observed in his office. The AC was severely
admonished for his immoral and “obnoxious behavior”. In the same meeting, lawyers decided to
take out a procession against him and burn his effigy outside his office, and the offices of the
dailies Jang and Nawa-e-Waqt.
Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that in South Asia, to protest against state bureaucracy is
a common practice of venting out against the state, which in response assures the protestors of a
resolution, one that is often never reached (2007). Although Chakrabarty rightly construes these
practices as constitutive of postcolonial politics, and as a continuity of protest politics developed
against the colonial state, he fails to recognize how the politics of resentment can culminate and
erupt into, or at least fuel, mass protest movements against the state. Chakrabarty

See figures 4 & 5.
As claimed in his interview with me, Jan has conducted a number of exposés on these
encroachments.
14
About Khairi and his litigation, see Chapter 6 on Islamists in the Movement.
12
13
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underestimates the everyday humiliations underlying these everyday protests.15 The lawyers,
and others who feel injured by the state, often take out processions and block streets, but to see
these everyday protests as the catharsis of a “political society” (Chatterjee 2004, 53), is to miss
the emotional and potentially explosive nature of these protest politics. The leading lawyers, as I
mentioned earlier, had acutely noticed these emotions and charged the movement on them.16
In June 1990, the lawyers passed another resolution against local police. The local
policemen, it was alleged, had roughed up a “junior lawyer”. According to the proceedings of
that meeting, the junior lawyers were furious at the bar’s inaction and claimed that the bar was
indifferent because the local administration and police had insulted a junior, rather than a
senior lawyer. The young lawyers’ resentment against the professional hierarchy of the senior
lawyers would also find expression in the protests against the General. The lawyers seemed to be
dismayed over their diminishing respect and insult at the hands of a “mamuli” (worthless)
Assistant Inspector of police. The lawyers’ dealings with the police, inside as well as outside of
the courts, are often tense and both parties are habitually impertinent toward each other.17
During the Movement, the police often used teargas and baton-charge to break up protests. The
protesting lawyers were beaten up, arrested, and some claimed, even tortured. However, as the
Bar’s resolutions show, the lawyers have had brief, albeit drawn out, encounters with the state
for decades. Those everyday encounters became emotionally charged protests in the movement.
In May 1994, the local administration moved once again to forcefully halt the lawyers’
encroachment. In response, the Rawalpindi lawyers passed a resolution against the powerful
bureaucrat responsible for the actions against them, the DC (Deputy Commissioner) of
As I discussed in the introduction, Partha Chatterjee’s suggestion about the politics of
“political society” against the state assumes a similar innocuousness of these protests (2004).
The lawyers could thus be placed both within political as well as civil society, as they did indeed
partake in the liberal politics and protest for the rule of law, rights and constitutionalism as well.
16
The everyday protest politics could also be approached as non-social movement protests. (See
Bayat 2010)
17
Everyday dealings with the police and the humiliations faced, also fueled the resentment of
urban youth, especially those hailing from the working class, against the state. I discuss the
youth’s protest politics in the next chapter.
15

171

Rawalpindi, declaring him the “most unfavorable personality”. Another resolution was
presented against both the Assistant and Deputy commissioners of the city for demolishing “new
lawyers” sheds. Soon after, on May 12th, 1994, a third resolution in the case, denouncing the
employees of the District Commissioner’s office was presented. By 1995, the lawyers seemed to
have realized the gravity of their spatial crisis and so the bar approved building new chambers; it
also declared that each chambers will be shared by two lawyers. A quick walk through the Blocks
reveals that more than three, in some cases even four lawyers, share most chambers.18
The lawyers’ unrest against the state continued after Musharraf’s takeover in 1999 but
was enflamed by the events that he was held directly responsible for. The Bar rejected his
constitutional amendments outright; his reluctant complicity with the U.S. deeply disturbed the
lawyers; they overwhelmingly condemned the Lal Masjid Operation against Islamic militants.19
However, it was the dismissal of Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and his
public humiliation by the military government, which infuriated lawyers and Pakistanis across
the country. In March 2004, a resolution was presented to condemn the dismissal of Dr. Abdul
Qadeer Khan;20 it was alleged that the Musharraf government had acted against Khan to please
the “Jewish lobby”, because Khan was the maker of the “Islamic atomic bomb”. Three years
later, the Rawalpindi Bar passed a resolution for his release. For the lawyers, Chief Justice
Chaudhry’s removal, especially the meeting with the Generals in which he was threatened to
resign, reminded them of how Khan was removed in the same humiliating manner not too long
ago. The historical memory of coups, murders and humiliations by the Army and the state under
its hold, played a furious effect on the lawyers.

Ikram Chaudhry, introduced in Chapter 2, also spoke in the meeting to approve new
chambers and asked the Bar not to ask the government for any financial aid. The lawyers, he
insisted, should build their chambers themselves and remain free of state influence.
19
See Chapters 2 & 7. (See also Devji 2008)
20
Khan was dismissed on allegations of providing nuclear secrets to Iran and Libya in 2004. He
publicly confessed to passing over the plans for “nuclear technology and centrifuges” (Raza
2008). Four years later, Khan retracted his confession and alleged that he was handed over a
written statement to be read (ibid.)
18
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Ahsan Satti (ex-Vice President Rawalpindi Bar)21 was deeply upset and felt helpless
because of how the military government had treated the national hero, nuclear scientist Qadeer
Khan. Khan was forced to confess on live television and unceremoniously sent home. A few
years later, the same humiliating treatment was meted out to the Chief Justice of the country, by
the same military government. On March 9th, 2007, Satti witnessed a replay of Qadeer Khan’s
humiliating expulsion. “I see”, he explained, “it’s the same room, same General in uniform, same
dictator, same dictator seated there, arrogantly, and there sits the Chief Justice of Pakistan,
Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry”. Musharraf had asked of Chaudhry the same as he had of Khan:
accept that you are guilty and resign. Chaudhry rebelled on both counts. The historical memory
of such arbitrary exercises of power by the Army was reignited. Satti recalled that lawyers across
the board, including himself, had been disappointed with General Musharraf’s false promises of
accountability of the corrupt political and bureaucratic elite and his political comprises with the
same, and so (the lawyers) were awaiting an opening to remove him from power. Chaudhry’s
dismissal provided them with a cause and the site to challenge the General and his military.
Many activists and lawyers waited to see if Chaudhry would soon come to a compromise
with the General. But when he persisted and refused to bow, they realized that this time
Pakistan’s history would not repeat itself: the Army will not prevail. Prior to his dismissal,
Chaudhry had already attracted the attention of Pakistanis due to his taking up of the cases
regarding enforced disappearances22 and ‘corruption’ (such as the famous Steel Mills
Privatization case).23 Satti applauded “the Chief Justice’s challenge to the power of the Military,
by asking them [its highest officers] to appear in Court”, and so, Satti claimed that by the time
he was sent home, “the lawyers and the aam admi were already upset and ready for the call to
action because of popular Scientist Qadeer Khan’s humiliation, the corruption scandal
surrounding the Steel Mills’ privatization, and the Missing Persons cases”. Satti passionately
Introduced in Chapter 2.
See Chapter 7.
23
See Steel Mills Case S.M.C 15/2009.
21
22
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supported the Chief Justice because he had stood up to the might of the military, and had asked
their chiefs of intelligence to appear in his court.
The Bar’s fragile relationship with Musharraf’s military regime was further weakened in
2005, when the lawyers violently confronted the state once again. Lawyers in Rawalpindi were
incensed as they learned of police operations against fellow lawyers in Gujjar Khan Tehsil. 24 The
District and Sessions Judges had ordered all illegally built chambers to be demolished there. The
Rawalpindi Bar announced protests, but even their rally was tear-gassed and lawyers batoncharged by the police inside the premises of the Sessions and District Courts. They quickly
passed resolutions condemning the state violence against them, went on strike, and demanded
that the judges responsible for the violence against the lawyers be disciplined and transferred.
The crisis continued and the lawyers took out more protests; the lawyers’ strike against their
humiliating treatment by the state continued. Finally, the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court
intervened and the local High Court judges were also asked to get involved, but the lawyers
stuck to their demand of transferring the judges responsible for the demolition in Gujjar Khan.
Finally, after months of negotiations, strikes and protests, the bar was informed that the higher
judiciary had agreed to transfer the judge responsible for ordering police action against the
lawyers. Speakers at that meeting congratulated members of the bar for making the Rawalpindi
Bar Association “the country’s most powerful bar”. This encounter of the lawyers with the state’s
law enforcement apparatus, higher judiciary and district administration, exemplifies the
historically fraught and tense dealings that the lawyers, at least at the lower courts and bars,
have had with the state, and their emergence as a bloc against it. Their associational politics,
based on professional interests and represented by their bar, cut across and triumphed the

The lawyers from smaller bars, surrounding Rawalpindi and Islamabad, played an important
role in mobilizing for protests and marches. Munir A. Malik, as I mentioned before, stressed the
role of smaller bars in the Lawyers’ Movement, not only of those around Rawalpindi and
Islamabad, but even those along the G.T. Road.
24
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politics based on identity. Its members therefore jealously, and often aggressively, secured the
bar’s autonomy against the state and its arrogant bureaucracy.
The Lawyers’ Movement thereon quickly turned into a movement against Musharraf’s
military rule and what was seen as his hold on ‘the state’. The lawyers eagerly responded to their
bars’ call. Chaudhry’s dismissal provided the trigger; it magnified the crisis that was already lit
by the unrest felt against the state and the unease over Musharraf’s humiliating and unfair
actions toward a “national hero” (nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan); his collusion with the
U.S. and “against the interests of Islam” to save his own undemocratic government after 9/11;
his amendments to the Constitution to secure his unconstitutional regime, and, most
importantly, the use of the state’s security apparatus against the lawyers. The sacking of Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry infuriated lawyers across Pakistan and their dismay was shared across
ethnic, regional and class divides.

Emotion and Memory
Apart from their own everyday grievances and confrontations with the state, the lawyers
were infuriated by how disparagingly the Chief Justice of the highest court in the country was
called over by General Musharraf, and bullied by his fellow Generals in uniform, to resign.25 On
March 13, 2007, as Chief Justice Chaudhry defied his dismissal orders and attempted to walk to
his office from his residence, police officers blocked his way and tried to shove him into a car.
The photograph of that grotesque encounter became the infernal image, which rendered life and
emotional meaning to a protest movement no one yet knew the course of. The lawyers often
passionately referred to that image of humiliation as the event that sparked the movement.26
The event of the Chief Justice’s humiliation had re-ignited the lawyers’ “structure of
emotion” against the state (Lutz and White 1986, 409). The lawyers had publicly displayed their

25
26

See Chapter 1.
Ibid.
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collective emotions before, but those had been violently subdued by the state. Anger, theorists of
social movements argue, could be a “valued commodity of protest” and could widely mobilize
political emotions (Flam and King 2005, 26). Chaudhry’s inglorious suspension and subsequent
manhandling re-activated the lawyers’ emotions, as they were directed at the state. Their furious
response was, however, as the archive of the Rawalpindi Bar shows, not purely a spontaneous
reaction but rather, preceded by a longer history of often violent protests against the state’s
civilian and police bureaucracy.
However, the lawyers’ emotions and language of protest were also colored by traditional,
Islamic tropes. Nadir Chaudhry’s poem about Saira Khatoon’s daring actions against the police
is one of many sites of the memory of marginalized voices (Pandey 1992, 1488), and exemplifies
how such meanings – other than those of the rule of law and constitutional rights – were
attributed to the lawyers’ protests.27
Saira Khatoon was elected to the Bar in 2002. I met her at the Rawalpindi District
Courts. Her niece, who was also her apprentice and aspiring to become a lawyer like her,
accompanied Khatoon. We sat in Khatoon’s sparsely furnished office. Nadir Chaudhry soon
joined us. In his early 60s, Nadir appeared a humble, reclusive poet. Khatoon’s heroic challenge
to General Musharraf’s police force had impressed Nadir, and the next day, he penned a poem to
memorialize that daring hero of the lawyers. Justice Chaudhry had also, after all, become a
“hero” of the lawyers (and for most Pakistanis, who eagerly awaited along the streets and roads
to catch a glimpse of the man who had said ‘NO’ to General Musharraf), but the terms in which
Khatoon’s heroic actions were recognized, and how they were historically referenced and
interpreted, provide an insight into the ‘local’, situated knowledge and the meanings that the
lawyers brought to their movement against the state. Their traditional, Islamic meanings and
references differed sharply from the ‘secular’ humanist ideas that leading lawyers, as well as the

Nadir Chaudhry wrote the poem, as I mentioned at the start of the chapter, inspired by Saira
Khatoon’s challenge to the police.
27
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liberal civil society and political activists, attributed to their protest actions.28 It is important to
note here that even the majority of petty, traditional lawyers would persistently reiterate the
hegemonic discourse of the Lawyers’ Movement: that it was a movement for the rule of law and
constitutional rule!
Nadir Chaudhry disclosed that the poem he wrote, praising Khatoon, was inspired by
Iqbal’s famous poem, Fatima Bin Abdullah (1912). Philosopher and poet Allama Mohammad
Iqbal’s (1877-1938) work engaged with Islamic history, its glories and tragedies, within the
colonial context of British India.29 His mujaheda (holy warrior), Fatima, appeared on the Libyan
battlefield to bring water to Muslim soldiers, as Italians invaded Libya and pushed back the
Turks in 1911-12. Fatima represented the lost pride of the Muslims and embraced martyrdom,
while giving water to her dying Muslim brothers. Even on the battlefield, where death and
violence ruled, she called upon Muslims to rise up. Her martyrdom – a glorious death on the
battlefield – was a remarkable call for the Muslims to revolt against Western imperial powers.
Nadir explained that, for him, Khatoon’s “jazba” [passion] in the protests summoned Iqbal’s
Fatima; Saira Khatoon recalled, “it seemed as if we were in trance and had forgotten our other
lives … We were just so passionately devoted to this movement and sacrificed for Justice
Chaudhry”. Khatoon’s hands were as bloodied as Fatima’s in the battle, Nadir imagined. Nadir
regarded Khatoon’s actions in the protests, particularly when she threw teargas shells back at
the police and burnt her hands, extraordinarily liberating. Khatoon’s was a battle against
injustice, tyranny, and violence. For Nadir she was today’s Fatima because both, as he
suggested, fought for “insaaf” [justice] and both stood beside their Muslim brothers. Both also,
Nadir continued, sacrificed for justice. “She picked up the shell courageously and threw it back

See Chapter 6 on Islamist lawyers and political parties. See Chapter 2 on the urban, educated,
ashrafia middle-class protestors’ definition and hopes of the rule of law and constitutionalism.
As I discuss in Chapter 2, it was the rule of law, upon which the lawyers and other classes and
political groups converged, however imputing various interpretations and aspirations to this
ambiguous idea.
29
See Naveeda Khan 2012 on the evocation of Iqbal’s thought in everyday Pakistani life.
28
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at the oppressors”, he wrote; she is the one, Nadir continued, who “toys with death and this is
the secret of a glorious life”; Khatoon “is a daughter of the nation”, he proclaimed. She fearlessly
stood, as Fatima did, against the powerful oppressors – as the Chief Justice had done against the
powerful Generals. Nadir reawakened Islamic history; Saira’s glories were steeped in Islamic
imagery and given life by Iqbal’s nationalist prose, which provided a referential framework and
meaning to the lawyers’ actions against “the tyrant”, General Musharraf. Nadir recited his poem
numerous times in protest meetings at the bar and elsewhere, and brushed the narrative of the
movement with traditional, Islamic colors of bravery and sacrifice.30
Jazba (passion), sacrifice and the historical memory of a glorious Islamic past and those
who had sacrificed for “Islamic glory”, shaped the lawyers’ narrative of the Movement. The
lawyers, in order to justify their (as well as others’) emotional labor in, and commitment to, the
movement regularly referred to Jazba or jazbaat. These terms were also invoked in terms of
witnessing other protestors and remembering their collective expressions of support for the
lawyers and the Chief Justice. “Emotional concepts” are often used to understand, as well as
describe, social reality and events, especially ones which are considered traumatic or, at least,
extraordinary (Lutz and White 1986, 420). Interpreted vernacularly as a passionate state,
outwardly expressed, jazba is often used to define nationalist sentiments or sentiments for the
nation as well. Emotion, as Lutz notes, is seen as a “component of individuals”, and collective
emotions are disparaged and considered irrational, rather than constitutive of “social situations
or relationships”, or, I add, historical memories and events (Lutz 1998, 41). Emotions are
assumed to be “private, psychological, hidden, interior, and ineffable events” (1998, 42). Their
public demonstrations or expressions are considered dangerous and often managed by the state
(Blom 2008).31 Events such as protest movements provide the space in which the emotions of

I discuss how the Islamists see state as a tool of modern political power to achieve a glorious
Islamic state in Chapter 6. See also Maududi 1960 and Nasr 1996 and 2001.
31
I have discussed in Chapter 2, on ashrafia politics and the crowds, how the urban educated
protestors distanced themselves from the lawyers and their loud protests.
30
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the everyday, humiliations, confrontations, or simply even joy and relief, come together, if only
fleetingly. They may even become the spectacles of the extraordinary events in the life of the
individuals who witness and take part in them.
Khurram Masood Kiyani (ex-General Secretary of the Rawalpindi Bar) claimed that the
lawyers and the “aam admi” passionately supported Chief Justice Chaudhry against Musharraf,
and there was “jazbaat ka eik samandar” [boundless passion] in support of Chaudhry. He
explained, “our jazbaat erupted by his ‘No’, which we saw as a courageous step to take in
Pakistan, because in this country’s history, no one has ever said ‘No’ to the powerful. So, we
thought this man must be fought for.” Kiyani argued that it was not only the lawyers who had so
passionately raised the Chief Justice against Musharraf, even the aam admi was extremely
jazbati [passionate] about Chaudhry. Chaudhry’s image (as well as self-promotion) in popular
imagination as the challenger of the corrupt ruling and bureaucratic elite, and his populist
judicial activism and interventions, politically appealed to, emotionally aroused and collectively
seduced Pakistanis.32
Kiyani accompanied Chief Justice Chaudhry on his visits across Pakistan and had
witnessed the emotions of Pakistanis across the nation-state. On the famous 36-hour journey to
Lahore, Kiyani saw people waiting along the G.T. Road in anticipation of Chaudhry’s arrival.33
These men and women, he proclaimed, had waited for hours in the blazing sun:
We were driving to Dena,34 on our way to Lahore, and I saw this old man standing on
the side of the road, with flowers in one hand and water in the other. He waved at us to
stop. We did. He approached us and offered us water. He said, where is Chaudhry
Iftikhar – I have been waiting for him since this morning. As soon as Chaudhry’s car
approached, he ran and showered all the flowers on him [on his car], because he couldn’t
touch him himself. He was a really old man. People had jazba. Wherever we would go,
people would greet us and offer us food and drinks.35 They would wait for hours and
hours for us. That was the jazba of the aam admi; they saw Chaudhry as their messiah.

See the chapters (7&8) on Honor Killings and Missing Persons.
See Chapter 1.
34
200 kilometers northwest of Lahore.
35
Recall that the bazaaris had extended their support against the General and offered logistical
support to the lawyers during protests and marches. See Chapter 3.
32
33
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In 2007, advocate Abdul Hameed was the Vice President of the Rawalpindi Bar and a
fellow traveler of Kiyani, Satti, Asmatullah, and Sadeeq in the Movement. He became a regular
marcher in the long journeys that took Chaudhry around the country. At 5.2’, Hameed seemed
to sink into his grand, dark wooden chair, when I met him at the Rawalpindi Sessions Courts.36
A set of three photographs, in which he featured with Justice Chaudhry at different moments in
the movement, adorned the wall beside him (see Figure. 5). “I sacrificed a lot for the Lawyers’
Movement and its cause”, he keenly explained; “even the Chief Justice doesn’t know how much I
sacrificed for him”, he added. Regular boycott of the courts, which lawyers engaged in
throughout the movement (for almost two years), had painful financial consequences for many
struggling lawyers, particularly those who didn’t have the means other than their own practice.37
Hameed exclaimed, “In the time of the movement, there were days when my children asked for
ice cream and I told them, ‘I am sorry, I have no money’. I had nothing in my pockets … I even
called their school once and told the Principal that please don’t expel my children, I don’t have
money to pay the fees, but I will”.
Sacrifice for the collective of the bar and for the person of Chief Justice Chaudhry,
alongside the resistance against General Musharraf and his military, are the key defining tropes
in the lawyers’ construction of their collective memory and narrative of the movement. Many
lawyers passionately told me of how they depleted their savings and further helped out their
colleagues because their practice had been reduced to lower courts – at times they would boycott
those courts as well. Because the Rawalpindi and Islamabad Bars were considered host Bars for
the lawyers from across Pakistan (who were joining protests at the capital), local lawyers hosted
them at their own expense. Kiyani offered his home to the lawyers; he claimed, “I am a very
jazbati [emotional] man and I spent my own money for the cause. I would host lawyers, who

See figure 3.
I discuss professional hierarchy amongst lawyers below, but many lawyers (especially those
whom I call ‘petty’) struggle to find briefs, and those were the ones who felt the court boycotts
the most.
36
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would come to Rawalpindi for the protests and Long Marches. I even hosted those 5-6 lawyers,
who had walked in protest from Lahore to Rawalpindi in the summer of 2007. I thought they
were the real heroes of our movement.”
Many lawyers were bitter about how those who had truly sacrificed for the lawyers’ cause
had been marginalized after the movement, and those who were nominal figures but were able
to bring themselves closer to the Chief Justice – by taking photographs with him or had used his
office to exercise political and judicial influence – had gained professional prestige that added to
their practice. As I noticed in both the Islamabad and Rawalpindi Courts, a number of lawyers
had adorned their walls with group photographs, in which they stood with the Chief Justice.
These mementos had been quite prestigious after the movement ended, but gradually lost their
value as the Chief Justice’s charisma and prestige faded.
Hameed also claimed that the Chief Justice had moved Pakistanis emotionally. He
recalled that during the march to Lahore, people lined up along the towns and villages on G.T.
Road and waited for hours to welcome the Chief Justice and lawyers’ caravan. The local bars, of
course, had been mobilized but the people came out on their own. It was around Kamoke (a
town 52 km from Lahore), Hameed remembered, that the Chief Justice’s motorcade stalled
because of the crowd gathered there:
There were old people, children, women – all waiting to catch a glimpse of the Chief
Justice, and then suddenly this very tall man climbed Chaudhry’s car. I was standing
outside, on the car’s pedestal and, believe me, I pushed him so hard that he fell almost 10
feet away. I am a short person but that man was big. He flew in the air, when I pushed
him. I went over to him to see if he was ok. He fell to my feet and prayed, ‘khuda k eliye
mujhe CJ ko dekhne do. Me pichle barran ghate se yahan khara hun. Siraf is khiyal se
ke me CJ ko eik nazar dekhun ga. [For God’s sake, let me see the Chief Justice. I have
been standing here for the last 12 hours, waiting for him, and I don’t want to miss him; I
just want to see him].
Collective emotions and their expressions are often disparaged and considered irrational
‘outbursts’, dangerous for democratic politics and mobilizing mass movements (Mazarella 2015;
Adorno 1982[1952]; and LeBon 2001[1896]). However, attention to “emotional discourse” (Lutz
and Abu-Lughod 1990, 1) shows how significant its role is in constituting and narrating social
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and political realities. Khatoon, Kiyani, and Hameed defined their relentless stamina and
passionate devotion for the Chief Justice in mystical terms. Hameed explained: “We had a jazba
but no one can explain where it came from; it was a ruhani jazba [spiritual emotion] that
everyone in the movement experienced. We would walk, drive and march for hours and hours,
and so would the people with us”. Hameed further emphasized the devotion of the aam admi
which he himself had experienced for Chief Justice Chaudhry: “We don’t know where the people
would show up from at 2.00 or 3.00 in the morning, while we were driving on the main
highways or even on the inner streets. It would be very late at night and, you know, villagers
usually go to sleep very early, but they would come out to see Chaudhry”. “You know why”, he
asked, “because they wanted to see; they were curious about that man: jo aam dunya se hat ke
hai. Aur us ne jo kamal kiya, aam dunya se hat ke kiya [who is not like the others, and whose
achievement is so extraordinary]”.
The populism of the Lawyers’ Movement was thus driven by passion for the Chief
Justice’s heroism, as he stood up against a military ruler, challenged the military’s violence (in
enforced disappearance cases, for example) and had started to summon the ‘corrupt’ politicians
and bureaucratic elite, and disparagingly scrutinize their adventures. The higher courts’
interventions were construed as necessary for the marginalized and the welfare of all; these were
to save the powerless and check the excesses of the state’s security, bureaucratic and police
apparatus. After restoration, Chaudhry would try to live up to this heroic, populist image of
himself, adored by his diehard young lawyers as well as the aam admi, for whom he had risen
up as a messiah.
Chief Justice Chaudhry’s populism was fueled by the aspirations of the young lawyers
and legitimized as the upholding of the law and constitution against arbitrary and corrupt
practices, even as Chaudhry himself, after restoration, would be severely criticized for his erratic
and arbitrary decisions in Court. The criticism would emerge from the educated civil society,
which had stood behind him against General Musharraf, and the self-proclaimed ‘professional
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lawyers’, who already disdained Chaudhry’s professional parochialism. As I mentioned earlier,
Chaudhry would often bypass procedure and judicial protocol. I speak to the divide of political
versus professional amongst lawyers below.
Like Sardar Asmatullah, Hameed defined the lawyers’ challenge to Musharraf as a
resistance against the military. “We fought the Army”, he proudly exclaimed, “and won”. “No
one has done this in Pakistan’s history”, he declared. Chief Justice Chaudhry’s infamous
photograph with a uniformed General (Musharraf) had captured the wretched political reality of
the country for ordinary Pakistanis: you just can’t defy the powerful Army because the ‘real’
power lies with them. And yet, Chaudhry and the lawyers were trying to prove the contrary by
appealing to, and as Atizaz Ahsan put it, touching the people and mobilizing their jazba
[passion] against military power.

Structure of the Bar: Professional vs. Political Lawyers
Professional lawyers and activists alike often criticized Chief Justice Chaudhry’s
seemingly arbitrary orders and populist declarations during court proceedings. 38 These senior,
professionals, some petty young lawyers claimed, disapproved of their ‘unruly’ politics of protest
too.39 “The senior lawyers didn’t like our participation in the movement; they thought we were
just wasting our time and practice”, Satti explained. He further explained that while the bar
seemed to be united in support of the movement, some of its members disdained the
“unprofessionalism” of the activist lawyers. Satti and many young, petty lawyers have remained
resentful of their seniors, even after the movement.40

Post-restoration, the Chaudhry Court became (in)famous for its populist postures; the Court
regularly interjected into and took numerous notices of petty matters of public interest, to the
extent of fixing prices of everyday commodities, such as sugar. (See Cheema and Gilani 2015).
39
Senior - Junior distinction among lawyers depends on years of practice and prestige, inside as
well as outside the bar. (See also Morrison 1969).
40
Satti referred to the treason case lodged against Musharraf in 2013, and his trail thereof,
“these senior lawyers belong to the status quo. People from the status quo say things like these.
If the status quo had remained, an ex-Army Chief wouldn’t have been brought to the court”.
38
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The professional versus political divide persists amongst the lawyers in two forms: first,
there exists a “Professional Group” of lawyers, headed by Hamid Khan, which regularly takes
part in bars’ elections,41 and secondly, this divide is brought up as a means of identification
amongst the lawyers, to distinguish between those who openly belong to a political party
(and/or to that party’s lawyers’ forum) or support such ideological affiliation, and those who
claim not to blend or influence their practice with politics.42 In other words, many self-declared
professional lawyers draw a line, albeit not clearly demarcated, between politics and law. A legal
practitioner, for them, is a professional, an officer of the law and court, whose only duty is
toward his client and the upholding of the law. This division became apparent during the
movement and had consequences for the lawyers and bar politics in its aftermath, when the
consensus amongst the lawyers disintegrated.
Lawyers from the Professional Group differentiate between lawyers by defining the
political ones as those who do not regularly practice law. They are alleged to be registered with
the bar and pay their dues, but they only appear when elections are held –even if they do visit
the bar or courts during the rest of year, these lawyers socialize at the bar offices, sit there, chat,
drink tea and engage in debates and conversations. These lawyers do not, professionals claim,
indulge in “professional lawyerly” work.
Most of the professional lawyers were dismissive of the young, junior lawyers and the
seniors who led them in the movement. Sheikh Ameer Hussain43 refused to boycott the courts,
upon the lawyers’ call of protest against General Musharraf. In his late 60s and well known as a
successful criminal lawyer, Hussain regretted the “time wasted by young lawyers in the
movement”, because “when they should have been reading law books and learning how to

The Professional Group, in fact, supported the current President of the SCBA, Rasheed A.
Rizvi, into office.
42
This distinction has always been difficult to draw, as lawyers, if not openly involved in politics,
still engage in the struggles for fundamental and human rights in the courts. (See Schmitthener
1969).
43
Pseudonym.
41
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practice law, they were holding sticks and marching on the streets. These young lawyers didn’t
learn anything about the law and lawyering during that time”.
For Hussain, an “unprofessional lawyer”, was one who didn’t commit to the ethical and
moral obligations toward both his profession and his client. A lawyer as a professional, Hussain
argued, was bound by his contract with – and duly answerable to – his client. He explained his
refusal to boycott the courts: “The lawyers had taken fees from their clients, how could they have
refused to appear for them? What is my duty as a professional? I violate my duty toward my
client by not appearing on his behalf. The client pays, whatever we demand, and so we come into
a contract, then how can I refuse to appear? There is no religious, social or legal approval for
breaking the agreement. All lawyers are bound by legal ethics”. After Justice Chaudhry was
finally restored, senior professional lawyers like Hussain began to tacitly criticized his arbitrary,
unprofessional decisions and postures as well the unruly conduct of his supporters in the bar –
the young, junior lawyers, who remained his diehard champions.44
The fragmentation of the lawyers became more visible, defined and distasteful postMovement and after the return of Chief Justice Chaudhry to his office. As I mentioned before,
along with old divisions, new pro and anti-Chief Justice groups emerged at the different levels of
bar politics across the country. Some professionals, as well as the Chief Justice’s opponents
claimed that the most incompetent lawyers were being elevated to the Bench because they had
held the Chief Justice’s flags during the Movement.45 Some, like Athar Minallah and Shaukat
Siddiqi (both currently serving as judges of the Islamabad High Court), had indeed been close to
Chief Justice Chaudhry and were staunch supporters of the movement. Professional lawyers and
retired senior judges alleged that incompetent, but loyal, lawyers were made judges because they
Recall that Munir A. Malik, in his farewell address for Chaudhry, lauds his refusal to be bound
by formalism. Chaudhry was (in)famous for his disregard for precedents and contradictions in
decisions. Critics of formalism, like Malik, see it as a major hurdle in the way of substantive
justice. (See Kennedy 2001 on formalism and the summary of the debates and definitions about
the concept).
45
Ironically, Hamid Khan was counted amongst the Chief Justice’s supporters for a while after
the Movement.
44
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had been diehard supporters of Chaudhry. A senior lawyer and former High Court Judge, Ali
Hassan,46 was openly critical of the training young lawyers had received in the two years of the
movement, and claimed that some of these lawyers continue to gain from their association with
the Chief Justice. Hassan was also very critical of the young lawyers’ unruliness in the courts and
their confrontations with the police and the judiciary. He argued that these are the same junior
lawyers who had learnt their unprofessionalism in the political contours of the movement.
On the other hand, Satti and many young petty lawyers defined both their involvement
in the movement, and the domination of senior lawyers, in the context of hierarchical and
uneven distribution of labor in the profession. Even though they continue to show respect and
admit to their hierarchy, the young lawyers vehemently critique the hegemony that their seniors
enjoy in the profession, and the complicit role some of them have played in past military
takeovers.47 The movement, albeit briefly, provided the site and space to question the
professional unevenness and raise criticism about structural inequality in the profession. The
ugly confrontations with the judges, albeit not exclusively, is born out of the young lawyers’
frustration with the judiciary, which often accords privileged treatment to (some notable) senior
lawyers in the court.48

Professional Hierarchy and Uneven Labor
The legal profession in South Asia continues to train lawyers as craftsmen; juniors join
senior lawyers and spend years learning how to practice law. Unless they have a firm in the
family to welcome them, young law graduates work as “low-paid apprentices” for senior lawyers
“or strike out on their own and often remain brief-less for years” (Siddique 2014, 506). Even
those who join senior lawyers, spend years under their shadow, before they are able to establish

Pseudonym.
Military rulers have made use of constitutional experts to legitimize their takeovers and make
favorable amendments in the constitution. (See Siddiqi 2017)
48
See Jehangir 2017.
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their own practice.49 In the course of my fieldwork I noticed that the majority of young lawyers
tend to share briefs: by providing or soliciting advice, appearing for fellow lawyers, and moving
case files or other required documents; most also share offices, as well as clerical staff. Lawyers
share space, labor and the precarity inherent in their profession. The lawyers from wealthy
families or those who have other means of income often entertain colleagues in their offices.
Informal networks and flows of information, ideas and cases, take place in these offices. The
most influential are those who can gather allies around them. Since bars elect their members
annually, these networks and relations become crucial for anyone aspiring to win office.
However, the majority of those who enter the legal profession don’t have the means or
social capital to create these networks or enter bar politics comfortably. They often feel voiceless
in the matters of the bar. And it was the majority of those lawyers, like Satti, who rebelled
against both the values and the traditions of their profession, alongside the injustices of the
larger political system. They revolted against the professional sensibility, not only present in the
legal culture but also carried by the educated urban middle-class, the ashrafia, whom I discuss
in Chapter 2.
Senior lawyer and PPP’s ex-MPA (Member of Provincial Assembly) Mujtaba Haider
Shirazi argued that the young lawyers revolted because they felt that they had no say in the
politics of the bar and disagreed with the way getting clientele and the fee structure worked; they
resented how the judges treated senior lawyers, in contrast to the juniors, in court . They
rejected the elitist professionalism of the seniors: lawyers must not take part in politics or
agitate on the street as a “common man”, seniors cautioned. In other words, the young lawyers
rejected the hegemonic professional ethics, values and culture, which they already felt alienated
from. According to Shirazi, the young lawyers “thought that all the bounty in the system is being
had by the grey haired seniors – we are not getting any benefits. And we are not getting anything

Even Jinnah and Gandhi are remembered to have struggled at the start of their legal careers.
(See Pannu 1976 and DiSalvo 2013)
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out of the profession. So there was serious resentment amongst young lawyers towards the
lawyerly culture, which these same seniors were preaching and teaching them”. Even though
juniors continued to show deference to their seniors, their resentment channeled itself through
the movement against Musharraf and found hope in, and stirred, Chaudhry’s populism. At the
same time, this populism in itself seemingly challenged the established political culture and
authority, as well as the instituted legal culture within the profession. Chaudhry’s disregard for
precedent and procedure was cheered and applauded by the young lawyers; they could identify
with the figure of Chaudhry as both were bent on challenging the status quo in the profession as
well as in the country.
Recall that Chaudhry’s poor command of the English language, that is, how imperfectly
he spoke and atrociously wrote his decisions in English, was often ridiculed by fellow judges and
the senior lawyers. Of course, they didn’t publicly engage in such derision, but legal
professionals, well-educated barristers, and judges, held little professional regard for Chaudhry.
He was a marginal yet ambitious judge, who had risen from lower ranks to become the Chief
Justice of the country. He was a Punjabi with Baluch domicile, and had spent most of his
professional career in the country’s remote and marginal territory, Baluchistan. He didn’t
belong to, as one barrister characterized:
the Lahori class of judges: who study from Model Town School and the prestigious
Government College Lahore. After graduating, they join the state’s legal apparatus as
public prosecutor or Additional Attorney General, and are eventually elevated to the
bench. They are judges of the status quo. Typical Punjabi urban, educated, upper middleclass is ruling the higher courts and unfortunately, the judges are not going to change it.
This class of judges, even though they supported Chaudhry against General Musharraf,
had never been fond of the Chief Justice and mocked his language and judgements.
Chaudhry was rustic in manner and language, similar to the majority of lawyers
practicing at the lower, district and sessions courts. These lawyers come from rural areas and
small towns, and often belong to the traditional intermediate middle class. Most struggle
through law colleges. Their families support them within their means but also anticipate radical
change, hoping that the graduate will help alleviate the family situation, both socially and
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financially. However, upon graduation, the majority enters an already saturated hierarchical
profession and struggles for years to achieve professional independence. As Munir A. Malik
claimed, the movement appealed to this class of young lawyers, who hoped that Chaudhry and
the higher judiciary’s restoration might bring significant change in the judicial system. What
that change meant or how it would be achieved was not clear. Ahsan’s reformulation of the state
– as a social welfare state and Malik’s idea of substantial justice – fueled their imaginaries and
aspirations of hope. On the other hand, many ambitious lawyers immediately recognized the
movement as the quickest way to professional recognition, and social and political prestige.
Ghulam Mustafa Kandwal humbly admitted that he is one of those lawyers who achieved
recognition in the Bar and success in his practice owing to his activism in the movement.
Kandwal rose quickly amongst the lawyers at the Rawalpindi Bar. With his white turban and full
beard, Kandwal always appeared prominently in the vanguard of the protests (see Figure. 7). He
was even successfully elected to the Punjab Bar Council in 2009. “Nobody knew me”, Kandwal
candidly explained, “but people said, he is one of the Movement lawyers, and so they voted for
me. I was a District level lawyer, before the movement, but afterwards, became a Supreme Court
one and defeated 19 other candidates to win Punjab Bar Council elections”. Framed photographs
of the lawyers with Chief Justice Chaudhry decorated the walls of numerous chambers at the
Rawalpindi and Islamabad District Courts. Standing next to Chaudhry or posing in a group with
him, bestowed professional and political recognition upon lawyers; identification with Chaudhry
was “good for business”, as few openly admitted, because the aam admi recognized the Chief
Justice and held him in high regard along with those who were associated with him. Of course,
many clients assumed that posing next to Chaudhry meant that the lawyer might have some
sway in the courts and could influence judges in their favor. Some activist lawyers bluntly
refuted and defended themselves when such rumors started to spread. Malik Abdul Hameed was
forthright in his defense: “I am one of the time-tested people. I never benefited from the
movement or from the Chief Justice”. Hamid proudly declared, “after his restoration, I never
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wagged my tail in front of the CJ to get any favor or benefit from him”. The stories of sacrifice,
bravado, and heroism often memorialized these mementos of recognition, fame, glory, and, for
some, disappointments with the Chief Justice’s populism after his restoration. There were losers
and winners of the movement. Some lawyers remained bitterly disappointed, while others
continued to freeze the narrative of the movement and glorify their sacrifices and successes
against the military regime.
The Lawyers’ Movement had brought together lawyers from all across the country and
made them aware of their associational power. The lawyers’ associational network and hierarchy
proved to be crucial in the mobilization for the restoration of the Chief Justice. An extensive
network of Bars connected lawyers from small towns, villages and tehsils, to the bigger cities
and districts. This was the first time in the postcolonial history of the profession that the
lawyers’ imagination of themselves as a unified community had been successfully realized.50 As
Ahsan astutely stated, the lawyers were finally leading a movement by themselves and had the
opportunity to craft “its soul”. The sense of an integrated community was nurtured both in
ideology and in action; the rule of law and constitutionalism provided ideological content and
the protests organized by the bars, the political comradeship in which lawyers could collectively
act together. Many lawyers told me that they were thrilled to meet their colleagues from across
Pakistan and to host them in their homes. The lawyers who travelled with the Chief Justice’s
caravan on his long marches and drives experienced a new political topography, populated by
fellow lawyers and ordinary Pakistanis, with varying dialects, speeches and dresses; many, for
the first time, met colleagues from remote areas, such as interior Punjab and Baluchistan. The
lawyers cemented new contacts and friendships. Their imagined solidarity took concrete
expressions. People ate, slept and protested together. Many even spent time in jail together.

The lawyers had protested as a collective in the past (see the last chapter), but the Movement
had introduced lawyers to each other across the country, especially through the long marches
and journeys that the Chief Justice and his caravan undertook.
50
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Upon restoration, Chief Justice Chaudhry continued to patronize young, junior lawyers,
who had mutated into his constituency from across the country. Even when Chaudhry was
entrapped in judicial and political quagmires – some of which were self-created – these lawyers
continued to support him.

Conclusion
The petty lawyers’ memory and their emotional discourse of the movement show the
languages other than the liberal rule of law or constitutional rights, which had become the
hegemonic language of the Lawyers’ Movement and of its historical narrative. These tropes and
emotions represented how the traditional classes saw and remember the movement. The
lawyers’ successful mobilization of their historic bloc, after all, depended upon their articulation
of the demands of their allied traditional intermediate classes, on the terrain of the cultural
politics of the nation. Post-restoration, the ‘anti-secular’ and nationalist-Islamist stance of the
Chief Justice and the lawyers politically gratified the traditional middle-class. Blasphemy
emerged as the new site upon which the lawyers and their allied Islamist and traditional middleclass fought the cultural politics of the nation. Mumtaz Qadri, who had murdered Salman Taseer
(Punjab’s Governor) on blasphemy allegations in 2011, was cheered and garlanded when he
appeared for hearings at the court. Mourned by lawyers, Qadri’s funeral drew hundreds of
thousands, and proved the popular power of the traditional middle-classes in Pakistan. In
chapter 6, I turn to Islamists and their allied middle-class and political parties: the JI (Jamaati-Islami) in specific. I examine their political ideologies and aspirations, and how they construe
the state as the tool of their political modernity. I also follow the legal career of an Islamist
lawyer, Wahab-ul-Khairi and look at JI’s founder, Abu-ul-Ala’ Maududi’s theory of the Islamic
state in Chapter 6.
The Chief Justice’s return, followed by Musharraf’s resignation, was considered a
humiliating retreat of the security and bureaucratic elite of the country while the lawyers fully
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intended to benefit on this account. Soon after the restoration, lawyers started appearing in the
news for their unruliness toward the judges and policemen – the state’s security and judicial
apparatus, which had pre-movement, contributed to the lawyers’ humiliations of the everyday.
The lawyers’ confrontations with the state turned ugly and violent once again. The state,
however, was on the retreat now. The lawyers’ emotion, their anger, was aimed at the judges and
their old nemesis, the police, which had brutalized them during the movement.
In the next chapter, I continue examining the urban middle-class youth, university and
college students, who mobilized for protest on their campuses. Young lawyers and students
provided the movement with political emotion, directed against the state. Students and youth
activists, many of whom claimed to be ‘apolitical’, converged together with self-proclaimed
progressive and leftist students at the site of the movement. Together, they opened up spaces of
public protest and critique of the military rule in Pakistan.
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Figure 4. Islamabad District Courts.

Figure 5. Islamabad District Courts II.

Figure 6. Advocate Abdul Hameed, The Rawalpindi District Courts.

Figure. 7. Advocates Kandwal and Satti in protest together, outside the Rawalpindi District
Courts.
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CHAPTER 5
Politics Against ‘the State’: The ‘Apolitical’ Students and Spaces of Violence
and Protest
I became interested in the lawyers’ protests because, qanun [law] is zalim [unjust and violent]
toward mazdoor log [working class people] like me. I am stopped at the police check posts
almost daily. The policemen search me and my motorcycle and woh mujhe zaleel karte hain aur
galian nikalte hain [they abuse, humiliate and swear at me]. I have been roughed up many
times at these check posts. They extort money from me … Our protests for the Chief Justice and
our street theatre was about qanun ki baladasti [rule of law], and we wanted to show Pakistani
awam [nation] how they had become jamhuras [disciples] of the rulers.
~ Bilal Satti, AWP Activist
The idea of the benign state was shattered for me, when I faced police brutality in the protests. I
had been sheltered from that violence until then. For the first time, I saw the excess of state
power and how the state served the interests of a small elite.
~ Mohammad Ali, Blogger and Activist

Yeh jo dehshatgardi hai, is ke peche wardi hai

It’s the military which is behind all
‘terrorism’
Her chahre pe zardi hai, kiya mulk ki halat kar di Everyone is yellow with fear and what
hai
Ye fauj nahi sardardi hai.
Have you (the Army) done to this
country? This military is a headache and
an embarrassment for us all.
~ Popular Slogans of the Students
On June 18, 2008, a Pakistani student, Samad Khurram, walked off the stage in Islamabad,
refusing to accept his Harvard Scholarship award from the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Anne
Patterson. Khurram would later explain that he had acted as such to protest ongoing U.S. drone
attacks in the sovereign space of Pakistan.1 Khurram was amongst those tens of students who
had travelled back to Pakistan from abroad in order to take part, as they all imagined, in a
historical movement against military rule and for ‘the rule of law’ in the country. By the time I
met him, almost eight years later in Islamabad, Khurram was a politically disenchanted
Khurram was applauded for his refusal and invited by numerous student organizations to
address them. (See Waqt News 2008).
1

consultant working with the NADRA2 department of the Pakistani government. After
completing his studies in the U.S., Khurram had returned to Pakistan, and after running an
electoral campaign for a PML-N candidate (who won the parliamentary elections), he had
decided to work on projects through which, he told me, he could create “immediate impact”.
After General Musharraf suspended the higher judiciary and imposed Emergency (on
November 3rd, 2007), university and college students in most of the major cities joined the
lawyers, political parties and civil society activists on the streets in protest, they welcomed the
lawyers and the Chief Justice on their journeys across the country.3 However, unlike student
activism of the past, which had been led by ‘leftist’ students from public institutions, it was
mostly, although not exclusively, the students of private, elite colleges and universities who
joined the protests this time.4 Moreover, the majority of these students belonged to the urban,
educated middle and upper-middle-classes and, again, unlike the student politics of yore, which
were mainly organized around class-activism (Naqvi and Ishtiaq 2014), they protested to restore
the liberal-democratic principles of the rule of law, judiciary and democracy in the country.
These urban youth expressed their dissatisfaction with the state in the language of rights,
legality and democracy, demanding a reform of the (neo) liberal state and the revision and
transparent enforcement of the constitutional framework (Butler and Athanasiou 2013; Blincow
2011). Along with their parents, they approved, supported and provided the audience for the
courts’ interventions in the governance of the country and its society.
Interviews with the youth activists and students, ethnographic observations with them,
and a reading of their blog, active during the movement, show how these students and young

National Database and Registration Authority.
Munir A. Malik recounted how, when the CJ visited Lahore, the students and their teachers
lined up along the streets to welcome them. See Chapter 1.
4
‘Leftist’, in Pakistani political and student circles, is used for those who follow various strands
of Marxist, Communist, Maoist, Leninist, Trotskyist and even labor ideologies, and are part of a
few, fairly small, political parties in the country. (See Ali 2015). I use the term ‘leftist’ to
represent both individuals and political groups, who claim to engage in politics of/against the
state, on the basis of aforementioned ideologies.
2
3
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activists entered and experienced the politics of protest against the state. By ‘politics against the
state’, I describe those political actions that don’t conform to the politics of common sense –
negotiating and allying with the state and its military-bureaucratic frame of rule (Alavi 1972;
Ahmad 1996). However, these protest actions do not necessarily confront the neoliberal state
and its exclusions outright either, rather, they employ the same claims of sovereignty (of the
people) and liberal discourses of the rule of law and rights (the constitutional raison d’etre of the
liberal state) against the state to hold it accountable. This form of politicization demonstrates
the interplay between “depoliticization and repoliticization under neoliberalism” in South Asia
(Gupta 2012, 85). Even though these conditions and attitudes might be indicative of how
politics, under neoliberalism, are more concerned with “problem-solving” and claim-making
(Gupta 2012, 93), I suggest that they do have the potential for recruiting youth in the democratic
politics of protest against the state.
Many of these students claimed to be politically immaculate before they joined the
protests. They had been “politically-distant”, as one described, from the dirty and corrupt
business of politics in Pakistan. Their politics against the state was conducted from the
‘sanctified’ site of the rule of law and constitutionalism – the same liberal democratic principles,
upon which the lawyers were agitating for the judiciary’s restoration alongside other classes in
their historic bloc. Well-known ‘progressive’ lawyers, such as Atizaz Ahsan, Munir A. Malik and
Asma Jehangir,5 rather than the traditional, middle-class lawyers, bridged these students to the
Lawyers’ Movement.6
The majority of these students had not personally witnessed or experienced how violence
was used against protest movements in Pakistan. Their political subjectivities (Butler 1997),
albeit shaped by the hegemonic, moral and legal language of the rule of law (Mouffe 1979;
Jehangir wrote to and advised the students as well. See her letter to the students, soon after the
imposition of Emergency:
http://www.sacw.net/pakistan/emergency/EmergencyTelegraph1.pdf
6
Recall that the traditional middle-class lawyers had bridged the bazaaris, Islamists and ulema
and other allies of the traditional middle-class to their Movement. See Chapters 1, 3 and 4.
5
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Roseberry 1994), were nevertheless shocked by the events of witnessing and experiencing the
truth of state power, that is, the brutality of state violence against protests. Their imagination of
‘the state’, as a benign structure of authority and protection, radically transformed through these
events. However, for working-class youth and students (like Bilal Satti), the everyday experience
of ‘the state’ (Joseph and Nugent 1994), had always been of zulm [violence] and zillat
[humiliation]. The movement brought all these students together, and together they discovered,
nay, carved a space for an articulation and a public critique of the structures and practices of
power, by engaging in open criticism of the military rule in Pakistan. As they re-iterated their
protests in the hegemonic liberal language of the rule of law and rights, the students, at the
same time, questioned the military state and its governance of Pakistani society. Together with
leftist activists, the elite youth and students formulated a public critique on the national sanctity
of the Pakistani Military in their protests, essentially organized for the non-partisan purpose of
restoring the rule of law and judiciary in the country and supposedly led by non-aligned lawyers
and their Bar Associations.

‘Apolitical Politics’ of the Middle-Class Youth in the Lawyers’ Movement
Commentators of the ‘Arab Spring’ and recent uprisings elsewhere have praised the vital
role of urban middle-class students and the youth in their “spontaneous, non-horizontal”
mobilizations (Krastev 2014; Mason 2012). These young men and women are characterized as
bearing a deep distrust of organized political parties and their leadership, and so, it is claimed
that most of them organized themselves independently, through social media and personal
networks rather than joining or following these parties. That is, these youth organized
themselves horizontally, rather than hierarchically, their politics were “gestural”, rather than
ideological, and their “inclinations non-theoretical” (Mason 2012, 3). These uprisings are
therefore celebrated as a complete rejection of ‘traditional’ politics and local political elitism,
while the youth and students who provided a face to these “leaderless” expressions of “mass
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fury”, are presented as deeply skeptical of democracy and those who claim to rule in its name
(Krastev 2014, 3-13). This chapter will add to these works by examining how these conditions
and attitudes are indicative of politics under neoliberalism, defined by claiming to be nonpartisan, and even ‘apolitical’. Yet how the state is imagined and experienced by the protesting
youth and students remains unexamined. That is, most studies on the recent popular uprisings
fail to analyze how the protesting youth and students identified and defined the state and what,
as I call, the ‘politics against the state’ entailed for them?
I met Mohammad Ali7 at one of the many cafes which have sprung up in Islamabad in
the last decade, to cater to the city’s growing consumer professional middle-class. In his late 20s,
he sported a short beard and bunned hair. Ali was one of the organizers of SAC (Students Action
Committee) at LUMS (Lahore University of Management Sciences), a prestigious private
University in Lahore, and had managed a popular blog, The Emergency Times, during the
movement.8 Ali introduced himself as a researcher-activist, currently working on social, political
and policy issues. Since the Lawyers’ Movement, he told me, he has remained involved in
different forms of Left activism, and was presently part of the AWP (Awami Workers Party), a
party that was formed after the merger (and then fragmentation) of various smaller Communist
parties, following the Lawyer’s Movement.9
Ali and Khurram can perhaps be counted amongst those youth, whom some
commentators call “Zia’s generation”.10 These men and women, born in the mid-late 1980s, grew
up in the next decade (following General Zia’s death in 1988), the major political highlight of
which was the tug-of-war for political domination between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto –
heirs of the two defining political legacies in Pakistan. In power since 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq,

Pseudonym.
The first SAC was established against General Ayub Khan’s military rule in the 1960s. (See also
Mushtaq 2014).
9
The Movement became the site on which various smaller Marxist and Maoist parties came
together. On Communist politics in Pakistan, see Naqvi and Ishtiaq 2014.
10
Interview with journalist Issam Ahmad, who closely covered the students protests in Lahore.
7
8
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by the mid-1980s, had brutally suppressed all modes of resistance to his rule, especially from the
left. The labor and student unions were either banned or appropriated by his military state.
Student unions have historically served as sites of organized resistance to military rule in
Pakistan. Former member of the CPP (Communist Party Pakistan), Syed Jamaluddin Naqvi in
his autobiography, Leaving the Left Behind (2013), details the rise of one such organization, the
DSF (Democratic Student Federation), a socialist student organization; and how it encountered
state repression during the 1950s. The DSF was founded in 1950, in Karachi, to resolve students’
academic and educational concerns. By 1952, it had evolved into a leftist student organization,
having won many union elections in various colleges across the city (Naqvi and Ishtiaq 2013,
28). In 1954, after a mutual defense agreement with the United States was signed, the CPP and
the DSF were banned and most of their organizers arrested (2013, 39). Many of the DSF cadres
had by then, infiltrated the NSF (National Students Federation), and from there lead the
movement to restore democracy against General Ayub Khan in the 1960s. Radical leftist student
organizations, such as the NSF, made alliances with other working class coalitions, building up a
serious challenge to Ayub Khan and the ruling industrial and landed elite that supported him.11
In 1970, the same students and their working class comrades played a critical role in the
spectacular rise and ensuing electoral success of Khan’s political nemesis, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
After coming to power on the wave of student and other forms of popular mobilization by
raising popular, socialist slogans of roti, kapra aur makan (bread, clothes and shelter), Bhutto
had successfully appropriated most of the student and labor unions, and brutally crushed the
ones that dissented.
After toppling Bhutto in 1977 and callously hanging him in 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq and
the compliant Army behind him, turned towards weakening the organized centers of opposition
to his rule. The state, under Zia, tacitly encouraged student coalitions on campuses along ethnic

A number of NSF activists turned toward rights-based activism, following the end of Soviet
Union, and are now leading NGOs in the country.
11
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and regional divisions, while the Islamist student organization of the JI, Jamaat-e-Islami (a
stakeholder in Zia’s government and its staunchest supporter) the IJT (Islami-Jamiat-e-Talba),
was backed by its repressive and bureaucratic apparatus (Nasr 1999). Meanwhile, student
bodies representing the interests of mainstream political parties also grew stronger on
campuses, and increasingly started to function as these parties’ strong arms, rather than
ideological nurseries, for the new incoming students. The IJT benefited from the fragmentation
of students along ethnic and political lines and quickly tightened its hold on most of the public
universities and colleges campuses.
As a result, the urban educated middle-class grew up with a disdain for organized
student politics. If, on the one hand, this class grew distant from organized politics owing to the
rise of other “intermediate classes” – real estate investors, traders and merchants, local-level
strongmen and mid-level landlords (Ahmad 1996) – into electoral politics during Zia’s era, its
offspring lost any aspiration to join the ‘dirty’ and increasingly bloody student politics of the
same period. After Zia’s sudden death in a plane crash in 1988, the country entered another
phase of electoral, democratic politics. Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and Zia’s protégé,
Nawaz Sharif, pushed the country, and its electorate, into a spiral of spectacular failures of
democracy in the decade following Zia’s death. As both Sharif and Bhutto rode a seesaw of
incompetent governance, the urban, educated middle-class watched this messy game of
democracy from the political margins. It is no wonder then, that many from this class welcomed
General Pervaiz Musharraf’s take over in 1999, and his supposedly liberal project of
“enlightened moderation” for Pakistan.
At the tail end of yet another dictatorship, the Lawyers’ Movement appealed to this
politically distant class and its offspring, who had stayed away from organized politics and
protest for decades. Private, elite universities, such as LUMS in Lahore, emerged as sites of
student-organized protest against Musharraf’s martial law and the first SAC was formed there.
These students welcomed Chief Justice Chaudhry to Lahore and they joined the lawyers’ major
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protests, such as the one at the Lahore High Court.12 While political parties had failed to capture
their attention, the Chaudhry Court’s governance interventions and the Lawyers’ Movement’s
slogans of the rule of law and justice appealed to these students. The neo-liberal tropes of
transparency, anti-corruption, human rights and the rule of law, appeared as the slogans
through which the state and its political class could be held accountable.
Speaking for SAC Lahore, Mohammad Ali had defined the non-political nature of the
students’ protests at LUMS. The Press Release posted on his blog read thus:
As our movement gains in strength, support, momentum and therefore, media
attention, the students of the protest movement at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences would like to clarify our position on a number of points.
Our movement is fundamentally a non-partisan, civil society movement, which was
begun by students last week as a spontaneous reaction against the imposition of a state
of emergency in our country. We are united in a clear and principled commitment to the
reinstatement of the judiciary and the restoration of the Constitution and of basic civil
rights, the release of illegally detained prisoners and an end to preposterous curbs on the
media. Our aim is to uphold and defend the autonomy of the judiciary in Pakistan. As
we increase communication with students from other educational institutions in the
country, we are confident and hopeful that we can all unite behind a particular principle
- the critical necessity of the sovereignty of the judiciary for sustainable political and
social development in Pakistan. (The Emergency Times, 2007, italics added)
Ali, and many activists like him, were at pains to express their non-partisan commitment
to the movement, because it stood to support the ‘apolitical’ principles of the rule of law and
basic fundamental rights which, they assumed, could be the key to political change, progress and
consensus in Pakistan. They aspired to the rule of law with an aim to redeem the Pakistani state
of political corruption, nepotism, deception, and exercise of violence, which, the higher judiciary
under Chaudhry had just started to undertake, before it was sent home.
Kamran Hameed,13 one of the organizers of the SAC in Islamabad, proudly disclosed to
me that before the Lawyers’ Movement he and his parents had never been involved in the
“traditional party politics of ghundas [local strongmen] and jagirdars [landowners]”. And yet,
Hameed and youth like him, who disdained the ‘traditional’ political parties (such as Sharif’s
12
13

See Chapters 1 and 3.
Pseudonym.
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PML-N and Bhutto’s PPP), joined the lawyers and protestors with these same parties in the
movement to restore Chaudhry.
Like some of the youth who became involved in the Islamabad protests, Hameed had
attended Khaldunia – a private, liberal arts school, inspired by activist and academic Eqbal
Ahmad.14 There, Hameed claimed, he spent his “formative years trying to understand how this
country worked, and became aware of political and social issues.” The “traditional naras
[slogans]” of the political parties didn’t arouse the political agency of these students, as Samina
Ahmed,15 another alumnus of Khaldunia, and Hameed’s friend, explained. Ahmed and Hameed
organized one of the first student protests in Islamabad by using their personal networks and
“without inviting or allying with any political party”. An inspiring Bharatanatyam16 artist and
also closely associated with the AWP, Ahmed’s post-movement trajectory shows a unique vector
of political activism that very few of the students involved in the movement followed.
For these students who grew up in a “neoliberal era” of alienation from the traditional
organized, electoral politics, and a deep suspicion of the military state that deeply influenced
and even managed this politics, the necessity of the rule of law, human rights and constitution
seduced them into the movement.17 The rule of law worked as a bridge between the movement
and these students, precisely because they considered it an apolitical, non-partisan protest
movement, whose only aim was to restore an institution, the higher judiciary, which under
Chaudhry, had begun to interject into the social and cultural life of Pakistanis.18

Academic and anti-war activist, Ahmad’s dream, on his return to Pakistan, was to build a
university, but due to the indifference of Pakistani state, his project soon stalled. Ahmad passed
away in 1999.
15
Pseudonym.
16
South Indian classical dance form. Most Indian classic cultural forms and artefacts were
censored by the state under General Zia, and that official disdain affected how these forms are
received by the Pakistani society, even long after the end of Zia’s regime.
17
See Harvey 2007 and Brown 2014, on neoliberalism and resistance against its economic and
political projects.
18
See Chapter 2 on ashrafia middle-class.
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The urban middle-class youth were thus drawn into protest politics towards the end of
General Musharraf’s rule. Many of these students encountered and experienced state violence in
the protests and gradually extended their critique of the military state beyond the movement, to
question the excesses of state power, such as the case of ‘the missing persons’. As I discuss later,
some of these students also participated in street theatre, and formulated a public critique of
military rule and the infrastructure that supported it.

From Apathy to Action
A reading of Ali’s blog, which at the apex of its popularity drew over 100,000 readers,
reveals the evolving engagement of students and activists within and outside the movement,
over the year and a half in which this blog was active. Although the protests started against the
dismissal of the Chief Justice and the enforcement of Emergency (martial law) in the country,
the students’ political analysis and actions extended to issues ranging from the price hikes of
basic commodities to the politically explosive issue of ‘the missing persons’, both of which were
interestingly also taken up by the deposed Chief Justice before his dismissal. The students’
recruitment into a politics against the state entailed not only taking part in public protests, but
also questioning and protesting the covert forms of state violence – the most brutal example of
which were the enforced disappearances by the military in its ‘war on terror’.
Two days after the Emergency was announced, The Emergency Times, reflected on how
the protests at LUMS were being ridiculed by the commentators:
The Students of LUMS, the so-called elitist brats that we have so often been labeled and
signed off as, proved their mettle today, to not only the lawyers they joined in protest
outside the High Court, but also in the example that they set today when they turned up
in hundreds to protest on campus, outside the PDC. Yes, the very depoliticized student
society that our leaders have taken for granted and grown so accustomed to, has awoken
from its decades long slumber with a roar, that enough is enough. No longer are we
going to be conformist to our government’s policies, as if we have no choice, no longer
are we going to be scared to question or raise our voice because we are intimidated by
the state’s power and what may be done to us; no longer are we going to refrain from
action, from sheer complacency. (italics added)
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These students were aware of their privileged institutional position and how they were perceived
from outside of their schools. But they were also surprised at the apathy shown, so far, by the
rest of the country:
How can Pakistanis sit back and watch all that is happening in our country today and
not want to do something about it? How can they ‘disapprove’ but still fail to take actions
to rectify what is wrong? How can they be so apathetic? These and many others like them
have always been the criticisms hurled at the Pakistani public but today, on the eve of a
revolution that is taking the country by storm, such criticism can no longer apply, these
insults can no longer be aimed at Pakistanis. In a feat of unprecedented defiance, judges
of the Supreme Court refused to take oath under the PCO, lawyers boycotted the courts,
and Pakistani lawyers, students and activists protested in the streets of Lahore,
Islamabad, New York and London. (The Emergency Blog, 2007)
For the educated, middle-class youth who had remained politically distant from electoral
politics, the judiciary’s challenge to a military ruler, and the rise of the lawyers and civil society
in their support, looked truly ‘revolutionary’. But what made this challenge politically
worthwhile for these activists and students?
In a letter of support addressed to the deposed judges, the students reflected on the
unique nature of their protest movement:
Dear Sir,
Our generation - born and bred in the politically disappointing decade of 1990s that
ushered in another military rule in Pakistan - had always doubted the possibility of
change. Our parents and peers told us that the only way to live in the country was to
subject our ideals to the “system” and that the only code of conduct was that of bribery
and bullying. They quoted history books and told us how pointless it was to struggle for
justice and democracy in Pakistan. Newspapers and TV channels simply added facts that
proved their arguments and our own little experiences with “practical life” verified them.
We didn’t see people around us as good and bad, or right and wrong, but simply as the
smart and the stupid in terms of their dealings with political reality. We weren’t able to
take any sides because we didn’t see any. All we saw was a jumble of interests, each and
every one of which could be compromised at a certain price. The theories and principles
we learned at school and college seemed utterly devoid of any relevance to our real lives.
But then we saw some people fighting, not for their personal material interests, but for
ideas and institutions. Ideas and institutions that form the basis of justice and
democracy. We saw them fighting with a passion and selflessness that simply
astounded our conventional understanding. We also saw them being oppressed and
tortured with such heartlessness that offended the very notion of being human. For the
first time in our lives, we saw a conflict where compromise was not an option. For the
first times in our lives, we were not in doubt about which side to take.
(The Emergency Blog, 2007, italics added)
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On the one hand, these students claimed to have grown up and unquestioningly accepted the
politics of common sense –which, as they put it, people engage in for their personal material
interests – internalized by Pakistanis across classes. On the other hand, they had learned, but
had also been told throughout their lives that to resist such hegemonic meaning of and approach
to politics was futile. So, according to the discourse of these students, and unlike the existing
political class and their allies who engage in politics only to secure their personal or regional,
ethnic or sectarian interests, an educated, professional class of lawyers and judges had risen up
for the sake of certain enlightening ideals and humanist institutions, and had thus provided an
opportunity to question the state-established relationships of power, patronage and interests.
The politics of such a disposition was “amenable” to the people from the educated class,
Ali explained, because the movement was led by lawyers and legal professionals, instead of
‘corrupt’ landowners, industrialists, and local strongmen – figures that Pakistanis usually
associate with politics, state and ‘corruption’. The impersonal, abstract political modality of the
movement appealed to these students and young activists. Although Ali argued, and as the first
quote from the blog shows, many students were aware of their privileged class position, at the
same time, for most of them the appeal of the movement lay in its ideological form, such that it
allowed them to channel their “resentment without challenging their privileged position in the
society”. This is not to say that these students were not, even though inadvertently, engaged in
the politics against the state. A look at a pamphlet from February 2 nd, 2008, four months after
the Emergency had been imposed, shows how the students had advanced from their single
demand of restoring the Chief Justice, to raising a critique about the structural, political and
economic violence and inequalities in the country. Under the title, “Students Demand A Check
on the Establishment”, students list their demands:
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Addressed to the country’s powerful Military and bureaucracy, the students draw the scale upon
which the postcolonial state of Pakistan has failed its citizens. By calling the militarybureaucratic state to account, the students showed that they were well aware of who actually
dominated the state and controlled its repressive apparatus (Althusser 1972). For these
students, their engagement with the movement had prompted them to rethink what the state
meant for the aam admi [common Pakistani]? Who controlled its resources? And how they
must question their own nationalist sentiments about the benign state.
As I discussed earlier, the lawyers had faced violence and humiliations of the everyday,
by the state and its police, before the Movement. The students however only witnessed and
experienced such events of violence in their protests. Many, for the first time, learned how the
state responds to dissent and what the politics of/against the state entail.

Experiencing State Violence and State of Exception
Political theorists and jurists writing on the state of exception often fail to take into
account how individuals experience its violence (Schmitt 1985[1922]; Hussain 2000)? How does
the event of the violence of exception, in this case the imposition of Emergency and the
suspension of fundamental rights, transform and make or break people’s ‘political agency’?
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General Musharraf’s martial law seemed relatively less repressive to those who had
experienced the violence of General Zia’s regime (1977-1988), which was especially unforgiving
toward leftist students, labor unions and political activists. For example, on July 19th, 1980,
military intelligence units in Karachi abducted Comrade Nazeer Abbasi (of the CPP) . He was
tortured to death a few days later. Abbasi was leading the Sind chapter of the NSF at the time,
and was in the process of forming alliances with other student organizations, against the
military regime of General Zia (Naqvi and Ishtiaq 2013). Zia’s martial law had proved to be
exemplary in its violence towards any mode of resistance to Military rule. On his orders, the
ferocity with which the Pakistani military crushed the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy) of 1983 in Sindh, is a dark and bloody part of the country’s history of military rule.19
Hundreds of students and political activists were killed, imprisoned, tortured or publicly flogged
by the country’s security forces during Zia’s rule. Dissent was intolerable.
General Musharraf, on the other hand, had reserved the wrath of the Pakistani military
for Baluch and Sindhi separatists, and following September 11, 2001, the Islamic militants.20 But
his ‘benign’ rule changed its course when he imposed his second martial law in November 2007.
The experience of the imposition of martial law, and the state violence toward those who
resisted it, was a politically provocative spectacle for this generation of students. They finally
faced the ferocity of state power, which had historically been reserved for the rebellious
Communists and the unruly Baluch and Sindhis in Pakistan.
The day the Emergency was announced, the cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan was
at LUMS to speak about the Lawyers’ Movement. As soon as Emergency was proclaimed, Ali
said, Khan fled to avoid arrest. By that time, the news stations had been taken off air. “Many of
us”, Ali explained, “hadn’t experienced this sort of media blackout before in our lives. Suddenly
we saw a lot of security around our campus, and once we started protesting, our campus was
On MRD movement and lawyers’ protests, see Chapter 3.
See Chapter 2, on the Lal Masjid Operation, and Chapter 7 on the missing persons of the Lal
Masjid.
19
20
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surrounded by Punjab Police”. The students quickly sensed the potential for violence and its
immediacy (Jeganathan 2000; Taussig 1992). The presence of the police was to ensure that the
students’ protest doesn’t spill over on to the streets and become a serious public nuisance for the
military government.
Ali, and many of his friends, soon joined the lawyers in their protest at the Lahore High
Court on November 5th, and for the first time experienced both a mass political rally and police
violence. However, it was one of Ali’s fellow student activists, Amina Hassan,21 who was the first
to report the state’s response to protests against Emergency during a protest rally in Islamabad a
few days later. I now turn to her narrative of that event.
According to Hassan, about 150 activists from Lahore had joined the lawyers’ protest in
Islamabad, when the police barricaded them. She was hit on the face, Hassan wrote, while
“trying to reach the house of our Chief Justice held captive by a brutal dictator. The extent of his
brutality, we were just beginning to get a taste of”. “This was a procession of over 1500 lawyers,
students, civil society members”, she wrote, which had “gathered to protest against the blatant
usurpation of our judicial institution, our media, as well as our fundamental rights”. While
marching toward Judges Enclave (where most of the judges as well as the Chief Justice
Chaudhry lived) and chanting slogans, Hassan noticed:
some smoke and ran backwards, thinking it was tear gas; but I soon realized that it was
fire trucks positioned to hose down protestors with cold water in this chilly weather.
They kept hitting us with cold, high pressure water in vain. When it became evident that
we would keep going nevertheless, the police started shelling us with tear gas. Most of us
smelled CS gas for the first time as we ran backwards experiencing its excruciating
effects. A friend had held my hand and almost dragged me along as we ran backwards.
Don't breathe. Don't fall. Don't stop. I kept repeating to myself as my throat, eyes, and
nose lit on fire. I ran as far back as possible. The spoiled, protected and sheltered girl
that I was, nothing even close to this viciousness had touched me before.
(The Emergency Blog, 2007, emphasis added)
It was a “surreal feeling” for her as she “stood on the very periphery, panting through [her]
scratched throat and rubbing [her] burning eyes”. “This was only the beginning”, Hassan wrote,
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as she “saw people coming back, drenched [because of the deliberate use of cold water canon by
the Police to disperse the protestors]. Saw an Auntie who had fallen in a puddle. Saw a girl about
my age screaming at the top of her lungs at the police meant to protect us, the people” (italics
added). “It was a battle field”, Hassan continued, and “it was us, the people, against them the
colonizers – our military state. A broken piece of a brick hit me, I shrugged it off. A much bigger
brick hit the girl next to me on her hip and left her limping for a while, she didn’t stop”. Hassan
and others kept on marching until:
the police stormed us. A certain police officer who was especially targeting women ran
after me full force. I took cover inside a house to save myself. Never have I run so fast in
my life. Many were beaten up, some had to be hospitalized. Today was more than just
another protest. In the midst of raw emotions, hurt limbs and hoarse throats, the only
thing that mattered was the wrong being done to us. Indignant, and offended at this
treatment; our protest very much was for human dignity. And more than anything else,
the sensitivity that this now offended dignity of ours cannot even compare to the years
of torment and subhuman treatment that most of our people in this country have
endured. Well no more. Passivity that translates into consent and complicity, never
again! (ibid., italics added)
Historically, military dictatorships as well as the few democratic governments that have
governed the country in between these dictatorships, have equally used the state’s security
agencies to repress opposition to their rule. However, it is the poor and the subordinated class
that faces police excesses on a frequent basis – in the form of extortion and public humiliations,
as well as outright physical violence. The police normally deal with those who appear to be a part
of the professional and educated class, and can resist their extortions, in a rather malleable
manner. The educated middle-class therefore remains at some distance from the shadow of state
violence in their everyday lives. For the students from this class, who faced “state brutality” at
the protests, the idea of a benign invisible state, presumed to be present and alert to protect its
complacent citizens, was therefore shattered.
Events of conflict and violence can bring the “fundamental aspects of society” into light,
often normalized by the repetitions of the everyday (Turner 1974, 35). Moreover, these events
may “create new orders and worldviews” (Fibiger 2015, 30). For the “first time, I saw the display
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of state power”, Ali explained, and “how its violence served the interests of a small elite”. “I had
been sheltered from state violence until then”, he admitted. Samad Khurram (introduced at the
start of the chapter) had his head and a finger broken by the police baton charges. “There is
certainly a loss of innocence involved”, he reflected. “You assume [that] we will protest openly
and it’s our right”, he explained; that sense of a civic right is “shattered”, he concluded. Other
students who considered protesting their right and public space their space of protest, also
expressed this sort of civic naïveté,.
How ‘the state’ is experienced and how it deals with dissent varies, of course, across its
spatial and ideological topography. Baloch and Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan have often been
‘disappeared’ and not even allowed the public space to protest or to mobilize their
sympathizers.22 The state’s violence, at its margins, is lethal and the state is intolerable of
dissent. At its territorial and social margins, states often attempt to pacify the ‘unruly’ into
“lawful subjects of the state” (Das and Poole 2004, 9). “Technologies of violence” (Hussain 2012,
256) and “technologies of power” (Das and Poole 2004, 9) are both used by states to discipline
and govern ‘the unruly’. As I discuss in the chapter on missing persons, thousands of Islamic
and nationalist activists are presumed to be ‘missing’ – apparently abducted by the intelligence
agencies.23 On the other hand, the laboring class, the poor and marginalized groups experience
the state and its violence in the form of humiliations of the everyday. They are harassed at police
check posts and abused in police stations. For them, structural violence of the state exists in
other forms as well, such as the “red tape” of bureaucracy (Gupta 2012).
Ali, Khurram, and Ahmed experienced what “being political” implied when, as Ali put it,
they felt the immanent vulnerability of street politics. Ali explained, the “shelters, that had been
surrounding us, broke, and, for the first time, I saw the excess of state power”. The rupture
between the claimed reality of power, what a state claims to be, and what a state actually is
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23

See Chapter 7 on ‘enforced disappearances’.
See Chapter 7.
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(unveiled in times of crisis),24 and the actual class relations that underpin it, became painfully
clear to students like Ali and Ahmed. They finally witnessed and partook in events, within which
they saw the reflection of the violent truth of ‘the state’.
However, for many young, working-class activists, this had been the only state that they
had ever experienced – both in the protests as well as in their everyday lives. Bilal Satti 25 was
working as a part-time golf caddy at the Islamabad Golf Club, when the movement against
General Musharraf started. In his late 20s, Satti met me at the Club too; this is where
Islamabad’s military and civilian elite relaxes and is entertained. Satti was, at the time, working
closely with a handful of leftist activists in Islamabad. Together with Samina Ahmed and Daud
Khan,26 Satti explained that he would perform “flash demos [demonstrations]” and street
theatre in local markets in the city.
Even though the Islamabad Police dealt with the protestors, as many activists claimed, in
a rather “civilizing manner”, some of the encounters were, indeed, quite violent. The day
General Musharraf submitted his nomination papers at the Election Commission was, according
to Satti, one such day. “We had all gathered in front of the Election Commission”, he
remembered, and there were only about 100-150 protestors, as many couldn’t make it because
of the blockades in the city. That day, he said:
I witnessed such a ferocious play of state violence. There were security personnel
present from almost all forces – Rangers, the local Police, Special Services Police, the
Punjab Police, the Frontier Corps, and so on – and even intelligence officers in plain
clothes were present that day and above all, they were 4 times our strength. They beat
everyone ruthlessly; they didn’t even spare women and children. They threw bricks at us;
beat us with lathis (batons); they beat us so mercilessly as if we were not Pakistanis. The
policemen didn’t even spare women protestors. They then arrested us all and took us to
the local police station, but released us in the evening.
This was the “real face of the state”, now unveiled for many of the “sheltered ones”, as Ali
put it. But for Satti, this was the “asli siyasat riyasat ke sath [the time of real politics with the
See Schmitt 1938 and 1922, on friend/enemy distinction and the state.
Pseudonym.
26
Introduced below.
24
25
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state]”. The policemen beat him up each time he was arrested during the Lawyers’ Movement.
But Satti had faced police violence even before these protests and had quite clearly learnt whom
the state strikes against, and why. Each time he had stood up and protested for Baluch
separatists, or for the rights of the kachi abadis (squatter populations), he and fellow activists
had been baton-charged and tear-gassed. So Satti was aware of the contradiction inherent in his
support for a movement that was launched to strengthen a legal system, which is deeply partisan
against dissenters like him, who transgress and disrupt the rule of law. Even if in protests, like
the ones described above, in which police repression was exceptional and no one was spared,
there were still many who were differentially treated by the state.
Kamran Hameed was arrested twice during the protests, but released soon after. He
explained:
I was arrested twice. First time, I was not scared as we were minors, but the second time,
I was. I was nervous the first time, but also thought that they can’t charge a minor. At
the time, I thought that we would not be arrested and sent to jail. It was humiliating for
the police to arrest a bunch of kids. One of them tried to give us a lecture on how we
should stay home with our mummies and daddies. It was a joke really. Other times, I was
worried because I was a legal adult. And I was arrested with adults as well, when there
was serious tear gas and lathi [baton] charge, and when people got seriously hurt.
“None of us had been brutalized by the police”, he continued, “even when they detained us”; as
Hameed lightly explained, he was not even taken as a serious threat by the police. However,
Hameed does admit that he probably “got away, because a lot had to do with my social standing.
My family knew people who would be able to get me out. I had a safety net”.
Most of the protesting Islamabadi youth had close family and personal connections with
the state. They were the children of the educated middle-class ashrafia, many of who were
either employed by the state or kept close relations with those who did. Chief Justice Chaudhry’s
daughter, in fact, organized one of the first protests in Islamabad where friends and classmates
warmly joined her. These young men and women were confident of their right to protest and to
display their emotions and their anger at the state. As I discussed earlier, “anger” is considered a
“prerogative of the powerful”, and deviant, when “the powerless” display it (Flam and King
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2005, 26). Dipesh Chakrabarty’s argument (2007) about public protest as a form of catharsis in
South Asia appears unconvincing, as he and Partha Chatterjee, in his account of “political
society” (2004, 53), assume that the space of protest is ideologically free and available to all, and
while the educated middle-class has the exclusive space of civil society to express itself
politically, the poor can freely express their dissatisfaction with the state as well. However, who
does the state allow such display of emotions? And who walks away, after posing emotional
gestures at the state?
Satti closely observed how the state treated its subjects even in time of crisis, and so, on
my probing as to why he participated in the Movement, he replied, “I protested in the Lawyers’
Movement because qanun [law] is zalim [unjust and violent] toward us, mazdoor log [working
class people] like me”. “Every day”, he said, “we have to face the police”. He continued, “I am
stopped at the check post almost daily. I am humiliated and abused and I can’t even say a word
to the policemen, because if I do they will beat me. The police extort money from people like me;
and one policeman even tried to plant a small pouch of narcotics on me”. “I have been roughed
up many times at these check posts”, he added with a hurt smile.
The rule of law, and its agents whom Satti faces regularly, discipline marginal subjects
like him. The difference in the experiences of violence – of the educated middle-class students
and of youth activists, like Satti – correlate to how the rule of law functions to discipline some
and govern other populations across the country. This tension was present not only between
student activists from different regional, ethnic, and class backgrounds, but as I discuss in detail
in Chapter 2, the same friction underlay the uneven legal and political development across
Pakistan, which, as I argue in this dissertation, manifested itself in the Lawyers’ Movement.27
Mohammad Ali eventually joined hands with some of Satti’s activist friends in
Islamabad, who would, in the aftermath of the movement, help merge the few remaining
Communist political parties in Pakistan. These leftist activists joined the protests, and created a
27

See also Chapters 7 & 8 on Missing Persons and Honor Killings.
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space there and in the public sphere, for their critical discourse on the Pakistani Army. Seasoned
political and rights activists also joined their street theatre and public protests to sharpen the
critique of the military state.

Mobilizing the ‘Non-Partisan’ Students for the Protests: The SAC (Student Action
Committee) and QAU (Quaid-e-Azam University) in Islamabad
The tension between what different classes aspired to achieve through the movement
reflects itself in how the students and youth, from various class, ethnic, and regional
backgrounds, joined the protests and how some successfully carved a public space for the
critique of the Pakistani state: on the campuses as well as in the capital city. Amongst these were
included even those who claimed to be ‘apolitical’ and non-ideological and were protesting only
for the rule of law and the rule of judiciary.
Known as the city of drawing room politics, Islamabad was built as the modernist capital
of Pakistan (Hull 2012). The city was designed as the bureaucratic center of the state and to
serve the society from a distance (Scott 1999). Over the years, as the city grew and eventually
went off its Original Plan for development, the borders between state and society became
malleable. However, Islamabad still lacks, as a number of activists characterized, “organic”
politics – locally-rooted, bazaar and neighborhood-based informal networks of political
activists and respective ideologies and solidarities. It’s a city of back-door politics, conspiracies
and intrigues. The Lawyers’ Movement re-defined Islamabad’s political geography, as the
students, the young activists and the lawyers fought hard to claim its public space for their
protests. Constitution Avenue, where the Supreme Court was located, close to the Judges’
Colony and the residence of Chief Justice Chaudhry, became a central point of protest for
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lawyers and other activists. QAU, a public institution on the city’s outskirts, emerged as another
site of protest, and its students soon allied themselves with Islamabadi youth inside the city.28
At QAU, the ethnic and regional student councils dominated campus politics. Located in
the capital of the country, students from all over Pakistan attended the university. These
councils were divided along ethnicity: Pashtun, Baluch, Sindhi, Saraiki, and so on. The political
space of the university was dominated by these ethnic councils, which claimed to represent and
protect their respective members’ institutional interests. Involvement in the Lawyers’
Movement, and taking the lead in organizing protests helped leftist students to create a political
space for themselves, and to counter the politics of ethnicity and identity. As discussed above,
the ban on student unions (during General Zia’s martial law) and political fragmentation
encouraged by the state along sectarian, ethnic and regional lines, had facilitated the emergence
of these ethnic student councils. Moreover, located in the capital, the QAU remained under close
state surveillance and any ‘anti-national or anti-state’ academic or political activity was
unwelcomed by the both the state intelligence agencies and the university administration.
Political activities during the Lawyers’ Movement – protests and study circles at the campus and
protesting with the lawyers outside – helped to peacefully expand the discursive space for
counter-narratives on the campus.
Imran Mohsin,29 a student activist at the QAU, had moved from Lahore a year before the
Movement started to work on his M.A. in the Anthropology Department. Originally from a
village in Southwestern Punjab, Mohsin had studied at the well-respected Government College
Lahore. He described himself as belonging to a “typical middle-class Punjabi family”, employed
in the Army and bureaucracy, even involved in electoral politics. His was the ‘typical’ Punjabi
family, because it had built its reach into the bureaucratic-military complex of the Pakistani
However, the state does allow protests to be registered, often for reporting by the media,
outside the Press club. Civil society activists and/or anyone, who wishes to register protest
appears outside the Press Club. See also Chapter 8 on Honor Killings and the protest against,
outside the Club.
29
Pseudonym.
28
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state, through the politics of common sense, that is, patronage, negotiations and alliances.
However, Mohsin himself took an alternative political path and joined a leftist student
organization, the DSF (Democratic Students Federation), in 2004-05. Around 2006, he moved
to the QAU and became involved with the small circle of leftist activists in neighboring
Islamabad. As the protests started in 2007, Mohsin organized a study circle with some of his
friends and students joined them in increasing numbers. The circle helped, Mohsin explained,
“to disseminate our political ideas to the students”, who were mostly used to the “politics of
ethnicity and negotiations” on the campus. The study circle started during the movement is still
active and meets every Sunday.
While Mohsin and other activists were organizing students at the QAU, the SAC (Student
Action Committee) Islamabad had already started to take shape and would soon invite the QAU
students to join. Daud Khan,30 who then was affiliated with the PRM (People’s Right Movement)
and was a member of the CMKP (Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party) too, was actively involved
in SAC Islamabad. Khan was originally from Mansehra, Hazara District (KPK Province), but had
been brought up in Islamabad. His was from a working-class family, and his father had been one
of the old guards of the CPP (Communist Party Pakistan). SAC, Khan recalled, at first appealed
to “the mummy-daddy type school kids”, that is, the upper-middle class youth in Islamabad’s
elite schools. Later on, he explained, students from public Colleges and schools joined the
protests. Soon SAC was working closely with the QAU students.
Back at the QAU, Mohsin and his fellow students had started to reach out to the ‘nonaligned’ students asking them to join their protests, and would organize various kinds of
political actions on campus. “We would be protesting almost every day”, Mohsin explained, and
“we even formed human chains around the campus a few times”. In order to recruit students for
these peaceful protests, Mohsin would make the rounds on campus carrying a megaphone. “We
would just wander on campus and talk to students”, he stated, and “would ask them to join us in
30
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protest on certain days”. Activists like Mohsin had sensed that the space for mobilizing students,
both ideologically, in the critique of the military state, as well as for the protest movement, had
begun to take shape, and so they increased their activities. Mohsin observed that the students
were receptive to “alternative political discourses”. For instance, he was surprised to witness
their response to a protest call for the observance of a Black Day on campus. On that day,
Mohsin claimed, even those students who were yet to join in any protest had worn black. The
response was overwhelming, he said, “we had this huge human chain in black”.
Public spaces were quickly opening up for protests against Musharraf’s rule across the
country. The bazaars, with the support of the tajirs, had already responded to the lawyers’ call
for protests and strikes,31 they had been extremely receptive towards the activists’ and students’
flash demonstrations. QAU followed, and on the campus as well as in the protests outside,
activists began to articulate a sharp critique of the military rule and its infrastructure of power.
The space for political expression, protest and counter-narrative was being carved.
Eventually, the QAU and other public schools joined SAC Islamabad, but as Daud Khan
explained, the “ideological discussions remained very limited in our meetings”. The “Englishmedium, private-school students”, he claimed, were wary of any political encroachment upon
the SAC. He further explained, “these mummy-daddy students would keep a distance from us.
They would even accuse us of hijacking the SAC. Some of our student friends did make those
sort of moves: like they would raise Communist slogans, such as inquilaab [revolution] or surkh
hai surkh hai Asia surkh hai [Asia is Red], in SAC meetings.” These slogans would irritate the
Islamabadi youth. For these “mummy-daddy students”, Daud stated, allowing any political
ideology in the SAC was a return to existing politics, and their protest movement – for the rule
of law and democracy – was above “dirty politics”. These students hailed from the same
educated, urban middle-class that had stood up against General Musharraf’s dismissal of the
higher judiciary. They spoke the liberal language of the rule of law. They wanted a Pakistan,
31
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Khan added, in which human rights, constitution and democracy existed; they were, he claimed,
“the real neoliberal discourse followers”. “These boys and girls used to hear about the rule of law
and other liberal ideas at home and would re-cycle them at our meetings”, he concluded.
Even though ideological conversations were restricted at the SAC, and organizational
energies were spent on how to organize protest, the leftist student activists had already
recognized the movement as a site – albeit contentious and shared – from which they could
articulate their critique of the Pakistani state, its bureaucratic-military complex, and to open up
the public space which had remained hostile to such critiques. They did so through two
performative strategies: by engaging in street theatre and creating a repertoire of sloganeering
and poetic performances in the protests.

The Spaces of Confrontation: The Street Theatre and Repertoire of Youth Protest
During the Lawyers’ Movement, William John Pervaiz, a Christian graphics designer at
PATTAN,32 and his fellow artists became a major street attraction because of their play, Bacha
Jamhura. Many other student activists and artists also became involved in street theatre during
the same period. Most of their plays openly critiqued military rule, structural violence,
inequality and class politics in the country.
Theorists of social movements argue that protestors “develop a variety of protest forms
in an attempt to disengage or shock the onlookers from the daily routine. They resort to irony
and humor, drama or the grotesque” (Flam and King 2005, 14). But how are the spaces for such
displays created? And what are the conditions under which ordinary people become emotional
spectators?
In May 2002, William John Pervaiz had, in fact, been arrested from Abpara (one of the
major and the oldest retail markets in Islamabad)33 for performing the same play (Bacha
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219

Jamhura). An Army Officer passing by had noticed the crowd gathered around the performance,
he stepped closer and upon seeing Pervaiz impersonating General Musharraf (Pervaiz was
wearing a khaki shirt and an army cap), called the local police. Pervaiz and his fellow performers
were swiftly thrown into a police van and taken to the local police station. There, the police
officers threatened Pervaiz for parodying the most powerful institution of the country. He was
released, soon after he signed an undertaking to never perform against the military government
again. Yet, in 2007, Pervaiz was back on the streets.
Five years later, the Lawyers’ Movement provided a site – “an environment for
alternative narratives”, as many activists put it – for criticizing existing structural inequalities
and power relations, especially the Army and its hold on the state, an act which had not been
possible before. And the aam admi, they claimed, was willing to listen. The event(s) had
provided the site and possibility of critique of the larger power structures. Or in Gramscian
terms, the event provided the passage from conjunctural to the organic critique of existing
power relations (2000, 177).
Most significantly, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, a public critique of the Army
had emerged from the province of Punjab. This type of critique and antagonism against the
military had historically found sympathy in the minority provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh,
but now these voices were being raised from Punjab – the heartland of Army recruitment and of
emotional and ideological support in the country.
During the protests, leftist students and activists would raise slogans against the
Pakistani Military to draw attention to the political and economic infrastructure that sustained
this most powerful institution, and its rooted interests in the country’s society and economy
(Siddiqa 2007). They did so by sometimes subverting popular slogans, such as Pakistan ka
Matlab kiya (what is the meaning of Pakistan?). This slogan was considered one of the most
popular rallying cries for Pakistan’s creation during the Independence Movement, and, because
it clearly laid out the Islamic nationalist demand for Pakistan – Pakistan ka matlab kiya, La
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illaha il Allah (Allah is one) – it was regarded as an appropriate reply to those who challenged
the idea of a separate state for the Muslims of British India. During the movement, leftist
activists swapped the slogan’s second phrase with, Lathi, goli martial law (Baton, bullet and
military rule),. By substituting the Islamic nationalist slogan with a critique of military rule, the
activists enunciated the truth behind the Pakistani state – the reality of the state since its
independence had been one of successive martial laws, the Army had ruled Pakistanis through
an absolute violence of batons and bullets.
According to these activists, the nationalist narrative, in which the military
predominantly featured as the savior and guardian of the nation-state,34 had to be challenged –
a challenge that could not have been taken up in the space and time of the ‘everyday’. Mikhail
Bakhtin has discussed different temporalities and their spaces of transgression in his seminal
work, Rabelais and His World (1965). Bakhtin argues that the co-existence of life and death,
high and low, and solemnity and the comic, were the defining characteristics of “grotesque
realism” in the Middle Ages, which found life during the time of the carnival (1965, xvii). New
relationships between body, language and political practice were revealed in the carnival (1965,
xxi). The aesthetic of the carnival was open and it did not separate life and birth from death, or
laughter from macabre (Bakhtin 1965, 51). The co-existence of serious and comic was a central
characteristic of grotesque realism, expressed in carnivalesque forms. Even churches, Bakhtin
claims, once tolerated this kind of comical satire on certain days of feasts and carnivals, in which
sacred figures and authority were ridiculed (1965, 75). But with the rise of the state-centric
political order, Bakhtin argues, and the consolidation of monarchical authority, this
transgressive duality waned and authority and power came to be construed as serious affairs
alongside the persons associated with them.
For Bakhtin, the parodies performed during the event of the carnival did not represent a
complete ideological rejection of the social and political order that was being parodied. Some of
34
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the people who performed the parodies were serious church followers, believers and
practitioners. “The consciousness of freedom”, he therefore argues, “could only be limited and
utopian. It would therefore be a mistake to presume that popular distrust of seriousness and
popular love of laughter, as of another truth, could always reach full awareness in expressing a
critical and clearly defined opposition” (Bakhtin 1965, 95). However, the activists and students
did recognize the temporality and the space of protest, which allowed for political transgression
against the established political order. These activists joined the protests to influence, Daud
Khan argued, “the discourse and objective of the movement, which was very neoliberal and
limited, and so we wanted to speak our political language and to carry it to the people during the
protests”. He explained, “we wanted to expand the scope of the movement because it was
narrow and had been made ‘non-political’ by the educated middle-class students, and therefore
we wanted to connect our protests to other structural and institutional issues. We were not able
to attract a lot of people, but we did create an acceptance for a leftist critique of the Militarybureaucratic complex that has ruled this country”.
Khan wanted to target the civil society standing behind the state (Gramsci 1971). For
Gramsci, behind the state lay deep “trenches” of the civil society (democratic associations of
culture, religion and politics), and it was on the site of civil society where the “war of position”
for hegemony was often fought (1971 207-08, 243). Khan wanted to move beyond the
conjectural to the organic, from the critique of a “small group of rulers” to the structure of
violence that the state stood upon; and they identified the movement as the site to do so
(Gramsci 2000, 199).
Political transgression was radical, revolutionary and romantic for the students and
youth activists, especially for those who, for the first time, were engaged in the street politics of
collective protest. Their “collective jouissance” was “organized around transgressing the norms
of public utterances, around saying the ‘unsayable’” (Hansen 1999, 184). As I have suggested
before, protests are “events which institute a public arena: actors accomplish symbolic
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performances, enact emotions, claim moral preferences, reaffirm collective identities” (Blom
2008, 20). Uttering the unsayable can arouse and mobilize the emotions of the spectators too.
Initially, the lawyers and the JI (Jamaat-i-Islami) activists distanced themselves from
the critique of the Army. Khan explained, “we used to say, Go Fauj [Army] Go, and not Go
Musharraf Go. The lawyers and other political workers, especially the JI, would object to this
slogan and ask us to speak about Musharraf, and not the Army”. Most of “our slogans”, Mohsin
claimed, were not about the restoration of the Chief Justice, they were aimed at larger,
structural problems concerning the Pakistani state, and wished to highlight for the public, how
much of the national budget was swooped away by the Army every year. Hence they would raise
the slogan: phukke reh gaye mein te tu, lut ke le gaye GHQ (we have all been left hungry, while
the Army looted everything). These activists would sometimes join Jehangir Akhter, an
independent activist and a bazaar tajaran (small traders) leader, who would bring his van with
a huge military boot on top of it, to the protests. According to Akhter, who described himself as a
“middle-class agitator”, he would go to these protests with the “military boot on top, to
symbolize and demand decrease in the military expenditure” too.
Shakir Hussain,35 a poet and playwright, was a student at the QAU when the protests
started. Hussain soon joined Mohsin’s study circle and became quite active in the protests.
Hussain wrote a number of poems during that time. One of which, Haathon me le kar hath
chalo, became quite popular. Hussain’s intellectual labor added to the critique of the military
that the leftist activists were formulating at the time. Another popular poem of his, Gawadar
Chaoni (Gawadar Cantonment) is also an elegant critique of the Army’s economic and security
encroachment upon the nation-state. The poem focuses on the new cantonment being
‘developed’ with Chinese assistance36 on the coast of Gawadar, Baluchistan. Hussain questions
the nationalist narrative of the military, as the protector of the nation, and speaks about the
Pseudonym. Hussain ‘disappeared’ in 2016 but returned home after a few weeks. He has
stayed out of the public sphere since his return.
36
On Chinese-Pakistan relations and development projects, see Small 2015.
35

223

violence it used to clear up the land for development. Hussain’s poems found their way into, and
became popular slogans of, the Lawyers’ Movement. They were even recited by protestors far
from Islamabad.
Sheikh Babar,37 who would later join Hussain, Mohsin and Khan in Islamabad, was in
Faisalabad, Punjab, when the protests against Musharraf started in 2007. 38 He recalled how he
had heard one of his friends reading Hussain’s political anthems against the military. Babar
belonged to a working-class family and, according to him, his route to politicization diverged
from the urban, educated middle-class students whom we met above. Although introduced to
Marxist thought a few years prior, it was not until he joined the protests that Babar actually
fashioned a particular political subjectivity. It was by engaging in protest action with other
comrades, Babar explained, that he understood what it meant to engage in the politics against
the state, and for him this entailed articulating, in the face of censorship from the lawyers and
the JI (Jamaat-i-Islami) activists, a loud criticism of the military rule in the country. He
explained:
When we only used to read and debate in our study circle, we used to think that
inquilabi activity siraf hamari zimadari hai aur baki sab harami hain (that to bring
revolutionary change was only our responsibility). But when I took part in the
protests, I realized that this is not the case: there are others who are part of this process
as well, but to different extents, and even if we have ideological differences with them, we
must engage them in politics with us. For example, the Islamists stood in these protest
with us. It’s not our choice that we have made them stand with us: but it’s the
circumstances and the context, which we all share.
Babar learnt, that “through political activity, by being involved in it, we established our
political identity as Marxists, and it was because we spoke against the military rule, not only
against a General [Musharraf]”. Babar and a fellow labor activist wrote an entertaining,
rhythmic poem called la ragra, and when they recited it together, it would bring other
protestors around them. Babar recited some of its couplets: “Ragre te ragra la ragra,
Musharraf nu ragra la ragra, America nu ragra la regra, fauj nu ragra la regra (bring
37
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Musharraf down; bring the U.S. down; and also the Army, bring it down)”. Their biting satire
became a unique slogan, and even though only a few students with Babar would recite it in the
protests, they would attract hundreds around them.
It is important to recall here that all of these sharp and candid critiques were being made
from the supposedly liberal, non-partisan space, which the demands for the rule of law, liberal
rights and the rule of constitution had created; a site that was tactically, albeit partially,
occupied by the students and young activists to challenge the state-imposed censorship and the
nationalist narrative of the supposedly benign military. Both the nationalist narrative and the
state censorship did not allow for any public critique of the Army, or of its defense budget, its
ever-increasing economic infrastructure of industrial units, private security industry or real
estate investment that encroached upon public land.
These activists carried their critique to the aam admi in the form of street theatre as
well. Khan, Satti, and Ahmed together performed short plays at different commercial markets in
Islamabad. Khan used to impersonate Musharraf in these plays. He explained: “These would be
symbolic plays, with minimum props, maybe a military cap and a uniform shirt. I used to mimic
Musharraf and his famous line, ‘I am not scared of anyone’. Or act as a mullah with my pants up
to my ankle, as mullahs do. They [the mullahs] would be recognized as such and the public
would laugh”. The audience would sometime be entertained and join in, or at other times, as
Khan explained, disagree and taunt them. Street theatre was necessary, he says, because “we
couldn’t tell our story or speak our ideas openly before, but since it was the time of the
movement, we could do so. People are emotionally receptive towards new ideas in times of
crisis. People are looking for answers, and so that was the time”. The street performances were
intended to “shock” the spectators “out of their everyday routine compliance or indifference,
cynicism and resignation” (Flam and King 2005, 12). Successful protests “offer a radically
different emotional (re)framing of reality” (ibid.), and by engaging the emotions of their
spectators through humor, these activists hoped to attract the spectators’ “emotional

225

engagement” to their critique (Flam and King 2005, 14). Mohsin, Khan and their activist friends
had realized the space that the protest movement had made available for alternative discourses
– albeit in the name of fighting for the rule of law, constitution, and democracy –both on school
campuses as well as in the broader public sphere, about the state and its political economy of
power.
William John Pervaiz’s play, Bacha Jamhura, perhaps best conveys how the relationship
between organized politics, the military-bureaucratic state and the political emotions of the aam
admi was exposed by the activists, and how they desired the public to enter their critique. I
conclude this chapter with a look at Pervaiz’s play.
A Punjabi play, Bacha Jamhura was based on the interplay between three archetypal
characters: A jamhura (disciple), a madaari (trickster-master) and a politician. The play is a
long, continuous dialogue between a madaari and his jamhura, in which the former questions
and the latter responds. The play begins as the madaari asks the jamhura to scan the audience
and tell him who are these spectators. He replies, they are all the oppressed because they have
always encountered tricksters. The madaari then orders him to turn left and right and bow
down to the audience, but the jamhura refuses to follow instructions and in defiance, unties the
rope tied to his legs, (as the madaari held its other end,) and walks away. At this moment, the
politician enters and the madaari tells him of jamhura’s rebellion. The politician advises the
madaari to impose Emergency on him and take away all of his rights, and if he submits,
promises him full support. The madaari announces that all of the jamhura’s rights are now
suspended and whoever dared to speak for him would be flogged. In the meantime, the madaari
receives a call on his cellphone. It seems as if his master has called. The madaari reassures him
that he is in control and will soon have the jamhura roped back in. At this, the jamhura
suddenly re-enters with some young men and women following him, and all of them raise
slogans against the madaari, who now attempts to placate the jamhura by offering him various
kinds of schemes to get rich. But jamhura is defiant, he tells the madaari that his days of
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profiteering from the jamhura’s labor are over: he will not dance to preset tunes anymore. The
play ends with the jamhura and his young comrades, raising slogans in favor of the judiciary
and democracy, women rights, a free media, and for the freedom of the Pakistani nation.
According to Pervaiz, the show would usually last 6-7 minutes and was performed
numerous times during the Lawyers’ Movement. The play built upon cultural figures of street
performers in Pakistan, who use monkeys, snakes, goats, horses and sometimes even bears in
their performances. These mobile performers travel with trained animals, who charm their
audience by attempting different acrobatics at their masters’ orders. These men are popularly
known as madaari. The play works by making a number of substitutions: jamhura represents
the nation, madaari the military ruler and the politician, that despicable figure, just represents
himself. The play even shows how global powers, the U.S. in particular, are invested in the
country’s military regime. The phone call and the deference displayed by the madaari, show
that even he is being controlled and disciplined from elsewhere. The corrupt and easily bought
political class is subservient to the Army, which, in turn, bows down to the global super power.
The nexus between a global imperial power (U.S.), the Pakistani Military and corrupt,
unprincipled local politicians is preyed open in 6 minutes. The play pulls in the aam admi, the
nation, in two ways: the nation is not only the oppressed, it is also the audience and so, a witness
to its own oppression – and therefore, this scenario will not end unless the audience stops being
passive and rises up to take action.
Pervaiz’s play was a humorous and grotesque depiction of the reality behind state and
political power in Pakistan. It challenged the emotions of onlookers by displaying the collective
humiliations of the nation, at the hands of the U.S. – an imperial power that stood behind
Musharraf and every military ruler before him – and those of the everyday, by a state firmly held
by the ‘corrupt’ and dishonest politicians who were thoroughly involved in dealings and
negotiations with the Military. They had all, the play suggested, made a jamhura, a docile
performing animal, of the Pakistani populace.
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Conclusion
The street plays and protests were performed in a city (the capital, Islamabad), which
didn’t yet allow for organic politics or a public sphere of critique and protest. These
performances rallied the political emotions of the aam admi by declaring the military state
accountable in the name of the rule of law. Leftist students and activists dismissed the educated
middle-class youth and their ‘apolitical’ neoliberal stance towards their Marxist critique of
Pakistani state as anti-political. However, the site of the movement, on which all these different
groups came together, was itself a product of the political (Spencer 2007, 175-180), as it
appealed to, performed upon, and mobilized emotions against the state, again, in the name of
the rule of law. Whether it was the lawyers’ non-partisan associational politics or the students
‘non-political stance towards the movement, the slogans of the rule of law and constitutional
rule were providing the site and mobilizing political emotions across the country.
With their own fantasies of ‘revolution’, the students of the elite, private schools joined
the bloc of the professional and educated intermediate classes as they were all led by the lawyers
against Musharraf’s government. The ‘liberal’ lawyers and rights activists bridged these students
to the movement. And yet the elite students’ state experiences of the everyday, as well as of the
Emergency rule, diverged from the petty young lawyers and working, lower-middle-class youth,
for whom the humiliations of the everyday were one of the profound experiences of the state.
The events of experiencing state violence broke that shell of civic naiveté of the elite students.
The bloc led by the lawyers, albeit with divergent aspirations and imaginations, was rallying the
emotions of the nation. The convergence without consensus on what the state ought to be had
begun to take shape.
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CHAPTER 6
The Emotions of the Aam Admi : Khairi’s Jehad, Islamic State and its
Hudood
Owing to his ignorance and weakness, which he inherently possesses, [man] loses himself in the
maze of destruction … These limits [hudood] determine what direction man should take in life’s
journey and they guide him”, and if he strays, it’s the duty of the state to steer him back on that
path.
~ Maududi 1961, 144
We have had many constitutions, but it’s the ideology of Islam that binds us together as a nation
within the Constitution. Otherwise why did we separate from India and broke apart Bharat
Mata?
~Advocate Wahab-ul-Khairi
The Lawyers’ Movement brought together religious and ‘secular’ political parties and
bridged the educated and professional middle class and the ‘liberal’ civil society to petit
professional and traditional business and bazaar classes simultaneously. JI (Jamaat-i-Islami)
was the most influential Islamist political party in the movement, and drew its cadres and
support from some sections of the bazaaris, the traditional intermediate middle-class, but more
significantly, from the educated middle-class professionals, the lawyers and the low bureaucracy
of the state (Iqtidar 2011; Nasr 1994). In the JI, the traditional petty lawyers found willing allies
to be engaged with in the cultural politics of the state.1
The JI’s intellectual roots were laid by Abu ala’ Maududi to counter colonial modernity
and its worrying cultural influence on the Muslims of India. Maududi’s antidote was in the form
of the modern Islamic state, constitution and law. The JI was a modernist, Islamist political
party, rather than a ‘traditional’ Islamic one, such as the Deobandi Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI),2 and represented the urban educated professionals. In the decades following
Independence, it had gradually built its reach into the lower strata of the Pakistani state,
especially when it grew closer to General Zia and lent legitimacy to his Islamization project for
Pakistan. Because of its open support for ‘Afghan jehad’ against the Soviet Union’s occupation of
1

See Chapter 3 on the lawyers’ Bar resolutions and how they intervened in, what I call, the
‘cultural politics of the state’.
2 See Metcalf 1982.

Afghanistan (1979-1988), the JI was able to win many military and political as well as
international allies and establish networks of support, both locally as well as globally.3 Even
though the JI’s electoral gains have remained modest, it has successfully recruited its
sympathizers and even party members in the state bureaucracy, colleges, universities and has
successfully set up labor and student unions.
The sole demand of restoring the judiciary and democracy and return to constitutional
rule allowed for the creation of a larger bloc between the lawyers, various political parties, the
rights and Islamists activists – even though they all differed on the meanings imputed to the
rule of law, the Constitution and the state, and what they aspired to achieve through them. For
the Jamaat-e-Islami, formation of an Islamic welfare state rested upon the rule of law based on
a constitution that already affirmed Allah’s sovereignty (hakmeat-e-alla). However, as a
modernist Islamist party, the JI saw no contradiction in its definition of sovereignty and efforts
to reconcile Islam with the modern, liberal ideas of constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule
of law.

A Note on the Ashrafia Middle-Class ‘Islamist Politics’
Scholarship on Islamist politics, their intellectual genealogies, and leading thinkers
privileges certain histories and figures in South Asia, especially in postcolonial Pakistan.
Islamist modernist thought, in its both intellectual-political and intellectual-ethical forms, is
mainly traced back to two major figures: Allama Mohammad Iqbal (the Bergen-GoetheNietzsche-influenced philosopher and poet) and Abu’ala Maududi – the founder of Jamaat-eIslami (Khan 2012; Iqtidar 2011; and Nasr 1994). After September 11, 2001, the U.S. invasion of
neighboring Afghanistan, and its ‘softer’ interventions inside Pakistan, a number of scholars
have added to the research on Islamist politics by historicizing the militant forms of emergent
Islamic political formations in the region, and have argued against placing Islamic politics
3
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outside of colonial modernity and rooted in, or appealing to, a ‘medieval’ form and time of Islam
(Jalal 2010; Mamdani 2004).
The colonial era was indeed intellectually and politically fertile for the nationalists
(whether inspired by Islamic or ‘secular’ nationalism) both within and outside of British India.
Many nationalist thinkers and freedom fighters flirted with political theories and ideas
circulating globally too. In India, the nationalists confronted the colonial state on its own liberal
political turf, in the name of rule of law, on the basis of which the British legitimized their rule. A
number of these nationalist leaders, such as Jinnah, Nehru and Gandhi, were barristers.4 Their
encounter with the colonial government was essentially guided by and within the liberal, legal
etiquette of politics, which was based on practices of negotiation and non-violent political
actions.
Outside of India, however, Indian nationalists became profoundly influenced by a
number of powerful political ideologies. Many nationalists, who experienced populist
movements – for example, Fascism and Socialist-Nationalism in Italy and Germany,
respectively – expressed their admiration for them and hoped for personal success by emulating
the tactics and actions of these movements. The Khaksar movement, of Maulana Mashraqi, is
considered to be deeply inspired by the fascist mobilizations and political victories in Italy and
Germany.5 The military discipline, rank, and badges became a hallmark of many other nonviolent movements as well, such as Khudai Khidmatgars of Ghaffar Khan in the north-western
parts of the British Indian Empire (Banerjee 2000). Nationalists such as Subhash Bose appealed
to the Axis powers as well and actively recruited the Indian diaspora to fight the British (Preckel
2008, 306-310).

See Chapter 2 on lawyers.
On the Khaksar movement, see its founder, Allama Mashraqi’s, grandson Nasim Yousaf’s
work, Government of British India on Allama Mashraqi and Khaksar Tehreek (Movement): A
Select Chronology (2010).
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Discipline of bodies, hygiene, and emotions were the new defining elements of the
emerging middle-class in colonial India, and the state, as a collective power of bodies and
individuals, was the object of their political desire (Daechsel 2013). Maududi, and other
Islamists, lesser-known Islamic-Socialist thinkers’, such as the Khairi brothers, theories of the
state demanded a powerful, modern, constitutional state, under a strong leader, and a state
which could place hudood [limits] on the emotions of the masses. Markus Daechsel places this
concern with the modern state in “the politics of self-expression”, which, he argues, emerged
amongst the South Asian Urdu middle-class between 1930s and 1950s (2013, 1). In the new
culture of consumption and education, “both individuals and collectives were made alike by the
assumption that they had single and unchanging ‘selves’, which needed to be expressed in an
arena of existential struggle” (2013, 83). “The terminology of the statehood”, therefore, Daechsel
argues, fit well, as “a micro expression of power” vis-à-vis Hindus via the British, in the “logic of
the self-expressionism” (2013, 105). The self-expressionist idea of state and nation built upon
the notions of (collective) state power as a merger of bodies and individuals as the nation (2013,
120). Bodies and their discipline, in terms of hygiene and sex, became important and thus the
control of emotions and passions became central to this form of new political culture. However,
it is important to note that the Islamists’ desired a state based not on popular sovereignty, as the
new middle-class politics of self-expression desired for itself (Gilmartin 2017), but rather on
hakmeat-e-alla (Allah’s sovereignty). I discuss this point below in Maududi’s theory of the state
and constitution.
Both Iqbal and Maududi can be placed in this intellectual and political encounter with
the colonial state and governance in India, and, in fact, Maududi, like many Muslim intellectuals
of the period, belonged to the middle-class ashrafia6 – North Indians educated government-

For a long time, after Partition, Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami focused on recruiting and
attracting educated, middle-class Muslims. This changed with the launch into electoral politics
and with the shift in the leadership of the Jamaat.
6
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employed professional Muslims (Alavi 1972; Metcalf 1984) – which emerged to lead the
Pakistan Movement for the Muslim League, after the party’s departure from Congress-led
Indian nationalism. However there were many other nationalists at the margins of the
intellectual class to which both Iqbal and Maududi belonged. Amongst Maududi’s interlocutors,
the Khairi Brothers, Sattar and Jabar Khairi, were two such nationalist figures, whose political
and intellectual mantle is claimed by their nephew and self-proclaimed heir, Advocate Wahabul-Khairi of the Lawyers’ Movement. I introduce Khairi and his petitioning, politically inspired
by the theories and politics of Maududi and the Khairi Brothers, in the last section of this
chapter.

The Perspective of Jamaat-e-Islami: Islamic State and Constitutional Rule in
Pakistan7
Pakistan’s constitutional and political history is marred by competing interpretations –
over the years polarized as ‘Islamic’ versus ‘secular’ – about the ‘true’ nature of the nation-state

Before protests against Musharraf started, JI was part of the religious political alliance
supporting his government. The success of the MMA (Muteheda Majlis-e-Amal) – an alliance of
Islamic political parties – was one of the shocking results of the 2002 parliamentary elections in
Pakistan. The MMA set up its government in the KPK province and became a coalition partner
of General Musharraf in the Parliament. The electoral victory of the religious alliance was
unanticipated because these parties had until then repeatedly failed to broaden their political
appeal beyond their established electoral bases. However, this time the Islamist parties
politically benefited from the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, an anti-Islam rhetoric emanating
from the West, and the global language of ‘war on terror’, in which Islam was characterized as
the driving force behind recent violence world-wide. Their alliance with General Musharraf was
an uneasy and tense one however. He had recently launched his program of ‘Enlightened
Moderation’ and was openly supported by the Pakistani civil society for his apparently ‘secular’
leanings. The ‘liberal’ civil society was enticed by Musharraf as they saw a moderate and liberal
General advocating these principles at the state level. Musharraf had toppled sociallyconservative Nawaz Sharif in 1999 and so he was welcomed by most of the Pakistani civil society
and tolerated by the Western powers, especially after September 11, 2001. By 2007, most of
these parties (as well as the ‘liberal’ civil society) had turned against the General and joined the
Movement to restore the judiciary. While trying to allure these opposing ideological forces, he
lost both as they identified his ‘double game’ (of appeasing these opposing camps) as a
Machiavellian scheme to stay in power.
7
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and its constitution.8 General Zia-ul-Haq attempted to put to rest the confrontation between
these competing ideologies by making a number of amendments in the Constitution that were
intended to preserve and restore its Islamic objectives. Many of these were inspired by JI’s
theory of the Islamic state, finely articulated by its founder, Maulana Maududi. Following
Maududi, Zia renamed the parliament Majlis-e-Shura (the Shura Council) and appeased the
Islamists by adopting an Islamic mode of advisory rule (shura, or consultation); imposed
stricter legal restrictions on the Ahmadiya sect; and passed Hudood Ordinance.9 This historic
divide between multiple ‘secular’ and ‘Islamist’ ideologies in Pakistan, and formations which
politically and socially represented and defended them, was finally bridged in the Lawyers’
Movement. The last such alliance had emerged in 1977, when the nationalist and Islamic
political parties (including the JI), under the banner of PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), had
rallied against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government. Even though the protests against Bhutto were
led by nationalist parties, soon the religious ones took over and turned the protest movement
into one for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic rule and law) in the country.
General Zia took their gesture seriously and proceeded to transform the Pakistani state into an
Islamic one, while ensuring he remained its guardian for life!
The JI was established by the ashrafia intellectuals of the northern India and appealed
exclusively to the intellectuals from this class. However, the party gradually transformed itself to
represent the urban, educated, petit professionals, traders and teachers and professors, across
ethnicities and regions in Pakistan. The JI evolved, organizationally as well as politically, in the
early postcolonial period, by learning from and confronting the Pakistani Left, which had
profoundly influenced and mobilized labor and student unions, teachers and professionals and
See Khan 2012 on the ‘non-state’ sites of these debates of the everyday. See also Dhulipala 2015
on how (the idea of) Pakistan was imagined as a sovereign Islamic state.
9
Hudood Ordinance (1979) was claimed to have merged Pakistan Penal Code offences, based on
Common Law Jurisprudence and criminal procedure, with Hudood laws based on Hanafi
jurisprudence. These laws were severely criticized and protested by human and women rights
activists for institutionalizing limits on women’s rights and regulating their social and familial
conduct.
8
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intellectuals in the decades from 1950-1970s (Iqtidar 2011, 87). From a closed cadre-based
political organization, the JI grew to recruit and organize students, traders, laborers, lawyers,
doctors and other professionals (ibid.). It especially attracted petty government officials, small
shop keepers, farmers and local intellectuals and school, college and university teachers (Iqtidar
2011, 94). The JI’s student wing, the IJT (Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba), appealed to the new-arrivals
from small towns and rural areas in colleges and universities and successfully captured the
campus politics, with the backing of the state under General Zia (ibid.)10 It is important to note
that most of the lawyer activists also belonged to this migrant middle-class and many carried the
same religious and traditional cultural assumptions about the Pakistani state and society.11 The
JI’s influence over tajirs or bazaaris connects the party to its non-professional ‘traditional’
middle-class.
Kashif Chaudhry was an influential tajir representative and Naib Ameer (vice president)
of JI Islamabad, when the protests against Musharraf started. When I met him in 2014, he had
been elected President of Markazi Anjuman-e-Tajran, one of the two main organizations
representing shopkeepers and small traders in Islamabad. As I arrived at Chaudhry’s office, he
was busy resolving a dispute between a local shopkeeper and his suppliers. Many of these
representatives, as I noticed during my fieldwork, worked as mediators between the small
traders and shop keepers and the state. Chaudhry claimed that the tajir unions are ‘nonpolitical’, non-partisan associations, and like bars, they represent only the interests of their
members, and that’s how they achieve consensus by staying above political allegiances. And so
the decision to join in with the lawyers was taken because the “tajir baradari [traders’
community] saw the Chief Justice’s act as a historical gesture against a General and thought that
the movement could take the nation to a better place”. “Independent judiciary can bring peace
and prosperity to this country”, he said, “but only if the Constitution is implemented”. Upon my
See Chapter 5 on youth and student politics.
A look at lawyers’ Bar resolutions, how they partook in the cultural politics of the state, shows
their affinity with the Islamists. See Chapter 3.
10
11
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asking him about the nature of the Constitution and the competing claims about its ‘secular or
Islamic’ character, he calmly explained:
Pakistan’s constitution is an Islamic constitution. The 1973 Constitution is a totally
Islamic constitution, and the actual problem in this country is not that of the
constitution, but of its implementation. In our constitution, remember, hakmeat-e-alla
is recognized only of Allah. Objectives Resolution is part of the constitution; and Article
62, 63, which set the criteria for contesting elections, are about the moral character of
the contestants and whether they follow Islamic principles or not. If we act 100% on the
constitution, all of the nation’s issues will be resolved. The ruling elite and the civilmilitary bureaucracy do not respect the constitution or its sanctity; the powerful use it
for their interests, and the law strikes against the weak and the poor only. Most of the
corrupt members of Parliament do not even pass the moral test set by the Articles 62,
63.12
Accepting hakmeat-e-alla (Allah’s sovereignty), re-fashioning the state based on it and
implementing the Islamic Constitution of Pakistan were the main elements of JI’s constitutional
discourse, which differed from the interpretation of the liberal civil society and rights activists
and liberal, secular lawyers and activists. However, all of these groups converged on the critique
of the existing ruling elite, which the JI deplored as both politically and morally corrupt.
Islamist lawyers – one of whom we will meet below – actively litigated in the Courts on these
principles, and particularly invoked Articles 62, 63, against the ‘corrupt’ political class of the
landowners, industrial, real estate and merchant capitalists, who lead mainstream political
parties, like Bhutto’s PPP and Sharif’s PML-N, and controlled the Parliament.
The JI has remained consistent in its demand for the cultural and legal reconfiguration
of the Pakistani state as an “Islami falahi riasat” (Islamic welfare state). Soon after
independence, the JI entered Pakistani politics by overcoming its initial ambiguity about
Partition and began its political project of articulating and actively forwarding a modernist
Islamic imaginary of the Pakistani state.13 The JI availed itself of the first opportunity to do so in

The Supreme Court recently disqualified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from office as, the
Court decided, he failed the test of Articles 62,63. See Bhatti 2017.
13
JI, under Maulana Maududi, had refrained from supporting the creation of Pakistan as it went
against its pan-Islamic vision of an Islamic state. After independence, it reluctantly entered the
12
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1953, when it led the public agitation to declare the Ahmadiya sect14 non-Muslim. Even though
JI opposed Ayub Khan’s military rule, it welcomed and provided political legitimacy to General
Zia-ul-Haq’s military takeover in 1977. After initially supporting another military takeover
(Musharraf’s in 1999), by 2007, the Jamaat had turned against that one as well.
The chief of Jamaat-e-Islami Islamabad, Zubair Khan, explained that when the Chief
Justice was dismissed by General Musharraf in 2007, the head of the JI then, Qazi Hussain
Ahmed, called its activists and supporters to come out on the streets to protest, because “an
Army General cannot be allowed to send the judiciary home. There are procedures in place to
dismiss a judge and due process should have taken course, according to the rule of law”. I met
Khan at JI’s Islamabad office. Its main office serves not only as the administrative center of the
party, but also provides the public space for the members and sympathizers to bring their
grievances against the state for resolution. Party officials are often asked to intercede with the
state. The office was filled with men and women, holding various forms of petitions,
applications, and so on, and waiting for the party officials to arrive. Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s
statement about Pakistani Constitution adorned the wall outside, by the main entrance.
Portrayed standing, presumably, in the Legislative Assembly, Jinnah, with his hand in the air,
stated: “If you ask me about the constitution of Pakistan, it’s provided in the form of the holy
Quran” (see Figure 1). Over Jinnah’s statement, and in fact diminishing him, was the famous
nationalist slogan: “Pakistani Ka Matlab Kiya, La’ilaha ilal la” (see Figure 2). This was the
popular slogan turned on its head by the leftist student and youth activists.15 Both Jinnah’s
quote and the nationalist slogan were displayed as such to clearly articulate the constitutional,
political and cultural truth about the Islamic state.

Pakistani political scene and started advocating an Islamic state, based on Islamic law and
ideology, against a secular western one.
14
The Ahmadiyya sect was eventually declared non-Muslim in 1974 and further restrictions
were officially sanctioned against its members, in 1984, during Zia-ul-Haq’s rule. See Ahmed
2009.
15
See Chapter 5.
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Khan explained that the JI’s support of the movement was, in essence, a political
struggle for the Constitution, because, Jamaat contends that, it is not the martial law, rather, it
is democracy which will bring a change in the country’s governance.16 If lawyers, like Atizaz
Ahsan and Munir A. Malik, identified the rule of law and constitutional rule as the political
means to achieve social justice, and turned these notions into key slogans for mobilizing support
for the movement beyond the bar associations, the JI’s discourse was similarly intended to
mobilize its supporting middle-class by continuing to demand a modern constitutional state
based on Islamic principles. For both, however, these slogans served as mobilizing devices to
appeal to Pakistanis beyond political affiliations.
Khan argued, and it’s an important point to note, that the contradictions between their
(the JI’s) ideology and the “secularists” in the movement could be reconciled by the Constitution
– that is, their struggles were (are) constitutional and for the restoration of judiciary and
constitutional rule in the country. Khan claimed that it is the Constitution that can bring various
political parties and ideologies together. However, he further argued that the differences in
political ideologies can be reconciled only if all political parties “accept and take oath under the
Constitution, in which hakmeat-e-alla [Allah’s sovereignty] has been recognized and accepted.
Even if their (non-Islamists’) ideology is secular, after all, their struggle is constitutional”, Khan
contended.
This interpretation of the Pakistani Constitution diverged ideologically from the one
forwarded by the ‘secular’ lawyers (such as Atizaz Ahsan and Munir A. Malik), who were leading
the movement, and from the ‘liberal’ political and civil society activists. These competing
interpretations of the Constitution and its underlying principles were argued by those who
converged together under the banner of the rule of law and constitutional rule, but diverged on
what that rule entailed and what it was meant to achieve. Despite these interpretive differences

As I mentioned earlier, JI, of course, has lent its full support to the last two martial laws in the
country. Under General Zia, JI benefited enormously from its proximity to the state.
16
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and conflicting political desires, the JI’s discourse on law and state is by no means ‘nonmodern’. The JI activists draw their interpretations of the Pakistani Constitution and the state
from Maulana Maududi’s theory of the modern Islamic state and law (Shari’ah).

Maududi’s Islamic State: Hakmeat-e-Alla and the Need for Hudood (limits) in
Pakistan
Islamist scholars, like Maududi, didn’t draw their response to colonial modernity from a
preexisting Islamic ideology, but rather it was intellectually formulated as an answer to existing,
current problems which the Muslims encountered. For Maududi, the crisis facing the Indian
Muslims was mostly cultural in nature and western theories and categories, which he thought
were inorganic to the Subcontinent, could not resolve it. His answer was a (re)formulation of the
Islamic state and law (Shari’ah), and it was a rational and modern response to the crisis of
modernity.
Maududi was a scholar, tutor, and a journalist (Iqtidar 2011, 44), who had to move
numerous times in his life to find work in the Subcontinent. As scholars of South Asia have
pointed out (see Alavi 1972, for example), this precarity profoundly affected the political psyche
of the Muslim salaried, professional class of Northern India, the ashrafia, who found themselves
alienated in the colonial, united India and eventually took the Independence Movement to its
culmination under Jinnah’s leadership. Maududi’s response was an intellectual one at first, and
as the former General Secretary of the JI, Professor Khurshid Ahmed, states in his introduction
to Maududi’s The Islamic State and Constitution (1961), he became the bridge between the
traditional ulema (the Deobandis) and the secular modernists (the nationalists) – both of whom
were also responding to the colonial rule in India (1961, 18-19). Maududi was celebrated as the
one who succeeded in bridging the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ divide in Muslim colonial, and
then later, in postcolonial political thought (ibid.) His theory of the state and constitution was
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considered an Islamic reconstructionist response to the postcolonial predicament of being born
out of the legal and political womb of a colonial state.
The hegemony of the Western intellectual, cultural and political thought was the
challenge that the Muslims, according to Maududi, faced. “This state of degradation … the
culmination of a gradual process of decay” had taken many centuries to take over Muslim
cultures and states, and had commenced with the “stagnation in the domains of knowledge and
learning, research and discovery and thought and culture” (Maududi 1961, 40). The result had
been “our political breakdown, making many a Muslim countries the slave of non-Muslim
imperialist powers”; the “political slavery” had given birth to an “inferiority complex”, which, in
turn, had resulted in our “intellectual serfdom” (1961, 41). “The adoption of Western Culture and
Civilization and aping the West”, just showed the degree to which the Muslims had “succumbed
totally to the slavery of the West” (ibid.). This was the crisis that the Muslims had to overcome,
said Maududi, and, therefore, the political power that they had lost, had to be regained to smash
the cultural and intellectual hegemony of the West. And that’s why, for Maududi, the state was
essential for the objective of remolding the Muslim society in the postcolonial period.
However, the state that Maududi imagined for the salvation of Muslims, is essentially
modern in form but Islamic in substance. Maududi was acutely aware of the power of the
modern state, of its apparatuses, and the social and cultural wonders that it could achieve. He
argued that “a very large part of the Islamic system of law … needs for its enforcement, in all its
details, the coercive powers and authority of the state” (Maududi 1961, 56). He further
explained: “political power is essential for protecting the Islamic system of life from
deterioration and perversion, for the eradication of vice and the establishment of virtue, and,
finally, for the enforcement of all these laws that require the sanction of the state and the
judiciary for their operation” (ibid.) Maududi recognized that the coercive power of the modern
state will be needed to implement Islamic law and to eradicate those ‘vices’, which, as Khurshid
Ahmed proclaimed, “couldn’t be eradicated through sermons” (Maududi 1961, 5). The
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relationship between Islamic law (Shari’ah) and modern state is a crucial one for Maududi,
because he was well aware that only those rules and regulations can be considered law, which
are recognized by the state as such and upheld by its violence. He recognized that “only those
injunctions … which are backed by the political authority … are, in modern parlance, termed as
‘law’”, and hence, “to avoid confusion, we shall apply the term ‘Islamic Law’ to those portions of
the Shari’ah only which demand the sanction of the State-power for their enforcement”
(Maududi 1961, 56). Maududi’s Islamic state was therefore ‘modern’ in form, as it was to be a
centralized structure of violence, commanding law and demanding obedience (Hobbes
1668[1991]).
Maududi appropriated the form of the social contract between the citizens and the
modern state and established the foundations of his theory of the Islamic state upon it. He
explained:
The basic principle of Islam is that human beings must, individually and collectively,
surrender all rights on overlordship, legislation and exercising of authority over others.
No one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands in his own right and no one
ought to accept the obligation to carry out such commands and obey such orders. None is
entitled to make such laws on his own authority and none is obliged to abide by them.
(Maududi 1961, 137)
The authority to make laws, that “right”, stated Maududi, vests not with the people, represented
by a human sovereign, but rather with “Allah alone” (ibid.) So the first principle of an Islamic
state is that sovereignty belongs to Allah only. This principle, which both JI activists Zubair
Khan and Kashif Chaudhry referred to, is known in Urdu as hakmeat-e-alla.
Although retaining the modern state form, Maududi claimed that the Islamic state is
fundamentally different from the Western democratic one, as it “repudiates the philosophy of
popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the
vicegerency (khilafat) of man” (Maududi 1961, 139, emphasis added), who is merely his
representative on this earth. So, in the Islamic state, Allah “alone is the real sovereign; is the real
law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation vests in him”; and “the government which
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runs such a state will be entitled to obedience [not for providing protection or guarding the
borders of the nation-state against external enemies, as the Hobbesian state ought to do
{Schmitt 1996(1938)}, but rather] in its capacity as a political agency set to enforce the laws of
God and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If it disregards the law revealed by God, its
commands will not be binding on the believers” (Maududi 1961, 138).
But why place limitations on popular sovereignty in an Islamic state? Maududi
responded to critics who might object to these limitations as a way of taking away “the liberty of
human mind and intellect” (1961, 140). These limitations, hudood, are placed, he argued, in
order to “save man from going astray and inviting his ruin” (1961, 140). Maududi, the rational
intellectual, is deeply skeptical of human nature, specifically that of the aam admi and the
masses: “The great mass of the common people are incapable of perceiving their own true
interests … He [the common man] is swayed by emotions and desires to such an extent that
rarely, if ever, can he judge important matters with the impartiality and objectivity of scientific
reason. Quite often he rejects the plea of reason simply because it conflicts with his passions
and desires” (1961, 141, emphasis added). And that’s why, Maududi argued, God has established
“Divine Limits’ (Hudud-Allah)”, which consist of “certain principles, checks and balances and
specific injunctions in different spheres of life and activity … These limits he is not permitted to
overstep and if he does so, the whole scheme of his life will go away” (Maududi 1961, 143). The
common man, Maududi continued, “owing to his ignorance and weakness, which he inherently
possesses, loses himself in the maze of destruction … These limits [hudood] determine what
direction man should take in life’s journey and they guide him”, and if he strays, it’s the duty of
the state to steer him back on that path (1961, 144, emphasis added). It is pertinent to recall
here that JI advised and wholeheartedly supported General Zia’s enforcement of the Hudood
Ordinance 1979, which synthesized the Pakistan Penal Code with the hudood laws based on
Hanafi Jurisprudence. These laws were fiercely protested by women and human rights activists
of the time, who saw their implementation mainly as a move to Islamize the state by way of
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disciplining social transgressions of women only. General Musharraf attempted to reverse some
of these laws, but succumbed to Islamists’ mobilization against these reversals.
The educated ‘liberal’ middle-class shared the same skepticism about the passions and
emotions of the aam admi.17 Many of them were wary of the emotional protests of young, petty
lawyers and emotional attachment and identification with Chief Justice Chaudhry.18 In this
respect, the educated middle-class JI activists share the skepticism of the liberal, middle-classes,
for whom the aam admi is an ignorant political being who continuously requires limits,
discipline, governance and education and is easily swayed by his emotions. Western liberal
thought also remains deeply suspicious of the role of emotions in politics and especially of its
role in democracy and its populist forms (Schmitt 1988[1923]). The law and state, then, become
the tool of disciplining, governing and commanding popular emotions.
The JI activists are well-versed in Maududi’s thoughts on hudood [limits] in an Islamic
state and the crucial role of law in enforcing them. Zubair Khan, thus, forcefully told me,
“hudood are established in the laws and the constitution by the state and the awam [the masses
or the nation] can’t just go on doing whatever they wish to”. “Our Islamic democracy”, he
continued, “is not free for all as it is in the West. There are limits, hudood, set by our law, on
what we are allowed to do. Or not. To be azad [free or to have freedom] here, in Pakistan,
doesn’t mean what it does in the secular West, that a woman can marry a woman and a man can
another. We have hudood set by Allah and his Prophet, and we have to act in the light of those
hudood in our daily lives; even the rulers have to follows these hudood, which they often don’t”.
Maududi in fact extended his critique of the “Western secular democracy”, based on popular
sovereignty, to a critique of the ruling elites of those states and reflected on who is deemed
morally fit to rule in an Islamic state. He called the leading figures of the Islamic state, ulul-amr.

17
18

See Chapter 2.
See Chapters 2 and 4.
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Maududi suggested that the divorce between politics and religion, which has taken place
because of the secularization of the modern, Western state, has resulted in the death of
“morality and ethics” in the Western, secular democracies (1961, 141). And so only those
politicians capture power there, who can “dupe the masses by their wealth, power and deceptive
propaganda … They often make laws not in the best interest of the people who raised them to
power but to further their own sectional and class interests” (ibid.). Although Maududi made
every Muslim a caliph of God and answerable to Him (1961, 149, 151) – in what he called a
“Democratic Khilafat” – he envisioned a “righteous group of people” to wield political power of
the Islamic state (1961, 102). These principles held for both Kashif Chaudhry and Zubair Khan,
for whom the Lawyers’ Movement was a mobilization against the corrupt ruling elite, which
does not even qualify to lead the nation under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. “We are
under the grip of corrupt mafias”, Khan stated, and “these politicians are opportunists, who join
different political parties, but … are the same people who are always in power, whether
democracy or dictatorship; they move where the power shifts. We need righteous leadership”.
Both of these Articles have been used to litigate against the political elite in Pakistan. I look at
the litigation conducted under these articles by an Islamist lawyer, Wahab-ul-Khairi, below. For
now, I return to Maududi and his notion of ulul-amr – the guiding figures in an Islamic state.
Maududi defined ulul-amr under “The Principles of Loyalty to the State” (1961, 179).
Ulul-amr is the “third object of the Muslims’ obedience” in the “Islamic Order of life”, and
consists of “the men in authority, the government” (ibid.) But the obedience to ulul-amr follows,
first, obedience to Allah, “the Real Sovereign”, and second, “loyalty and obedience to the
Prophet” (ibid.) Ulul-amr are the leaders of the Muslim society “who control and administer its
affairs, may they be leaders of thought or literature, religious divines, political leaders,
administrators, judges, commanders or chiefs of social, cultural, tribal, municipal or local
organizations” (Maududi 1961, 180). However, obedience to these men rests upon two
conditions: “(i) These ulul-amr should be from amongst the Muslim community. (ii) They
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should themselves be obedient to God and His Prophet and their policies and actions must
conform to the letter and the spirit of the Shari’ah” (ibid.) The ulul-amr must rule to establish
salat (worship and prayers) and zakat (poor-due) in the Islamic state and if they fail to do so,
they must be removed (Maududi 1961, 181-183). So not only that ulul-amr “should themselves
offer prayers, but [they] should also utilize the power of the state to establish the institution of
salat in the community. If the state does so, it retains its Islamic character” (Maududi 1961, 181).
It was during General Zia’s rule that salat was officially enforced in state bureaucracy and
strictly encouraged in the Pakistani public sphere. Obedience to ulul-amr is then conditional,
tenuous and open to challenge, if they fail to follow these principles.
Maududi’s theory of the Islamic state provides a powerful critique of the Pakistani ruling
elite and establishes intellectual as well as political grounds for differentiating the postcolonial
state from the Western as well as the past Islamic ones. Maududi’s modern Islamic state differed
from the past ones because of his re-defining of the location and origin of sovereignty. Rather
than situated in multiple and amorphous social and cultural spaces – as did the pre-British,
Mughal state, for example (Gilmartin 2017) – like the modern colonial state, sovereignty is
consolidated and centralized in Maududi’s Islamic state. Sovereignty in the Islamic state is not
earthly or popular, as in the modern Western liberal-democratic state, rather it derives its
legitimacy from and is placed in Allah, who commands his representative in this world, through
his laws, which the state, as an apparatus, or as a medium, must implement through ulul-amr.
The Islamist lawyers have built upon this political and cultural critique and have litigated
in the higher courts in the matters to do with the ‘corrupt’ deals and political intrigues and
supposed conspiracies (of the ‘secularist’ and the ‘corrupt’ politicians) against the nation-state.
The advocate of the Supreme Court Wahab-ul-Khairi is one such eccentric figure. Khairi’s
uncles, the famous Khairi brothers, Abdul Sattar and Jabar Khairi, were in fact Maududi’s
interlocutors. Through an intellectual and professional litigation life history of Wahab-ul-Khairi,
who has recurrently appealed to the Supreme Court regarding matters of religious, moral,
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political and judicial concern for the last three decades, I look at how the Islamist lawyers of the
Lawyers’ Movement have challenged, using the ethics of the Islamist state, and held Pakistani
state and its political elites accountable in the higher courts.

Politics by Other Means: Wahab-ul-Khairi’s Petitioning for the Nation and Islam
Wahab-ul-Khairi was active in the Rawalpindi Bar politics and had been a regular
petitioner of the higher courts for decades. He had also been involved in local politics and had
served as a councilor from his neighborhood in Rawalpindi. Khairi also ran a newspaper. When
I met him in 2015, he still had tens of Public Interest petitions pending in the Supreme Court of
Pakistan.19
Even though deeply inspired by Maududi’s reconstructive Islamist thought, Wahab-ulKhairi traced his intellectual and political genealogy back to the Indian nationalist brothers,
Jabbar and Sattar Khairi, and placed his legal activism (which he defined as a struggle by nonviolent, legal means against zulm [injustice]) in this particular genealogy of scholars and
activists who served Islam and the nationalist cause in the Subcontinent. Khairi therefore
appealed to the Islamist reformist ideas about the leadership of the Muslim nation-state;
construed his legal activism as a mode of nationalist politics; and, lastly, envisioned himself to
be ethically and politically obliged to intervene, by legal and constitutional means only, to secure
the Islamic character of the Pakistani Constitution and the nation-state against la’deeniat
(secularism).

Khairi, the Petitioner
Wahab-ul-Khairi’s chamber was situated on the ground floor of an un-plastered, twostorey house in a lower-middle-class neighborhood in Rawalpindi. Facing a public park, the
upper floor housed a primary school and a tuition center, run by Khairi’s Al-Jehad Trust, which
19

On PIL (Public Interest Litigation) in Pakistan, see Menski et al. 2000.
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he had set up in 1988. The school charged a very nominal fee and was basically set up to educate
those children from the neighborhood whose parents couldn’t afford to send them to private
schools. By the time I met Khairi (in early 2015) the school was struggling financially. Khairi’s
practice, which had been the main source of financing for the school, had dried up.
Khairi sat in the back room, at the farthest end from the entrance on the ground floor. I
made my way through broken chairs and dust-covered floor into a small office, passing by piles
of case files, briefs, stagnant under layers of dust. The glass cases surrounding Khairi’s majestic
table protected his favored case files, magazines, legal digests and books. Among all this
imposing documentation was seated the 84-year old Advocate of the Supreme Court, Wahab-ulKhairi (see Figures 9 & 10).
Khairi’s petitioning career started on April 5th, 1979, when he filed a criminal complaint
against two international journalists, Mark Tully (BBC) and Chris Sherwell (Financial Times),
under the Telegraph Act of 1885. He alleged that both journalists were guilty of “anti-Pakistan
propaganda” in their news reports (Crim. Misc. No. 4020/B 1982, 3). Khairi claimed that Tully
and Sherwell had reported “false and fabricated messages” about former Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s hanging (ibid.). According to Khairi, both had falsely attributed, “I am
innocent, God help me” to Bhutto, as his last words (ibid.), and the historical record had to be
set straight, because “both were working from India, and were acting to forward Indian spies in
Pakistan” (ibid.). The complaint had to be lodged, Khairi contended, because he couldn’t allow
history to be factitious about the “most secular and brutal ruler of Pakistan”. This intervention
into nationalist history, as Khairi imagined it, was the start of his litigation career, which would
span well over the next thirty years.
As a mode of making political demands, legal historians and scholars trace the right to
petition as far back as the early Roman Empire (Preub 2012, 2). However, in the context of
European constitutional history, the development of the right to appeal evolved around the
fourteenth century as a “common law right of appeal” (ibid.). The right to a legislative hearing

247

emerged later, during the English Civil War (1642-1651) and went on to become part of the Bill
of Rights of 1689. By the nineteenth century, petitioning had become tied to the practices and
procedures of constitutionalism and detached from its earlier practices of addressing and
referring to administrators and with its concern for jurisdiction issues (Wurgler 2001, 14).
Petitions aroused the interest of scholars, especially historians, with the subaltern turn in
historiography (Guha 1997). As more and more researchers turned toward social history to
excavate the voices of the subaltern – those forgotten in the dominant histories – historians
realized the significance of petitions in uncovering those voices in the appeals made to the state
authority in the form of petitions (Voss 2001). Petitions became one of the most fertile sites to
trace the ‘agency’ of the subaltern. Petitioning was thus identified as a “communicative practice”
through which individuals as well as collectives spoke with, appealed to, and challenged the
authority of the state (Zaret 2000, 15).
On the other hand, David Zaret argues that, with the advent of the printing press, textual
forms of petitioning gradually became the means for those in power to assess “public opinion”
(Zaret 2000, 15). The “traditional norms of secrecy” of parliamentary proceedings gave way to a
more inclusive mode of communicating with the public, one that spoke back to the political elite
regarding legislation in the parliament, in the form of petitions. Zaret argues that politics hereby
took on a “dialogical” form, as petitioning became the vehicle for constituting as well as
negotiating grievances between the parliament and the public (2000, 250).
In late eighteenth century South Asia, as the British colonial regime introduced new legal
provisions and began to establish their own judicial system, many locals turned toward
petitioning to speak to the colonial state. Earlier forms of protest and contact – destruction of
property and strikes, for example – were categorized illegal by the colonial laws, while only
respectful, non-violent and docile ways of making demands on the governing authority were
considered legitimate (Swarnalatha 2001, 109-110). Grieving collectives (such as the laborers
and weavers working for the East India Company) had to adjust their tactics of resistance and
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began to employ petitions as a means to negotiate the “procedural hierarchy” put in place to
create the distance between the rulers and the ruled (2001, 119). As the Indian legal profession
expanded and a number of lawyers entered nationalist politics, petitioning became one of the
most common non-violent practices of making social as well as political demands upon and
negotiating with the colonial state (Sharafi 2014).20
Petitioning thus has a long history in the Subcontinent and was the mode preferred by
the nationalist leaders to appeal to the colonial state (Cody 2009). Before he turned toward the
politics of civil disobedience, Barrister Mohandas Gandhi was a regular petitioner of the British
Government in South Africa and considered the practice a peaceful way of challenging the
‘unjust’ laws of the colonial state (DiSalvo 2013). His very first petition was in fact addressed to
Joseph Chamberlain – Secretary of State for the colonies (DiSalvo 2013, 108). Gandhi dissuaded
Chamberlain from approving an anti-Indian legislation, passed by the Natal legislature of South
Africa (ibid.). Like his many subsequent petitions, this one failed as well to influence the colonial
policies or laws regarding the Indians in South Africa. Charles DiSalvo suggests that Gandhi, like
other barrister-nationalists, genuinely believed in the “British fair play and equal justice” and
thought that by speaking to the colonial government in such a “polite, respectful, relatively
restrained” way, the Indians could edge closer to the colonial rulers and would eventually win, in
a peaceful and lawful manner, “Indian control of Indian affairs” (2013, xxi). The hegemony of
the British liberal notions of justice, fair play and respect for the rule of law was prevalent
among the Muslim nationalists as well. Jinnah, himself a barrister, was famous for his
admiration and respect of liberal law and adherence to non-violent politics for independence to
the very end of British rule in India.
The practice of petitioning continued into the postcolonial period, but took on new life
with the passage of the 1973 Constitution in Pakistan, which guaranteed fundamental rights.

I have discussed colonial legal profession, its development and influence on nationalist and
postcolonial politics in Chapter 3.
20
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Some activist lawyers of the time became famous for their petitions regarding political and
socio-economic issues. One such example is Advocate M.D. Tahir, who remains a legendary
figure in legal circles for his consistent petitioning of the higher courts: his petitions, according
to some senior lawyers, numbered in the thousands.21 It is important to note that once the 1973
Constitution was passed and fundamental rights guaranteed in it, the writ petition became the
judicial tool to enforce those very rights in Pakistan. Article 184(3), upon which are admitted the
majority of Khairi’s petitions too, established the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in matters
pertaining to the enforcement of fundamental rights. It reads: “184. Original Jurisdiction of
Supreme Court. - (3) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court
shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of
any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved, have the power to
make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article” (The Constitution of Pakistan
2012[1973], 234-35). Therefore, the Supreme Court can not only send various writs, it can also
issue orders for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. The majority of the Supreme
Court interventions are invited either on the basis of petitions or, as I mentioned earlier, on
courts themselves taking suo moto notices.
From the late 1980s, with the influence of the Indian Supreme Court’s turn toward
judicial activism, the Pakistani Supreme Court became more receptive towards PIL (Menski,
Alam and Raza 2000). Recently, PIL has expanded to address complex political and statecentric issues, such as the sovereignty of the nation-state, in the petitions about the U.Sconducted drone attacks and ‘the missing persons’ cases,22 in which habeas corpus petitions

Donald Black famously argued that lawyers play a key role in “legal mobilization” (1973, 126);
and the PIL is the major means through which legal mobilization takes place. In the Law and
Society literature, which has mainly focused on North American lawyers, “cause lawyering” fuels
the mobilization for rights (Sarat and Scheingold 2008, 1-7; Epp 1998).
22
Although the cases of the latter are still pending in the Court, the Peshawar High Court
recently delivered a bold ruling in the drones’ case, stating that these attacks were a “violation of
Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty, protected by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter” (Writ Petition
No. 1551-P/2012).
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have been filed to trace the whereabouts of suspected citizens in the extra-judicial custody of the
Pakistani Intelligence Agencies.23 As I discussed in earlier chapters, especially in Chapter 1, the
Supreme Court intervened in the everyday social and cultural life of Pakistanis and petitions
became one of the modes of these interventions. In short, through the petition, the state is called
upon and made answerable by the courts.
By 2015, in his petitioning career, Khairi had poised legal challenges to the corrupt
financial and political dealings of the members of parliament; highlighted the anti-Islamic
conspiracies of foreign spies as well as of a ‘heretic’ Islamic sect, the Ahmadiya; defended
Islamist Army Officers in a failed military coup; challenged rigging in the parliamentary
elections; and criticized judges’ conduct and judicial leadership. Khairi is, in fact, well-known in
the legal circles for his Al-Jehad Trust Case (PLD 1996 SC 324), as a result of which the Supreme
Court of Pakistan finally settled the procedures for the appointment of the judges. Khairi’s
petitions, which, he proudly disclosed, are always hand-written in the national language, Urdu,
can, therefore, be categorized as his challenges to the ‘corruption’ of the political and ruling elite,
under the Articles 62, 63 of the Pakistani Constitution, un-Islamic (secular encroachments
on/and) interpretations of the Constitution, and the moral conduct and appointment of the
judiciary. This list is, of course, not exhaustive of Khairi’s petitioning interests, but is largely
reflective of what he considers to be of vital importance for his jehad to hold the Pakistani state
accountable. Khairi warmly reminisced that, because of his petitioning in the higher courts, he
was once called “the old guard of the judiciary” in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Khairi regularly refers to and uses Article 2-A in his petitions, expounding upon it as a
means to tie the Islamic spirit of the nation-state to its constitutional fundamental rights. In
other words, he Islamizes fundamental rights vis-à-vis his reference to the Objective Resolution.
One of the constitutional amendments made by General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law regime
declared “principles and provisions set out in the Objective Resolution” to be a “substantive part
23

See Chapter 7.
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of the Constitution” (The Constitution of Pakistan 2012[1973] Art.2, 36-37). The Objective
Resolution was originally passed by the first legislative assembly of the newly independent state
and refers in its entirety, not only to fundamental rights (such as those of religious minorities),
but also to fundamental Islamic principles of the nation-state. The amended Article 2-A
profoundly affected the interpretation of the Constitution as many provisions of the Objectives
Resolution pertained to “the vision of a proper Islamic society and to social and economic
justice” (Alam 2000, 37).24
Nevertheless, as Khairi’s petitions make clear, the Islamization of the Pakistani state or
the public debate about its secular or Islamic nature, is far from over, and Khairi confidently
imagines his interventions directed toward saving Pakistan from becoming a ‘secular state’. In
this battle, he places himself in the reconstructivist genealogy of Islamist nationalist politics in
South Asia.
I now turn to that genealogy, by way of Khairi’s petitioning and life history.

The Khairis: A Forgotten Genealogy of Indian Mujahedeen in South Asia
Born in Delhi in 1931, Wahab-ul-Khairi also belonged to an ashrafia family, which
counted amongst its learned notables the famous Urdu novelist and reformist, Allama Rashidul-Khairi (1870-1936). Khairullah Shah, their scholarly forefather, according to Khairi, had
intellectual connections to Saudi Arabia. The Khairis were a religious, learned family and,
during the Mughal era, their members even served as imams of mosques and madrassas. His
forefathers, Khairi claimed, used to teach Mughal princes. These figures, he further claimed,
served in prestigious positions of learning (and not wealth or power) from which they could, as
many did, ‘correct’ Mughal princes and kings. By tracing the intellectual genealogy of his family,
Khairi implied a key point about the relationship between power, knowledge and the legitimacy
of those who can, nay, must challenge incompetent and unjust rulers of their time. That is, the
24
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Khairi family has remained unswervingly committed to the tradition to correct and counsel the
rulers, and Khairi’s legal activism must be viewed within this intellectual and critical tradition.
In his family of scholars, Khairi counted a few political firebrands too, and amongst
them, notable, were the lesser-known nationalist brothers of the novelist Allama Rashid-ulKhairi, Jabbar and Abdul-Sattar Khairi. Khairi proudly traced his political and intellectual
genealogy back to the Khairi brothers. He claimed his petitioning, as well as activism via AlJehad Trust, as a means of contribution to and continuation of the vision set up by the Khairi
brothers, of turning Pakistan into a real Islamic state, under a righteous leadership, and ,
moreover, of guarding the nation-state against conspiracies from without and zulm (injustice)
and ladeen’at (secularism) from within.
Wahab-ul-Khairi’s uncles, Jabbar and Sattar Khairi, were quite active, first, in the Indian
and, then, the Muslim nationalist movement, led by Jinnah’s Muslim League. The Khairi
Brothers (as the Sattar and Jabbar duo was called) spent over thirty years in exile in Turkey,
Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Germany and England. They were amongst those Indian
internationalists (also called, the Indian mujahedeen), who around the time of World War I left
India for Turkey, to actively support the Ottoman Empire. Prior to that, the brothers were first
at Al-Azhar in Cairo and then at the American University in Beirut. Most importantly, in 1917,
they attended the Socialist International Conference in Stockholm, where they circulated a
resolution, which asked for the complete independence of India and “the partition of India into a
Muslim and a Hindu India” (Pirzada 1963, 89). Wahab-ul-Khairi claimed that the idea of
partition of India took life after the Khairi brothers’ resolution started circulating globally. After
the War ended, the brothers arrived in Germany.
In Germany, the Khairi brothers published a newspaper, titled “Islam-ein Wegweiser zu
Rettung und Wiederaufbau (Islam–a signpost to salvation and reconstruction)” [Preckel 2008,
302]. Jabbar Khairi was even elected the first imam of the mosque “Islamische Gemeinde von
Berlin e.V.”, which was mostly supported by the South Asian Muslim diaspora in Berlin (ibid.).
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After the rise of Adolf Hitler, the brothers moved to England. There, they founded publications
and created networks aimed at serving Islam and Indian independence.
Maulana Maududi knew the brothers well and was in dialogue with them about setting
up an organization which would serve the cause of Islam in India. However, Maududi did not
agree with Jabbar Khairi’s stringent approach toward the role of the ultimate leader in Islam.
Jabbar Khairi argued that the ameer (head) of the jamat (organization) must be an “ameer-emutliq” (total or absolute leader) [Akhter 48]. Although Maududi envisioned his Islamic state to
be a powerful, centralized state, shura (advising and consultation) was central to how he
imagined such a state would be led.25 Maududi’s Islamic state sought “to mold every aspect of
life and activity … In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and
private” (Maududi 1961, 146), and even though every Muslim is a caliph of God, Maududi
argued, they must “delegate their caliphate” to the one who would then be “answerable to God
on the one hand and on the other to his fellow ‘caliphs’ who have delegated their authority to
him” (1961, 151). However, the caliph can’t act as a total ruler, because “if he raises himself to the
position of an irresponsible absolute ruler … a dictator, he assumes the character of an usurper
rather than a caliph, because dictatorship is the negation of popular vicegerency” (ibid.) Wahabul-Khairi’s ideas about the leadership of his Al-Jehad Trust, as a Raees-ul-Mujahedeen
(Commander of the faithful fighters), are deeply influenced by the Khairi Brothers’, rather than
Maududi’s, definition of who must lead Muslims in their jehad against injustice and an unjust
state.
After 33 years in exile, the Khairi Brothers finally returned to India in 1937 and started a
monthly, Spirit of the Time. Moreover, Sattar Khairi joined Jinnah’s All India Muslim League
and returned to Aligarh University to teach German and French languages. Owing to his past
affinities with the Germans, he was imprisoned by the colonial state at the start of World War II.

General Zia amended the Constitution to term the parliament, Majlis-e-Shura (assembly of
advice and consultation).
25
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Wahab-ul-Khairi claimed political and intellectual mentorship of the Khairi Brothers to
carry forth their ideological mantle and was profoundly influenced by the ideological genealogy
of these international jehadists. His Al-Jehad Trust openly outlined Islamic injunctions against
zulm and injustice in Pakistani society and state. “Insaaf [justice] is necessary to rule justly”,
Khairi quoted Ali (the Prophet’s son-in-law and the Fourth Caliph of Islam). So Khairi had to
wage his struggle, he explained, because “those, who witness zulm, and stay silent, they are
indeed complicit in that zulm, no matter how powerful zalim might be”.

Khairi’s Al-Jehad Trust and Petitioning for/Against the State
On January 16th, 2012, Wahab-ul-Khairi filed a constitutional petition in the Supreme
Court against the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari (Const. P. No. NIL/2012-SCJ). Khairi
contended that Zardari, his Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, and most of Gilani’s cabinet
must be removed from office on the charges of ‘corruption’. He prayed that the Court declare
them ineligible to hold public office on moral grounds: they were all dishonest, zalim,
untrustworthy and corrupt. He then referenced Articles 62 and 63 – along with a number of
others, regarding the violation of his Fundamental Rights – which delineated the criteria for
eligibility to stand for public office. In his petition, Khairi quoted the qualifications for the
membership of Parliament, which according to him, the current President, Prime Minister and
his ministers all failed to meet. These Articles concerned the “moral character” of the members
of Parliament and were referenced by JI activists, Zubair Khan and Kashif Chaudhry, too. Khairi
contended that Zardari and Gilani failed the provisions, which stated that a member of the
Parliament must be of “(d) good character and is not commonly known as one who violated
Islamic Injunctions; (e) has adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings and practices obligatory
duties prescribed by Islam as well as abstains from major sins; (f) is sagacious, righteous, nonprofligate, honest and ameen (honest)” (The Constitution of Pakistan 2012[1973], 97-98). Recall
that Maududi envisaged a “righteous group” of Muslims to run the Islamic state (1961, 102), and
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so Khairi, similarly, argued that those who lead the state must be of the highest moral character
and free of corruption and Western cultural influence.
In his petition, Khairi called President Zardari and his political lackeys zalim, and a
zalim can’t be counted amongst the ulul-amr because, as he explained to me, “zalim is that
person, who doesn’t act according to what Allah has asked of us in the Quran and Sunnah; [and
referring to the judges, Khairi continued] those who don’t decide according to His commands
are zalim too. And if you don’t judge according to the Quran, according to what Allah demands
and desires, then you are not an ulul-amr”. These ethical demands work at the level of the
individual – for Khairi’s self-definition and his personal moral orientation – who he considers a
Muslim, as well as, they establish moral codes, according to which the actions of the rulers and
the powerful figures (such as judges) in an Islamic society are judged.
The petition was signed by “Raees-ul-Mujahedeen” Wahab-ul-Khairi of Al-Jehad Trust.
Khairi declared in the petition that Al-Jehad Trust was a welfare organization, established to
wage jehad against zulm (Const.P. No. NIL/2012-SCJ:02). Khairi had founded Al-Jehad Trust
in 1988. Seven professional middle-class men and women became the first mujaheds and
mujahedas of the Trust. Among these were included an engineer, a well-known Islamist fiction
writer, a couple of lawyers, and a mid-level landowner. According to the Memorandum of
Association, the Trust was established to fight against injustice in the society and to aid the
powerless and the socio-economically vulnerable (The Memorandum 1991, 1). Khairi donated
his house, two cars, printing presses and library to the Trust and agreed to take only a stipend
for his living expenses. The members agreed to approach and petition the courts for the rights of
the marginalized of the society. The Memorandum went on to declare that the Trust shall be
used to establish schools, libraries and other sites for increasing the awareness of the common
man regarding his rights, and ended with a pledge to restore the sovereignty of Allah by
mobilizing mass movements (ibid.). All mujaheds vowed to make Pakistan a ‘pure’ Islamic state.
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Pakistan ka Matlab Kiya: Islam Ya La’deeniat?26
In her recent work on Islam in Pakistan, Muslim Becoming: Aspiration and Skepticism
in Pakistan (2012), Naveeda Khan asks us to pay close attention to everyday practices and
debates that Pakistanis engage in regarding Islam. She correctly points out that, since Partition,
Pakistanis have failed to achieve consensus on Islam. Aspirations, self-perfecting routines, and
doubts and skepticism(s) define the practices and debates around un-consensus on Islam in
Pakistan (Khan 2012, 8-17). However, Khan disregards how ‘the state’ centers in these debates
and practices. The everyday practices, for example of salat [daily prayers], as I mentioned
earlier, came under the scrutiny of the military state (under JI-influenced) General Zia.
Recently, blasphemy has emerged as another site of disciplining the everyday questions and
contestations about Islam and to censor any critique of the military and intelligence apparatus
on social media.27 The state has remained central to the discussions and arguments over Islam
in Pakistan; what I have called ‘the cultural politics of the state’, engaged in by the lawyers,
Islamists and traditional middle-class, are also directed at the Pakistani state. As I have argued
throughout this dissertation, everyday political practices, humiliations and encounters with ‘the
state’ shape Pakistanis as political Muslim subjects and affect their recruitment into protest
movements. Khairi’s Bar activism and petitioning is part of these encounters and contestations
as well, which, however, engages the state on Islam from the site of constitutional politics.
In his petitions, Advocate Wahab-ul-Khairi liberally references those constitutional
articles which clearly define the Pakistani state in Islamic terms. For example, in the petition
filed against the Eighteenth Amendment28 in 2010, he referred to Articles 2-A, 227, and 230(4)
of the Constitution, arguing that according to these, “Pakistan is an Islamic Republic; that its

What is the meaning of Pakistan: Islam or Secularism?
A number of activists, who are publicly identified as ‘liberals’, were ‘disappeared’ and
blasphemy allegations made against them. See Hashim 2017.
28
Khairi argued in his petition that the 18th Amendment was passed to allow Nawaz Sharif
(former Prime Minister of Pakistan) run for a third time for the Prime Ministership (Const. P.
No. 31/2010).
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state religion is Islam; that Parliament cannot legislate against the principles set out in Quran
and Sunnah; and that the immoral rulers haven’t yet followed the Islamic injunctions set in the
Constitution to re-evaluate laws in Pakistan” (C.P. No. 31/2010, 2). Further chastising the
parliamentarians, he reminded the Court of the oath that the legislators took, which he quoted
in verbatim: “That I will strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation
of Pakistan” (Const. P. No. 31/2010, 3). In the same petition, Khairi went on to pray to the Court
that Dr. Jabbar and Sattar Khairi’s resolutions at the Stockholm Socialist International and
other writings be admitted to truly grasp the meaning of the Pakistan Movement and what
Jinnah had desired Pakistan to be, that is, a total Islamic state (ibid.).
Wahab-ul-Khairi had safely archived the Khairi Brothers’ correspondence with Jinnah
and he showed me some of those letters. One such exchange took place during 1941. On 19 th
September 1941, M. A. Jinnah wrote a reply to Dr. Jabbar Khairi. Jabbar Khairi had sought
Jinnah’s assistance in freeing his brother, Sattar Khairi, from Jhansi Jail in his previous letter.
Jinnah wrote that while he was “fully alive” to Sattar’s case, he was unable to give “any good
news” (1941). Along with requesting Jinnah to intercede with the colonial state on his brother’s
behalf, Jabbar Khairi, in his previous letters, had also advised Jinnah about, and presented his
ideas on, the nature of the Muslim independence movement in India and the nation-state that
might, in future, be born as a result of that struggle.
In his letters to Jinnah, while addressing him as “the chosen one” to lead the Indian
Muslims, Jabbar Khairi, nonetheless, candidly directed Jinnah on what is in fact needed for if
the Muslims were to succeed in achieving statehood. He wrote:
Muslims cannot be united if they don’t agree to certain basal [sic] facts of Islam. It is
their united convictions on vital questions that unite them solidly.
It is very necessary that Muslims take & attach themselves strongly to a single leader
who of course must himself be a true Muslim in order to lead them according to the
principles and aims of Islam.
Laws made by men can be destroyed by men. Laws made by men or man to rule over
men are always faulty. It is Islam only that abolishes rule of men or man on men. The
cry of Islam is:- Rule of Allah, through the caliph of Allah, for the people of Allah. There
are, of course, ways and means to adapt the eternal law of Islam to the modern
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constitution. Through the proper channels established also through the same eternal
laws. In glorium at infinitum [sic].
(Khairi September 17th, 1941, italics added)
Aimed at Jinnah, Jabbar Khairi hinted at what it entailed to lead Indian Muslims toward
independence – not only that all Muslims must unite under a single leader, but also that he has
to be the one who knows what Islam truly demands from those who claim its leadership. Ethical
uprightness is never far from the Khairi Brothers’ nationalist vision of the leadership of the
nation-state. The same ideological attachment to principles of moral uprightness is present in
Wahab-ul-Khairi’s critique of the political leadership of Pakistan. He is ruthless in his criticism
of the moral shortcomings of not only politicians, but also some members of the higher
judiciary. He has, in fact, been declared in contempt by the Courts on a number of occasions.29
Jabbar Khairi, moreover, proposed that Islamic state must be led, as Maududi had
argued too, under Allah’s sovereignty and not of men. Thus, Jabbar obviated any nationalist
inclinations toward a democratic state, based on popular sovereignty. Wahab-ul-Khairi
extended his jehad against such secular claims too and called the ‘secularists’ “la’deen” – a term
used to pejoratively characterize ‘modern’, non-practicing Muslims or anyone who is identified
as a ‘liberal’ in Pakistan – and which can be translated as: absence of religion or those without
deen [religion]. Khairi extended its meaning further and applied it in defining the nature of the
Pakistani state and those who are supposedly its enemies, conspiring against it from within. He
stated, “the la’deen are no doubt Indian agents, who never wished for Pakistan to come into
existence”. Following Jabbar Khairi’s advice to Jinnah and the emphasis on the Islamic nature
of the legal regime of the nation-state, Wahab-ul-Khairi argued, “our laws must be Islamic,
because our Constitution is; just look at the Articles 1, 2, 20, 227, 230, and 26b”. “Pakistan was
founded”, he exclaimed, “solely on Pakistan ka matlab kiya, La ila ha ilallah [What does
Pakistan mean, there is no God but Allah]”. In the previous chapter on youth and student

Khairi openly published reports on Lahore High Court’s judge extra-marital affair in his
newspaper, Nida-e-Haq (the cry of the just/truth), in 1994.
29
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activists, I have argued that the leftist activists and students raised counter slogans against this
Islamist rendering of the state in the protests during the Lawyers’ Movement.
Post-Independence, ‘secularism’ was made the Other of/in the nascent Muslim nationstate.30 Intellectuals fought on the cultural terrain of the nation, struggling to define the identity
of the state. Maududi and the JI had, early on, recognized culture as the terrain of postcolonial
politics and the state as central to the contestations about Islam on it. In his jehad, Khairi stays
intellectually closer to the JI, as both equate Communists (the ‘Indian agents’) and Ahmadiya –
the Other of the postcolonial Muslims – as la’deen or secularists and outside the ideological
borders of the nation-state. However, both, the Khairis and Maududi saw the modern state and
its forms of rule as compatible with Islam to achieve a total Islamic state. If Jabbar Khairi
proposed that Muslims must be ruled by the laws of Allah – even though he allowed that these
laws could take modern constitutional form – Wahab-ul-Khairi extended his emphasis on the
nature of the nation’s laws and Constitution by imagining the latter as carrying the
gemeinschaft, the mystical, transcendental binding force, which may ultimately bring the nation
together under the leadership of the ethically righteous. He argued, “We have had many
constitutions, but it’s the ideology of Islam that binds us together as a nation within the
Constitution. Otherwise why did we separate from India and broken apart Bharat Mata?”
(emphasis added). Similarly, for Maududi, it was imperative that the postcolonial state of
Pakistan be built upon Islamic law and constitution, and “if instead of an Islamic, a secular and
Godless Constitution was to be introduced, and if instead of Islamic Shari’ah, the British Civil
and Criminal Procedure Codes had to be enforced, what was the sense in all this struggle for a
separate Muslim homeland?” (Maududi 1961, 43).
Same as Jabbar Khairi and Maulana Maududi, Wahab-ul-Khairi doesn’t see any
contradiction inherent in the relationship between the modern constitutional state and law and
Allah’s sovereignty which those laws must express and protect. “Allah’s hakmeat
30

On secularism, see Asad 1993 and Asad et al. 2009.
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[rule/sovereignty]”, he argued, “can only be imposed through the laws, through the Courts”
because “Islam ka doosra naam insaaf hai [Justice is Islam’s second name]. No insaaf means
no Islam and no hakmeat-e-alla”. Islam and the modern constitutional state are, then, totally
compatible, and it is through the modern state that postcolonial Pakistan can be turned into a
modern Islamic nation-state.
In the process of Khairi’s successive legal interventions and petitions, a particular
Islamist nationalist ideology, with the aim of keeping alive an unfulfilled project from the past, is
continuously reproduced. This historical project was given a nationalist color by Maulana
Maududi and Khairi Brothers, but it was their forefathers, who, before them had laid the
foundations of a nationalist imaginary through challenging and reforming the last of the Mughal
rulers. The Khairi Brothers continued this transcendental struggle with Jinnah, the leader of
Indian Muslims. Wahab-ul-Khairi’s legal subjectivity is thus historically anchored, referring to
and fashioned by – as he construes his actions and imagines himself partaking in – this
transcendental nationalist imaginary, in an ongoing struggle in which he continues to fight off
conspiracies against Islam in postcolonial Pakistan.

Conclusion
Islamist cultural and political critique emerged from a minority amongst the middleclass ashrafia, who were dissatisfied with the nationalist response to colonial modernity and
engaged in the politics of self-expression and identity (Daechsel 2013). But after Partition,
Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami grew influential among the professionals, the urban migrants, the
bazaaris and the lower bureaucrats, who were equally dissatisfied with the postcolonial state
and the ruling class of Generals, bureaucrats and landowners which it had inherited. These
classes supported the movement to restore the higher judiciary and the lawyers’ historic bloc
against General Musharraf. They had become willing allies of the lawyers in the cultural politics
of the state, as many entered the legal profession from these classes too. They had emerged to
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support lawyers from a civil society, which over the years had inched closer to the state and the
project of its Islamization.
The rule of law provided a political site of mobilization and protest for Islamists as well
as for ‘liberal, secularists’ to peacefully come together, under the lawyers’ leadership. They all
shared the belief in the power of the modern state and law to reform, transform and govern the
society. Their politics were centered on, and aimed at, reformulating the Pakistani state,
according to their own political desires. They shared the disgust over the failure of the
postcolonial ruling elite, which the emotional masses usually send to the parliament through
their vote. Both the Pakistani urban, educated civil society and the Islamists share the
skepticism about the intellectual capacity of aam admi, as a ‘rational’ political agent. Even
though both disagree on the nature of the state and the legal form that the state must adapt,
both assume that the masses can easily be swayed by their passions and emotions and need to
be governed, for their own welfare and education, by the means of law and the modern state.31
In the next chapters, I look at how the rights activists and families of ‘the disappeared
persons’ have petitioned the higher courts; how they hold the state accountable in name of the
rule of law; and how these ordinary Pakistanis have learned to master judicial forms of
performance and documentation in the courts.

31

See Chapters 2 & 7.
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Figure 8. Outside the Jamaat’s Islamabad office. Photograph by the author.

Figure 9. Outside the Jamaat’s Islamabad Office II. Photograph by the author.

263

Figure 10. The Office of Wahab-ul-Khairi, Rawalpindi. Photograph by the author.

Figure 11. Khairi at Work. Photograph by the author.
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CHAPTER 7
The ‘Missing Persons Cases: The Rule of Law Against the State
We were part and parcel of the Lawyers’ Movement for two years, and, with the lawyers, we
faced all kinds of hardships. We were on the streets, facing extremes of weather; we marched
with the lawyers, to restore an independent and fair judiciary, but we are still waiting to receive
justice.
~ Amina Masood Janjua, Chairperson DHRP
When you learn [about the abduction], that your husband has disappeared, you don’t know what
to do. You feel helpless; you feel lost as a mad dog; you run after hope. The Supreme Court is my
last hope.
~ Asifa (Husband missing since October 2013)
The Supreme Court’s intervention in the Enforced disappearance cases proved to be one of the
major provocations felt by Musharraf’s military regime, which retaliated by suspending Chief
Justice Chaudhry in March and then, again, in November 2007. These cases continued after
Chaudhry’s restoration and became a site of “war of position” against the powerful military
(Gramsci 2000, 224). As these cases stretched over many years – during which the Supreme
Court gradually entrenched itself – the petitioners (as well as some of the judges themselves)
turned the courts into an arena of conflict, as public sites of humiliation, protest and resistance
against the state’s security apparatus (Grossberg 1994, 154). In other words, the courtroom
became a site of struggle over rights and limits of judicial authority between the Supreme Court,
the military and its intelligence services, and the claimants and families of the missing persons.
More importantly, the courtroom became a public site for the “contests over the meaning and
application of law”, that is, of the fundamental human rights of the missing persons and the
substance and application of the rule of law by the courts (Grossberg 1994, 154).
In this chapter, I will discuss the Supreme Court’s intervention in the cases of the
‘missing persons’ – suspected Islamic militants and nationalists and their sympathizers,
disappeared by the military and intelligence agencies; how the Court publicly humiliated and
threatened the state’s civilian bureaucracy with the contempt of court, while cautiously

challenging the powerful security and intelligence apparatus; how the Court struggled to bring
the latter under its jurisdiction by invoking the rule of law and due process; and by using the
writ of habeas corpus, how the Supreme Court extended its jurisdiction over areas of uneven
legal development, across the nation-state. Moreover, this chapter and the next one will also
show what are the material forms in which the contestability of law takes place and how the
socially and politically marginalized men and women challenge dominant “coercive structures”
(Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994, 1, 13).
The chapter will ethnographically examine the activism of the families and activists,
organized under DHRP (Defense of Human Rights Pakistan), set up by a resilient woman,
Amina Masood Janjua, whose husband has been missing since 2005. Janjua also led the
families of the missing persons and other activists in the protests of the Lawyers’ Movement.
Janjua’s petition and the Court’s suo moto notice on her case, launched enforced disappearances
cases and the legal and protest activism against them in the country. I conclude the chapter by
ethnographically examining the activism of the claimants and activists in the missing persons
cases, their narratives, how they have learned to use the “law against the state” and the limits of
their protests and litigation (Eckert et al. 2012, 1).

The Supreme Court Intervenes in Masood Janjua’s Case and the Activism Against
Enforced Disappearances Begins
The enforced disappearances cases concerned missing of hundreds of men, allegedly
abducted by the state’s military and intelligence services in the country’s so-called ‘war on
terror’ and in the ongoing brutal suppression of separatist and nationalist movements in the
provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. The Supreme Court, under Chaudhry, admitted the
petitions of their family members and demanded the state to produce the missing persons in the
court. This provocation irked the military and intelligence apparatus to the extent that it became
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one of the main charges for the dismissal of Chaudhry and the subsequent imposition of
Emergency in November 2007.
Most Pakistanis were aware that the impending Presidential election and challenges to
General Musharraf’s candidacy, because of his holding of both the offices of Chief of the Army
Staff and the President, pending in the Supreme Court, had become consequential threats for
the General. Nevertheless, the proclamation of Emergency repeatedly cited ‘terrorist’ threats
and held the higher judiciary responsible for their exacerbation. The proclamation read thus:
Whereas some members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the
executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism thereby
weakening the government and the nation’s resolve diluting the efficacy of its actions to
control this menace; …
Whereas constant interference in executive functions, including but not limited to the
control of terrorist activity, economic policy, price controls, downsizing of corporations
and urban planning, has weakened the writ of the government; the police force has been
completely demoralized and is fast losing its efficacy to fight terrorism and intelligence
agencies have been thwarted in their activities and prevented from pursuing terrorists;
Whereas some hard core militants, extremists, terrorists and suicide bombers, who
were arrested and being investigated were ordered to be released. The persons so
released have subsequently been involved in heinous terrorist activities, resulting in
loss of human life and property. Militants across the country have, thus, been
encouraged while law enforcement agencies subdued; …
Whereas the humiliating treatment meted out to government officials by some
members of the judiciary on a routine basis during court proceedings has
demoralized the civil bureaucracy and senior government functionaries, to avoid
being harassed, prefer inaction; …
Whereas a situation has thus arisen where the government of the country cannot be
carried on in accordance with the constitution and as the constitution provides no
solution for this situation, there is no way out except through emergent and
extraordinary measures. (BBC News, Text of Pakistan Emergency 2007, emphasis
added)
The Supreme Court had been hearing the missing persons’ cases since 2005. The person who
first brought these cases to the Court against the state was Amina Masood Janjua.
I first met Amina in June 2012 in Rawalpindi. A charismatic short woman in her lateforties, Amina, wearing traditional shalwar qameez1 and a head scarf, appeared calm, but
determined. Her husband, Masood Janjua, who had left for Peshawar on a tablegi (dawa’h) trip

1

A long shirt and a loose trouser, commonly worn by men and women in Pakistan.
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with a friend (Faisal Faraz), had been missing since July 7th, 2005. Masood and Faraz apparently
were taken away, while enroute to Peshawar, by the men from the intelligence services. After
failing to recruit the help of the law-enforcement apparatus to trace Masood Janjua, Amina,
first, filed a petition in the Supreme Court and by 2006, had set up the Defense for Human
Rights Pakistan (DHRP) to support, organize and mobilize the families of the constantly
increasing missing persons for protests as well litigation in the higher courts.2
Under the title ‘Manhunt’, General Musharraf proudly admits in his autobiography, In
the Line of Fire (2008), that after September 11, 2001, his government arrested and transferred
369 suspected militants over to the U.S. government, earning millions of dollars of bounties
(2008, 237). Many of those disappeared by the military and secret agencies in Pakistan are
suspected to have been handed over to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In fact, one of the
missing persons, who was released by the Pakistani intelligence agencies, after being tortured
for months, revealed to Amina Janjua that, while imprisoned, he was often interrogated by
gorras (a term commonly used for persons of Western origin in Pakistan) in English. The
phenomenon of enforced disappearances therefore (re)emerged in Pakistan as the U.S.
government sternly demanded, soon after September 11, 2001, that Pakistan arrest and extradite
‘terror’ suspects (Rashid 2009).3 The “good Muslims” of the Cold War, the CIA-funded and
trained jehadis, who had fought in Afghanistan, were now identified as a threat in the state’s
registers. Many of the good Muslims of the past found themselves caught unaware by a new
wave of geopolitical violence that took over South and Central Asia (Mamdani 2004).
Along with suspected Islamic militants,4 among the disappeared can be counted many
engaged in the nationalist separatist movements in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sind as

2

Both ‘missing persons’ and ‘enforced disappearances’ are terms used by activists and family
members of the disappeared.
3 Disappearance of political activists had taken place in the past as well.
4 The state completely refuses to admit its role in disappearances of suspected Islamist militants
because some of these terror ‘suspects’, arrested by the Pakistani security agencies, or in joint
operations with the Americans, have ended up in prisons in either Bagram Air Base in
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well.5 The count of the disappeared in both of these provinces now runs in thousands. These
numbers do not include over two thousand cases of the missing persons, mostly belonging to
N.W.F.P (renamed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK in 2010) and Punjab, that are recorded by
the DHRP. By August 2016, 2330 cases of enforced disappearances had been registered by
DHRP. Together, DHRP and the families of the disappeared, have petitioned the higher courts,
protested outside the Supreme Court and the Parliament, and organized sit-ins (see fig.2).
Janjua claimed that only about 144 missing persons have been traced so far to the internment
centers (controlled by the Army) in the KPK province, FATA (Federally Administered Territorial
Areas) and PATA (Provincially Administered Territorial Areas). The Interior Minister himself
confirmed that there are about 45 internment centers operating across the country. Out of the
total missing, according to Janjua, 49 have expired in the military’s custody so far and their
dead bodies have been handed over to their families.
Amina’s husband, Masood Janjua, went missing on July 30th, 2005. According to his
parents, he had visited Bannu (and perhaps other towns of the KPK province) for tableghi
training before, but on the 30th, he didn’t even reach Peshawar. After Janjua approached the
Supreme Court, the proceedings started on December 20th, 2005. She claimed that Masood was

Afghanistan, CIA-run rendition sites in the Eastern Europe, or at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, have alleged, based on the
testimonies of those who were released from these prisons, that the suspects held there have
routinely been tortured. One of the disappeared, Muhammad Saad Iqbal (from Lahore,
Pakistan) confirms that he was indeed severely tortured, while imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay
for over five years (See The Rendition Project).
5 The Communist, Baluch and Sindhi activists have faced excessive state violence and
disappearances for decades in Pakistan. The Communist challenge was recognized and brutally
repressed by the Pakistani state in its formative years. The Baluch and Sindhi nationalist
movements have different historical trajectories though. The Baluch have been demanding
autonomy since independence of Pakistan. In fact, it was Jinnah himself who coerced the Baluch
princely state of Qalaat to join Pakistan. Movements for autonomy in Baluchistan, since General
Musharraf’s rule, have radicalized to demand for secession from Pakistan. Sindhi nationalist
movements gained momentum after the hanging of a Sindhi Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, by the military in 1977. The Army violently suppressed the movement for the restoration
of democracy (MRD) that was mainly centered and led by the Sindhi political, student and labor
leadership in 1983. Enforced disappearances and killings of Sindhi nationalist figures and
workers continues.
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in the custody of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Amina, in fact, alleged that he and Faraz
had been spotted in Peshawar and were held by the ISI there.
During the next two years of proceedings in the enforced disappearances cases in the
Supreme Court, the number of the missing persons continued to rise. Advocate Asma Jehangir
(a well-known human rights activist and a leading lawyer of the Lawyers’ Movement)6 and other
lawyers for the HRCP (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan) approached the Court on behalf
of the missing persons’ families too. They appeared mostly on behalf of the missing Baluch and
Sindhi nationalists. Janjua and her DHRP were mainly (and continue to be) approached, she
claimed, by the families of the missing persons from the KPK and Punjab, and most of these
missing men seem to have been picked up by the Army and its intelligence agencies, in the
context of military campaigns against ‘Islamic terrorism’. Many have been reported to have been
detained at the check posts or during sweep operations of neighborhoods in the areas of military
operations (such as Swat Valley, KPK) against various factions of Pakistani Taliban and multiple
other militant groups.
As these cases continued to accumulate in the Supreme Court, the vexed judges pushed
the Interior and Defense Ministries to trace the missing men. By January 18th, 2006, the
government claimed, out of the total 41 missing, 25 had been traced, while 16 remained missing.
Janjua contested these numbers and alleged that only 18 were traced and 23 were still missing.
The HRCP list, presented on February 2nd, 2007, claimed 198 missing in total, while 99 traced,
16 in prison, and 83 released. While these contestations over the exact numbers and location of
the disappeared persons continued to take place in the Supreme Court, on March 9th, 2007,
General Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Chaudhry on charges of misuse of powers of the
Chief Justice’s office and sent a reference against him to the Supreme Judicial Council.7

6
7

See Chapter 2 & 3, on lawyers.
See Chapter 1.
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The Chief Justice Returns and the Missing Persons’ Cases Continue
As I have discussed above, Iftikhar Chaudhry’s dismissal was protested by the lawyers
and their bar associations across the country. Janjua and her organization, the DHRP, the
families of the missing persons and activists joined the protesting lawyers and civil society and
political activists too. They were, in fact, amongst the first ones to join lawyers outside the
Supreme Court, soon after Chaudhry’s suspension. On July 20th, 2007, fellow judges reinstated
Chaudhry. This was to be a rare, albeit short lived, triumph of the Supreme Court over the
powerful military. However, the restoration emboldened Chaudhry and soon after his return to
Court No. 1, he restarted presiding over the enforced disappearance cases.
In Chief Justice Chaudhry’s forced absence, Amina Janjua had challenged the state’s
stubborn and callous silence in her husband’s disappearance by requesting the court to produce
Dr. Imran Munir and his personal diary.8 Munir was in the Army’s custody and was facing court
martial on spying charges. His uncle claimed to have met him in a meeting arranged by two
Army Majors at the Chaklala Cantonment. The state prosecutors admitted in the court that Dr.
Munir was under arrest on allegations of spying for “foreign elements” and was currently “facing
court field marshal general” (HRC 965/2005, 3).
In its proceedings on June 20th, 2007, the Court threatened to charge the Secretaries of
Defense and Interior with contempt of court, if they failed to stop the military proceedings
against Munir and produce him in the Court. Contempt powers have often been used by the
higher courts to enforce their jurisdiction and consolidate their authority against the state and
its bureaucracy (Nair 2004). Recall that these proceedings were taking place in the period prior
to the Chief Justice’s second dismissal. The higher judiciary (as I discussed in Chapter 1) was
increasingly interjecting itself into matters to do with fundamental rights and public interest.
The court was incensed to learn that, despite its orders, Munir had been sentenced to eight years

Munir had allegedly kept a personal diary in detention and had recorded details about Masood
in his diary and also confided in his lawyer about him.
8
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in prison for the charges he faced by a military Court. The Court was annoyed over the
illegitimacy awarded to its proceedings by denying jurisdiction by the military. The judges
ordered the Secretaries to produce Munir along with the proceedings of his court martial.
The Supreme Court held the state accountable for the disappearances, on the account of
the violation of the rule of law, which, for the judges, entailed not only following procedural law
in placing these men under arrest and producing them in the courts (and thereby surrendering
them to the civilian courts’ jurisdiction), but also a violation of the missing’s fundamental
human rights. The petitions against disappearances were always filed by the claimants and
activists on grounds of violating the human and constitutional rights of the missing persons. It is
important to note here that the civilian bureaucracy had to respond to the Supreme Court in the
missing persons cases and often faced judges’ ire over their incompetence, ignorance (about the
events of the disappearances) and helplessness in tracing, let alone returning, the missing
persons. In his proclamation of Emergency, General Musharraf referred to the disparaging way
in which the higher judiciary publicly reprimanded senior bureaucrats in the Supreme Court
and how its interference demoralized the ‘public servants’ of the state.
On August 20th, 2007, the Court was informed that Dr. Imran Munir was on his way
from Mangala Cantonment and would be produced the next day in the court. Dr. Munir made
his appearance on the next hearing but was ordered to be transferred to a local hospital to
receive treatment. The Court, once again, was fuming because of Munir’s confinement at Adiala
Jail, contrary to its ruling about him. He, like many others who had returned from the military’s
custody, was too sick and broken to testify in the court and was therefore transferred to the
hospital. As the court learnt about his improving health, Munir’s stay at the hospital was
extended. However, Munir’s appearance reaffirmed (for the judges and the families and the
activists) that the military and the intelligence agencies were indeed holding people without
charges. The Court addressed the Secretary of Defense and questioned his previous assertions:
there is “sufficient evidence available on the record to the effect that prima facie missing persons
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are under custody of agencies including the ISI, MI or IB” (HRC 965/2005, 1-2).9 In the next few
hearings, Imran Munir’s hospital stay was further extended, while additional cases of the
missing persons were presented in the Court.
In the same hearing (on August 20th), the Court ordered Director General FIA (Federal
Investigations Agency) Tariq Pervaiz to produce Hafiz Abdul Basit in the court or face jail.
Pervaiz was the Additional Inspector General Police of Punjab at the time of Basit’s arrest and
his transfer to military Intelligence in 2004. The Chief Justice directly held Pervaiz, a senior
civilian bureaucrat, responsible for Basit’s extra-judicial detention by the military. Exasperated,
Pervaiz left the Court multiple times but returned without any further information about Basit
(Amnesty 2008, 24). In the same hearing, Attorney General Malik M. Qayyum told the Court
that he had recently received information about a man who might be Basit, interned in Khyber
Agency (in FATA, Federally Administered Tribal Areas), in the custody of the Political Agent.10
The following day, August 21st, Qayyum confirmed to the Court that Basit was indeed in the
custody of Khyber Agency’s Political Agent and would be transported to Islamabad soon.
Chaudhry reprimanded Qayyum and asked Basit to be brought to FIA’s office before 8.00 pm.
Basit was released the same night (ibid.)
In the hearing on October 5th 2007, the Secretaries of Interior and Defense, representing
the state, appeared before Chief Justice Chaudhry. Chaudhry, frustrated because of the
obtrusiveness shown by the intelligence agencies in the missing persons cases, demanded that
the state respond to the Court responsibly and trace the missing persons. He asked the
Secretaries to question the chiefs of intelligence agencies. He ordered them to recover all the
missing persons by October 11th. On the Interior Secretary’s suggestion that the provincial
As I discussed in the earlier chapters, these secret agencies, MI (military intelligence), ISI
(inter-services intelligence) and IB (intelligence bureau), and their chiefs had been involved in
Chief Justice’s detention by Musharraf and his humiliation as well.
10
Following colonial system of administering border territories, FATA is still managed by the
Central government through its appointed Political Agent, who, again, similar to the colonial
laws, represents both judicial as well as administrative authority of the state and can pass
sentences as well.
9
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governments should be answerable in these disappearances and not the Federal, Chaudhry
responded, “Police say that these people were not lifted by them and that they are in the custody
of federal agencies. If the Defense Secretary says he cannot do anything we will summon the
heads of intelligence agencies. Uniformed generals of ISI and MI will be standing here and
[be] questioned”. (Amnesty 2008, 24, italics added). He further told the secretaries that there
was evidence that the disappeared persons were detained by the intelligence agencies and that
those responsible for their “illegal custody” would be charged by the Court (ibid.)
This was a direct challenge, however, formulated in the language of the rule of law, from
the Supreme Court to the GHQ (General Head Quarters of Pakistan Army) and the subservient
civilian bureaucracy serving its interests. Hinting at the state necessity of holding the rule of law,
the Chief Justice stated: “The court could not abdicate its responsibility of protecting
fundamental rights of the people as guaranteed in the Constitution … The court did not want to
take any extreme step but if it was forced to do so, the responsibility would lie on the
government. If we abrogate the whole system, these agencies will be free to do anything. The
people will not come to us. They will decide things in streets” (Dawn 2007, italics added). By
holding the state’s security apparatus accountable for the disappearances, the courts were also
extending their reach over, and, in the process, addressing, the uneven legal development across
the nation-state.
In his historical review of the writ of habeas corpus, Paul Halliday has exaimned how
habeas corpus became an “instrument of judicial power” in the British Empire (2010, 14). He
argues that the judges who made use of the writ were more concerned about the “wrongs
committed” in the King’s name, rather than the rights of the detained (2010, 34). The judges
made habeas corpus a tool of judicial power, but in the process of consolidating that power,
“bounded the empire together” by extending the judicial reach through the use of the writ (2010,
262-3). A new “jurisdictional geography” of the empire took life because of the binding together
of many of the royal domains through habeas corpus (Halliday 2010, 267). By exercising the
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writ, the courts bounded together new subjects, boundaries and objects and brought them under
the protection of one King.
Exercising of judicial authority establishes the state’s sovereignty over bodies even at its
spatial margins – considered ‘unruly’, violent and hidden from its reach.11 Those at these
margins often exist under customary, non-liberal, normative orders and, subsequently, under
competing, such as tribal or religious, sovereignties as well. By claiming to enforce the rule of
law, the higher courts addressed the uneven reach and influence of the courts across the state.
By taking up enforced disappearance cases, new legal subjects and jurisdictions were brought
into the judicial orbit. The courts challenged state violence, carried out in the name of exception
and emergency and, in the process, extended, albeit frugally, its jurisdiction to regions (such as
FATA and PATA) and institutions (such as the military and civilian bureaucracy) – considered
exceptional and beyond its authority; it brought new subjects (such as claimants from the ‘tribal
zone’ in the missing persons cases) under its hegemony. I examine how the legal topography of
enforced disappearances is disclosed and legal subjects formed in the encounter of claimants in
the missing persons cases in the last section of the chapter.
On October 11th, the Court learnt of Ansar Ali, who had disappeared on July 1st, 2004.
The Court was informed that he had been released and was given into the custody of the police
by an Army Colonel and two Majors. Ali was released after being held for three years and ten
months. His release, once again, confirmed that ‘the missing persons’ were indeed being held by
the military and intelligence agencies and their records and details were also deliberately being
withheld from the courts.
On November 1st, 2007, Secretary Interior Kamal Shah again appeared and reassured the
Court that the government was committed to tracing all the disappeared persons. As the
hearings in these cases continued and the Chaudhry Court seemed to have reached the limits of
its patience with the reticent higher bureaucracy, on November 3th, 2007, General Musharraf
11

I discuss this point in detail in the next chapter (on honor killings).
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once again sent the judiciary home, suspended the Constitution and imposed martial law in the
country.
The dismissal of the Chief Justice was a heartbreaking setback for Janjua and the men
and women who had rallied around her in the Supreme Court. Together, they had built a legal
and public protest campaign, but Chaudhry’s dismissal left many of them desolate. For the next
two years, Janjua led the families of the missing persons in protests in the Lawyers’ Movement,
while enforced disappearance cases painfully dragged on in the Supreme Court; the judges now
gave a perfunctory review to these cases as most of them had either taken a new oath under
General Musharraf’s PCO (Provisional Constitution Order) or had been freshly appointed by the
government. However, the number of missing persons kept on rising; the missing men and
women of the Lal Masjid had also been added to the list of the disappeared persons.
The arrival of the PPP’s government in power (March 2008) and the Chief Justice’s
return to the Court a year later, lifted the expectations of Janjua and other activists. However,
Chaudhry gradually distanced himself from their cases. As his judicial grandeur grew, Chaudhry
moved on to other politically-attractive, popularly-flavored cases (such as those to do with
‘corruption’) against the government and the arrogant bureaucracy, which had been fearfully
and carefully watching Chaudhry’s return to Court No.1.
The Supreme Court’s avoidance of a direct confrontation with the powerful military and
Chaudhry’s diversion towards mechanizing judicial interventions in multiple directions
(through issuing suo moto notices), however, didn’t deter Janjua and other claimants’ activism
in the missing persons cases. Their campaign for the recovery of the missing persons
continued(es) in the form of sit-ins, street protests, seminars and publications. Their activism
and legal proceedings have resulted in two substantial gains: first, the legal topography of
internments centers in the country has been exposed and, second, by learning to use law against
the state, the claimants and activists have compelled the state to admit the existence of enforced
disappearances. These claimants and activists have learned how to use the law, its legal artefacts
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and documents, against the state [Eckert et al. 2012; Ewick and Silbey 1998]. I will discuss this
activism, its language, forms and performances in the last section of this chapter.

Post-Restoration: Missing Persons Cases and the Return of the Chief Justice
Janjua and the protesting families of the missing persons continued their support of the
Chief Justice and the movement for his restoration. They joined the lawyers, their bar
associations and civil society activists in the protests. Janjua explained:
We joined the Lawyers’ Movement in solidarity … because for us the restoration of the
independent judges was a matter of life and death. We had high hopes of the new
government [of Pakistan People’s Party] to which we kept telling that our loved ones are
illegally detained, beyond all laws, in the custody of the security agencies. We will be
relieved when our loved ones are safe and sound, standing freed before us … I believe
that my husband Masood is held only three kilometers from my home, yet he continues
to suffer unknown ill-treatment and we, his wife, his children and his very old
parents, cannot even see him. They [the new government] must act now to bring them
back immediately. (Amnesty 2008, 34)
Amina Janjua stated to me that the families of the missing persons “were part and parcel of the
Lawyers’ Movement for two years, and, with the lawyers, we faced all kinds of hardships. We
were on the streets, facing extremes of weather; we marched with the lawyers, to restore
independent and fair judiciary”, but, “even after the return of the Chief Justice finally to the
Supreme Court”,. she lamented, “we are still waiting to get justice”.
Janjua’s case was eventually taken up by the Supreme Court on November 23rd, 2009.
Janjua informed the Court that Dr. Imran Munir was still under protective custody and
admitted in the local hospital. Even though the Chief Justice started to remain peculiarly absent
from the bench hearing enforced disappearance cases, the rest of the Supreme Court judges
appeared stern and confident and were irritated by the delay tactics of the government, and so
they decided to hear the missing persons case twice a week. On January 1 st, 2010, the bench
addressed the Attorney General: “It has been made clear to the learned Attorney General that
the cases of the missing persons will have to be decided on either way without granting any

277

uncalled for adjournment … No further adjournment will be granted and the cases of the
missing persons will be dealt with on a day to day basis” (HRC 965/2005, 2-3).
On January 21st, 2010, the Court learnt in Janjua’s case that the intelligence agencies had
submitted certificates to the Attorney General confirming that Masood Janjua was not in their
custody; in fact, according to these certificates, he was never arrested by them (HRC 965/2005,
2-3). After a month had passed and the government ministers (Defense and Interior) failed to
adequately satisfy the sitting judges, the bench admitted its helplessness as well as frustration:
“there is no material progress in these cases … The pace of progress in each case is negligible and
police is helpless due to the alleged involvement of various [security] agencies” (ibid.). Janjua’s
case continued in the Court and finally on March 2nd, 2010, the Ministry of Defense alleged that
Amina didn’t have any concrete evidence about her husband’s custody and all she had was
“hearsay” about the role of the ISI (ibid.).
The crucial testimony (yet to be recorded) in Janjua’s case was of Dr. Imran Munir, who
a few months later, was granted asylum, through the United Nations, in a South East Asian
country. With Munir’s departure, Janjua case lost the momentum it had gained. The
contestation over the recording of Munir’s testimony, which would have confirmed that Masood
was in the military’s custody, turned into a crucial struggle between Amina Janjua and the
military. After numerous postponements and adjournments, on March 13, 2014, Justice Jawad
S. Khwaja finally ruled that Munir could testify through a video link in the Court. Munir
contacted his lawyers to record his statement. Justice Khwaja directed the IT Department of the
Supreme Court to make the necessary arrangements. Justice Khwaja’s ruling, delivered on
March 13th, 2014, allowed the recording of Munir’s statement on March 30th. Amina explained to
me that Masood Janjua’s case had been continuously fixed in Khwaja’s court, for the last year
and a half before this ruling. However, she claimed, on March 30th, the day Munir had to record
his statement in the Court, the bench changed to include Justices Dost Mohammad Jamali and
Saqib Nisar.
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Janjua’s case was suddenly transferred from the court of one of the most critical and
activist Supreme Court judges (Justice Khwaja), who had been quite sympathetic toward
Janjua.12 Amina explained, “on that day (March 30th), the Court was misled about contacting Dr.
Munir, the star witness in my husband’s case. The witness was there and waiting for the call, but
the Attorney General and others deceived the Court by insisting that Munir was not available on
Skype and couldn’t be contacted”. Amina soon realized that this was a “conspiracy” – both
Justice Khwaja’s transfer from her case and the deception by the state attorneys.
After Justice Khwaja’s retirement,13 Justice Jamali became one of the three Supreme
Court judges assigned to the bench hearing Janjua’s petition, and, according to Amina, he
passed the following comments in one of the hearings in her husband’s case: “We have done a
lot for you, and how far can we go? Even we have limits”, he said. Hinting at the military, Jamali
continued “there is a danger of confrontation between the state institutions because of your
case” (emphasis added). These comments suggested that the higher judiciary was eager to
secure its integrity and consolidate its jurisdiction by withdrawing from the military’s orbit of
operations. However, before this retreat, the Supreme Court (under Chaudhry) attempted a final
push against the powerful military through the famous Mohabat Shah case.

Mohabat Shah Case: The Chaudhry Court Finally Responds to Enforced
Disappearances
On December 7th, 2013, Pakistani security agencies presented seven men in the Supreme
Court of Pakistan in the famous Mohabat Shah Case. Two of their fellow detainees had already
died in the custody of the security agencies. In the next hearing of the case, on December 10th,
the bench headed by Chaudhry declared that the Army had illegally removed 35 persons from

At the time of Chaudhry’s dismissal, Khwaja was a judge of the Lahore High Court, and he
resigned in protest against Musharraf’s dismissal of the higher judiciary.
13
Justice Jawad S. Khwaja succeeded Justice Chaudhry (after Justices Jillani and Nasur-ulMulk) as the Chief Justice and was well-known for his activist stance against the state.
12
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the internment center in Malakand Garrison out of whom only (the above mentioned) 7 had
been produced so far in the Court. Yasin Shah, brother of Mohabat Shah, was among those 35
and it was now established that he was no more a missing person, as his custody had been
traced to the Army. In its verdict, the bench ordered that “action be taken against the people
responsible for the non-compliance of court orders” (HRC.29388-K/2013, 3).
On January 19th, 2014, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) pleaded in the Supreme Court to
review its verdict. The counsel for the MOD invoked the state of exception, which ‘terrorism’ had
created in the country, and the crisis faced by the state; and so he prayed that “holding the
Pakistan Army responsible for enforced disappearances by the court would demoralize the
troops engaged in combating terrorists in Swat and Malakand” (Iqbal 2014).14 The state’s plea
was in line with the arguments being made globally, especially by the countries engaged in the
so-called ‘war on terror’. After the events of September 11, 2001, many states have justified their
involvement in extra-legal arrests, torture and other forms of violence by invoking the notions of
exception, necessity or emergency (Wilson 2005).15 In its review petition, MOD requested “the
apex court to revisit its verdict by accepting the contentions raised in the interest of Pakistan
and the state and expunge all the findings, remarks and observations recorded against the army
and its intelligence agencies” (Iqbal 2014).
The Yasin Shah disappearance case had finally sprained the judicial temper, as his
custody, unlike the majority of the missing persons cases, had been established, with evidence
from those in charge of the internment center he was detained in. In the prior hearings of the
case (on November 25th, 2013), the MOD had denied that Yasin Shah was in the custody of the
Army and claimed in the court that he was still being traced. However, Chaudhry reminded the
counsel for MOD that the Superintendent of Malakand Internment Center had acknowledged, in
the Peshawar High Court, about two years ago, that 66 persons, including Yasin Shah, were
See Schmitt 1996[1929] and 2006 [1922], on state of exception and distinction between friend
and enemy as the defining of the political in times of crisis.
15
See also Finkelstein, Ohlin and Altman 2012.
14
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handed over to him by the Army, without any internment orders, and while 31 were still
interned, the remaining 35 had been take away by the Army. The Court ordered the state to
produce Yasin Shah the next day.
On Tuesday, November 26th, the Superintendent of the Malakand Internment Center,
Attaullah, presented the record of the 35 missing persons in the court. He confirmed that he had
handed over these 35 persons, including Shah, to the Army. Chaudhry, reportedly, was “visibly
annoyed” at the MOD’s reply that it still needed additional time to produce the 35 missing.
Directed at the military, the bench, in its ruling, stated: “As sufficient evidence has been made
available to conclude that 34+1=35, named herein above, are in the custody of Army, therefore,
the Army authorities are bound, under the law, to produce them before the Court of Law and
has (sic) no authority to retain their custody unauthorisedly” (HRC.29388-K/2013, 3,
emphasis added).
Prior to this ruling, the Supreme Court had prudently refrained from directly implicating
and addressing the Army and had, until then, demanded answers about the disappearances
from the civilian bureaucracy of the state. But once the custody of the missing persons was
established beyond doubt, the Court directly held the security and intelligence apparatus
responsible for their disappearance, declared the custody “unlawful” and, most importantly,
ruled that those 35 persons were no longer missing, as their custody had been “identified”. The
Court gave two more days to MOD to produce the missing 35.
On December 2nd, the court was informed that 2 of the 35 missing had died in custody
due to natural causes. The bench ordered that the remaining 33 be produced and those
responsible for the disappearances be arrested and charged.
On December 6th, 2013, the defense minister, Khwaja Asif, appeared in the court and
presented a report, which was dismissed by the Chief Justice, as based on “merely speculation”
(Dawn 2013). The Minister claimed in the court that none of the missing were in the custody of
the Army. Chaudhry reminded the Minister that “as per the Constitution of Pakistan, no persons
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could be detained without being produced in the court first”, and asked Asif: “under which law a
detention center was set up in Malakand Division, which is a settled area in the country” (Dawn
2013).
The next day, MOD, which until then had denied the custody, finally presented 14
missing persons in the court. The lawyers and activists, including Janjua, expressed skepticism
about the identity of these and considered this a delaying ploy by the military.
On December 10th, 2013, two days before his retirement, Chief Justice Chaudhry finally
delivered the verdict in Mohabat Shah case. Even though considered “light and toothless” by the
critics, the ruling irritated the Army, which immediately sought a review through MOD. In its
judgement, the three-member bench, headed by the Chief Justice, ruled that “no intelligence or
security agencies, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI),
Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Frontier Corps, could secretly detain a person for a long time
without sharing information relating to his whereabouts with his relatives” (Iqbal 2013). The
bench affirmed that “except for the regulations relating to the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (Fata) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Pata), there was no other law which
allowed security agencies to confine people without any authority” (ibid.) Even though the Court
acknowledged limits of its jurisdiction in the federally and provincially administered areas, it
nevertheless wrapped its challenge to the provocation posed by the Army to its jurisdiction in
the constitutional human rights of the detained and the protection of all Pakistanis against the
violence of the state and its military and secret agencies.
The judgement focused on the Army and its detention of the persons presumed to have
‘disappeared’. And so the ruling went on to state that “the army authorities under the Pata
regulations had taken away 35 detainees from the Lakki Marwat internment center but only
seven of them had been produced before the court and the whereabouts of the remaining could
be known only to them” (Iqbal 2013). Further, the bench ordered “the prime minister as well as
the governor and chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to ensure the recovery of the missing
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internees in seven days and submit a report to the SC registrar after taking strict action against
those involved in enforced disappearances” (ibid.). The judgement stated that “since no law
existed about the detention of the undeclared internees, except in KP and that too under Pata
regulations, the other three provinces should also come up with proper legislation to discourage
the tendency of enforced disappearances. The chief executives of the provinces should also
ensure that enforced disappearances do not take place in future” (ibid.)
Tariq Asad, the counsel for Lal Masjid and the claimants in the missing persons cases,
termed the ruling “an ambiguous and ineffective verdict”; he stated that the verdict “shows that
the judiciary is still not independent and the real power vests with the armed forces and
agencies which control everything” (Iqbal 2013). However, the counsel for the Army and MOD
immediately filed for a review of the judgement. Raising the exception argument, the counsel
argued that the “Supreme Court had failed to take into consideration that the armed forces were
called in Swat and Malakand under Article 245 of the constitution to act in aid of the civil
powers and to fight the worst form of terrorism in the area. And when the army is called to
assist the authorities to carry out a constitutional duty, the jurisdiction of the high court as
well as the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution are suspended” (ibid., italics
added). The counsel further contended that holding the Army responsible for the disappearance
of 35 persons from Malakand internment center was not based on “conclusive material or
evidence and relied upon by the court on ‘inaccurate particulars’ provided by superintendent of
the Malakand internment center, Attaullah, when the defense ministry had clearly disputed the
same for being unsubstantiated and factually incorrect” (ibid.). The counsel further argued that
“without proper assistance through a probe, the Pakistan Army should not have been held
responsible for having detained these missing persons … The court’s finding that those missing
were with the armed forces was based on assumptions not supported by facts or record” (ibid.).
The petition asked the Court to remove any references that would malign the Army and remove
any comments or findings against the military and its intelligence agencies.

283

After Chaudhry’s retirement, Janjua’s case failed to receive much attention from the
Supreme Court. Justice Jamali, in fact, offered to send Amina Janjua to the Commission on
Enforced Disappearances (set up by the government on the Court’s orders in May 2010), but she
refused, arguing that the Commission was ineffective in tracing the disappeared persons and
was formed only to assuage the claimants of the missing persons cases.
The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Chaudhry, had turned the Court into a site from
which even the most powerful institution of the state could be challenged publicly, by invoking
the rule of law. Chaudhry’s judicial activism and populism built upon disciplining the civilian
bureaucracy and security apparatus of the state. Recall that reformulating the state, from a
“hard security” one to a “welfare state”, as Atizaz Ahsan put it, or as one based on “substantive
justice”, as Munir A. Malik imagined, fueled the populist appeal of the Lawyers’ Movement. The
higher courts’ interventions ranged from fixing the prices of everyday commodities and
restricting police excesses against the poor to questioning disappearances by the spy agencies
and the Army. As I mentioned above, the courts were engaged in a war of position with the
military and could not challenge it outright.
The military and its intelligence agencies retaliated by defaming any judge of the higher
courts who took a serious interest in the enforced disappearance cases. Justice Khwaja, who
presided over these cases and sternly demanded a response from the military, was maligned in
the media by the journalists considered close, or, at least sympathetic, to the Army and its
intelligence agencies. The “establishment-fed journalists”, Janjua claimed, systematically disreputed him and his judgments because he was sympathetic to the missing persons cases. Even
banners were erected in the Red Zone [a highly secured area in the capital, Islamabad] against
him. “These were clear messages to Justice Khwaja”, Janjua further claimed, “that you are being
very hard on the Defense Ministry and the Army and are taking keen interest in the enforced
disappearance cases”. “He had to keep quiet after those banners and the campaign against him
in the media and public”, she stated, and “everything just hushed up”.
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After Chaudhry’s departure, Justice Khwaja’s retirement and the passage of the Pakistan
Protection Act 2015 (to award legal cover to disappearances by the military) by the Parliament,
the missing persons cases lost the public attention, judicial interest and the media’s sympathy,
which these cases had attracted over the years. Soon after the Taliban’s bloody assault on a
primary-secondary school (Army Public School) run by the Army in Peshawar, and following the
attack, the military’s public relations campaign, couched in the nationalist language of saving
the nation from the ‘terrorists and miscreants’, the Supreme Court became extremely cautious in
the missing persons cases and about the alleged role of the military in the disappearances.16
Even prior to the APS attack, the Army’s media cell had already launched an extensive
campaign to reassert the nationalist narrative and win public support for its recently launched
‘war on terror’. However, Amina Janjua’s activism and litigation, through the DHRP, continued.
A handful of activists continued to (and still do) support her ongoing campaign of public protest,
rallies and sit-ins as well as seminars and press conferences. I now turn to an ethnographic
discussion of this activism and examine how the families and claimants of the missing persons
themselves engage in this protest, outside of the courts; what are their languages and practices
of protest; and how they invite the higher judiciary to intervene and secure their fundamental
rights, and, in the process, are themselves transformed by engaging “law against the state”
(Eckert et al. 2012, 1).

Activism Against Enforced Disappearances, Protests and Sit-Ins
Speeches had already commenced when I reached the DHRP-organized sit-in, outside
the Islamabad Press Club in October 2014 (See Figures 14 & 15). About fifty men and women
were sitting under a canopy. The photographs of the missing men and slogans against
disappearances were inscribed on banners wrapped around the canopies. The media had been
invited too, but the journalists’ cameras were mainly panning political notables visiting the sit16

In the attack on APS on December 16th, 2014, over a hundred young students died.
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in. Jamaat-i-Islami’s chief, Siraj-ul-Haq, was the last to arrive. As soon as he departed, so did
most of the cameramen.
Haji Ahmed,17 whose son had been missing (for over five years) and had recently
received his dead body from a military internment center, started addressing the protestors.
Ahmed placed enforced disappearances in the global context of the war on terror by stating that
“it was to please the U.S., and on its behest, that the Pakistani state started abducting people and
handing them over to the Americans”. Addressing the ruling political elite, he lashed out at
them: “our rulers, including Asif Zardari (former President) and Nawaz Sharif (current Prime
Minister), are always trying to appease the Americans.” “What is their understanding with the
CIA and U.S. on drone attacks and on the missing persons?” he angrily asked. Lambasting the
political leaders on their acquiescence to U.S. violations of Pakistani sovereignty, he continued,
“a pseudo war has been imposed on Pakistan and our leaders are helpless. We need to rise up
and recognize our rights”.
Haji Ahmed’s son was picked up by the intelligence and military personnel in October
2009, from a middle-class neighborhood in Rawalpindi. As is the case with most of the family
members of the missing persons, Ahmed made multiple visits to the local Police Station, the
Police Headquarters and the Supreme Court (where a petition was filed for his son’s recovery).
His efforts finally led him to the Commission set up by the government to investigate enforced
disappearances. After four years of constantly pursuing his son’s case at the Commission and
before the Supreme Court, Ahmed was finally able to trace him to an internment center in
Kohat, a town in the north-west of the country. He was in the custody of the ISI (Inter-Services
Intelligence). On the directives of the Commission, Ahmed was able to obtain permission to visit
his son in February 2014. When he and his wife finally met him there, Ahmed told me, his son
seemed fine. For the next five months, Ahmed waited in vain to be granted the permission to see
him again. Eventually, in July that year, he received a call from the Office of the Commissioner
17

Pseudonym.
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Kohat informing him that his son had passed away. He was asked to come and collect the body.
Ahmed claimed that his son’s body bore burn marks above the neck. The military refused to
offer any explanation, except that he had died of “some illness”; “perhaps, tuberculosis”, he was
told. Even after his son’s death, Ahmed remains one of the most defiant and tirelessly dedicated
activists of the DHRP.
After his fiery address to the protestors (mainly, family members, both men and women,
of the disappeared), Haji Ahmed handed the microphone over to Amina Janjua. For over ten
years, Janjua has publicly led the human rights campaign against enforced disappearances. Her
public protests and legal activism violate the local cultural code, which expects women to
privately and silently mourn their loss and pain. 18 Many of the wives and mothers of the missing
persons have joined Janjua in public protests and at the hearings at the Supreme Court.
Humanitarian appeals to the law and the higher courts and protests in the name of Islam have
helped Janjua to find a public space of protest against the disappearances.
In her speech, Janjua connected the global narrative on Muslims’ plight, in the context of
the imperialist war on terror, to Islamic history and then drew it back to Pakistan and the
appalling state of Islam in the country. It is important to note that the same traditional Islamic
tropes were used by the lawyers to engage in cultural politics of the state and to rally their
intermediate class allies. Their bar resolutions deployed the same Islamic imagery of antiimperialism.
Janjua also appealed to the Islamic umma (nation), stating that “Muslims, around the
world, must unite. Iraq was attacked, but we [the Muslims] didn’t provide support or resist the
invasion. One, after the other, Muslim countries were attacked, invaded and occupied, but we
didn’t fight. Now it’s Pakistan’s turn, which is the only Muslim nuclear power in the world”.
Janjua then associated the Global ‘War on Terror’ waged by the U.S., violations of the sovereign

Same is the case in protests by women in honor killings cases, which I discuss in the next
chapter. See also Hirsch 1994.
18
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space of Pakistan, and the nationalist sacredness of Pakistanis to enforced disappearances in the
country: “The abducted persons have reported that, while in Army’s custody, they have been
interrogated by gorras. Who were these English-speaking Western interrogators?” she
challenged. “One of these female interrogators”, she continued, “used to come in a burqa and
with the help of an interpreter, would interrogate our missing persons”. “She would ask”, Janjua
disclosed, “about the Taliban, their networks and where they worked”. Janjua continued: “who
allowed these gorra interrogators to come into our country? Who invited them?” Janjua claimed
that, in 2012, she herself had seen “an American interrogator in an Army jeep in the Rawalpindi
Cantonment area; she was wearing Pakistani Army Medical Core Uniform; that woman was
wearing a sari – as female doctors do in Pakistani Army”.
According to Janjua and Ahmed’s counter narratives on enforced disappearances,
addressed to Pakistanis and uncannily calling upon the higher judiciary, the state and its
military have failed to secure the country’s boundaries, its sovereignty, and most painfully for
Janjua and Ahmed, the sacred bodies of its citizens. Thus the judiciary is demanded to step in,
not only to restrain the excess of military power, but also to check the state’s conspiratorial
association with the global imperial powers against its own citizens.
As Amina continued to speak to the protestors, the language of suffering and trauma
seeped into her her narrative:
People, who return from these interrogations, are psychologically and mentally
damaged because they are severely tortured by the intelligence agencies. For
example, a lot of them become completely silent, after they return to their homes;
they can’t even stand the sound of their children crying. They become mad at their own
families. One young man has actually turned ‘insane’; he beats his children and his wife
can’t bear him, because he is so tortured and broken. These families were financially fine
before, but now, because of these men’s mental health issues, they are in trouble. We
[Janjua and the DHRP] are helping these families to survive.
Janjua and the DHRP’s stress on the grief and suffering of the families of the missing persons
colors the humanitarian narrative on enforced disappearances and shows that, even after the
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return of the disappeared, the trauma endures. More importantly, the humanitarian language of
rights allows production of a collective of ‘victims’.
Amina and other activists demand from the state, not as individuals, or as individual
rights bearers, as some critics of liberal human rights argue (Butler and Athanasiou 2013), but
rather as a collective of sufferers. The liberal idea of rights is often critiqued because of its
privileging of the individual as the rights bearer (Pashukanis 1978[1929]). The individual “legal
subject of juridical theories is very closely related to the commodity [property] owner”, as
Pashukanis famously argued (1978[1929], 39). However, the protest activism against enforced
disappearances facilitates collective consciousness of fundamental human rights, justice and
state violence and resistance to that violence. The ‘victims’ collectively learn to hold ‘the state’
accountable for the excesses committed against their family members.19

Legal Topography of the Disappearances and Learning to Use Law Against ‘the
State’
As Janjua spoke, Hasan Khan shook his head and wiped off his tears. “I respect her; she
knows that we want jawab [accountability] from the riyasat [state]”. Khan, a Pashtun from
Mohmand Agency (FATA), introduced himself as an illiterate man who drives a rickshaw
(three-wheeler taxi) in neighboring Rawalpindi. His brother had died in the Army’s custody last
year, and Khan, since then, had been “demanding answers from the riyasat” regarding his
death. As I sat down to hear Janjua’s address to the protesting families, many there
misconstrued me as a journalist, because of my backpack and voice recorder, and, like Khan,
edged towards me (See Figure 14).20

On human rights culture and in the ‘war on terror’, see Wilson 1999 and 2005. On
anthropological studies and critique of human rights, see also Merry 2016 and Goodale 2008.
20 Many of these men were carrying ‘dossiers of memory’ of the missing persons – their
photographs, newspapers clippings, First Investigation Reports (FIR), and court documents and
petitions – with them. The thick folders that these men carried under their arms contained
copies of petitions made to the courts and applications to the parliamentarians and bureaucrats,
19
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Khan’s brother was a day laborer, who was first picked up by the intelligence agencies in
August 2011. He returned after a few months of interrogation. Khan placed his photograph in
front of me and lamented that he never actually got to know what his brother was interrogated
on and why was he detained. A year later, “some men in plain clothes” (euphemism for the
intelligence agencies personnel) again showed up at his brother’s recycling shop, which he had
recently opened up in Attock,21 and took him away. This time he did not return. Eventually,
Khan reached the DHRP’s office in Rawalpindi and filed a petition in the Supreme Court, from
where he was sent to appear in Judicial Commission on enforced disappearances, set up by the
government in September 2011.
In the Commission on Enforced Disappearances, by then, the security agencies’ lowranking officials had acquiesced to appear. By attending a commission, headed by a retired
Supreme Court Judge, the military and intelligence agencies acknowledged, even though
nominally, the jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of enforced disappearances, while at the
same time using the Commission to delay legal proceedings in these cases. However, after he
consistently appeared in the Commission for months, Khan told me, “the intelligence agencies
finally admitted that they had my brother in their custody in an internment center in Kohat. So I
met him there once. But soon after our second meeting, he died in their custody.” A month after
their last meeting, Khan had received a call from Kohat Internment Center, asking him to come
and collect his brother’s dead body. His brother, Khan claimed, “had signs of tashadud [torture],
the newspaper clippings of their meetings with the politicians and prominent political figures,
and the National Identity and Service Cards of the missing (see fig.4). Many also had the
photographs of their missing family member attached to these documents as well as a short
narrative about the enforced disappearance itself. Most studies of state and its bureaucracy and
legality search for and follow the history of state power and its formation in its official archives –
assumed to be embedded in files and documents (Hull 2012). The dossiers of memory that these
men carry not only challenge the state narrative on its war against terrorism, but they also serve
as counter archives through which the state violence can be traced culturally, ethnically and
mapped geographically. Resistance to state power and violence lies precisely in how these
fragments about the missing are collected by their claimants so that they could find their way
into the legal memory of the state – by lodging police reports and becoming a part of the
archives of the higher courts.
21 A small city at the border of KPK and Punjab provinces.
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on both sides of the head, near the ears”. When Khan was given the body, the military didn’t
bother to hand him any medical reports or provide any comprehensive evidence or explanation
for his death. Like Haji Ahmed, Khan was told that his brother had died either of “Tuberculosis
or Jaundice”, and, again, like Ahmed’s son, the body bore marks of torture above the neck.
The missing persons cases became a contested site about the military state, its ‘war on
terror’ and the limits of exception, in the name of which the higher courts was were being denied
jurisdiction. However, it was because of the claimants like Khan and Janjua, whose unflagging
appeals to the Supreme Court, continuous protests outside the courts, and petitions to the
courts to register and record the cases of the missing persons, convinced a wary judiciary to keep
on returning to the missing persons cases and thereby question the military’s role in illegal
abductions. These claimants have learned to “manipulate context and deploy and appropriate
legal symbols in their favor, in fashioning resistance within the legal system and resisting its
hegemony” (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994, 13). They have learned to engage the law against
the state by registering the memory of the disappeared – the fragments of their lives and events
– in the state’s judicial registers.
One of the ways in which these activists and litigants do so is by asking the courts to
order the police to lodge an FIR (First Investigation Report) about the event of the
disappearance and record the details of the missing persons. The state refuses to acknowledge
the disappearance of the missing person and so this report attempts to inscribe a legal memory
in the state’s official registers to obviate its denial of abduction.22 The local police, being
cognizant of the fact that the missing men have been picked up by the military and the
intelligence agencies and most probably are in their custody, is always reluctant to lodge an FIR
implicating them.

FIR is considered the most important preliminary investigation report filed by the Police, on
the basis of which further legal proceedings take place in the court.
22
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Nasarullah Baluch, who runs a human rights organization, Voice for the Baluch Missing
Persons (VBMP), won this right from the Supreme Court in 2010.23 His uncle, Ali Asghar
Bangalzai, a tailor by profession and a Baluch nationalist, has been missing since October 12 th,
2002. Ali Asghar Bangalzai was a political worker and, Nasarullah Baluch claimed, “was the first
to be disappeared in Baluchistan, after General Musharraf took over in 1999”.24 After Janjua’s
and other missing persons cases gained judicial tracking in the Supreme Court, Baluch was also
asked by the Supreme Court to make his appearance in the court regarding the cases of
disappearances in Baluchistan. The Supreme Court’s ruling regarding the FIR provided
Nasarullah Baluch with a tactical opportunity that he made apt use of: he not only compelled the
state to acknowledge the disappearance of Bangalzai, he also asked the police to include the
names of the Corps Commander Quetta and two senior ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) Officers
in the Report. So, the lodging of the FIR becomes the first battle for the claimants to engage in,
in order to disprove the absence of their family members in the state’s legal records and register
their details in those records. The repudiation by the state is resisted by petitioning the higher
courts and by implicating powerful military officials, who are often regarded as heroes in the
national narrative on the wars against ‘terrorism’ and separatism.
Ethnic and geographic distribution of the enforced disappearances and how the missing
bodies circulate and are confined emerges as well in the encounter of the claimants with the
courts.25 These ethnic and geographic details of the missing map the uneven legal development,
grown out of state violence, across the country. For example, at the DHRP’s protests and sit-ins,
I met family members of many young Pashtun and Punjabi young men, who disappeared after
the military operation carried out against Lal Masjid in Islamabad and, after tortuous litigation,
If police refuses to lodge FIR (First Investigation Report), High Court can be approached to
order the police to do so.
24
Recent Baluch insurgency against the Pakistani state began in 2006, started by Baluch
Sardars, but is now mainly led by the middle-class professional radical separatists (Ahmed
2014)
25
These details live in the dossiers of memory that the claimants in the missing persons cases
create, bring to the courts, and fight to turn into court’s records and to enter its legal archives.
23
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protests and activism, some of them had been traced to the internment centers in the northwest
of the country. These centers were found to be in the tribal and adjoining areas, considered
beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of Pakistani courts.
Internment centers began to emerge on the jurisdictional map of the courts because of
the habeas corpus petitioning against the disappearances by the activists and families of the
disappeared persons. The courts found out that most of these centers were either operating in
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) or in PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal
Areas).26 The military had purposely built these centers in those regions and transferred the
detainees there because of the constitutional ambiguity about Pakistani courts’ jurisdiction over
the tribal areas. However, the higher courts didn’t hesitate to at least exercise jurisdiction in
PATA (such as in Malakand and Dir) and ask for the records of the detainees to be produced
from the internment centers located there. It was because of the courts’ extending their reach
into areas considered beyond their authority that Khan successfully traced and met his brother.
The ethnic distribution of the missing persons also becomes obvious from the claimants’
activism and the ‘dossiers of memory’ (biographical records of the disappeared) which they
create for the courts and journalists. Most of the suspected Islamist militants, these dossiers
indicate, either belong to the KPK province or Punjab, while the nationalists from Sind or
Baluchistan. Bangalzai was also a Baluchi nationalist. Nasarullah Baluch explained that
Bangalzai’s first abduction lasted 14 days, but he was picked up again on October 12th, 2002, and
he has been going to the courts to free him since then. Bangalzai was brutally tortured by the
Army during his first detention. The interrogators, Baluch claimed, wanted to know about
Bangalzai’s contact with the Baluch nationalists. Bangalzai disclosed to Baluch, that he would be
“hung upside down and then struck on his thighs; he wouldn’t even be allowed to sleep, and

The use of the writ of habeas corpus has historically facilitated expansion of judicial reach and
thus power of the courts (see Halliday 2010). The higher judiciary in Pakistan used the petitions,
filed on basis of invoking this writ, to challenge the unquestioned power exercised by the state’s
security and bureaucratic apparatus.
26
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sometimes would be placed on slabs of ice for a night or two in a row”. When Bangalzai was
released, Baluch claimed, “because of these violent beatings, he couldn’t even walk and we had
to hold him from both sides”. Baluch further claimed, “my uncle couldn’t even hold a cigarette
between his fingers. His fingers would shake. He had been slow-poisoned, a doctor told us, after
examining him”. Since his second abduction by the military in 2002, Bangalzai remains missing.
Nasarullah Baluch continues to appear in the Supreme Court in Bangalzai’s as well as in many
other cases of the enforced disappearances, registered by his organization in Baluchistan.
Nasarullah Baluch was harassed by the intelligence agencies, when he first attended the
Supreme Court to pursue the cases of the missing Baluch. Years later, his edginess expresses
their fear. When I met him at the Baluchistan House,27 where he usually stays during the
proceedings of his case, Baluch first swept his room, checking if the room had been bugged in
his absence. On the Supreme Court’s orders, Baluch is provided residence and travel expenses as
he has to fly from Baluchistan to appear before the court in Islamabad. Fellow Baluch, working
at the House, berate him for becoming the guest of a state against which he is litigating in the
courts. But Baluch considers his appearance at the Court crucial, because he is able to register
the names, and details of those who have been ‘disappeared’ from the state’s registers as well as
have been denied national memory. The missing students of the Lal Masjid operation were dealt
with in similar manner by the military.
The security apparatus and its reluctant allies in the civil society were quick in declaring
all those who were left behind in Lal Masjid, before the operation began, as ‘terrorists’ or
‘miscreants’ (as the military prefers to call those who challenge its violence with theirs).28
Muzamal Khan’s dossier of his missing son, Ali, tells another story though. I met Khan at
DHRP’s office in January 2015. Khan, a Pashtun from Mardan (KPK), was a retired security
guard, living in Rawalpindi for over twenty years. Ali, according to Khan, was a fourteen-yearEvery province maintains a hostel for their visiting parliamentarians and bureaucrats in the
capital.
28
See Chapter 2 on Lal Masjid operation.
27
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old student, who used to visit Lal Masjid to say his daily prayers. On the day of the Operation,
Ali found himself trapped inside the Masjid complex, because of the cross fire; apart from the
shootout between the militants inside the Mosque and the military outside, the militants were
not allowing anyone to leave the Complex. On the other hand, the military would shoot at any
person emerging out of the Mosque. Ali was wounded, as he attempted to leave the Complex.
Khan displayed for me Ali’s photograph, petitions to the courts and the FIR (First Investigation
Report), which was ordered to be lodged by the Supreme Court. According to Khan’s narrative,
after the Operation ended, he lost all contact with his son. A few months later, he received a
telephone call from Ali. Apparently, he had survived the operation and was in the Army’s
custody. Ali was allowed to make a few more calls to his family. It has been five years since Khan
last heard from Ali, who is suspected to be in an internment center in FATA.
At protests, press conferences and seminars organized by Amina Janjua’s DHRP, I met
many desperate, angry, desolate family members of young men, who went missing after the Lal
Masjid operation. At one of the dharnas (sit-in protest, discussed below), Kamran Ali29 showed
me his son Mujahid Ali’s30 photograph. As the siege of Lal Masjid began, Ali somehow made his
way inside the Mosque to pull out his sister, who was a student in the women’s madrassa.
However, Ali was also caught, Kamran claimed, in the crossfire; he was shot in the leg and taken
to Fauji Foundation Hospital. Tahir disappeared from the Hospital and remains traceless.
Kamran filed a petition in the Supreme Court through DHRP, appeared before the Commission
on Lal Masjid, and filed a report with the Commission about his son. He was disappointed
because of the judicial paralysis in the enforced disappearance cases; he angrily retorted, “hum
khwar ho gaye hain, apno ko duh’nte, duh’nte [we have been humiliated in search for our loved
ones] the courts are not courageous enough to call the military or intelligence agencies to come
to the court and give answers about the missing persons. These judges are helpless, and so is the

29
30

Pseudonym.
Pseudonym.
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Parliament. It’s all a drama to make a fool out of us. They [the judges] know that the agencies
are holding our children but they still can’t do anything about it”. He continued, “the Army
killed young girls and boys in Lal Masjid. They pick whoever they wish and disappear them. If
my son is guilty, bring him to the court. If not, then, give him back to me. If he is dead, give me
his dead body. I am at the limits of my patience. I am accepting their qanun [law], but the Army
and the agencies are not accepting their own law”.
For most of these desperate family members, years of searching, petitioning and
protesting have worn them out and made them deeply suspicious of the state and skeptical of
the potency of the courts to seek answers from the military and oblige it to follow the rule of law,
in the name of which the military operations against militants had been carried out. For Farooq,
it was the state, its repressive apparatus, which was the real terrorist and not him or his son,
who had accepted the legitimacy of the courts and state’s hegemony over both violence and law.

Before the Law, Against the Law, or Law Against the State?
However, it is learning to use the law against the state, rather than standing against the
law (Ewick and Silbey 1998), that facilitates this ongoing activism. In the course of their
encounter with the legal institutions – by standing before the law (Kafka 1925[2009]) – the
claimants in the missing persons cases learn to use the ways of the law, as a practice of
resistance, to challenge the state as well as legitimize its judicial reach and power of governance.
Law and the encounter with its practices (performative as well as textual, authoritative [Messick
1993]), agents and institutions not only conditions activists’ “consciousness but also shapes
[their] oppositional practices” (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994, 20). Khan thus stated of his
encounter with the law:
I am a rakhshaw driver, and am not an educated man, but I have gotten to know the law
well in the last two years. I have learned to know my legal rights and state’s obligations,
and so I ask, why we do have to experience this zulm [violence] of the state? Before I
didn’t know about the ways of the law. I didn’t know the ways to ask from the judges and
the right to know in the courts. If you can’t understand or learn that shaoor
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[consciousness], then you are an animal and will have to accept whichever way you are
treated by the riyasat, and, in fact, by anyone who is powerful. I know about nainsaafi
[injustice] and how to challenge it. I want answers, and I want the courts to demand
them from the riyasat.
Khan went on to proudly claim that Justice Jawad S. Khawaja, who, as I mentioned above, was
most sympathetic to the missing persons’ cause, knew him by name and sometimes called him
over during the hearings. This hailing by the law (Althusser 1971) if legitimizes the hegemony of
judicial power, it simultaneously allows for formulating challenges to the violence of the state’s
repressive apparatus from within an insurgent consciousness about the law. Khan, Baluch and
many other claimants in the missing persons’ cases learn of their rights and the rule of law –
construed by litigants, such as Khan, as shaoor (roughly defined in Urdu as an agentive/active
state of consciousness) – when they are subjected to, or experience, arbitrary exercise of state
power. They learn to use the law against the state by learning to perform more than just as the
victims of its violence, both inside and outside the courts.
From early on, Khan recognized that his case in the Supreme Court would not progress
unless he continued to produce new witnesses and evidence for the judges. He refused to be a
passive victim of state violence or only a means for law’s hegemony. He brought witnesses from
Mohmand Agency (located in FATA) to the Supreme Court in the capital to challenge the
intelligence agencies’ claim that they didn’t have his brother in their custody. Khan realized that
“if you are not going to be outspoken and bold enough to speak to the judges and help them get
evidence, then, how would they know about the facts and help you?” “If you have been wronged
by the Army”, Khan said, “it’s your own weakness, it’s your own buzdili [cowardliness] if you
don’t go to the courts and let them know about it.” For Khan, in order for the courts to protect
one’s rights, one has to inform and appeal to them so they can intervene on one’s behalf. And if
the courts’ directives are not being implemented – as happened in his brother’s case – then, “tell
the court that its orders are not being followed” by the Army and its intelligence services.
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The human rights activists and litigants in the enforced disappearance cases are also
aware of how their consistent protest action, outside the courts, morally impacts the judges. In
2005, Ali Asghar Bangalzai’s family set up a protest camp outside Quetta Press Club, which went
on for over a year. After a few weeks had passed, and, in desperation, as Bangalzai’s children
went on a hunger strike, the Chief Justice of the Baluchistan High Court (BHC) finally took suo
moto notice on Bangalzai’s case and ordered an FIR to be lodged about his disappearance. The
BHC had delivered the same order before; in total, Nasarullah Baluch claimed, the BHC had
ruled four times (for the FIR to be entered), but because of the known involvement of the
military in enforced disappearances, the police was reluctant to do so. However, Baluch and the
family of Bangalzai didn’t relent either, and, in 2007, they went on to file a petition in the
Supreme Court of Pakistan; and then on September 27th, 2009, Baluch set up the VBMP. He
thought that an “organized struggle for the cause of the enforced disappearances was needed by
the families of the Baluch missing persons”. Finally, after five years of constant petitioning the
courts and organizing protests, hunger strikes and sit-ins outside of it, the Supreme Court
ordered the police to register an FIR in every jurisdiction, in which a person had been reported
missing. For Baluch and other claimants, this ruling meant that they could ask the police to
lodge the FIR against the state’s powerful intelligence agencies and military officers, thus
subverting the national narrative on military operations against ‘terrorists’ in Baluchistan.
In March 2012, on Chief Justice Chaudhry’s visit to Baluchistan, Baluch again organized
a protest and, on this occasion, daringly decided to take the protest to the judges, inside the
court. He assembled the families of the missing persons together and brought them to
Chaudhry’s court. Chaudhry was in Quetta to hear a petition filed by the local bar association on
the “law and order situation” in Baluchistan. Baluch wanted the court to hear his petition on the
missing persons cases. Although it’s the registrar who is responsible for fixing cases for the
judges, in fact, chief justices of the respective courts influence the lists of cases to be taken up.
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Baluch’s petition had been pending in the court and was not put up for the Chief Justice. Baluch
explained:
I had organized about 80 families of the missing persons to go to the Quetta
Registry because our cases had been pending for so long. So on Chaudhry’s visit, we all
went inside the court. The whole court was disturbed, as we came in; the police
threatened to throw us out, but we didn’t relent. When Chief Justice Chaudhry arrived,
we all became emotional, women and children cried and plead in front of the Chief
Justice to help and find their family members. When he saw this, he said, ok, I will take
notice, and he started the hearing on our application.
Baluch and the family members of the missing persons manipulated the legal context through
their performance. Their moral protest triumphed procedural hierarchy, according to which
their petition was not even on the list for the judges’ review.
Chaudhry swiftly acted on Baluch’s petition. Four members of a family, illegally detained
by the security forces (the paramilitary Frontier Corps), were produced the next day. The next
hearing took place in Islamabad and six more of the missing Baluch men were released by the
police. As the hearings continued and missing Baluch continued to be located, litigants in
increasing numbers began to file their petitions and appear at the higher courts, in both Quetta
and Islamabad. Legal historians of British history argued long ago that law’s authority and
legitimacy rested upon spectacularly performing justice, mercy and majesty as its three main
effects and functions (Hay et al. 1979). That sometimes the powerful were also punished publicly
added to the law’s mystique of fairness and justice and as a structure of authority which existed
above everyone, even those who controlled and exercised state violence. The appeal for justice
and mercy, however, I suggest, had to be made by the claimants in the ‘apolitical’ humanitarian
language or the language of fundamental human rights.
Baluch claimed that his litigation and protest action against the disappearances is “nonviolent, peaceful, and legal” in nature. Conscious of the non-partisan ways of the law, he shied
away from claiming his legal and political activism in the name of Baluch nationalism. Baluch
knows that the judiciary has to be convinced to take action against the state on constitutional
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and human rights grounds, rather than to be asked to take an insurgent ethnic minority under
its cover. Baluch has enunciated in the courts: “I don’t make any political statements, or claim
any political affiliations. I told the judges that I have a family member, who is missing, and I am
peacefully protesting and going to the courts to get him freed. That’s it”. Such an apolitical
stance helps in challenging the military by securing legitimacy from the courts. Therefore, both
Amina Janjua as well as Nasarullah Baluch have come to realize that they have to at least claim
to be apolitical and engage in a peaceful campaign to free the missing if they wish the courts to
legitimize their activism against the state.

The Limits of Legal Activism Against the State
On December 16th, 2014, seven militants, supposedly belonging to one of the many
factions of the Pakistani Taliban, stormed an Army-run primary and secondary school, APS,
(Army Public School) in Peshawar. By the evening, 132 boys, between the ages of eight and
sixteen, were dead. The Army’s media wing, ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations), took full
advantage of the anger and grief that these killings had caused across the nation, and along with
the mainstream media, in its statements, placed the militants outside the polity and its legality
and thus undeserving of any leniency from the state. According to this narrative of the
exceptional terrorist threat to the state and society, the nation demanded no less than their
blood. A day after the APS attack, the government lifted the seven-year moratorium on death
sentences.
The protest action and legal activism of the human rights activists and litigants had
compelled the Army and intelligence agencies to engage in contestations about the practices of
enforced disappearances in the courts and, occasionally, to free some of the detained men. After
the APS killings, Amina Janjua claimed, “even the Supreme Court judges felt threatened by the
Army’s media campaign. They came under intense pressure and started talking about quickly
hearing and adjourning the cases of the missing persons. The judges suggested making a larger
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bench and a five-judge bench was in fact assigned to these cases”. The Supreme Court fixed all
105 petitions concerning the missing persons together for a single hearing in front of this bench.
However, on that particular hearing, “the judges gave the case just over half a minute and
adjourned it further”. The Parliament had already passed the Pakistan Protection Act 2014
(PPA) a few months prior to the APS incident. This Act awarded alarmingly extensive powers of
arrest and detention to the security agencies. By then, a major military operation against the
militants had also been launched in the northwestern tribal area, adjoining Afghanistan. This
was followed by the passing of the 21st Amendment to the Constitution by the Parliament and
thus clearing the way to set up military courts for the ‘speedy’ trial of the terror suspects,
amongst whom were many of the missing persons, so far held in the Army’s detention without
any charges. The first to be given death sentences by the Army were those convicted in General
Musharraf’s assassination attempt case. The swift hanging of others, who had been convicted of
attacking the Army, its personnel and assets, followed. The message to the judiciary and human
rights activists and litigants could not have been clearer.
After the first few death sentences were passed by the military courts, however, a number
of petitions were lodged in the Supreme Court to challenge their constitutionality and to appeal
against their judgments. Janjua and a number of other activists were the leading petitioners in
these challenges to the military justice. These appeals continued as the courts reviewed the
legality and jurisdiction of the military courts under the Constitution and stayed sentences
passed by these courts, until the petitions challenging them were decided.

Conclusion
Judicial activism under Chief Justice Chaudhry and the Lawyers’ Movement, its
mobilization and the appeals based on liberal rights and the rule of law, deeply impacted the
aam admi’s (common Pakistanis) imagination of ‘the state’. Pakistani higher courts have
historically remained as the mediators of the tension, inherited from the colonial state, between
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“public order” and “individual rights” (Newberg 1995, 101). The state has struggled with the
legacy of British colonialism in defining its sovereignty and detaching from the colonial raison
d’etat: to maintain law and order. The higher courts, from early on, decided in favor of keeping
public order and provided legitimacy to military take-overs by relying upon the doctrine of
necessity of the state. The populism that fueled the Lawyers’ Movement and judicial
interventions of the higher courts changed how the courts saw the state arguments about
necessity or exception. In the process, they also extended their jurisdiction and law’s hegemony
over the uneven legal development of the nation-state.
In their encounter with the “hierarchical coercive structures” (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch
1994, 13), people reconfigure these structures, mediated by the law itself. Law’s fragmented
hegemony, and not domination (Guha 1998), is perhaps the product, as Chatterjee has recently
argued, of forms of “governmentality”, which “itself produced forms of popular politics of claimmaking, agitation and resistance” (n.d., 1). As I have argued throughout, the rule of law has
served as the discourse, and the higher courts the site, of claim-making against the state and
holding it accountable. I examine another site of intervention and governance, honor killings, in
the next chapter.
The activists and litigants in the missing persons cases remain defiant, though. Khan
refuses to pardon the military. He said: “If my brother was guilty, was involved in anti-Pakistani
activities, then he should have been proven guilty in court. I am asking the riyasat [state]: give
me the reasons why he died after two and a half years in your custody? The state is answerable
for each and every one of its citizens”. Litigants, like Khan and Baluch, have recognized courts as
the counter site to state power and continue to master its forms to learn how to appear before
the law and eventually receive justice.
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Fig. 12. Amina Masood Janjua addressing families of the missing persons at a dharna protest in
Islamabad (October 2014). Photograph taken by the author.

Fig. 13. At the office of the DHRP, Rawalpindi. (August 2014). Photograph taken by the author.
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Fig. 14. Dharna camp in Islamabad, Pakistan. (October 2014). Photograph taken by the author.

Fig. 15. A photograph and a short narrative about the missing (Mohammad Tahir Farooq) from
a ‘dossier of memory’. (October 2014). Photograph taken by the author.
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CHAPTER 8
The ‘Honor Killings’ Cases: The Rule of Law and Uneven Legal
Development1
On this footpath, I spent 15 months and then the Supreme Court finally took notice … The
Speaker of the Parliament came to meet me here; the MNAs from Sind came to see me too …
NGO women also helped me … I didn’t ask any lawyer to represent me, because I don’t trust
lawyers. The MNA, who dispossessed me of my land, he can buy anyone … In Islamabad, I have
learned that everybody – politicians, NGO activists, journalists – looks after their own interests
… And to seek help from the politicians is to waste time. I just need to speak to the courts and
bureaucrats, because they have power … The politicians are only concerned with what would
benefit their politics; they don’t care about the aam admi.
~Haleema Bhutto
On June 3rd, 2011, Haleema Bhutto swallowed dozens of sleeping pills outside the Pakistani
Parliament. As journalists and spectators watched, an ambulance rushed Bhutto to the hospital.
For months, Bhutto had been resiliently protesting outside the Islamabad Press Club. Fifteen
months ago, she had been declared kari (blackened and dishonored) and sentenced to death by
a local jirga2 in Sind. Bhutto fled her village to save her life and reached the capital, Islamabad,
where she desperately sought support from the rights activists, politicians and bureaucrats.
Eventually, she learned of the Supreme Court and its Human Rights Cell; yet, even after filing
her petition there, she waited for months but received no reply. The ubiquitous Pakistani media

1

Honor killing has emerged as an iconic humanitarian category to describe Muslim women’s
plight in recent times. The spectacular success of Pakistani documentary maker Sharmeen
Obaid-Chinoy’s (Academy Award winner for the best short documentary film in 2016), A Girl in
the River: The Price of Forgiveness [2015], reveals the discursive power of honor killings.
However, in Pakistan, many have condemned Chinoy for calling attention to ‘honor killings’ in
the country. In her film, eighteen years old Saba (the target of ‘honor killing’) survives after
being shot in the face by her father and paternal uncle and thrown in the river near the city of
Gujranwala. Saba, as Chinoy tells us, had married against their wishes. Under pressure from her
in-laws, specifically her eldest brother-in-law, Saba reluctantly withdraws her court case against
them and eventually reestablishes relations with her family. Her father remains unrepentant
and defiant though, and over the course of the film, invokes the honor that was first lost and
then restored, by the attempt to murder his daughter. Pakistanis were divided over Chinoy’s
rendition of ‘honor killing’ in the film. As most women and human rights ‘liberal’ activists
celebrated the prominence that honor killings received through her glistening success, many
ordinary Pakistanis furiously dismissed the dark representation of gender relations in Pakistan
laid bare through Saba’s story.
2 Informal council of elders and local notables.

swiftly sensationalized her injury and turned her into another victim of ‘honor violence’, who
had to be saved by the human and women rights activists and the insurgent Supreme Court,
which – after the restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry and the end of the Lawyers’ Movement –
had been constantly, and very vocally, taking suo moto notices on human rights and public
interest issues.3
This chapter mainly focuses on two famous cases of honor violence – Haleema Bhutto
and Mukhtar Mai’s – in order to examine how the courts are invited to intervene by the human
and women rights activists, the humanitarian language used and the cultural and legal
topography of the nation-state assembled through these legal interventions, made in the name
of the rule of law. Invoking ‘honor killing’ establishes an ethnic and regional legal geography –
created by defining violence exercised in the name of/justified by honor as a culturally
sanctioned form of violence – and forwards a liberal, normative understanding of the ‘victim
woman’.
On the other hand, litigants such as Haleema Bhutto and even Mai, question and subvert
the liberal, procedural notions of justice. Procedural justice failed Mai, as the suspects in her
rape case were freed by the high court judge because of inconsistencies in her statement as well
as in the evidence presented in the court. Recall that, in the missing persons cases, the Supreme
Court’s efforts to recover the disappeared persons, by using procedural hierarchy of the state (its
civilian bureaucracy), was stymied by the powerful intelligence services.4 But when Chief Justice
Chaudhry directly intervened, he was, sometimes, successful in tracing and freeing some of the
Many Pakistani critics also pointed towards the Muslim diasporas, which have increasingly
come under their host states as well as societies’ scrutiny for the violence committed towards
women in the name of honor as well. These perspectives are fueled by the assumption that the
societies that Muslim immigrants have come from “abide by hierarchical and strongly
patriarchal traditions” (Wikan 2004, 194), and so many of the European states, especially ones
that claim to be multicultural, question Muslim “patriarchal culture” and its accommodation
into their liberal polities (2004, 202). Researchers, journalists, and popular commentators on
Islamic countries and the Muslim diasporas in Western states seem to be equally perplexed and
disturbed over an unwritten code of honor that makes “parents kill their own children” (Pope
2012, ix). See also Ewing 2008.
4 See Chapter 7.
3
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disappeared persons. Therefore, the Chaudhry Court’s appeal partly lay in bypassing procedural
requirements of justice, whose structural violence, the “red tape” of the state, and humiliations
are faced by aam admi on a daily basis (Gupta 2012). Bhutto as well was humiliated by the
procedural and bureaucratic hierarchy that she faced. She waited for months for the Supreme
Court, specifically Chief Justice Chaudhry, to take notice of her ‘suffering’. She felt publicly
humiliated as well as humiliated those who postured and pretended to help her. Bhutto defied
cultural gender roles to attract the higher courts’ attention and to get her land back from her
husband and her own family.

Judicial Interventions, Tribal Councils, and the Rule of Law
Mukhtar Mai, Women Rights and Judicial Activism
On September 13, 2005, General Pervaiz Musharraf shocked his Western audience when
he dismissed rape victims in Pakistan as attention seekers, who claim to be raped, he alleged, so
they could migrate abroad on a humanitarian basis (Dawn 2005). Pakistani human rights and
civil society activists were incensed at the callousness expressed by the country’s president.
Musharraf’s comments were made in reference to the rape of Mukhtar Mai. Still under
adjudication then, Mukhtar Mai’s case had emerged a few years earlier and had captured the
attention of the local as well as international media. Four men from Mastoi tribe in
Muzaffargarh allegedly raped Mai, to settle a violation of their ‘honor’. The rape was apparently
sanctioned by the local panchayat (local, village council of notable and lineage/caste elders) to
take revenge for the actions of her brother, who had been seen, or was rather caught, with an
unmarried girl of the locally powerful Mastoi tribe. Mai belonged to the humbler Gujjar caste.
Around midnight on June 22, 2002, four Mastoi men dragged Mai to a room, close to where the
panchayat had assembled, and, for one hour, repeatedly raped her.
For the women and human rights activists, the Mukhtar Mai rape case symbolized the
patriarchal violence inherent in the tribal, village councils and they looked towards the higher

307

courts to counter this violence against women. Under Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry – and
especially after his restoration – the Pakistani Supreme Court had indeed started to project itself
as a guardian of the rights of Pakistanis and a protector of the rule of law against the ‘corrupt’
political practices and business deals of the political and financial elite of the country. Human
rights were a key part of the re-branding of the Supreme Court led by Chaudhry. In his address
at the inauguration of Human Rights Directorate at the Peshawar High Court, Chaudhry
stressed the relationship between justice, human rights, and security. Justice, Chaudhry told his
audience of lawyers and judges, is an “attribute of God”, and “being members of an Islamic
society, we have to give more importance to the administration of justice” (Chaudhry 2013, 3).
But this justice can only be achieved, he argued, “by providing protection of fundamental
[human] rights to the people as guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973” (ibid.). The
violation of rights was for Chaudhry the first step towards instability in the social and political
life of Pakistanis, and so he stated: “It has been observed that the powerful segments of the
society often deny the fundamental rights to the poor and weaker segment of the society which
results in the imbalance of power. The denial of these rights is denial of justice and is a tragedy
and creates a situation in society which results in unrest and then often leads to … violence”
(Chaudhry 2013, 7). Securing rights and imparting justice, Chaudhry suggested, “would solve all
of our problems and would ensure the rule of law” in the country (Chaudhry 2013, 4).
It was in the context of the Chaudhry Court’s judicial activism – the Court’s quick and
intrepid response to issues of ‘public interest’ (to do with fundamental rights) – that the women
and human rights activists appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge prevalent “barbaric” and
“uncivilized” tribal customs in the country, such as those of Wanni, Swara, Karo Kari, and
Sung Chatti. These customary practices are often invoked in matters of settling disputes in the
rural areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan in Pakistan. Local elders,
including politicians, parliamentarians, and even bureaucrats, sit in locally-organized
assemblies and resolve disputes. Although they cover a variety of conflicts and most of the
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resolutions entail an exchange of cash, cattle or kind, in matters of homicide or elopements,
resolutions are sometimes reached by marrying the women from opposing groups. The
mainstream media and self-proclaimed ‘liberal’ human rights activists often label these practices
as ‘tribal’, ‘backward’ and extra-legal. On the other hand, the supporters of jirgas and
panchayats invoke the historical continuity of these practices as a self-evident fact of their
effectiveness in dealing with local-level issues on a self-help basis. By calling these practices
‘traditional’, the local-level notables attempt to secure and protect their spheres of authority and
their cultural life from ‘modern’ encroachments of the state and law.
The human and women’s rights activists invite and celebrate, albeit skeptically, the
intervention of the higher judiciary in the ‘tribal’ life of those existing at the spatial margins of
the nation-state. Many of these activists have asked the higher courts to intervene against the
violations of gender rights in areas remote from the authority of the courts – in other words, in
regions unevenly developed across the nation-state (Hall 1986, 9).5 Shumaila Malik,6 a
prominent women’s and human rights activist, who was a regular protestor in the movement to
restore the Chief Justice, blamed “the persistence of honor killings mainly on feudalism,
tribalism and the continuing presence of elder councils, especially in rural Pakistan. The
councils allow the families to settle ‘honor killing’ cases among themselves so that there is no
legal punishment and the victim’s family is given monetary compensation instead” (Ullah 2015).
In her early 60s, Malik has worked with several human and women rights organizations
and is defiantly vocal on human rights issues, including the missing persons (which I have
discussed in the last chapter). After weeks of scheduling issues, we finally met in Islamabad in
Summer 2015. Malik identified both the exceptional events of the dismissal of the Chief Justice
Chaudhry, the imposition of Emergency by General Musharraf, as well as the everyday
violations of the rights of ordinary Pakistanis as a direct consequence of the non-enforcement of
5

In Chapter 2, on ashrafia in the Movement, I have discussed how the urban middle-class views
the unruly groups and what they aspire to achieve through the state.
6 Pseudonym.
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the Constitution. For Malik, the absence of the rule of law was expressed both in the humiliating
dismissal of the Chief Justice of the country as well as in the everyday violations of the rights of
women, in the name of honor. And as the Supreme Court, under Chaudhry, resurged as an
activist court, she recognized the Chief Justice as an “advocate and a champion” of the
oppressed in Pakistan, including the women who are ‘bartered’ by the tribal councils and
panchayats in their bloody feudal affairs. Speaking about Chaudhry’s populist judicial activism,
she claimed: “he became the voice of the oppressed, and he became a voice of the masses and
they loved it, but not the elites. And it’s the elites who have captured the state, the media, and
the intelligentsia”. In the urban, educated middle-class critique of the state, as I mentioned
before, the ‘traditional’ ruling political elite (of feudal landowners, industrialists and so on) was
often held responsible for the political and cultural demise of the nation-state . “The big
businessmen, the bureaucracy, and the corrupt politicians”, Malik claimed, detested the Chief
Justice, as he became a populist judge and openly criticized injustices committed by the political
and bureaucratic elite of country. These elites detested an activist judiciary, she argued, because
the judges stressed the constitutional rights and the rule of law against the excesses of the state
as well as the tribal, feudal, and industrial elites attached to it. The rule of law, she further
argued, “should be applicable to all, regardless of their political or state affiliations and their
state or non-state status”. Although Abdullah admitted that often Chief Justice Chaudhry “went
for the optics”, rather than substance, of the cases that he heard, he nevertheless made possible,
at least for some of the marginalized Pakistanis, “the application and dispensation of justice in a
concrete way”.
Shumaila Malik and other activists have remained vocal against the alleged honor
killings in Pakistan, inviting the higher courts to intervene to secure women and punish those
responsible for violence against them. Fozia Habib,7 also a regular protestor in the Lawyers’
Movement, is a women’s rights activist and a professor in a public university in Islamabad. She
7
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was part of the inquiry commission set up by the Supreme Court in the famous Kohistan honor
killing case in June 2012. In Kohistan,8 it was alleged that five young girls were sentenced to
death by a local jirga, when a mobile video clip, in which they were seen clapping for four young
men (during a wedding ceremony), was leaked. Habib, however, was disappointed with the
Chief Justice’s stance on human and women’s rights in general and in the Kohistan case in
particular. She explained:
I was part of the inquiry committee [on the Kohistan girls case] and went to
Kohistan. I came back and was not convinced that these were the same women; I sent
my dissenting note to the Supreme Court that the women we met in Kohistan were not
the same women, and so I asked for further investigation and experts to be involved. But
the Chief Justice closed the case. However, other investigations were done and more
evidence was collected. So, I put all this new evidence before the Court and asked the
Chief Justice to open up the case again. But when I filed another appeal, he dismissed it.
Habib was dismayed by the Supreme Court’s fleeting attention to cases of honor killings. She
claimed that the Court took notice on these cases only because of the “hype in the media” about
them and then moved on to other “sensational cases”. Although these activists appeal to the
higher judiciary to intervene in the social and cultural life of Pakistanis, many remain wary of
the “conservative and right-wing credentials” of the same judiciary.
In Mukhtar Mai’s case, the Supreme Court did take suo moto notice, and once it did so,
the local police and district officers moved quickly to act against the suspects. All twelve were
arrested and tried in an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC). Four were given death sentences, while the
rest were acquitted. But as the case made its way through the judicial system – trial court (ATC),
High Court, and then the Supreme Court – it turned into a site of larger contention over how
rape cases were being dealt within the Pakistani judicial system.
One of the main points of contention emerged over the moral position and/or the
testimony of the rape victim against the procedural demands of justice, and which ultimately
weighed more in deciding the truth of the event. The veracity of the rape victim, Mukhtar Mai,
Kohistan valley is located in the north-western part of Pakistan and parts of it are inaccessible
by land routes.
8
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came under doubt, because of the inconsistencies in her statement. Due to these contradictions,
the court assumed that her rape allegations were a result of local rivalries and women, like Mai,
were used to exercise leverage in disputes against one’s rivals. Given benefit of doubt, all except
one suspect were acquitted by the Lahore High Court, and the appeal against its judgement was
rejected by the three-member bench of the Supreme Court, with one judge dissenting. Filed in
June 2002 in the ATC, the case and the final appeal against the sentences were finally decided
by the Supreme court in April 2011, nine years after the alleged rape had occurred.

Mukhtar Mai: Procedural Violence and Gendered Justice
On the night of June 22, 2002, Mukhtar Mai writes in her biography, In the Name of
Honor (2006), she was asked by her father and uncle to appear before the Mastoi panchayat.
The panchayat had assembled near the house of the main suspect, Abdul Khaliq, who had locked
up her brother, Shakur, in his compound. Earlier in the day, Shakur had been caught with
Khaliq’s sister, Salma, at the edge of the Mastoi family farm. He was beaten up and brought to
Khaliq’s house. Mastois were enraged over the dishonor dealt to their name by Shakur. They
craved revenge, Mai says. After mediation between Gujjars, Mai’s caste, and Mastois broke
down, a suggestion was put forward to ask a woman from the Gujjars’ side to appear before
Mastois and beg for forgiveness – a Baluch custom geared to morally induce powerful rivals in
such a deadlock. Mai picked up a Quran, she says, and head toward the Mastois. Around
midnight, Mai was standing before the panchayat. She recited some verses from Quran and then
stood silent before this assembly of “brutes” who now stared at her “contemptuously” (Mai
2006, 7).
Before Mai’s arrival, the village mullah, Abdul Razzaq, had stormed out of the panchayat.
His watta satta (exchange marriages) proposal, that Salma be wed to Shakur and a woman from
Gujjars to Razzaq, had been turned down by Mastois. The reciprocal form of marital exchange is
often resorted to resolve disputes, which have the potential to lead to (further) violence and
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often involve whole castes and/or clans (Shah 2017). Mastois had rejected Razzaq’s solution,
Mai claims, because they had already decided to settle this dispute not by exchanging women,
but rather by returning the insult that Shakur had inflicted on them. They wanted “honor
justice” (Mai 2006, 9), Mai claims, and so soon Khaliq stepped forward and held Mai by her
arm. Even though he was carrying a pistol and other Mastois rifles, Mai fearlessly pulled herself
away from Khaliq. Undeterred, Khaliq and three other men dragged Mai to a room (of the
stable), adjacent to his house, and raped her on the cold unpaved floor. After an hour, Mai was
shoved out of the room. Half naked, her shalwar (pants) and dupatta (a mini shawl) were
thrown at her. There she stood, Mai remembers, in front of the whole village. Her father
wrapped his shawl around her, and they stumbled painfully back home.
Shakur had been turned over to the police by then and was being held at the local police
station. The same night, Mai’s father went to the Mastoi chief, Faiz, and begged him to release
his son. Shakur was finally let go, after Faiz made a call and Mai’s father delivered the bribe to
the local police officials.
For the next 7-8 days, Mai hid at home, curled into herself with shame and despair.
Many times, she remembers, she contemplated killing herself. In the meantime, Razzaq, the
local mullah, publicly disclosed the whole incident in one of his sermons at the village mosque.
He was soon approached by a local journalist, and both came to see Mai’s father. The broken
man related the sad story to the journalist, who asked him to come to the police station and
lodge an FIR (First Investigation Report) against the Mastois. After some forceful persuasion,
the reluctant man agreed. The case was lodged and, soon after, Mai found herself in front of,
first, the police officials and then a magistrate to record her statement. Her story had made the
national as well as international headlines by then, and so the Musharraf government suddenly
found itself under public pressure to act against the rapists. All the four accused rapists, along
with eight Mastoi members of the panchayat, were arrested and tried in the ATC (Anti-Terrorist
Court), which awarded death sentences to the four accused and life imprisonment to the rest.
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However, the Lahore High Court set aside death and imprisonment sentences (except of
one suspect) awarded by the ATC, on the following grounds: the FIR (First Investigation Report)
was lodged several days after the incident; Mai’s testimony carried a number of contradictions
regarding the place, time and the event of the rape; the DNA tests were not carried out; and her
body didn’t show signs of trauma, which would prove, beyond doubt, that she was raped.
Although incompetence of the investigation and medical officers could be blamed for these
procedural negligence(s), it is, in fact, Mai who came under the shadow of judicial doubt, and in
the process, once de-victimized, lost the cover of truth assumed through the identity of a rape
victim. “The medical evidence”, the judgement stated:
did not corroborate the ocular account as [Prosecution Witness] PW.2 Dr.
Shahida Safdar, WMO [Women Medical Officer], did not clinically observe the
commission of rape with the complainant but she formulated her opinion keeping in
view the report of Chemical Examiner; that Mukhtar Mai (complainant) stated in her
evidence that she was laid rest on Kachcha [unpaved] floor and was allegedly subjected
to Zina-bil-Jabr [rape] by the four adult persons and it is in the evidence of the
complainant that she was dragged by Abdul Khaliq (convict) inside the room but it is
strange that WMO did not observe any scratch or bruise in the person of Mukhtar Mai
(complainant), or marks of violence on her private parts, which itself falsified the story of
commission of Zina; that Mukhtar Mai (complainant) was married 10 years ago and now
she was living without husband for the last seven years and there is no medical evidence
on record that whether any damage was occurred to the private parts of the complainant
… that there was complete silence uptil 29.06.2002 but subsequently there opens a
Pandora box and that speaks the volume of the innocence of the convicts. (LHC,
Crl.A.Nos.60-65, 2002)
In the appeal filed against the LHC’s judgement in the Supreme Court, Mai’s counsel, Atizaz
Ahsan (one of the leading figures of the Lawyers’ Movement),9 cited several precedents and
asked the Court to grant serious attention to Mai’s testimony. The Court however was reluctant
to lend exceptional status to Mai’s statement and was skeptical about its truth, because, first, the
medical evidence supporting her statement was absent and second, once placed in the context of
local- level rivalries (between Razzaq, the village mullah, the Gujjars and the Mastois), the Court
assumed, she might have been provoked to take revenge from the accused. The dissenting judge,
Justice Nasir-ul-Mulk, disagreed from the majority opinion, and contended that “the
9

See Chapters 1-4.
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fundamental and crucial testimony in any rape case is always that of the victim. Being the victim
of the crime, she is the most informed and credible witness of the incident” (SC, Crl.A. No.163
and S.M. Case No.5/2005, 70). On the question of corroboration of Mai’s testimony by the
medical evidence, Justice Mulk further argued:
When medically examined eight days after the incident, the doctor found healed bruises
on the complainant’s buttocks and back. The locale of the bruises indicates physical
struggle by the complainant and there healed condition coincide roughly with the timing
of the incident. Unlike most other cases of reported rape, the present one was not
committed in complete privacy and not for the satisfaction of the lust of the rapist. In the
presence and within the view of the members of Panchayat and the witnesses the
complainant was forcibly taken away by the accused to the house of Abdul Khaliq and
freed with clothes in her hand and body half naked. (SC, Crl.A. No.163 and S.M. Case
No.5/2005, 71)
The procedural demands of justice, which regarded Mai’s body as any other legal object to be
scrutinized for truth and her pain to be attested by the medical gaze, denied ‘justice’ to Mai.
After the Supreme Court delivered its decision, she responded: “I did not receive justice today. I
have left my fate in the hands of God. I want justice” (McCarthy 2011). She continued, “the
entire area knows that I was raped. The entire area provided witnesses ... and told the media.
Around 50 to 100 people were gathered there … Even one of the elders confessed to hearing me
cry and shout for them to stop. Why does the court not take all that into account?” (ibid.).
Ali Dayan Hasan of the Human Rights Watch Pakistan criticized the Supreme Court
decision too, stating that “Pakistan’s judiciary had been ushering in a new era of human-rights
advocacy. With this ruling … it took a step backward and essentially endorsed vigilante justice.
Village elders got together and thought it was a good idea that this dispute between these two
subtribes would be settled by handing this woman over. And the message the court sent was: It
doesn’t matter!” (ibid.) Criticizing the judicial protection lent to cultural excesses against
women, he alleged, “a male chauvinistic legal system continues to discriminate against Pakistani
women, and it was the Federal Shariat Court”, Hasan reminded us, which sought “to roll back
the 2006 Protection of Women Act on the grounds that it conflicts with ordinances that govern
such things as adultery and rape. The Shariah judges want to restore provisions that require
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women who have been raped to produce four witnesses, and to allow police to arrest a woman
on a charge of adultery based on the fact she filed a report of rape” (ibid.) Law (Hudood laws, in
particular) has remained a site of contention between the traditional ulema and Islamists and
the human and women rights activists. As I have discussed in previous chapters, the law and the
state have served as contested sites of cultural politics between various classes in Pakistan.10
For the human and women rights activists, this decision not only reflected on the
“conservative credentials” of the judiciary in Pakistan, but it also delivered legitimacy to tribal
forms of justice in the country. Fouzia Saeed, a women’s rights activist, stated, “Mukhtaran Mai
has had the courage to fight for so many years. This [verdict] shows that you can commit any
crime, even in front of 100 people, and get away with it … Every day something like this is
happening in Pakistan. Jirgas [village courts] are still doing this. The jirgas will be encouraged
by this verdict” (Shah 2011). After the rights activists had helped restore an activist judiciary
under Chief Justice Chaudhry, they looked towards the same to intervene against the ‘culturallysanctioned’ violence in the tribal zones of the nation-state. For these activists, Mukhtar Mai’s
rape case proved that the judiciary still needed to work towards enforcing the rule of law
amongst the unruly of the nation-state and to discipline those who challenged it.

Humanitarian Narrative on Honor Crimes: The Rule of Law and Uneven Legal
Development in Pakistan
In December 2005, in Court No.1 of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Chief Justice
Chaudhry started hearing a petition filed against honor killings in the country. The petitioner
was Samar Minallah, a well-known activist documentary maker, trained in Anthropology and
Development studies. Minallah (along with her sister-in-law and brother)11 would also be very
active in her support of the movement to restore the judiciary two years later. Minallah’s website
10

In the chapter on Islamists in the Movement (Chapter 6) and the ones on lawyers (Chapters 3
& 4), I discuss these contentions in detail.
11 See Chapter 1 & 2.
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described her “as a pioneer in using film and other innovative mediums of communication for
social change in Pakistan”, and that “her work focuses on a culturally sensitive approach to
development. Minallah has over 20 years of progressive experience in advocacy, women and
children’s causes, anthropological documentation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage,
social change, working in and with different media” (Minallah n.d.). Minallah pleaded to the
Supreme Court that the customs of wanni and swara denied “fundamental rights to women,
one of the most significant segment of the society” (C.P No.16/2004, 1). The petition referred to
a specific incident, in which three young girls were to be wed into the family in feud with theirs
and so the Court was urged to take immediate action and to extend protection to those girls.
Chief Justice Chaudhry ordered the Inspector Generals of Police of Punjab and KPK provinces to
provide state protection to any such girl who was in the danger of being given over in marriage
due to these customs.
Like many human and women rights activists, Minallah was deeply critical of honorrelated “cultural” practices and declared them a “culturally sanctioned form of violence”
(Minallah 2006). In her paper, presented at the Judicial Conference in 2006, titled “Justice as a
Catalyst for Social Change”, she commended the current judiciary because “it is only recently
that the role of the traditional parallel judicial system called jirgas or panchayats that
facilitate injustice in the garb of ‘peace’ has been questioned in the Honorable Supreme Court
of Pakistan” (2006, 1). Minallah invited the judiciary to raise its voice for the “rights of the weak
and the powerless”, amongst whom can be counted the majority of the women, who are “not
aware of their inherent human rights in rural as well as urban areas” (2006, 1).
As Minallah rooted parallel judicial practices and their traditional legitimacy in local
cultures, she invited the judiciary to fill in the gaps left by the unevenness of legal development
(because of which these practices still exist) across the nation-state: “The very fact that the
formal legal system is not applied in all areas of Pakistan perpetuates lack of accessibility to
justice and human rights violations in general”, and, therefore, “the judicial activism in the case
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of swara and vanni has in the true sense been a catalyst for social change” (2006, 2,9). The local
adjudication and conflict-resolution systems and those who maintain them – the tribal,
community leaders or local elders – some of whom are also local political representatives, are
held responsible for the unevenness by keeping the state and its judicial apparatus away from
the local cultural and social life.
In her address to the Conference, Minallah referenced a number of cases of swara and
vanni from Mianwali, Kashmore, rural Baluchistan, Thatta, Mardan, Sukkur, Meerwala, Swabi,
Bhakkar, Shikarpur, and Buner. While Bhakkar, Mianwali, and Meerwala are located in Central
and Southern Punjab, the rest lie deep in the provinces of KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Sind
and are often represented as still under strong influence of tribal and traditional, customary
laws and local customs. These areas are often represented in the media as historically and
culturally patriarchal, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘backward’, and dominated by tribal, feudal, and other
forms of non-state, non-modern, local systems of governance, based on patronage and
‘exploitation’. For example, the (afore mentioned) honor killing case from Kohistan, reported in
Pakistani media in 2012, was framed as a result of “centuries old traditions” (The Express
Tribune 2016), while a case reported from “tribal” Baluchistan was formulated as: “Three
teenage girls have been buried alive by their tribe in a remote part of Pakistan to punish them
for attempting to choose their own husbands, in an ‘honor’ killing case. After news of the deaths
emerged, male politicians from their province, Baluchistan, defended the killings in parliament,
claiming the practice was part of ‘our tribal custom’” (Shah 2008). The invoking of ‘tradition’ to
justify the violence against women is sometimes made in response to allegations of honor
violence. As I mentioned above, often through this claim, the local influentials, and even larger
communities, attempt to secure their sphere of influence from the state and its law. The higher
courts have regarded these claims as unconstitutional and unlawful.
A report prepared for Shirkat Gah, a women rights and advocacy organization, went
even further by arguing to trace the historical roots of honor killing to the areas of Khyber

318

Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and the Baluch tribal belt in Sind Province. Rabia Ali, the report’s
author, claimed the present bloody manifestation of violence against women in the urban areas
of Pakistan as a patriarchal export from the tribal depths of the country (Ali 2001, 17). She
argued:
The origins of honor killings in this country can be traced to the pre-Islamic, tribal
culture of Baluchistan and the northwest frontier. Migrating tribes from Baluchistan
carried their tribal code across the border into upper Sindh and southern Punjab where
the practice of honor killing, rooted in ancient custom, continues to this day. While in
Punjab, the practice was limited to the relatively small region of Baluch settlement –
such as the districts of Rahimyar Khan, Rajanpur, and Dear Ghazi Khan among the
derogate – along the Baluchistan border, honor killings became an integral element in
Sindh’s feudal social structure, with many Sindhi clans today tracing their lineage to
Baluch tribes. Thus, in Sindh, where the area of Baluch settlement was much larger,
honor killings commonly occur in an arc stretching along the border with Baluchistan
that includes districts such as Larkana, Jacobabad, Shikarpur, Sukkhur, Dadu and
Badin. According to Nafisa Shah, a scholar who has written extensively on the subject,
“such killings, encoded in the ancient custom of karo kari in Sindh, siyahkari in
Baluchistan, kala kali in southern Punjab and tor tora in the NWFP have been occurring
for centuries” (Shah 98:227-252; Shah 93). Infused with the meaning of ‘blackness’, the
terms express the social stigma attached to the act of adultery as well as to the persons
deemed guilty of it. Death was, as it is today, usually the only way to erase the stigma …
It is hardly surprising, then, that the practice of honor killing not only survives but has
also spread from its original ‘theatre’ in the tribal and feudal hinterlands to the more
urban terrain of modern Pakistan. (Ali 2001, 17)
Such legal topography, sketched, from the center of the state, by the media and rights
activists, assumes that the patriarchal violence against women exists because of the absence of
the rule of law. The framing of the tribal zone and its archaic customs and practices as culturally
and politically distant, but most importantly, exceptional, was in fact a result of the
administrative and military planning of the colonial administrators of the British India Empire.
The historians of the North-West Frontier credit Lord Curzon (Viceroy of India 1899-1905) for
devising the three-tier policy of the colonial frontier (Bangash 2016). The tribal regions in the
North-West and East were given the “autonomous” status and administered through indirect
rule; the “semi-autonomous” ones had minimal administrative supervision; while the modern
systems of governance, property and law were established in the settled areas of the Empire
only. In his three-fold frontier system, “the frontier ‘periphery’”, for Curzon, “had an importance

319

of its own in shaping the values and political imagination of the ‘center’ of the British Empire”
(Xu 2016, 3). Through extensive ethnographic as well as geographic surveillance and mapping,
the North-West Frontier was created as a “Frontier Tribal area – an epistemological project
which identified the region as socially, politically and geographically distinct within British
India” (2016,16).
The tribes of the frontier region were portrayed as ungovernable, unruly, and “outside
the realm of politics”, governed by their own codes of honor and violence (Xu 2016, 26). The
‘lawlessness’ of the tribal areas justified military assaults on them, often carried out to enforce
the rule of law: these campaigns were always conducted to “enforce a treaty or deliver a
sentence” (2016, 28). Such management of frontier and administrative division continued into
the postcolonial period under the independent nation-state of Pakistan. However, these regions
have increasingly come under national gaze (from the Center) and scrutiny (of the rights
activists) for their ‘inherent violence’ and lawlessness, expressed in feuding and its ‘arbitrary’
settlement, within which women are regularly tied to and exchanged in the name of honor.
The moral outcry over ‘honor killings’ and ‘compensation marriages’ (to settle feuds) is
not entirely a novel call to govern the unruly peripherals in Pakistan. However, the advent of 24hours news channels and coverage (which started in the last 12-15 years) has opened new spaces
for debate, contestation, and intervention to discipline these practices. As Chief Justice
Chaudhry led an activist judiciary in the Supreme Court, many human and women rights
activists looked towards the higher courts to intervene; they considered the state to have failed
to implement the rule of law against tribal customs that infringe upon human, especially,
women’s rights in the spaces hidden from the state’s reach.
Samar Minallah’s petition against honor violence in the Supreme Court reignited public
debate on the issue of women’s rights vis-à-vis the tribal customs and scrutinized incidents that
were increasingly being reported in the media in which panchayats and jirgas were accused of
arranging the marriage of minors to settle disputes. Soon the Supreme Court itself was taking
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suo moto notices on these news reports. Many activists continue to see these interventions into
the archaic tribal customs to be necessary to extend the rule of law to the remote, dark zones of
the nation-state, where it could be exercised to bring those who have lagged behind within the
fold of the nation-state and modernity thereon.
The absence of the rule of law and the existence of uneven legal development are thus
tied in the rights activists’ imagination of the state to its political, legal and ethnic peripheries.
Shumaila Malik, the firebrand rights activist, forcefully argued that “the rule of law and the
Constitution are the fundamental bedrock of the Pakistani state and society. They are the
grundnorm of existence of the state of Pakistan.” More importantly, for her, they are “the
anchors that mold us, all Pakistanis, to the state”, and they do so, because the Constitution, she
further argued, is a unanimous document that guarantees the rights for all Pakistanis (emphasis
added). According to such views, the absence of the rule of law, especially those of the women,
are indicative of the spatial as well as cultural and political distance that these tribal regions and
their cultures have maintained from the core of the Pakistani state.
The critique of the local systems of authority is often tied to the debilitated and ‘corrupt’
political ruling elite as most of the landowners, tribal chiefs and pirs (spiritual heirs and
descendants of sufi orders and shrines) who lead these councils are active in local and national
politics as well. In a report prepared on honor killings by Aurat Foundation, a well-known
women’s rights and advocacy organization, lawyer and activist Maliha Ali critiqued the sway
these local powerholders exercise over local adjudication sites. She argued that these local
political figures are most “powerful within the community, and therefore hold the clout to deal
with community issues. They act as judges and decide issues facing the community” (Ali 2011,
65). These men have their own interests in keeping these councils active and intervening, she
claimed. “The decision takes place at the home of the landowner”, she explained, and, “it is now
reported to have almost become a business, where the landlord takes a commission for his
personal expenditure and reserves the right to sell off the woman or keep her at his house. Or he
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decides that a large amount of money has to be paid by the offending party as khoon baha (blood
money), or that a girl (chatti) has to be given as badal/aiwaz (compensation). These feudal
landlords and tribal chiefs are active in some way or another in the commission or covering up
of honor killings and crimes” (2011, 66). The men who lead jirgas, Ali argued, “are also sitting in
the legislatures and they actively oppose the passing of any pro-women legislation. It was due to
their pressure that the 2004 law remains flawed and the application of the Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance was not revoked” (2011, 66). The relationship argued here between the corrupt ruling
elite, infirm state laws to protect women, the prevalence of violence against women, and the
tribal councils, jirgas and panchayats, is important to note, because, according to the arguments
of rights activists, the corrupt ruling politicians, the lawmakers, and the local political, spiritual
and cultural patrons of these uneven gender relations are the same figures.
The cultural critique of the tribal zone and its exceptions is thus tied to the political one:
the landed political and feudal figures are framed as the same ruling elite which protects a
corrupt political system (at the national level) as well as the tribal, caste-based systems (at the
local level). Both the critique of the tribal zone and its oppression of women and of the nepotism
and corruption of the political ruling elite converge in the discourse of the urban, middle,
educated class rights activists, who were an influential part of the Lawyers’ Movement.
The Lawyers’ Movement became the site on which both of these critiques were
formulated together; the movement also emerged as the site of convergence between the urban,
educated middle classes, who identified themselves on the political spectrum as ‘secularists’
(rights activists and civil society) with the modernist Islamists (Jamat-i-Islami). True to their
modernist assumptions, both (the Islamists as well as the liberals) imagined, desired and
appealed to the state to intervene into and govern these zones of religious and cultural
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backwardness and violence.12 Recall that Chief Justice Chaudhry’s populism rested upon
challenging both the traditional, ‘corrupt’ political elite, as well as their local claims to violence,
justice and sovereignty.
In her address to the Judicial Conference, Samar Minallah went on to argue that the
local jirgas protect the “interests of the powerful” only (2006, 2-3), and can’t provide justice or
act fairly towards the women because they lack due process. To support this critique of the local
sites of mediation and resolution, Minallah invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and argued that, according to the Declaration, “everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
competent national tribunals or violations of their human rights as granted to him/her by the
constitution or law” (2006, 3). The jirgas, she continued, “do not use established legal
procedures nor can they be referred to as competent national tribunals” (2006, 3, emphasis
added). Because the local tribal councils lack due process, assumed to be the bedrock of the rule
of law, Minallah and other human and women rights activists refuse to recognize them as
legitimate sites of delivering justice. However, as Mai’s case shows (and so would Haleema
Bhutto’s, discussed below), the ‘victims’ of honor and other forms of tribal violence wish to
bypass procedural justice and hierarchy, which they see as the biggest impediment to receiving
‘justice’. The state’s bureaucratic hierarchy and procedures often stymie efforts of those who
want to access the state from its peripheries or need the law’s help against the excesses of the
powerful.
The jirgas and tribal councils’ arbitrary exercise of power and lack of procedure and due
process – elements of liberal justice that give life to the idea of the rule of law – disturb liberal
sensibilities of the rights activists. These councils, and the men who lead them, also throw a
worrying challenge to the liberal conception of the state because of their own claims to
sovereignty. David Gilmartin argues that British colonial rule was challenged, as was that of the
12

I argue on the chapter on Islamist politics, that it was through the Hudood Laws (and
recently, Blasphemy laws) that the Islamists desired to curtail the peripheral cultural violence
and backwardness within the nation-state.
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Mughals before them, by competing genealogical, sufi ecclesial centers of rule, which often, but
not exclusively, existed at the margins of the imperial and then the colonial state. “For the
British, the ‘rule of law’ represented the institutional embodiment of a rationality standing
conceptually” above “politics and power, just as ‘divinely illuminated’ genealogy had provided
such a position for the Mughals” (Gilmartin 2017, 87). As I mentioned before, the rule of law
historically served to expand British power across Indian princely states, and eventually defined
the borders of the Empire through its opposites: the idioms of lawlessness, violence and excess.
The rule of law served to cement the British claim of exercising sovereignty against what
they alleged was the ‘arbitrary’ exercise of power (and claims to sovereignty) by the local rulers.
As it was claimed to be standing above power and politics and based on rational principles of
reason and procedure, the rule of law played a major role in colonial state-formation against
competing claims of sovereignty and rule (Klosky 2010, 148).
Minallah and other women rights activists question the local tribal, village councils and
argue that they lack legitimacy and can’t exercise sovereignty because they draw their “strength
from the local customs and practice”; therefore, these councils “can never prevail over the
Constitution or the law of the land” (Minallah 2006, 6-7). Minallah remains committed to
liberal notions of justice, based on state-centered sovereignty, and the higher judiciary to impart
it because it (the judiciary) is assumed not to be embedded (as was the British claim about the
supremacy of the rule of law) in the local social and political structures of kinship and patronage
and therefore can act as just and fair.
However, if on the one hand, Minallah and other rights activists remain deeply skeptical
of the local, non-state sites of adjudication – because, for them, these fail the test of liberal,
impartial justice that they imagine to be just for the women – on the other hand, they are
equally disturbed by the constraint that these councils put on women’s agency which the liberal
law and rights are supposed to set free. In the same address to the higher judiciary, Minallah
explains:
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‘Nikah’ (the marriage contract) is a social contract. Here consent based on free will is
mandatory. Moreover, if a girl herself is not willing to marry someone, then the nikah or
marriage will be considered ’void ab initio’. The key component of any marriage is
consent and willingness of the spouses. However, in such marriages, the marriage is
forced upon the woman, making it completely unacceptable. In essence, the 'Swara'
arrangement amounts to zina-bil-jabr [rape], and women forced to marry under this
custom need the protection of law. The said custom is in direct violation of section 6 of
Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The custom of swara is
violative of Article 9 of the Constitution. Right to life enshrined in the said article
guarantees right to marry with free consent … Under swara, the personal liberty of a
woman is restricted for the rest of her life against all norms of justice therefore
contravening Article 9 of the Constitution that guarantees the freedom of liberty.
(2006, 5-6)
This normative model of the woman, with ‘free will’, liberty, and choice, framed in its opposition
to the Other (of the backward and repressive cultures), denies the locally-situated socialeconomic context, within which the ‘victim’ woman, emerges as a historical subject,13 and more
importantly, assumes to speak for/represent the ‘marginalized women’. But how do those whom
these activists wish to save through the law, rights and courts, themselves imagine the state and
the law? I return to Haleema Bhutto’s story to reflect on these points about law, agency and
justice.

Haleema Bhutto: Land, Zillat and the Tamasha (Spectacle/Performance) of
Justice
On June 3rd, 2011, Haleema Bhutto attempted suicide in front of the Pakistani
Parliament by swallowing dozens of sleeping pills. Prior to her suicide attempt, Bhutto had been
on hunger strike. A few days after she recovered from her suicide attempt, Bhutto was called to
appear in the Supreme Court of Pakistan before Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. After a short
hearing, the Court ordered her husband and all the members of the jirga, which had declared

13

In other words, the normative understanding of free choice and freedom is complicated by
attention to the historical and particular social context, within which women’s resistance against
violence takes place; how it is informed by certain ideas and structures that are themselves
complicit in constraining their actions – but which are called for in resisting and punishing the
perpetrators of the same violence; and how, in the process, victims themselves are transformed
as legal subjects. See also Abu-Lughod 2013.
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her a kari (blackened by being dishonored) and passed a death sentence against her, to be
immediately arrested and her forty acres of land, occupied by her husband and cousins, to be
returned to her. Bhutto had been protesting for months and had an application pending in the
Supreme Court’s Human Rights Cell (filed months ago). If Bhutto had not publicly protested
and attempted a dramatic suicide, her appeal would have remained lost in the bureaucratic and
procedural hierarchy of the state. Mai’s case, after all, had taken almost nine years to reach the
Supreme Court.
Bhutto belonged to a remote village of District Ghotki, located in Sindh Province.14
Bhutto had fled her village, after she was declared karo kari by a local jirga in 2010. Bhutto,
who had seldom travelled outside of her social radius (limited to kinship networks and a few
close villages) before, eventually reached Islamabad, and after protesting for fifteen months, the
Supreme Court finally took suo moto notice, when Bhutto, humiliated and desperate, attempted
to end her life in public.
Haleema Bhutto didn’t allow her cousin to speak for and tell her story, when I met her
outside the Islamabad Press Club. In her late twenties, confident and defiant, Bhutto wore an
old suit of shalwar kameez (See Figure 16). The Club has become a site of protest for those who
want to address the state or attract its attention for the wrongs done against them. Men and
women from all over Pakistan put their grievances, against the state, its bureaucracy or local
influentials, on display outside the Press Club, hoping to be noticed by the state officials and/or
its higher judiciary. Bhutto spent fifteen months protesting outside this Club, before the
Supreme Court finally took notice of her suffering and delivered her land back to her in a
hearing that lasted only twenty-five minutes.
Bhutto was twelve when she was married to her cousin, Shakeel. Although she doesn’t
specify the circumstances, she spent the next sixteen years living with her parents. In early 2010,
her husband declared her a kari and demanded a jirga to be held. Bhutto claims that the jirga,
14

I met Bhutto in Summer 2014 in the capital, Islamabad.
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with the support of the local member of the National Assembly, pronounced her a kari too and
sentenced her to death. For the next few days, Bhutto hid in her home. Fearing for her life, she
soon fled her village. She explains, “my husband and the jirga people were planning to attack
my house during the night to kill me. And so I secretly left at 5:00 in the morning, in darkness. I
came here to Islamabad and sat here under this tree [outside the Press Club] on the footpath,
because there was no other way to save my life”. Before reaching Islamabad, Bhutto went to the
local police, which refused to help her, because, according to her, they were not willing to
support a farmer woman against a powerful politician.
Bhutto’s forty acres of land had been encroached upon by her husband and her cousins,
and it was because of her unrelenting claim to the land, rather than her or her husband’s honor,
that she had been turned into a kari. Her husband and cousins wanted to secure their claim on
her land by eliminating her. He first threatened her to transfer her ancestral land to him; but
when she refused, he conspired with the other family members, and with the backing of the local
MNA (Member of National Assembly), accused her of karo kari. After being denied help by the
local police, district officers and even a senior state official in Karachi, Bhutto fled to Islamabad,
hoping that she would have quick and easy access to justice. Bhutto had followed the rumors of
justice and rights (Eckert 2012, 147). However, she was soon lost in the bureaucratic and
procedural labyrinth of the Pakistani state.
Bhutto’s tortuous journey to the Supreme Court took fifteen months, at the end of which
she was dazzled by the spectacular display of power by the men sitting on the highest pedestal of
justice in the country – whom it took merely twenty-five minutes to award her land and life back
to her. On this journey, Bhutto was met by women and human rights activists, NGOs, women
politicians, ‘concerned’ citizens, and bureaucrats. “What people see at the end”, she angrily
declared to me, “is the result and not the zillat which I endured for months. Me zaleel ho gai
sarkon pe apni zameen wapis lene ke liye [to get my land back, I had to undergo public
humiliation]”.
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After a month of protest in Islamabad – and as the media sensationally started coloring
her story as an escape from honor killing – the local rights NGOs approached Haleema Bhutto.
The Aurat Foundation directed her to the Human Rights Ministry, from where she was sent to
the Supreme Court and its Human Rights Cell. After submitting her application to the Cell,
which receives thousands of petitions every year (Siddiqi 2014), Bhutto returned to her protest,
outside the Press Club, waiting to hear from the Supreme Court.
At the Human Rights Ministry, Bhutto had met Professor Farkhanda, who would later
join the Aurat Foundation. Farkhanda was the Director at the Ministry then. Before she moved
to Islamabad, Farkhanda had also protested to restore Chaudhry. In Quetta, which was Chief
Justice Chaudhry’s home town as well, her lawyer husband and she herself had taken part in
protests and marches. For Farkhanda, Haleema Bhutto’s story exemplified how ordinary,
desperate Pakistanis appealed for justice against the repressive, corrupt police and traditional
tribal and feudal systems. She proudly stated that it was she who had sent Bhutto to the
Supreme Court’s Human Rights Cell. However, Bhutto had to plead in front of all those
(political, judicial and civil society figures) who she imagined had the authority or could exercise
influence in returning her land back to her. Even Farkhanda admitted that she contacted the
local police and district administration several times to help Bhutto, but they ignored her too.
Frustrated with the ‘corrupt’ state bureaucracy, Farkhanda said, she wrote an application for
Bhutto and asked her to submit it to the Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court. After she did
so, Bhutto waited for a response, but none came.
In the meantime, politicians, members of Parliament, both men and women, regularly
showed up at Bhutto’s protest outside the Press Club and assured her of their support. Women
parliamentarians from her home province, Sind, often appeared at Bhutto’s protest to express
solidarity. Chief Minister Sindh’s advisor, Sharmila Farooqui, met Bhutto on May 27 th, 2010,
followed by an MNA, Marvi Memon, from the ruling party PML-N on May 27th. However,
Bhutto was extremely bitter about these political figures who, she angrily recalled, added to her
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zillat by making a “tamasha” (public spectacle) of her suffering. She remembered, “they were all
liars and fraudiyas [frauds] – the politicians and civil society activists used to come to me and
they would give me false assurances, but none did anything for me”. Bhutto continued:
I felt zaleel [humiliated] because it felt as if I had become a tamasha [public spectacle of
entertainment] for everyone. All of those ministers and activists would just pass
statements against honor crimes on my behalf; on my expense, they promoted
themselves to show how humane they were. But nothing changed for me. My husband,
the local landlord, and MNA even took away the harvest from my land and these
politicians didn’t help me … Even women parliamentarians would visit me and discuss
me in the media, but to no vail. Nothing would change for me. I don’t trust anyone
anymore. It was only the Supreme Court that gave me umeed [hope] and insaaf
[justice)].
Bhutto had to cross many sociocultural boundaries (of her home, village, and kinship), break
cultural codes and, ultimately, had to become a tamasha – spectacle of a suffering victim – to
see justice, which, for her, meant the return of her land, her property and the arrest of those
men, the jirga members, who had declared her kari and condemned her to death. She had to
perform her suffering as an exile and to become a ‘real’ victim of an honor crime for the media,
the women and human rights activists, their NGOs, and even for the compassionate Supreme
Court. She mischievously, albeit proudly, admitted to me, “I will do the drama again, if I need to,
to get insaaf (justice)”. Recall that Amina Janjua also had to breach gender codes of protest and
pain to lead the protesting families of the missing persons. Public display of pain and
humiliation morally induced the higher courts to take action.
Bhutto remained equally distrustful of women and human rights activists. In fact, during
her protest, she accused the Aurat Foundation of collecting funds on her behalf and of defrauding her. She alleged that a coordinator from the Foundation had been collecting funds in
her name, without transferring any to her. Bhutto was therefore deeply skeptical, both of the
state, which had stood against her and refused to act against those who wanted to punish her, as
well as of those human and women rights activists who claimed to fill in the gap left by the
state’s silence and passivity.
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After Bhutto attempted suicide, leading feminists, rights activists and lawyers offered to
send her abroad on humanitarian grounds, but she refused. She was adamant that her issue be
resolved and her land returned to her. The Speaker of the Parliament even offered to send
Bhutto to a women’s shelter for protection, but she refused, again. “I told them”, she said to me,
“that I will fight these people here [my husband and those who supported him], and the riyasat
[state] needs to protect me”.
Finally, on June 29th 2011, Bhutto was called to the Court. No. 1 of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. Chief Justice Chaudhry ordered that her land be given back to her and she be provided
police protection. The supreme court also ordered the local Civil Judge to ensure safety of
Haleema Bhutto and her family. Years later, the Judge still checks up on Bhutto every few
weeks. Bhutto triumphantly recalled: “I appeared only for 25 minutes in the Supreme Court and
my land, which no politician, not even the Prime Minister of Pakistan, could get back for me,
was given back to me there”. This spectacular performance of justice left a deep mark on Bhutto
as it transformed her ideas of justice, ‘the state’ and judicial power; that is, this experience of
judicial power redefined what the state meant for her, what forms of appeal to be formulated
and how to effectively demand from the state.
It is important to recall here that the Chaudhry Court had become extremely popular,
because of how the Chief Justice reined in, often disparagingly, the arrogant and distant
bureaucracy of the country. The aam admi amused in the juissance derived from the populist
transgressions of the Chaudhry Court. The Chief Justice, more importantly, often bypassed
procedural hierarchy and bureaucratic red tape. His actions as a ‘sovereign’, who defines and
decides exceptional actions (Schmitt 2006 [1922] and 1996 [1929]), fed his populist image. Aam
admi experiences, or at least witnesses, the humiliations of the everyday at the hands of the
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state’s police and civilian bureaucracy. These higher representatives of the state were regularly
disparaged, and sternly admonished on their lethargy and ignorance, in Chaudhry’s court.15
After the Supreme Court ruled in Bhutto’s favor, the local bureaucrats and police officers,
on Chaudhry’s directions, appeared the very next day at her land. Bhutto, was, in fact, driven in
a police van to her village. “The police and magistrate came to my land on a holiday”, Bhutto
remembered; “on a holiday!”, she exclaimed. The local police and district bureaucracy represent
the state at the local level, yield excessive sway over local affairs in their districts and are always
almost inaccessible for peasants and farmers like Bhutto. The politics of common sense, as I
discussed before, is defined by how it facilitates access to the powerful bureaucracy of the state.
Their hurried appearance to demarcate her land legitimized Bhutto’s belief in the power of the
Supreme Court to discipline the state and deliver insaaf (justice) to her. “To deal with the
corrupt politicians is to waste time; they can’t get anything from the riyasat”, Bhutto realized,
and “to solve our problems”, she arrived at the conclusion, “we just need to speak to the courts
and bureaucrats” (emphasis added). Bhutto thus (re)locates state power in its judiciary and
bureaucracy, both of which are often indifferent, if not complicit, in violence against peasants,
farmers and the marginalized people at the peripheries (as well as at the core) of the state.
Anthropologist Julia Eckert has argued that, in their encounter with the law, not only do
actors reinterpret legal norms, but they are themselves transformed in the process (2012, 3). In
other words, law transforms those who use law “against the state” (2012, 1). So, on the one hand,
Bhutto, a farmer woman from the margins of the state, is turned into a legal subject, as the
Court mercifully acts on her call; on the other hand, she learns whom to perform for and how to
resist the patriarchal and landed interests by using the same agents of the state who are
themselves complicit in failing to protect women like her.

15

See Chapter 1, on how the judges made the bureaucrats accountable under Chaudhry,
especially the month before his suspicion by General Musharraf.
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By securing Haleema Bhutto’s property rights, the Supreme Court had reestablished the
suspect and uneven relationship between claimants such as Bhutto and the state. On the one
hand, by mediating between the state and the claimants, the court projects itself as a neutral
arbitrator, and by doing so, extends its hegemony, in the name of the rule of law, to the margins
of the state. It does so by securing constitutional rights to property as well as life and hones legal
subjects even in the ‘dark zones’ of the nation-state, where the violence against women and ‘the
marginalized’ is assumed to prevail. The uneven legal development in the nation-state is thus
addressed by encountering honor killings, which are then construed as a result of the absence of
the rule of law in these zones. On the other hand, the same state and its agents, who were
complicit in violence against Bhutto and implicated in her exile, are sent to secure her land,
thereby recasting her relationship with the state.

Conclusion
In 2014, three years after Haleema Bhutto’s safe return to her village, she had to once
again call upon the Supreme Court for help. During the two years that Bhutto had been away,
fighting for her life and land, a local member of the parliament had started building a sugar mill
next to Bhutto’s fields. By 2014, the mill had started production, and soon Bhutto found its toxic
waste poisoning her crops. Resolute to save her land again, Bhutto resisted the owner’s political
influence and submitted complaint against the mill to the local administration and environment
ministry, and, once again, found herself caught in the bureaucratic labyrinth of the Pakistani
state (Hull 2012). Her file circulated between the Supreme Court, the offices of the district
management and the Environment and Revenue Ministries and then back to the Supreme
Court. With Chaudhry’s departure and judicial activism on the wane, Bhutto was directed,
rather indifferently, by the Court to adhere to the proper bureaucratic procedures. This time, she
was treated as a common claimant and asked to follow the procedural hierarchy. However,
Bhutto was confident that it would be the Supreme Court that will, once again, protect her land
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and deliver justice. She had learned the repertoire of protest and suffering and was patiently
entrenching her moral position against the political power of a wealthy and influential
politician.
To date, the Mukhtar Mai case continues in the Supreme Court, which recently allowed a
review of its prior decision in the case: the Court had turned down Mai’s appeal to uphold the
sentences given by the lower courts in its previous proceedings. To open the case for review was
an unprecedented move by the Supreme Court, and activists and lawyers have welcomed it.
Bhutto and Mai’s cases question the normative belief of the lawyers and rights activists
in the efficacy of due process and procedural justice, which lie at the core of the liberal triumph
of the rule of law against ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘despotism’. The uneven legal development and its
mapping onto the topography of the nation-state – in the cases of both honor killings and the
missing persons (last chapter) – show the limits of the appeal of the Lawyers’ Movement and the
ideological reach of the notion of the rule of law. For the civil society and women’s rights
activists, the Mukhtar Mai case exemplified the absence of the rule of law and the fundamental
constitutional rights in the tribal margins of the state, and this unevenness, these activists
assumed, yielded space to the violence inherent in cultural and tribal customs prevalent in these
areas. The activists and lawyers (as I argued in Chapter 2, on the Ashrafia class) invoked the
rule of law to hold the state accountable in the cases of honor violence. However, once the courts
acted on their call, the activists became disenchanted and (are now) skeptical of the “traditional,
patriarchal and conservative judges”, most of whom are perceived to have sympathy for the
‘backward and repressive’ cultural, religious and tribal practices within the nation-state.16 On
the other hand, Haleema Bhutto and the missing persons’ struggles show that ‘the
marginalized’, from these ‘unruly’ peripheries, can indeed speak of and demand their rights, by

16

Activists cite courts’ rulings in blasphemy cases as another proof of judiciary’s conservative
approach to state-society relations in Pakistan.
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performing for and demanding justice and bypassing the procedural hierarchy and red tape,
which denies them access to the state and cover from its violence.
For many, Chief Justice Chaudhry and the Lawyers’ Movement’s appeal lay in their
populist postures against the procedure and red tape that denied people access to the state and
induced them to engage in the politics of common sense rather than the politics of resistance or
against the state. The urban, educated middle-class and their allies celebrated the Lawyers’
Movement as a site from which the military state could be challenged in the name of the rule of
law and constitutional and human rights. For aam admi, holding the state and its bureaucracy
accountable was what the rule of law was intended to achieve.
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Figure 16. Haleema Bhutto, outside the Islamabad Press Club. Photograph by the author.
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Conclusion
Inside of the Lawyers’ Hegemony: A Successful Political Articulation
The success of the Lawyers’ Movement partly depended upon the rendering of the
restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry and the higher judiciary, as an ‘apolitical’ triumph of the
rule of law over the violence and arbitrariness of past and present military rule in the country.
The higher courts, prior to Chaudhry’s suspension, had become sites of governmental
intervention into the everyday social and cultural lives of Pakistanis; their judicial activism
against ‘the state’ helped the lawyers’ historic bloc to mobilize beyond their intermediate
middle-class allies.
However, the emergence of a dominant language of contention, or common sense
(Crehan 2016), is always the result of a hegemonic “political articulation” and for its success,
requires “a chain of equivalence” between different political demands and claims (Carpentier
and Cammaerts 2006, 4, 8). The injustices and degradations carried out by the military regime,
personified by General Musharraf and reflected in his humiliating removal of the Chief Justice
of the country, linked a variety of demands, desires and claims together. General Musharraf and
the military state became the unifying target – the “common adversary” – for various
intermediate classes (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, 8). The ‘non-partisan’ slogan of the rule
of law, raised against the military regime, brought disparate classes and groups together. The
courts’ disciplining of the state bureaucracy and its security apparatus, in order to make them
accountable for the welfare of its citizens, helped to popularize the appeal of the movement
across classes.
However, the hegemonic articulation of various demands in the language of the rule of
law, obfuscated the contradictions in the appeal and exercise of the rule of law, and the various
ways in which the rule of law tends to be simultaneously imagined: as a form of popular
empowerment and resistance as well as a mode of discipline and governance. The judicial

interventions and activism, and appeals of the rights activists, and of families in the missing
persons and honor killings cases, show how these contradictions are articulated, expressed and
experienced in the courts.

Frontier of the Hegemony: Uneasy Alliances, Political Emotions, and their
Management
The post-movement fragmentation of the lawyers and the disagreement between various
political and rights groups and activists, pointed to the state of political and cultural fission that
existed before the protests against the Chief Justice’s suspension and Musharraf’s Emergency
even began.
Pakistani lawyers had recaptured news headlines soon after Chief Justice Chaudhry’s
restoration and the end of the movement. For the past two years, the media as well as ordinary
Pakistanis had cheered the lawyers and their allies, as they took on the military state and its
security apparatus. However, the same supporters and spectators were now dismayed by the
lawyers’ unruliness as it was violently displayed towards the police and the lower judiciary in the
courts. These open confrontations with the state’s judicial and security apparatus, and the public
disruptions and disagreements (such as between the rights activists and the lawyers on
blasphemy laws), revealed unfulfilled dreams, unaddressed demands, unceasing ambitions and
uneasy alliances in the movement.
Even though the Lawyers’ Movement had become a successful bloc of sundry shades of
intermediate middle-classes, it continued to carry tension between the aspirations of the urban
educated middle-class, the political ambitions of the traditional and Islamist classes, and the
disenchantment of the ‘subordinated’ classes and the petty lawyers, all hailing from within the
middle-classes and equally dismayed by the professional hierarchies and unequal distribution of
labor in the profession. Their emotional ‘unruly’ protests had, as I discussed before, disturbed
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political sensibilities of the educated ashrafia and the middle-class Islamists, both of whom had
intended, albeit differently, the modern state to discipline and govern the aam admi.
In liberal political theory, collective emotions and their expressions are disparaged and
considered irrational ‘outbursts’; they are deemed disruptive and dangerous: unpredictable for
political action and for mobilizing mass movements (Mazarella 2015; Lutz 1986; and Adorno
1982[1952]). However, attention to “emotional discourse” and “discourses on emotion” (Lutz
and Abu-Lughod 1990, 1), as I have attempted in this dissertation, illustrates the significant role
of these emotions and expressions in constituting historical memory, and formulating political
action across ideological and class divides. Their mobilization and management, therefore,
becomes a key site of contestation between the state and the civil society in modern polities.
After all, I have argued that it was humiliation (zillat) as a critical emotion, which
brought together Pakistanis from various classes and backgrounds – even though they all lacked
consensus on what the postcolonial state ought to be, and what the rule of law was meant to
achieve. Emotion connected the historical memory of humiliations to the humiliations of the
everyday – and moved people to protest. And it was the image of the Chief Justice – sitting
humbly in the presence of Generals, and days later, being publicly humiliated by Police officers
– which connected these event(s) of zillat to the structure of humiliations and their historical
memory. It was collective emotion, diffused across classes, which brought people together in the
movement, and connected them in political action. Further work on the politics of humiliation
in the new age of social and electronic media might show how witnessing and shaming may have
become new techniques of power and resistance.
The management of emotions, then, might be consequential in mobilizing protests
against the structures of state authority and power, in addition to producing liberal conceptions
of public order, democracy and politics. The rights activists and the higher courts’ intervention
in the ‘honor killings/violence’ cases, show how these cases have become a critical site of
disciplining the nation’s disrupting Other, and of addressing the uneven legal development
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across the state. Further research may illustrate how the management of emotions has become
central to the production of the ‘modern’ ordered nation-state, as imagined by the educated
middle-classes in their projects of political modernity (Shoshan 2016). The gendered governance
of the tribal margins, after all, helps extend the hegemony of liberal law – further consolidated
when the ‘victims’ of honor violence themselves appeal to the courts to seek rights and
protection from their own traditions and customs. These margins (and their Others) at the
frontier of law’s hegemony, then, appear to be unordered, unevenly developed zones, that are in
need of discipline, governance and intervention.

Outside of the Hegemony: Extension of Governmentality in South Asia?
My dissertation has suggested that the “judicialization of politics” (Comaroffs 2006, 26),
claim-making upon the state (Eckert et.al 2012), and the management of emotions and memory
(Blom 2008) have become central to the emergent neoliberal forms of mobilization and
governance in South Asia.
Even though I haven’t been able to discuss the Khwaja Saras Case in the dissertation,
the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case and the khwaja saras’ activism for rights reinforces these
suggestions as well. In a famous human rights case in 2009, the Chaudhry Court declared the
hijras1 “complete and respectable citizens” of the country and asked the NADRA (National
Database and Registration Authority) and the Social Welfare Department to register and
provide them state assistance. The hijra community and human rights activists welcomed the
Supreme Court’s decision. Thereafter, seminars and workshops, organized by various
government departments and newly-founded NGOs – some of them run by the gurus of the
khwaja saras, while others by the civil society activists and experts – started deliberating on
1

Hijra or Khwaja Sara as a designation has historically represented a variety of
transgender/feminine/third gender cultural roles in South Asia, for example, eunuchs and
transvestites. However, in recent times, hijras have come to be identified as those transgender
entertainers who usually perform at weddings and ceremonies and live in their own all-hijra
communities, led by their gurus.
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how to proceed on the directives of the Supreme Court. These deliberations, suggestions,
disagreements and (resulting) fragmentation of/in the hijra community continues.
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision in the Khwaja Saras case (and in a number of other
cases) indicates how liberal governmentality has taken over state-society relations in
postcolonial South Asia, and has given rise to various forms of demands from the state (Foucault
1978[2004]). Liberal governmentality itself has produced forms of popular protest and political
movements, claim-making and agitation against the state. All kinds of social and cultural
conflicts, political assertions and economic demands are now taking – as their agents make use
of – the form of liberal legality (the invoking of the rule of law and appealing to judiciary and
courts) in the postcolony (Comaroffs 2006, 22).
Global and local nongovernmental organizations, which have hegemonized the space of
civil society, popularize the discourses on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These
discourses have started to impact the “postcolonial consciousness” surrounding liberal legality –
detaching it from its colonial and ‘alien’ background – and its role in the postcolonies (2006,
26). As the judiciary and the courts become the arbiters of conflicts and claims, some argue,
lawfare (Weizman 2010, 13) takes the place of classfare (Comaroffs 2006). Neoliberal
restructuring of the state and fear of the cultural and political Others might explain recourse to
law and the courts: an effort to contain the perceived ‘disorder’. But, perhaps, these shifts are
also indicative of how dissatisfaction with the postcolonial state and democratic rule has given
rise to the politics against the state, by appealing to law and the courts.
We therefore need to pay closer attention to everyday engagements, imaginations and
negotiations with the state and the role of law in them. Rather than solely exercising coercion or
disciplining populations, how the law and courts have expanded their governance (in the name
of providing welfare and protection – from the state, one’s own culture or local traditional
structures of exploitation and authority) to include even those outside of law’s hegemony – such
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as the hijras – becomes an important element in explaining how governance is extended to the
state’s social, political and spatial peripheries in South Asia.
My dissertation has thus focused on these neoliberal forms of power and resistance from
the site of the Lawyers’ Movement and explored how the lawyers managed to mobilize political
emotions and historical memory, and successfully led a historical bloc of the intermediate
middle-classes against the military regime of General Musharraf. A wide range of identities,
interests and emotions turned the rule of law into a “repository of expectations” that went far
beyond the initial demand of restoring the Chief Justice and his defiant fellow judges (Cheema
and Gilani 2015, xxiv). The movement became a site of the neoliberal politics of the rule of law,
upon which the lawyers and activists successfully converged, and hegemonically mobilized
Pakistanis across classes, regions and sects. My dissertation has thus shown the appeal of liberal
law and rights’ discourses, as well as the practices invoked by them in South Asia, and the limits,
contradictions and potential of those languages and actions.
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